The item below is a transcript of an editorial written in 1952 by T Keith Glennan, then Chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission.

The editorial makes unmistakably clear that the birth of the nuclear electricity program was necessarily based on the production of plutonium for bombs. One key sentences states that:

” … there now exists a basis for the creation of semirisk industrial
nuclear- power enterprise while the military demand for plutonium
continues.”
Semirisk meant subsidised.

Ironically, the editorial, toward its conclusion, says:
“A multitude of other factors also must be considered, such as preferential position, adequate security measures, suitable safety precautions, public liability, and international relations. None of these problems admits to an easy solution.. If such were the case, this whole matter would have been solved long ago because many able minds have thought long and hard on these points.”

The problem of nuclear waste is not even mentioned.
The editorial can be found in “Nuclear Science and Technology”. Volume 2 No 3, published (then) 3 times a year by the (then) United States Atomic Energy Commission.

Meanwhile, renewable energy and energy efficiency measures have become far more acceptable and economically competitive options than an industry which builds giant radioactive boilers – which no-one wants in their backyard, which are disasters begging to happen in an era of terrorist threats, which would cause vast downwind contamination in the event of being successfully targeted in a nuclear exchange – a scenario that would make Fukushima’s aftermath look like a glass of spilt milk
The article below makes very clear how nuclear electricity has always contributed to the risk of nuclear war, from the very beginning to the very perilous present.

=== Glennan, T. K — Editorial — Reactor Science and Technology Vol 2
No 3 — October 1952 ======

“Editorial
“For those of us who look forward to the day when American industry will no longer be the hired hand of government in atomic energy affairs but will assume a role of equal responsibility this issue of Reactor Science and Technology strikes a hopeful note. I would prefer to use the stronger adjective promising, but I fear it would ill serve the future progress of the industrial participation program to appear overly optimistic at this stage. Formidable problems must be overcome before the seeds already sewn can bear fruit. Yet when we compare these problems to those which have been solved thus far in the atomic energy program, we have reason to believe that given faith, time, sustained effort, money and patience, the goal of industrial nuclear power can be achieved.

The Atomic Energy Commission and its staff, during its early stewardship of the program, speculated at length on ways of bringing industry into the atomic energy picture on a more realistic basis, consistent with our normal competitive private enterprise economy. It remained however for Dr. Charles A Thomas, then Executive Vice-President of Monsanto Chemical Co., to crystallize this thought into a definite, concrete proposal. On June 20, 1950, Dr. Thomas sent the Commission a letter, stating that he believed the time was ripe for industry, with its own capital, to design, construct and operate reactors for the production of plutonium and power. This suggestion was based on the following assumptions: that the long-term military requirements for plutonium exceeded the then existing and planned production facilities; that it would be desirable to reduce the cost of existing and planned production facilities; that it would be desirable to reduce the cost of this metal to the government; that it would likewise be desirable to make use of the large quantities of heat attending the production of plutonium and not being utilized under existing conditions; and, finally, that the most nearly practicable use of such heat would be for the generation of useful quantities of electric power. It was Dr. Thomas’s contention that the program he envisaged would accomplish these objectives and, at the same time, would offer industry an opportunity to contribute to the reactor program directly and to earn a profit which could be related to the effort put forth.
Meantime a second proposal, rather similar in objective to the Monsanto approach, had been received from the officers of the Dow Chemical Co. and the Detroit Edison Company. The Commission addressed itself to a serious consideration of these suggestions and arrived at a basis on which it was willing to support the study phase of such programs. A public announcement was issued by the Commission on Jan 28, 1951, setting forth the general policy which had guided the consideration of these propositions and opening the door for further proposals from qualified groups. It was emphasized that in agreeing to such studies the Commission was not entering into any commitment to continue beyond the study phase. This public notice elicited further interest, and on May 16, 1951, it was announced that a maximum of four industrial study groups would be considered for the initial program. By early June agreements had been signed with the four groups, and the studies which are digested in the following pages had been set in motion. A maximum period of one year was permitted for the study. Under terms of the agreement, the contracting parties were to carry out a survey and study of the Commission’s reactor development activities: (1) to determine the engineering feasibility of their designing, constructing and operating a materials- and power- producing reactor; (2) to examine the economic and technical aspects of building this reactor in the next few years; (3) to determine the research and development work needed, if any, before such a reactor project could be undertaken; and (4) to offer recommendations in a report to the Commission concerning such a reactor project and industry’s role in undertaking it and carrying it out. So much for the background involved. What do these studies show?

