Food prices in 2027 are being influenced by choices made this spring, on farms and in capitals. Credit: Shutterstock

By Maurizio Martina
ROME, May 6 2026 (IPS)

Across Europe, winter wheat is already in the ground. What farmers apply in the coming weeks will determine the size of this year’s harvest. Those decisions are now being made under a sudden surge in costs that did not exist when seeds went in.

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz in late February disrupted energy and input markets that European agriculture cannot avoid. Within days, tanker traffic fell by 90 to 95 percent. European natural gas prices rose by 70 to 75 percent in the first week, with prices approaching double pre-conflict levels by mid-March.

Meanwhile Brent crude began the year at $61 per barrel and finished Q1 at $118, the largest quarterly price increase on an inflation-adjusted basis in data going back to 1988.

Farmers need immediate, targeted support to sustain the use of fertilizers and other key inputs during this narrow window, and governments should act to keep trade in agricultural inputs open while mobilizing rapid financing for countries under pressure

These shifts shape the cost of energy that underpins farming, from machinery and irrigation to the production of nitrogen fertilizers. At the same time, disruptions to Gulf fertilizer exports—representing roughly 20 to 30 percent of globally traded supply—pushed prices higher across all markets.

Europe, though not directly dependent on Gulf producers, buys into this global price system while also facing higher domestic production costs linked to gas. The result is a sustained increase in input costs at the precise moment farmers decide how much nitrogen to apply, decisions that will shape yields at harvest and are already beginning to set the direction of food prices into 2027.

Two priorities now shape the outcome. Farmers need immediate, targeted support to sustain the use of fertilizers and other key inputs during this narrow window, and governments should act to keep trade in agricultural inputs open while mobilizing rapid financing for countries under pressure.

These measures can still stabilize planting decisions and protect yields. Without them, higher input costs will translate directly into reduced application, lower production, and tighter food supply later in the year.

Rising fertilizer costs are already forcing farmers to adjust input use, with direct consequences for yields and food supply later in the year.

When fertilizer prices rise and liquidity tightens, farmers apply less nitrogen. Lower input use reduces yields. The impact does not appear immediately. It becomes visible at harvest, when production falls below potential, and later in markets, when supply tightens and prices rise. By then, the decisions that shaped the outcome cannot be reversed.

European agriculture enters this crisis with already thin margins and limited capacity to absorb further cost increases. Farmers have faced prolonged financial pressure since the 2022 input cost surge, with rising costs only partially offset by prices.

Climate variability and regulatory pressures add further uncertainty. The current surge compounds these conditions and risks eroding confidence at a critical moment. The resilience of European agriculture depends on whether farmers can absorb shocks of this scale without reducing investment or output.

A further pressure sits at the intersection of energy and food markets. Rising oil prices increase the attractiveness of biofuels, drawing crops such as maize and vegetable oils toward fuel production. This tightens food supply and raises prices further. Europe is deeply integrated into this system. Energy volatility feeds directly into agricultural markets, linking geopolitical risk to food prices and inflation.

The window for action remains open, but it is narrowing. Nitrogen has not yet been fully applied. Spring planting across parts of Europe is still underway. Acting now can limit the damage. Waiting until harvest will not.

The immediate priority is to sustain production. Farmers require timely and proportionate support to maintain input use, particularly fertilizers, during this critical phase.

Current policy responses have focused largely on fuel through tax cuts, price caps and targeted subsidies, while support for fertilizers and broader agrifood inputs remains limited. Existing instruments provide a foundation, but the scale and speed of the shock call for greater flexibility. Clear signals of support, combined with measures to ease liquidity constraints, can influence decisions now and reduce the risk of a contraction in output.

Europe’s response must also extend beyond its borders. As a central actor in global agricultural markets, it has both an interest and a responsibility to support stability. Maintaining open trade in agricultural inputs is essential. Export restrictions imposed by several countries risk shifting the burden onto more vulnerable economies. Europe should lead in opposing such measures.

Access to financing remains critical. Instruments such as the International Monetary Fund’s Food Shock Window can provide rapid support to countries facing acute pressure. Complementary approaches, including the Financing for Shock-Driven Food Crisis Facility facilities developed within the Food and Agriculture Organization, enable earlier and more proactive responses before shocks deepen and spread.

Over the medium term, countries should diversify fertilizer supply sources and strengthen regional coordination. Over the longer term, resilience will depend on more efficient input use, investment in alternative production methods such as green ammonia, and reduced dependence on volatile energy markets. Food production should be treated as a strategic asset, alongside energy and infrastructure.

The decisions taken now will shape outcomes far beyond Europe. Food prices in 2027 are being influenced by choices made this spring, on farms and in capitals. Farmers are adjusting under pressure. The question is whether the response they receive matches the urgency of the moment.

Excerpt:

 
CIVICUS discusses the status of political prisoners in Venezuela with Manuel Virgüez, director of Movimiento Vinotinto, a Venezuelan human rights organisation that works for citizen empowerment, democracy and justice.

Manuel Virgüez

What’s the status of political prisoners?

Following the 2024 presidential election, the state detained around 2,000 people as part of what it called Operation Tun Tun. In early 2026, around 1,000 remained in detention, although various organisations put the total at between 950 and 1,200, depending on the classification criteria they use. Since 8 January, when Jorge Rodríguez, President of the National Assembly, announced imminent releases, and following the approval of an amnesty law, that number has fallen to around 450.

Among those released were human rights defender Rocío San Miguel, activist Javier Tarazona and journalist Eduardo Torres. The vast majority of those released were members of civil society or political activists. On 16 April, it was unofficially reported that around 50 former employees of Petróleos de Venezuela, detained in 2025, had been released. If this is confirmed, the current number of political prisoners remaining would be around 380.

The group that remains in detention consists mainly of dissident military personnel and former public officials. The authorities are reluctant to release them because they pose a direct threat to the regime’s stability. They are the ones who have suffered the worst treatment: various organisations, including Movimiento Vinotinto, have documented enforced disappearances, inhuman treatment, torture and persecution of family members. In some cases, people remained missing for weeks or months, with no knowledge of their whereabouts or whether they were still alive. These are some of the most serious violations recorded in recent decades in Venezuela.

How did these arrests differ from previous ones?

