POLITICS-SOUTH ASIA:
Pakistan's Reward Could Turn into Liability
Commentary - By Praful Bidwai
NEW DELHI, Mar 20 (IPS) - U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell's major
surprise this week - making Pakistan a major non-North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO) ally of Washington - was greeted with enthusiasm in
Islamabad, but with stony silence here in New Delhi.
Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri exulted that with the
new status, relations between Washington and Islamabad would get a boost in
the future. Pakistan would be elevated to the same high level as U.S. close
allies such as Israel, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.
It will become the fourth Muslim-majority country to join the league of
major non-NATO allies, after Egypt, Jordan and Bahrain.
The status is meant to reward President Gen Pervez Musharraf for his
"positive" role in the 'war against terrorism' and to bolster his position
domestically. As Powell put it: "President Bush and the American people
appreciate the sacrifices Pakistan has already made to keep us all safer
from terrorism.''
The U.S. government is particularly pleased that Pakistan has cooperated
with it in the latest campaign to round up key al-Qaeda leaders, reportedly
including the Number Two man, Ayman al-Zawahri, in South Waziristan near
the Afghanistan border.
However, the move has all the characteristics of yet another
short-sighted manoeuvre by the U.S. government, made for essentially
short-term reasons, including President George W Bush's election campaign.
It will create new imbalances in the complex and skewed triangular
relationship between Washington, New Delhi and Islamabad. Imbalances will
not promote stability or parity so much as instability and greater
insecurity in South Asia.
Above all, Pakistan's gains from the non-NATO ally status could prove
illusory. They are liable to be negated by mounting pressure from the U.S.
government to intensify "mutual cooperation" against terrorism by signing
agreements which give immunity to U.S. troops from prosecution on Pakistani
soil.
In terms of India-Pakistan relations, this is yet another swing of the
pendulum from one extreme of favouring India to another, a pro-Pakistan
tilt.
The non-NATO ally designation has dismayed and unnerved Indian
policymakers. Although they did not react immediately to the announcement,
"there was a 'feel bad' mood in the government" and the U.S. embassy sent
deputy ambassador Robert Blake "to do some firefighting" in the Indian
foreign office, reported 'The Times of India' newspaper.
Indian officials believe that this ally status has a "strong political
significance" in Pakistan. It will help the U.S. administration's secure
military hardware for Islamabad. "All told, this is a label that Pakistan
will wear proudly," an official has been quoted as saying.
India is likely to see Pakistan's elevation in the U.S. scheme of things
as a setback to its own efforts to build an exclusive "strategic
partnership" with Washington. India has gone out of its way to offer itself
as a reliable, loyal, post-Cold War ally, one which supports the U.S.
government even on controversial questions like ballistic missile defence,
on which Washington's close allies have reservations.
There are worries in New Delhi that the non-NATO ally status will enable
Pakistan to buy new weapons like P-3C Orion maritime surveillance planes
and Harpoon missiles, and perhaps even F-16 fighter jets.
Many Indian policymakers believe that the non-NATO ally label is a
reward for Musharraf's cooperation on the issue of Abdul Qadeer Khan's
admission in February of having sold nuclear technology to Libya, North
Korea and Iran. Powell tried to minimise this by saying, it "was something
we have been working on for months and months and months à It's not a
reward for A Q Khan. (It's) the same relationship we want to have with
India''.
Such even-handedness "as an afterthought" may not mollify New Delhi
enough. India may try to extract some new assurances or arms from
Washington, in turn impelling Pakistan to do the same. This could spell an
accelerated South Asian arms race.
The Pakistan government stands to make two short-term gains from its
major non-NATO ally status. Musharraf will benefit because after a long
time, he will have something to show his critics, who accuse him of having
conceded too much sovereignty and independence to the U.S. government,
without getting enough in return.
He might be able to disprove the widespread view prevalent in the
Pakistani establishment, society and the press, that Washington has always
"dumped Pakistan after its strategic goals are met" and it is not genuinely
interested in a multi-dimensional, long-term relationship.
Secondly, Pakistani officials believe that the new status would greatly
improve the prospect for arms purchases from Washington. They could have
access to advanced weapons for the first time since 1990.
Since defence cooperation between Washington and Islamabad was resumed
after Sep. 11, 2001, Pakistan has identified and asked for a number of
high-technology weapons from the U.S. government. But major non-NATO ally
status does not open the doors to unlimited arms purchases. It gives the
ally soft loans for leasing weapons and equipment for research and
development purposes. It speeds up export licensing. It allows for U.S.
military training on easy financial terms.
However, the real downside is that Washington will probably insist on
one condition for substantial arms purchase - that Pakistan sign a Status
of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that
redefines the status of U.S. personnel and property on the territory of
another nation.
SOFAs exempt U.S. personnel from matters like criminal and civil
jurisdiction, wearing the uniform, carrying arms, tax and customs relief,
entry and exit of personnel and property, and resolving damage claims.
Their basic purpose is to give immunity to U.S. soldiers.
SOFAs have been extremely controversial in Japan, South Korea, the
Philippines and Bangladesh, where the U.S. government insisted on a SOFA
before providing relief to the victims of a major cyclone in 1991). Civil
society campaigns and peace movements regard SOFAs as serious, humiliating
assaults on national sovereignty.
This was especially the case in Japan after a schoolgirl was raped by
U.S. soldiers in Okinawa in 1995, and in South Korea after young girls were
killed by a U.S. armoured vehicle in 2002.
The United States has signed SOFAs with more than 90 countries, or
almost half the world-up from 40 at the end of the Cold War. After winding
up certain military bases under popular opposition - for example, Clark
and Subic Bay in the Philippines - the United States has used SOFAs as the
preferred instrument of maintaining military dominance in "allied" countries.
The SOFA issue is bound to become ultra-sensitive in Pakistan given
existing suspicions about Musharraf's pro-U.S. proclivities. The "reward"
or "promotion" could soon become a liability. (END/2004)
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