It would be futile in this space to attempt an assessment of the conclusions reached. However a few points do seem to warrant comment. First, the sophistication and engineering excellence of these reports stand as a real tribute to the scientists and engineers associated with the Commission’s reactor program. Because of their efforts, a wealth of technological data was available, enabling the study groups to move rapidly on their assignment.

Second, all parties concur in the belief that dual- purpose reactors are technically feasible and could be operated in such a fashion that the power credit would reduce the cost of plutonium by a considerable amount. Conversely, all groups agree that no reactor could be constructed in the very near future which would be economic on the basis of power generation alone. The significance of these conclusions should not be overlooked. They imply that there now exists a basis for the creation of semirisk industrial nuclear- power enterprise while the military demand for plutonium continues. In pointing up the many paths by which one can approach this goal, it is interesting to note that each of the groups settled on a different reactor type as holding the greatest promise from the group’s particular point of view.

As a final comment on the reports, it should be noted that all four groups wish to continue their efforts into a second phase. This would seem to represent a vote of confidence in nuclear power. Were this concept of a dual-purpose reactor devoid of substance, it hardly seems likely that all parties would continue to show interest in further association with the field.

This now brings us to the vital question: Where do we go from here? As this journal goes to press the problem is being debated by the Commission. No final decision has been reached. Certainly the time is not yet appropriate for a final answer. The second phase of this program, although intended for prosecution at a more specific engineering level and with somewhat greater effort, will still be operating at a relatively low rate of expenditure. It is when we move into phase three, that is, make commitments for the actual design and construction of a specific reactor, that weighty financial decisions must be made. Still it is not too early to start facing these future questions. Among the more critical seem to be the following:

1. Can and will the Commission permit private industry to construct, own and operate a dual- purpose reactor with the electric power generated therefrom to be sold and distributed by a private- investment-owned company?

2. Can and will the Commission make available to private industry the fuel needed for the initial operation of such a reactor and give assurances that continued operation will not be interrupted or curtailed by government order?

3. Can and will the Commission establish a price policy and a contract that will provide for the purchase of the products of a reactor in order that such projects will be economically feasible in the near future?

4. What will be the policy of the Commission on the issue of patents and licenses?

A multitude of other factors also must be considered, such as preferential position, adequate security measures, suitable safety precautions, public liability, and international relations. None of these problems admits to an easy solution.. If such were the case, this whole matter would have been solved long ago because many able minds have thought long and hard on these points.

That difficulties are involved, however, cannot be used as an excuse to ignore or side-step this pressing issue. The declaration of policy in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 places on us a responsibility that cannot be evaded. This policy states that “subject at all times to the paramount objective of assuring the common defense and security, the development and utilization of atomic energy shall, so far as practicable, be directed toward improving the public welfare, increasing the standard of living, strengthening free competition in private enterprise, and promoting world peace. It is by no means certain that “assuring the common defense and security” is completely achieved solely through the ever increasing stock piles of nuclear weapons.

T Keith Glennan
Atomic Energy Commission
=== other items in the issue of RS&T, from the table of contents
=
Monsanto Chemical Company – Union Electric Company
Plutonium-Power Reactor Feasability Study [page 9]

Commonwealth Edison – Public Service Company
Report on Power Generation Using Nuclear Energy [page 29]

Pacific Gas and Electric Company – Bechtel Corporation
Industrial Reactor Study [page 81]

Dow Chemical Company – Detroit Edison Company
Study of Materials-and Power-Producing Reactors [pp105 – 114]

Glennan, T. K — Editorial — Reactor Science and Technology Vol 2 No 3 — October 1952

Dr. Caldicott is spreading propaganda, she isn’t even expert in that she is talking.

Anyone who thinks radioactive nucleii are source of propoganda should be the first to give them a try. Do we have a volunteer?
Dr. Caldicott is fighting murderers not political aspirants.
Do you know what a radioactive isotopes is…what it does…?
It kills every living thing.

“Do you know what a radioactive isotopes is…what it does…?
It kills every living thing.”

OMG! So THAT’S why every single person who has ever had radiation therapy has dropped dead!

Wow… Thanks for clearing that up for us, wyynd.