Two things distinguished them from previous waves of repression. The first was the abusive use of the concept of ‘eradication’, provided for in the Organic Code of Criminal Procedure, to transfer all cases to courts in Caracas. People detained in states such as Bolívar, hundreds of kilometres from the capital, were required to appear there. This was an unprecedented violation of the procedural principles of Venezuelan law. Not even in the 1960s, in the face of guerrilla movements, was there such a concentration of cases in a single court.

The second thing was the criminalisation of everyday acts. The state used anonymous reports via mobile apps to identify and arrest people, and a simple WhatsApp status update could be treated as an act of terrorism. The presumption of innocence ceased to exist in practice and the burden of proof was reversed: it was the detainee who had to prove they were not guilty.

What does the amnesty law entail and what does it exclude?

The law provides for the closure of cases linked to political events from different periods in Venezuelan history. This is no minor matter. After years of mass detentions and restrictions on freedom, the state implicitly acknowledges that those people should not have been imprisoned. The credit goes, above all, to the detainees’ families, human rights organisations and the international community.

But the law falls short. It does not provide for any mechanism of redress for those who were unjustly detained. Nor does it provide for the restitution of property. Many political prisoners had their businesses, homes and vehicles confiscated and won’t recover them on release. The law also offers no clear guarantees for those in exile. On 16 April, former legislator Alexis Paparone returned to Venezuela and was detained for several hours before being brought before a court, demonstrating that returning remains risky.

The law effectively excludes dissident military personnel and makes no provision for the thousands of politically motivated dismissals that have taken place, in violation of International Labour Organization Convention 111, nor for political disqualifications. As long as leaders such as María Corina Machado are unable to exercise their political rights, there can be no talk of a genuine transition.

What conditions are required for a genuine democratic transition?

There can be no reconciliation without justice. What Venezuela has experienced is one of the darkest periods in South America’s recent history. Bringing victims and perpetrators together without a prior process of accountability is not reconciliation; it is impunity. Where there’s no justice, there’s vengeance, and that generates endless cycles of violence. Societies that have not dealt with their crimes have carried that wound for generations.

For there to be justice, profound institutional reform is needed: in the armed forces, the electoral system, the judiciary and the public prosecutor’s office. Cosmetic changes are not enough. It will be a long-term process, but the first steps must be taken to call general elections and move towards real economic recovery.

What’s possible, and necessary, is a pact of coexistence: an agreement to respect the constitution and live without mutual persecution. But such a pact requires the Chavista regime to acknowledge its mistakes and its crimes. Without that, any transition will remain incomplete.

Even so, I am optimistic. Venezuelan civil society, despite all it has lost, remains standing. There are signs that something is changing, and we must seize this opportunity. I’m confident that we will be able to lay the foundations for a democracy that says ‘never again’ to authoritarianism.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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Venezuela: ‘People once again believe they can influence what happens in their country’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Pedro González Caro 29.Mar.2026
Venezuela: democracy no closer CIVICUS Lens 29.Jan.2026
Venezuela: ‘We are seeing an economic transition, but no democratic transition’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Guillermo Miguelena 29.Jan.2026

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A conversation with Toril-Iren Pedersen, Director of the UNDP Global Policy Centre for Governance, and Michael Jarvis, Executive Director of the Trust, Accountability, and Inclusion (TAI) Collaborative

Q1: What is financial integrity and why is it important right now? Why is it relevant to TAI’s members?

Toril-Iren Pedersen

For us, the issue is not limited to one category of wrongdoing. It is about the connection between different parts of economic value, from public revenues to criminal flows, and the loopholes that exist within the regular financial system. Financial integrity cannot be considered in isolation. Weaknesses across tax, corruption, anti-money laundering and the broader global financial architecture all have to be understood together.

Michael Jarvis: At TAI, we see financial integrity as the need for systems to operate transparently, accountably and ethically. That is how people ideally manage their personal finances, and how we hope corporations run their businesses. But we are especially focused on governments and countries: how they strengthen the integrity of their financial systems, minimize corruption, encourage fairness and better steward public resources.

There is a clear development case for why this matters. TAI’s members are primarily U.S.-based philanthropies working internationally, and our work is organized around three priorities: strengthening healthy democracies, advancing climate accountability and improving fiscal accountability through fair and effective financial governance. Financial integrity underpins all three. Without it, progress in each area is weakened.

Michael Jarvis

When financial systems lack integrity, the damage is broad. It undermines trust in government, contributes to democratic disillusionment and weakens citizens’ confidence that public resources are being used fairly. It can also slow the energy transition, as we have seen with concerns around carbon markets. And it directly affects the ability of governments to raise and spend revenue effectively.

Toril-Iren Pedersen: I would add that declining trust in governments and in the multilateral system is higher than we have seen in a very long time. Lack of financial integrity contributes directly to that distrust.

Visible wealth inequality is one challenge, but so is the perception of invisible wealth being accumulated through the global financial architecture. When people sense that wealth is moving in the shadows, outside transparency and democratic control, it creates legitimate grounds for distrust. That is why lack of financial integrity must be understood as a systems failure that requires a systems approach.

Michael Jarvis: That is also the focus of the new paper from your team, the UNDP Global Policy Centre for Governance, which TAI supported. It emphasizes why progress requires action on multiple fronts and why no single actor or institution can solve this alone. Financial integrity is a collective action challenge.

Q2: How has UNDP’s Global Policy Centre for Governance worked on financial integrity over the past few years? What were your most important results and insights?

Toril-Iren Pedersen: The Centre’s work has taken place across several streams, but the most important contribution has been analyzing the system and the relationships among different actors. When we look at corruption and illicit financial flows, we have to ask who enables those flows within countries and across borders. Understanding those relationships is central to financial integrity.

The Centre has also convened actors within the UN and among practitioners, including country representatives involved in the Financing for Development negotiations in Sevilla last summer. That process helped produce stronger commitments to curb illicit financial flows and introduced more substantive language on financial integrity and corruption than we had seen in earlier iterations of the Financing for Development agenda.

The analytical work on the financial integrity ecosystem and the systems approach has also been developed in collaboration with several TAI members, including the MacArthur Foundation and Ford Foundation. Their support has been important both substantively and financially.

Q3: How will the Centre work on financial integrity going forward, under your leadership?

Toril-Iren Pedersen: The Centre has worked on a range of governance frontier issues. Going forward, we will focus on two areas: financial integrity, and data systems and data availability at the country level. The data agenda connects directly to financial integrity, but it also has broader relevance.

