Tuesday, June 6, 2023
Mona Alami
The essence of the movement was an alliance of rival warlords and political factions. Many Lebanese were amazed by the sight of Walid Joumblat (leader of the Druze Progressive Socialist Party), Amin Gemayel (Christian Kataeb party), Samir Geagea (Christian Lebanese Forces), and Saad Hariri (son of Rafik Hariri and head of the Sunni Future movement) standing side by side.
A few months after the demonstration, and leading up to the 2005 elections, Joumblat, Hariri and Geagea struck a deal with Syrian allies, the Shia Amal and Hezbollah parties, sidestepping General Michel Aoun, head of the Christian party the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM). Aoun had then recently returned from exile.
The alliance between March 14 and Hezbollah and Amal did not last long. A major political crisis erupted as soon as the March 14 demand for an international tribunal to investigate the assassination of Hariri was brought up. The crisis, lasting nearly two years, began with a public sit-in protest in Beirut organised by the opposition March 8 movement – which included Hezbollah, Amal, the FPM and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP). It ended with week-long fighting between the two groups in May that resulted in 67 deaths. On May 21, peace was brokered by Qatar between the March 14 and March 8 movements, leading to formation of a unity government.
“March 14 has certainly made the most concessions, as witnessed in the government composition, where the opposition has been able to secure as many key ministries for its allies as March 14, which has parliamentary majority,” says Carlos Edde, head of National Block party. Edde has left March 14 but says he still adheres to its underlining principles.
Not everyone thinks it is operating very well. “The cohabitation between the state and Hezbollah’s armed organisation is rendering the March 14 mission of nation building impossible,” says Fares Soaid, head of the March 14 secretariat. Hezbollah is the only Lebanese faction allowed its own arsenal under the resistance banner.
“Hezbollah’s weapons are tied to a regional strategy, as witnessed in the recent speeches of Iranian officials stressing that stability in Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq can only be achieved through an international agreement on Iran’s nuclear dossier,” says Soaid. Edde believes that the March 14 movement has been going downhill because it relied on a tactical approach without developing long-term policy. Soaid says March 14’s first mistake was to believe that Hezbollah’s decision to start a war with Israel in 2006 was purely Lebanese. “We need to focus our slogans and approach on the problem of Hezbollah’s weapons,” he says.
“March 14’s diversity is reflective of the country’s,” says Karam. As with Lebanon itself, that may be its greatest weakness, and strength. For the latter to prevail, the movement must strengthen its cohesion, defend a clearly delineated programme and start campaigning, says Karam.