POLITICS:
U.S. Tilt is Bad News for South Asian Security
Commentary - By Praful Bidwai
NEW DELHI, Mar 11 (IPS) - Washington's policymakers might believe they have
scored a diplomatic coup of sorts in South Asia by reportedly reaching a
deal with Pakistan to allow U.S. troops to be deployed in Pakistan to hunt
down Osama bin Laden.
This deal with Pakistan President Gen Pervez Musharraf is supposedly in
return for the pardon that Musharraf gave to nuclear expert Abdul Qadeer
Khan, who has admitted to selling nuclear secrets to Iran, Libya and North
Korea, and Islamabad's not taking any further action on this confession.
The agreement was reported by Seymour Hersh of 'The New Yorker', but
Pakistan officials have denied it.
But what the U.S. government may believe to be a coup may turn out to be
a delusion, if not a long-term liability.
If an intensified hunt for bin Laden succeeds, his capture will
certainly boost President George W Bush's election campaign. After the
U.S.-created political and security mess in Iraq, he may have something to
boast of.
But the costs of this "success" might prove onerous, and out of
proportion to the benefits. To start with, it is not clear that the
al-Qaeda fugitive now effectively controls a large global network.
More important, the physical presence of U.S. troops on Pakistani
soil-especially Special Forces, like the elite commando unit Task Force
121 that is reportedly being shifted from Iraq-will breed enormous
resentment and discontent in Pakistan.
Its impact will be greatest in the sensitive areas adjoining
Afghanistan: the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan.
Already, radical Islamists rule the two provinces, catapulted into power
there in elections by the unpopular U.S.-declared war on Afghanistan
following Sep. 11, 2001. The resentment is likely to be extremely high in
the turbulence-prone Pashtun "tribal agency" areas abutting Afghanistan.
Discontent will probably engulf all of Pakistan, including the country's
non-Islamist, liberal and moderate opinion, if U.S. troops are deployed.
Many Pakistanis, like other South Asians, did not strongly oppose the
U.S. action in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda in 2001 or vocally oppose
Pakistan's "cooperation" with the U.S government. But foreign troops'
presence on Pakistani soil is another matter altogether.
When those troops are from the United States, it will cause big hurt to
"national pride", and injure widely prevalent ideas about "sovereignty",
Pakistani observers have said in interviews recently.
Bluntly put, the U.S. government is not popular in Pakistan. It is
widely seen as a hegemonic, over-ambitious and cynical power, which has
treated Pakistan shabbily except when its cooperation is useful in
Washington's short-term interests.
Even bin Laden's capture is unlikely to enthuse the public in Pakistan
and Afghanistan - any more than deposed president Saddam Hussein's did in
Iraq. In some ways, its impact may be worse.
The likely adverse reaction in Pakistan to a Khan-for-Osama deal with
the U.S. government must be understood in the specific context of South
Asia's tortuous relationship with Washington. This has at least four
significant components.
First, there is a history of resentment against and suspicion of
Washington in both India and Pakistan. India was a leader in non-alignment
during the Cold War and often faced U.S. hostility.
Pakistan was a U.S. ally from the 1950s onwards. But after the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States downgraded it from a
"frontline" state to a virtual pariah. It curtailed its access to armaments
and technology to try to "cap" and "roll back" its nuclear weapons
programme, to which it had earlier turned a blind eye.
After the Cold War, the United States lost much of its economic,
political and strategic interest in Pakistan. The 1998 nuclear blasts
further marginalised Pakistan in the U.S. scheme. Things changed after Sep.
11, because of Pakistan's location right next to Afghanistan.
Second, many Pakistanis believe that Musharraf did not drive a good
enough bargain with Washington while offering unconditional support to its
'war on terror'. After Sep. 11, he fell in line without negotiating the
terms for his support.
He allowed himself to be pressed into acting against domestic extremists
and "diluting" Pakistan's traditional stand on Kashmir, favouring a
plebiscite about joining India or Pakistan. (Indian policymakers take the
opposite view of this.)
Third, there is a widespread perception that the U.S. government has
"tilted" toward India, especially since President Bill Clinton's 2000
visit, and U.S. economic relations with India have significantly improved.
By contrast, there is virtually no U.S. investment or business interest
in Pakistan. Some Pakistani commentators believe that the U.S. government
knew the truth about Pakistan's clandestine nuclear pursuits since the
1970s. Recent declassified U.S. documents with the National Security
Archive confirm these.
Washington chose to expose Khan at a time of its own convenience so it
could mount effective pressure on Musharraf.
Fourth, the recent disclosures, many Pakistani analysts say, have put
Pakistan's future nuclear activities in jeopardy. At the same time, the
U.S. government and India are building a close strategic partnership,
including sharing "dual-use" technology. This is widening the asymmetry
between India and Pakistan in relations with the United States.
Thus, nuclear specialist and journalist Shahid-ur-Rehman has been quoted
by the British Broadcasting Corp as saying Pakistan will now find it
difficult to maintain and modernise its nuclear facilities. "Pakistan's
programme was based on smuggled, imported technology;" he says: "By
contrast, India's programme was not as sophisticated, but it was
indigenous. If there are curbs on India, they will not suffer."
Argues Rehman, "If Pakistan needs a nuclear component, they will have to
approach the international market. They will not sell it, so Pakistan will
have to buy it on the black market." His conclusion: "Pakistan's nuclear
programme is now almost half-deadà."
This sounds exaggerated, but there is certainly a contrast between
Pakistan and India. India adopted the technologically easier route to
nuclear bomb-making by reprocessing plutonium from unsafeguarded reactor
fuel - thus, India could keep its nuclear programme largely indigenous.
Sanctions and import restrictions would not kill it.
Pakistan's uranium-enrichment route uses a more sophisticated
technology, involving centrifuges rotating at extremely high speeds like
1,000 revolutions per second. Such machines and their components cannot be
made domestically. Pakistan is far more vulnerable to external restrictions.
Adding to this asymmetry is growing military collaboration between India
and the U.S. government, and India and Israel.
In February, the U.S. government and India conducted relatively advanced
joint air exercises. Washington has invited India to participate in a major
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation exercise in Alaska. New Delhi strongly
supports Bush's Ballistic Missile Defence plans and has offered to
collaborate in developing that technology.
India has signed an agreement to buy the "Falcon" airborne early warning
and control system from Israel, with U.S. approval. This, Pakistani
officials say, will "disturb the strategic and conventional balance in
South Asia, and we will naturally take steps to redress the balance''.
This spells an accelerated arms race, in addition to the India-Pakistan
nuclear weapons competition. The U.S. government will only destabilise the
situation further if it pursues its present policy.
Washington can help improve matters if it becomes even-handed and
balanced in its ties with India and Pakistan and does not act only out of
expedient considerations. There can be no long-term stability and security
in this troubled region short of a momentum for global nuclear disarmament.
Is the United States ready to move in that direction?
(END/2004)
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