On financial integrity, we see a need to problem-solve the systemic challenges that are preventing progress at both the country and global levels. We will continue analyzing what is stopping countries from making substantive progress and what kinds of solutions and policy alternatives can be made available to them.

Some of these solutions already exist, but they are not always accessible. As a UNDP Policy Centre, our role is to make research, policy options and insights into systemic challenges available to UNDP country offices so they can be integrated into country-level programming. We also hope this work will help countries engage more effectively in global processes.

There is currently a disconnect. The Financial Action Task Force, the OECD tax framework and anti-corruption frameworks all rely on data from countries, but they do not always help solve what is fundamentally a systems challenge. We will continue engaging in those processes while breaking the work into more manageable areas where countries can take action nationally, regionally and globally.

Q4: What is the role of philanthropy in strengthening financial integrity against the backdrop of a fast-evolving global development landscape? What collaboration opportunities do you see between philanthropies, multilateral organizations and other stakeholders?

Michael Jarvis: Philanthropy’s role is a nimble one. The volume of finance philanthropy brings is not the same as government donors or what countries can mobilize themselves. The question is how philanthropy can prompt the right conversations and support work that moves the agenda more effectively.

Traditionally, philanthropy has supported civil society groups, independent media and think tanks at the global and national levels. Those actors investigate financial integrity issues, build evidence, raise public awareness and develop policy recommendations for governments and multilateral forums.

Philanthropy also has limits. Individual donors, including TAI members, often focus on a relatively small number of priority countries. They are not operating at a scale that covers all countries affected by these issues. That is where the UN system and international financial institutions can play a different role, because they work with nearly every country and have government relationships built into their mandates.

There are important complementarities. The MacArthur Foundation, for example, has made a major investment in Nigeria around financial integrity and anti-corruption, working with government agencies while also supporting civil society and media. More broadly, different actors bring different relationships, mandates and capacities.

The Financing for Development process in Sevilla is a good example. The outcome was stronger because many players were involved, from civil society groups working in-country to global and regional convenings that reinforced the message. Those efforts helped shape the negotiations and elevate financial integrity on the agenda.

An important opportunity is the Illicit Finance Summit, being hosted by the UK Government in June. It can bring together governments committed to addressing financial integrity challenges and create space for civil society, academia, philanthropy and others to develop practical solutions. Philanthropy should be part of that conversation and think about where its support can amplify or pilot ideas that emerge.

Visibility also matters because it helps attract resources. Funding for financial integrity work remains very limited. In a 2023 analysis, TAI estimated that about $150 million had been directed to illicit financial flows work since 2020, including efforts to address tax avoidance.

That averages roughly $30 million a year across different groups, countries and sectors. Compared with the scale of the problem, and compared with funding for fields such as climate or AI, that is extremely small.

The upcoming summit could serve as a call to action for philanthropy and other funders to invest more. The rise in fraud enabled by crypto and other technologies affects people directly and is creating grassroots demand for action. Partnership will be essential, including with UNDP, the World Bank, national governments, civil society and research networks.

Toril-Iren Pedersen: I agree. We need to mobilize more resources, but it is also important to recognize what has already been achieved with limited funding. Much of the momentum for change over the past 10 to 15 years has come from civil society organizations, journalist networks and collaborative investigations around leaks. Those efforts helped put issues such as tax fairness, transparency and beneficial ownership on national and global agendas.

This field has shown that limited resources can have an outsized effect when actors from different parts of the ecosystem work together. Anti-corruption, tax fairness and anti-money laundering were once treated as separate silos. Bringing those communities together around shared solutions is a cost-effective way of working.

Going forward, we also need to connect financial integrity to other development priorities, including climate finance and health financing. Each sector has its own financial integrity challenges. With the current development financing crunch, we cannot afford to leave money on the table, and we cannot afford to let resources disappear when policy action could prevent it.

Q5: Is there a case for involving the business community? What would the message be?

Toril-Iren Pedersen: Yes. Governance investments are one area we will be looking at closely. There is enormous pressure to mobilize funding from private actors and the private sector. Much of the focus has been on ensuring that specific investments comply with human rights and development standards. That remains important.

But financial integrity is also about longer-term systems de-risking. Investments in anti-corruption mechanisms, laws that reduce corruption risk and dispute-resolution frameworks can make markets more attractive for private investment. The goal is to build systems where private actors face lower real or perceived risk and can operate without relying as heavily on facilitated investment support.

In that sense, we need to distinguish between short-term and long-term de-risking, and between project-level and systems-level de-risking.

Michael Jarvis: There is a strong private sector incentive to support financial integrity, especially for companies operating across borders. But there is also a quid pro quo: corporate actors need to uphold their own standards of financial integrity. That includes thinking responsibly about the taxes they pay in different jurisdictions and avoiding excessive profit shifting.

The private sector benefits from stronger financial integrity systems, but it also has responsibilities within them. Beneficial ownership transparency is one example where progress has helped make it easier to identify who is behind corporate structures. These structures are still misused, but many legitimate private sector actors increasingly recognize that transparency can help distinguish them from bad actors and reduce reputational risk.

All of us have a role in the system. The challenge now is to make a clear case for why financial integrity deserves continued investment, government attention and policy bandwidth, especially at a time of aid cuts, foreign assistance pressures and tight country budgets. That is a collective challenge, and one we need to keep elevating.

IPS UN Bureau

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Irene Velez Torres, Director of the Colombian National Environmental Agency, during a panel discussion with policy experts at the Santa Marta Conference. Credit: Supplied

By Umar Manzoor Shah
SRINAGAR, India, May 6 2026 (IPS)

The First Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels in Santa Marta, Colombia, may eventually be remembered as a defining moment in global climate politics, not because it produced a treaty or a formal negotiation outcome, but because it changed the tone, structure, and ambition of the conversation itself.

For decades, international climate diplomacy has been about managing emissions, not addressing the source of those emissions: fossil fuels. Governments continued to discuss carbon markets, offsets and adaptation funds but so too did the growth in oil, gas and coal production. Within the UN climate process itself, producer nations and powerful economic interests often blocked direct discussion of phasing out fossil fuels. However, there was no such case as Santa Marta.

The conference, co-hosted by Colombia and the Netherlands and attended by delegates from almost 60 nations, was not intended to be another COP-style negotiation. It was explicitly designed as a political and practical platform for those countries willing to move faster on the fossil fuel phase-out. That makes a difference.

