EU REFORM WILL AFFECT LATIN AMERICA AS WELL

By Joaquín Roy Reprint | | Print |

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MIAMI, Nov 9 2007 (IPS) - The current state of the European Union since approval of the Reform Treaty could affect integration processes in the rest of the world and especially in the Americas, writes Joaquin Roy, \’\’Jean Monnet\’\’ professor and Director of the European Union Centre of the University of Miami. In this analysis, the author writes that once again the European constitutional impasse has revived Latin America\’s sense that the true reason underlying the \’\’no\’\’ vote by France and Holland in 2005 was the fear of a \’\’loss\’\’ of sovereignty. This fear is deeply rooted in the Latin American imagination and has been identified as a threat to nationalist centralism. The need to focus on correcting the negative impact of the French and Dutch \’\’no\’\’ and the subsequent compromise of the Reform Treaty suggest that the EU\’s priorities in the future will be directed more inward than outward, and towards the strengthening of its natural limits. Those alarmed by the lack of interest in distant areas of the planet argue, therefore, that Latin America is a sure candidate for future cuts in Official Development Assistance, though current assistance levels have been approved and are locked in through 2014.

Over the years the EU has transformed itself if not into an indispensable model at least into an unavoidable reference point for processes of regional integration. Thus any change to the European experiment will have repercussions around the world — even when (as is happening in the Americas) the influence of Europe as an model to imitate is being explicitly rejected.

According to certain analysts, the Reform Treaty, laboriously approved in Lisbon on October 19, represents a distancing, albeit symbolic, from the supranational nature that had been the hallmark of the European process. The specific abandonment of any ”constitutional” reference and the suppression of explicit mention of the symbols of the Union reveal a shift towards an ”intergovernmental” logic.

This perception was reinforced by the near unanimous decision of EU member countries to ratify the new text through a parliamentary procedure rather than a referendum, which they sought to avoid. It would seem that the anti-supranational model has won some followers. Thus the EU sees itself as belonging to the large camp of international organisations that oppose a transition to federal forms.

In the inter-American arena, the defeat of the constitutional project reinforced the ambivalence towards integration and the emphasis on free trade as a panacea for economic development. The defunct Free-Trade Area of the Americas had been transformed into a series of individual negotiations between the US and either single countries (Colombia, Peru, Dominican Republic) or fragile sub-regional groups (Central America and the Caribbean). After the failure of European efforts at a political deepening of the union, the model of the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA) seems to be the only alternative.

Once again, the European constitutional impasse has revived Latin America’s sense that the true reason underlying the ”no” vote by France and Holland in their respective 2005 referenda was the fear of a ”loss” of sovereignty. This fear is deeply rooted in the Latin American imagination and has been identified as a threat to nationalist centralism, personified by the pivotal role played by the figure of president and the weakness of parliament. No leader would risk the dubious offer of supranationality based on shared sovereignty, a foreign concept to the popular mind.

Latin America does not accept the evidence that the process of European integration never involved a ”loss of sovereignty” or even a partial ”cession” but rather was a shared exercise that was jointly administered by independently-functioning institutions but that was subject to state decisions. Thus calls for a deepening of integration systems either fell on deaf ears or were buried under the inertia and vacuousness of plans and decisions taken in successive summits.

The idea frequently expressed by Latin American economic and political elites about the suitability of the European model was reinforced. Even if these groups are in principle disposed to recognise the good in the European experiment, when its actions are visibly positive and its period of difficulties has passed, populist and opportunist arguments will still be raised against it. Although the European approach is successful in the long run and there is a real point of reference, the forces that oppose any hint of supranationality that might threaten their national privileges assert that Latin American countries ”must develop their own model for integration”. The problem is that the generation of any such formulas will not occur once the bilateral free-trade agreements with the US are concluded.

On the other hand, the need to focus on correcting the negative impact of the French and Dutch ”no” and the subsequent compromise of the Reform Treaty suggest that the EU’s priorities in the future will be directed more inward than outward and towards a strengthening of its natural limits. Those alarmed by the lack of interest in distant areas of the planet argue, therefore, that Latin America is a sure candidate for future cuts in Official Development Assistance (ODA), although current assistance levels have been approved and are locked in through 2014. (END/COPYRIGHT IPS)