“This was not a negotiating conference. This is about dialogue and looking together at what we can do and how we can apply our creativity, our collaboration, and the science to find new opportunities,” said Stientje van Veldhoven-van der Meer, Dutch Climate and Green Growth Minister.

The conference’s most important accomplishment might be the single transition from negotiation to problem-solving.

Traditional COP summits often descend into exercises in diplomatic survival, with countries fighting over language late into the night and protecting narrow interests. In Santa Marta, ministers repeatedly stressed that participants were not there to defend positions but to create solutions.

“The contrast was stark,” said Minina Talia, Tuvalu’s Minister for Home Affairs, Climate Change and Environment.

“I’ve been to a lot of COPs over the years and I’ve never felt like this. More chilled, ready to go home. We are not here to bargain. We’re here to find solutions,” he told reporters on the concluding day of the conference.

For small island states like Tuvalu, where climate change is an existential threat now rather than a future risk, this difference is significant. It is the politics of survival.

Several Concrete Results

Ireland and Tuvalu will co-host a second conference, ensuring continuity and signalling a conscious North-South partnership. A dedicated science panel will support countries and regions in their transition away from fossil fuels. Three work streams were established: pathways to transition away from fossil fuels; decarbonisation of trade balances; and new financial mechanisms to finance the transition.

These are not symbols for deliverables. They went to the core of the politics of dependence on fossil fuels.

The biggest challenge in climate politics is no longer to prove that climate change is real. It’s trying to work out how countries that rely on fossil fuel revenues can survive the transition without economic collapse, social unrest or widening inequality.

That means dealing with debt, subsidies, tax systems, labour transitions, industrial planning and trade balances. The focus on financial architecture in Santa Marta is a sign of awareness on the part of the participants.

The debate over fossil fuel subsidies was particularly important. Ministers emphasised the need for transparency on the location of fossil fuel incentives, revenues and dependencies within national economies. This is important because fossil fuels are not just an energy issue. They’re so entrenched in national budgets, banking systems, foreign policy and power structures.

The war in the Middle East, the disruption of oil supplies and the general insecurity of world energy have hastened the need for change. But unlike previous oil crises, this time renewable energy is getting cheaper and cheaper compared to fossil fuels, and electric vehicles are scaling up very fast.

Participants argued that the war has revealed not the need for more oil drilling, but the danger of fossil fuel dependence itself.

“The war really opened up peoples’ eyes to how fragile the fossil fuel system is,” a speaker said. “And this war comes at a time when renewables are cheaper than fossil fuels.

This shifts the transition from a strictly environmental imperative to a strategic economic and security priority.

Action on climate is no longer simply about saving the planet. It’s about stabilising economies, reducing geopolitical vulnerability and avoiding the financial risks of stranded fossil assets.

The reason this is a powerful shift is that finance ministers tend to move faster than environment ministers.

Another remarkable strength of Santa Marta was its insistence on being inclusive. Indigenous Peoples, parliamentarians, peasants, women, NGOs and even children were brought into the heart of the conversation.

“This is a new climate democracy, where governments are no longer the only actors making climate decisions,” said Irene Velez Torres, Director of the Colombian National Environmental Agency.

One of the strongest interventions at the conference came from Indigenous representatives, who warned that a clean energy transition without land justice would simply mean another wave of colonial extraction. Their declaration rejects a future where extraction of fossil fuels is replaced by mining for transition minerals, mega dams or industrial projects imposed on Indigenous lands without consent.

“If we are not part of building the just transition and the phase-out of fossil fuels, it will not be just,” they said in a joint declaration at the end of the conference on April 29.

This revealed one of the deepest contradictions in global climate policy: many governments speak of a green transition but continue with extractive models under a new name.

Indigenous leaders demanded free, prior and informed consent, legal recognition of the rights to their territories, direct access to climate finance and protection for land defenders at risk of criminalisation and violence.

The Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty initiative continues to be central. Tuvalu has been one of its earliest supporters, demanding a legally binding international framework to stop expansion and ensure a fair phase-out of fossil fuels.

Talia welcomed the treaty for raising the bar in terms of moral pressure and providing governments with clearer information but warned against limiting the whole transition conversation to one mechanism.

He said: “The treaty is an initiative. We want to look at all other initiatives so that we have a fair, balanced outcome.”

That’s a sign of strategic maturity. One treaty will not kill the most profitable industry in modern history.

These include UNFCCC processes, national policy, fossil fuel treaty mechanisms, regional declarations, central bank reforms and the involvement of financial institutions.

Participants highlighted China’s green lending strategies and said banking systems need to stop rewarding fossil fuel dependence and instead finance transition at scale.

Likewise, Pacific island nations are advocating for regional “fossil fuel-free zones”, supported by new declarations and intergovernmental task forces. These efforts matter because regional leadership often moves quicker than global consensus.

Hence, the choice of Tuvalu as the venue for the next conference is very significant. It’s shifting the discussion from the diplomatic capitals to one of the world’s most climate-vulnerable countries. It forces political leaders to confront the human reality of rising seas, disappearing land and threatened sovereignty.

History in the Making

Santa Marta won’t solve the fossil fuel crisis. It doesn’t stop new drilling. It does not yet impose binding obligations.But it may have done something more important, which is to make fossil fuel phase-out politically discussable at scale. For years, people saw talking straight about ending oil, gas, and coal as too radical, too unrealistic, or too politically dangerous. In Santa Marta it became the focus of the room.

If this coalition grows from 60 to 100 countries, if its outcomes feed into COP31 and national climate plans, if the finance systems start to shift, and if the Pacific conference deepens the legal momentum, then Santa Marta could be remembered not as a one-off summit but as the moment when climate diplomacy finally stopped treating the symptoms and started tackling the disease. That would be history.

IPS UN Bureau Report

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A street scene in Herat, where calls to reopen schools and universities for girls have exposed activists and educators to Taliban detention. Credit: Learning Together.

By External Source
HERAT, Afghanistan, May 5 2026 (IPS)

Qadoos Khatibi, an Afghan university lecturer, and Fayaz Ghori, a civil society activist, also from Afghanistan, were detained by the Taliban’s Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. Their crime? Advocating for girls’ right to education.

Their arrest came as Afghanistan began a new academic year in the last week of March. Schools reopened across the country, but girls above primary school level remain barred from classrooms for the fifth consecutive year.

Khatibi had posted a video urging the Taliban to reopen educational institutions for girls, emphasizing that a country cannot develop without girls’ education. Ghori, for his part, had written that, “We are looking forward to the day when the doors of education will be opened for the girls of this country.”

In Afghanistan today, even civic, non-political advocacy can carry extreme risk. Critics and activists risk arrest, forced disappearance and sometimes worse, simply for sharing a video, writing a post, or speaking out. Online spaces are closely monitored, and critical voices are swiftly suppressed

Nearly five years have passed since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan, a period marked by the closure of secondary schools and universities to girls and women. During this time, girls’ education has come to a complete halt, and anyone who dares to speak out in protest often faces swift and harsh punishment.

Sediq Yasinzada, a civil society activist in Herat province and friend of both men, said they had spoken out against the closure of schools and universities for girls. They had shared posts on Facebook calling for the reopening of schools beyond grade six, and for universities to once again re-admit female students.

More than 2.2 million girls in Afghanistan are currently denied access to education due to restrictions, according to the United Nations Children’s Fund (Unicef), highlighting the magnitude of the problem.

In March this year, both men were summoned by the Taliban’s Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice in Herat. After interrogating them, they were handed over to Taliban intelligence. They spent 24 hours in detention, a fate that has become all too familiar for critics of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

This time, however, the response was different. Because Khatibi and Ghori are well-known figures in Herat, their detention sparked a wave of support on social media. Ordinary citizens, activists, and local influencers called for their immediate release, bringing the issue to a wider public attention.

Alongside the social media outcry, several local elders and influential figures intervened directly with the Taliban, and after about 24 hours, both men were released.

Sarwar Khan, a prominent elder from Herat, says he has repeatedly urged the Taliban in meetings to reopen schools. He is the father of four daughters, all of whom are now denied access to education. “Send your sons to study”, was the Taliban’s mocking response, fully aware that Sarwar Khan has no sons.

When he pointed out that he has no sons, and that education is a right for both women and men, he was threatened with expulsion or even imprisonment if he continued to speak.

After his release from detention, Khatibi shared a statement on Facebook that underscored the core of their demand:

“What we asked for was a human, national, and Islamic request… Knowledge is the foundation of development and does not conflict with religious values. Knowledge does not have a gender. Our women and girls have the right to education.”

The arrests of Qadoos Khatibi and Fayaz Ghori are not isolated incidents. They reflect a broader pattern in Afghanistan, where even peaceful advocacy for girls’ education can be treated as a crime. Families like Sarwar Khan’s, as well as activists and ordinary citizens, face constant threats simply for demanding a basic human right.

In Afghanistan today, even civic, non-political advocacy can carry extreme risk. Critics and activists risk arrest, forced disappearance and sometimes worse, simply for sharing a video, writing a post, or speaking out. Online spaces are closely monitored, and critical voices are swiftly suppressed.

Many men avoid protest not out of indifference, but out of fear. In a situation whereby university professors and civil society activists can be scrutinized and ultimately criminalized simply for sharing a video or written text, many choose silence.

Yet despite this environment of repression, women, girls, and some men continue to protest. In recent years, dozens of women have been detained for weeks or even months without access to lawyers or contact with their families simply for demanding a fundamental right to education.

Since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, Afghanistan has entered a harsh new era. Progress made over two decades, during which millions of girls entered schools and universities, has abruptly halted. The closure of schools beyond grade six and the suspension of higher education have created not only an educational crisis, but also a deep social and human challenge. In this climate, any form of civic protest is met with security crackdowns, shrinking the space for public expression.

Taliban authorities have repeatedly detained critics and civil society activists over the past several years, particularly those who have spoken out against their policies.

Excerpt:

The rising number of centenarians and older individuals raises important questions and issues, such as retirement ages, healthcare, pensions, living expenses, and elder care. Credit: Maricel Sequeira/IPS

By Joseph Chamie
PORTLAND, USA, May 5 2026 (IPS)

Throughout human history, reaching the age of 100 was considered an exceptional accomplishment. However, in recent decades, the number of centenarians in the world has been on the rise.

The increases in longevity for both men and women are welcomed developments. This remarkable accomplishment in human longevity, reaching 100 years or more, also poses challenges for the long-living individuals, their families, communities, and societies.

The rise in the number of centenarians can be attributed to a number of key economic, social, and scientific factors. These factors encompass public health initiatives, sanitation, environmental enhancements, medical advancements, improved access to healthcare, enhanced nutrition, medical treatments, vaccines, antibiotics, decline in infectious diseases, higher living standards, education, better management of chronic conditions, preventive care, social connections, and lifestyle choices.

In 1950, there were nearly 15,000 centenarians worldwide, representing a very small fraction of one percent of the global population of 2.5 billion. By 2026, the number of centenarians had increased by 45 times, reaching 672,000. This figure continued to represent a small, but larger fraction of one percent of the world’s current population, which had tripled to 8.3 billion.

The number of centenarians is expected to continue rising. It is projected that by 2050, the number of centenarians will almost quadruple, increasing from today’s 672,000 to 2.6 million. Furthermore, by the end of the century, the number of centenarians is expected to be approximately twenty-seven times greater than it is today, reaching 18 million by 2100 (Figure 1).

Source: United Nations.

Of the world’s 672,000 centenarians, nearly two-thirds reside in the more developed regions. The country with the largest number of centenarians is Japan with 126,000, accounting for nearly one-fifth of the world’s total. Following Japan, the next four countries and their number of centenarians are the United States (77,000), China (53,000), India (43,000), and France (35,000) (Table 1).

Source: United Nations.

In these various countries, the large majority of centenarians are women. For example, in Japan, women make up nearly 90% of centenarians. Similarly in the United States, nearly 80% of the centenarians in 2024 were women.

The oldest, documented centenarian to have ever lived is Jeanne Calment of France. She died at the age of 122 years and 164 days. Her age is verified through reliable birth, marriage, and death records in Arles, France, with her life spanning from 1875 to 1997. Calment’s father lived to the age of 94 and her mother lived to the age of 86.

The longest-lived man in recorded history was Jiroemon Kimura of Japan who died at the age of 116 years and 54 days. He was born in 1897 and died in 2013, making him the only man in history confirmed to have reached the age of 116. Kimura credited his longevity to living an active life and practicing the concept of hara hachi bunme in Japan, which involves eating until he was only 80% full.

Healthy aging and increased longevity in both men and women are influenced by a combination of genetic and non-genetic factors. In addition to genetics, major contributors to long life include access to healthcare, a healthy and nutritious diet, regular physical activity, not smoking, moderate alcohol consumption, maintaining a healthy body weight, strong social connections, managing stress and chronic conditions, getting sufficient quality sleep, maintaining a sense of purpose, and engaging in vigorous exercise (Table 2).

Source: Author’s compilation.

Medical research is continuing to explore ways to extend healthy lifespan and increase human longevity. Some of this research is focused on anti-ageing interventions, which include targeting biological mechanisms of ageing, delaying the onset of chronic diseases, and prolonging the period of healthy life. These interventions aim to enable individuals to live long enough to become centenarians. Unlike in the past, centenarians are no longer exceptional societal outliers. This significant change in human longevity is impacting not only centenarians but also reshaping the ways individuals, families, communities, and societies approach aging, retirement, and healthcare

Some believe that advancements in medicine and biotechnology may further promote the increase in human longevity. However, others argue that humanity has reached an upper limit of longevity, with the maximum reported age at death plateauing at around 115 to 122 years.

Unlike in the past, centenarians are no longer exceptional societal outliers. This significant change in human longevity is impacting not only centenarians but also reshaping the ways individuals, families, communities, and societies approach aging, retirement, and healthcare.

Living to 100 years or more is a goal that many people aspire to achieve. The rising number of centenarians and older individuals raises important questions and issues, such as retirement ages, healthcare, pensions, living expenses, and elder care.

To reach the age of 100 or beyond, long-term planning, including advance care planning, is crucial for individuals, families, and governments. This planning essentially involves ensuring that there are enough resources available for pensions, healthcare, living expenses, and elder care needs.

Unfortunately, individuals, families, and governments tend to neglect long-term planning. As a result, the gaps between retirement funds and the expenses for individuals living longer lives are significant and increasing.

Most older individuals have limited savings, a financial shortfall that is becoming increasingly common among older women and men. This issue is exacerbated by the demographic ageing of populations, with decreasing numbers of people in the workforce able to contribute to pensions and healthcare for retirees.

These financial gaps are not only causing economic challenges for older individuals and families, but also leading to a reevaluation of government policies and programs related to retirement ages, pension benefits, and health care for seniors.

In conclusion, the increase in human longevity and the rise in the number of centenarians are positive trends. However, they also bring about significant challenges for older individuals, communities, and societies.

Joseph Chamie is a consulting demographer, a former director of the United Nations Population Division, and author of many publications on population issues.

Hadi Ali Chatha (left) and Imaan Hazir Mazari (right) in the front seat, taking Asad Toor (at the back on the left) home after his release from Rawalpindi’s Adiala Jail, on March 17, 2024. Credit: Asad Toor

By Zofeen Ebrahim
KARACHI, Pakistan, May 5 2026 (IPS)

“We’ve abandoned this couple completely; we have not done even 1% of what they did for us all these years!” said journalist Asad Ali Toor.

Arrested on January 23, 2026, two lawyers, also husband and wife – Imaan Mazari and Hadi Ali Chatha – were sentenced the next day to 17 years under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA), 2016 (amended in 2025) – a law Mazari had described as even more ‘draconian’ than its original version. Fines of Rs36 million (USD129,261) each were also imposed on the two under Sections 9 (glorification of an offence), 10 (cyber terrorism), and 26-A (false and fake information) under the same law.

“They have not violated PECA, and in my opinion the prosecution failed to prove any of the ingredients of any offence under the law,” said human rights activist and lawyer Jibran Nasir. He added that “the military elite and the new chief justice in the Islamabad High Court have taken a personal dislike to Imaan and Hadi.  He noted that “The laws may be inherently flawed, even draconian, but more dangerous is their malicious application by the state.”

The amendments on PECA were pushed through parliament within a week, without debate, and signed into law by President Asif Ali Zardari. The move triggered nationwide protests by journalists and rights groups, who warned that the law lacked safeguards. The government, however, defended it as necessary to regulate social media, arguing that similar frameworks exist globally.

Charges, Judgment and Allegations

The judgment stated that Mazari was accused of “disseminating and propagating narratives that align with hostile terrorist groups and proscribed organisations”, while Chatha was charged with reposting her content. The police report also alleged her social media content portrayed the armed forces as ineffective against groups such as the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan.

Protestors gather outside the Islamabad Press Club to mark 100 days of the two lawyers’ continued detention. Credit: Rana Shahbaz

For Toor, who runs the YouTube channel Asad Toor Uncensored, the case is deeply personal. In 2024, he spent 20 days in Federal Investigation Agency custody and 12 in solitary confinement at Rawalpindi’s Adiala Jail, the same prison where the couple is now held.

Arrested on February 26, 2024, on “digital terrorism” charges linked to his coverage, among other things, of a Supreme Court ruling stripping the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf of its election symbol, he was granted bail on March 17, 2024.

He credits Mazari and Chatha with securing his release. “They argued that journalists should not face criminal charges for “honest criticism” of court judgments, citing then Chief Justice of Pakistan Qazi Faez Isa and Attor­ney General for Pakistan Mansoor Usman Awan.”

But journalists like Toor are not alone in feeling what he describes as “a certain vacuum.”

Rana Shahbaz’s milk stall was demolished by the city administration. Credit: Rana Shahbaz

‘It Feels Like I’ve Lost My Right Arm’

The two lawyers had built a reputation for taking on cases few lawyers would touch.

“Imaan and Hadi have always taken up cases most lawyers shy away from due to their controversial or dangerous nature — including blasphemy accusations, enforced disappearances, and press freedom cases — often representing the most marginalised people, without charging anything,” said rights activist Usama Khilji, director of Bolo Bhi, an advocacy forum for digital rights.

“It feels like I’ve lost my right arm,” said a woman, who requested anonymity, as she struggles to secure the release of her brother and more than 400 others accused of blasphemy, languishing in jail across Pakistan.

“In the past three years, I have met countless lawyers and even judges, but no one fought like Imaan. She missed nothing – every detail mattered; she was relentless,” said the woman, talking to IPS.

Leading the campaign, she said most of the accused came from poor backgrounds. “She didn’t even charge for the photocopying of documents submitted to the court – she paid out of her own pocket.”

An Amnesty International poster protesting the 100 days since Hadi Ali Chatha and Imaan Hazir Mazari were jailed. Credit: Amnesty International

The sense of loss extends well beyond individual cases.

Rahat Mehmood, mother of missing poet and writer Mudassir Naru, who disappeared in 2018 described the couple’s arrest as devastating.

“It’s like my support system has collapsed,” she said over the phone from Faisalabad. “Not just for me—these two were a ray of hope, an anchor for hundreds of mothers, especially Baloch mothers.”

Mazari’s work, she said, was not limited to legal representation.

Her grandson, Sachal, was just six months old when his father was taken and later lost his mother in 2021. Court hearings, Mehmood recalled, became rare moments of relief. “They played hide-and-seek, raced around, and she would bring him toys and candy. Tell me—who does that?”

Although her son’s case has not been heard in over a year, Mehmood said that, with Mazari by their side, they had always had hope. “But now,” she added, “it’s all darkness.”

At the wedding of Imaan Mazari and Hadi Ali Chatha, Sachal (son of Mudassir Naru) sits between the two, on the far right; in black, Rahat Mehmood, Naru’s mother, sits. Credit: Rahat Mehmood

Mazari’s advocacy extended beyond the courtroom. She appeared in two of the three press conferences held by families of the blasphemy accused, which drew “huge crowds and media attention”. Today, more than 120 people are out on bail. “It’s because of the efforts of these two,” said the sister of the accused.

Their absence is being felt acutely among many others with the least protection.

A week after the lawyers’ arrest, Rana Shahbaz, a street vendor, went to visit Mazari in jail but was turned away. “I was told by jail authorities no one was allowed to meet her.” He had brought dry fruits, juices and clothes, which authorities refused to accept.

Shahbaz, president of the Anjuman Rehri Baan, Islamabad (association of street vendors), which represents over 20,000 street vendors, said Mazari had been instrumental in securing relief for them. Despite holding licences from the Metropolitan Corporation Islamabad, they routinely face raids and eviction by city administrations.

“Last year because of Madam Imaan, the Islamabad High Court stopped authorities from removing our stalls. She presented video evidence showing stalls being dismantled despite having permits,” Shahbaz said.

Since their arrest, he added, the pressure has returned.

“The day they were arrested, an official told us, ‘Call your lawyers now — I’ll see who stops me.’ She was right — only Madam Imaan had the courage to stand up for us,” said Shahbaz, whose stall has been destroyed thrice in the past two years.

“It costs Rs150,000 (USD 538) to set up these makeshift stalls – financed through a bank loan with a monthly instalment of Rs7,000 ($25). Each time authorities dismantle them, repairs cost up to Rs40,000 (US$144), making it impossible to keep up with repayments and pushing me toward default,” he said. Last week, despite having a valid licence, his lassi (yoghurt drink) and fresh milk stall were demolished.

The pretext for crackdowns can be anything—from late-night vending to fines for not displaying price lists or even refusing to offer “freebies” to the police. “Madam Imaan knew well that vendors are exempt from the curfew time for regular shops or that we can only display the price list once it comes from the city authorities and it doesn’t until midday,” he pointed out.

Like many others, Shahbaz said, the two lawyers worked for vendors for free. “We didn’t even know what the basic legal processes cost,” he said.

Muted Response

Despite the breadth of their work, support beyond affected communities has been limited.

“I hold both the journalist and legal fraternities responsible for doing virtually nothing,” said Toor. “Individual voices may struggle, but unions and bar councils have the power to pressure the government.”

Toor’s assessment is shared by lawyer Nasir. He acknowledged that the legal fraternity, with “many lawyers, like judges, appear to be motivated by self-preservation as opposed to the preservation of the constitutional and fundamental freedoms” and which has “blunted its effectiveness” and left it “equally vulnerable” in the long run.

Yet, even as this institutional weakness is laid bare, others frame the duo’s actions less as miscalculation and more as conscious defiance. Media development expert Adnan Rehmat argued that while some may see them as having paid a heavy price for their stance, the two have a long history of public-interest resistance. “They consciously chose to risk themselves to highlight state abuses, and their courage should be lauded—and we must continue raising our voices in their favour.”

As a result, sporadic protests have failed to shift the situation. With public pressure waning, the battle has moved to the courts.

An Uncertain Path

But even there, justice has remained elusive.

The Islamabad High Court refused interim relief. “Everyone knows the 17-year sentence is the product of a sham trial. No superior court in any modern judicial system would uphold it,” said senior advocate Faisal Siddiqi, the lawyer representing them.

Undeterred, the defence has moved the Supreme Court of Pakistan after the IHC failed to fix an early hearing for nearly two months – a delay which Siddiqui called “unheard of” and a ploy to “deny Imaan and Hadi their deserved liberty”.

The bail petition has since been accepted by the Supreme Court, offering a glimmer of hope. “It is our only and last hope,” said Siddiqi.

One hundred days on, that hope remains uncertain.

What is clearer, however, is the void left behind – felt in courtrooms, in protest spaces, and in the lives of those who had come to rely on the two lawyers willing to take risks few others would.

For many, it is not just their absence that is being measured in days but also the growing silence it has left behind.

“I cannot fathom why people like Imaan and Hadi are being punished—and for what,” said Mehmood. “They deserve to be saluted, not jailed!”

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On the sidelines of the UN Youth Forum, four climate leaders from across the continent and diaspora unite to call for stronger protection of Africa’s environment and vital resources.
 
Sibusiso Mazomba (far left), member of the UN Secretary-General’s Youth Advisory Group on Climate Change; Eugenia Boateng (second from left), Founder and Executive Director of the African Diaspora Youth Hub, FABA Institute; Jabri Ibrahim, also of the UN Secretary-General’s Youth Advisory Group on Climate Change; and Damon Hamman, Graduate Student, New York University, Centre for Global Affairs. Credit: UN Photo

By Alexandra del Castello
UNITED NATIONS, May 5 2026 (IPS)

Africa is on the frontlines of the climate crisis, warming faster than the global average and facing disproportionate climate impacts, despite contributing the least to global greenhouse gas emissions.

This is particularly evident in the growing pressures that climate change is placing on water resources and systems across the continent. As water underpins agriculture, livelihoods, ecosystems, and energy production, water-related climate impacts are deepening inequalities and threatening sustainable development across Africa.

At the forefront of this year’s ECOSOC Youth Forum – the largest annual UN gathering of young people – four African climate youth leaders led a dynamic discussion spotlighting the key role that African youth play in driving climate solutions across the continent, building community resilience, strengthening water security, and advancing locally led adaptation efforts.

Their insights highlighted how young people are not only responding to the climate crisis but reshaping the development agenda through innovation, advocacy, and community rooted action.

African youth are charting bold new pathways for climate leadership and proving that the future of climate action is being shaped by their vision and determination.

Learn more about the speakers:

Eugenia Boateng is an African diaspora strategist and founder of the African Diaspora Youth Hub (ADYH) and FABA, a production strategy lab building systems to make African economies more visible, structured, and investable.

Her work focuses on translating informal economies into institutional intelligence, connecting diaspora resources to African production, and designing systems that enable value retention on the continent.

Jabri Ibrahim is a climate and energy policy expert with an extensive network across Africa, connecting youth movements, policymakers, and private sector leaders. Jabri has played a central role in mobilizing African youth for climate action, particularly through the African Youth Initiative on Climate Change (AYICC).

Sibusiso Mazomba is a climate justice activist, advocate, and researcher. He leads youth advocacy at the African Climate Alliance, driving initiatives to ensure meaningful youth participation in decision-making.

A junior negotiator for South Africa’s UNFCCC delegation since COP26, he has contributed to negotiations on adaptation, oceans, and loss and damage, representing youth and national interests on the global stage.

Damon Hamman is a Master of Science candidate in Global Affairs at New York University, concentrating in transnational security, intelligence, and conflict analysis. His work centers on the intersection of human security, diplomacy, and data-driven policy research.

He has served with the United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, where he built an AI-assisted thematic analysis pipeline for Voluntary National Reviews, contributed to policy briefs aligned with Agenda 2030 and AU Agenda 2063, and supported diplomatic engagement with African missions.

Source: Africa Renewal, United Nations

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Credit: UN Photo/Manuel Elías

By Samuel King
BRUSSELS, Belgium, May 4 2026 (IPS)

In January, the government of Algeria succeeded in locking two civil society groups out of access to the United Nations (UN). It raised questions at the UN Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, known as the NGO Committee, about two civil society groups with accreditation. It alleged that Italian organisation Il Cenacolo was making politically motivated statements at the UN Human Rights Council and the Geneva-based International Committee for the Respect and Implementation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (CIRAC) was selling UN grounds passes. Four days later, it called a vote to revoke their status. Other states urged delay, but the no-action motion failed, and 11 of the body’s 19 members voted to recommend that the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) revoke Il Cenacolo’s accreditation and suspend CIRAC’s for a year.

As the primary gatekeeper for civil society participation at the UN, the NGO Committee controls ECOSOC consultative status, which allows organisations to attend UN meetings, submit written statements, make oral interventions, organise side events and access UN premises. Its mandate, set out in ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, is straightforward: to facilitate civil society access to the UN system.

Such access is particularly valuable for organisations working in repressive contexts, where domestic advocacy is suppressed. It can mean the difference between a community’s concerns being silenced or becoming a matter of international record. In practice, however, the Committee has so consistently worked to obstruct rather than enable access that it is widely known as the ‘anti-NGO Committee’.

On 8 April, in an almost entirely uncompetitive vote, ECOSOC members elected 19 states to serve on the NGO Committee for four-year terms. Only 20 candidates ran for the 19 seats. UN states are organised into five regional blocs, and four of them presented closed slates, putting forward only as many candidates as the number of seats available.

As a result, the Asia-Pacific group selected China, India, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), states with consistent track records of silencing civil society. Latin America and the Caribbean is represented by the likes of Cuba and Nicaragua, which suppress dissent and routinely detain critics. Four of the five African states elected have repressed or closed civic space. Two states elected from the Western European and Other States group, Israel and Turkey, have also recently intensified their repression of civic space.

The one exception was the Eastern European group, where Estonia and Ukraine won seats in a three-way contest, keeping out authoritarian Belarus, which received only 23 votes against Estonia’s 44 and Ukraine’s 38. As in 2022, when Russia lost a similar race, the result showed that competitive elections open up scrutiny and produce better outcomes. The problem is they rarely happen.

Overall, 13 of 19 newly elected states are rated as having closed or repressed civic space by the CIVICUS Monitor, our research initiative that tracks the conditions for civil society around the world. Only one, Estonia, has open civic space. Fourteen of the 20 candidates had been named as carrying out reprisals against people engaging with the UN.

In the run-up to the election, the International Service for Human Rights published scorecards assessing all 20 candidates against eight criteria; 12 of the 20 met none. Over 80 civil society organisations called on ECOSOC member states to hold competitive elections and vote for candidates committed to civil society access. Forty independent UN human rights experts, including special rapporteurs on human rights defenders and on countries including Afghanistan, Iran and Russia, issued a statement warning that Committee members were abusing the accreditation process to block access for human rights organisations. All these warnings went unheeded.

The withdrawal of accreditation from Il Cenacolo and CIRAC, which awaits ECOSOC confirmation, was unprecedented, but it sits within a long pattern of obstruction. At the Committee’s latest regular session in January, 618 applications were under consideration, 381 of which had been deferred from previous sessions.

The backlog is no accident. States ask repetitive questions about minor details and make short-notice requests for complex documentation to repeatedly delay applications until future sessions. States that repress civil society at home do the same in the international arena, targeting organisations that work on issues they deem controversial or opposed to their interests. Three states – China, India and Pakistan– stand out as the worst abusers of this mechanism, having asked almost half of the 647 questions posed to applicants during the January session. Repeated deferrals raise the costs for civil society organisations, draining financial resources and time.

The UN’s current financial crisis is compounding the problem. The consequences of funding cuts were visible at the latest session, when the question-and-answer session was cancelled following an early adjournment. The loss of the only opportunity for organisations seeking accreditation to engage directly with the Committee fell hardest on smaller organisations that had travelled to New York to take part.

The UN’s current cost-cutting drive could at least be used as an opportunity to push for online participation and other efficiency reforms to reduce the bureaucratic burden of repeated requests for information. Beyond this, there’s a need to reassert that the Committee’s function is supposed to be that of an enabler rather than an obstructor.

The NGO Committee determines whether the voices of communities facing repression and violence can be heard in the UN system, and it’s been hijacked by states with every interest in ensuring that they cannot. The floor can’t be left clear for states that repress civil society to act as gatekeepers. States that claim to support civil society must be willing to put themselves forward.

Samuel King is a researcher with the Horizon Europe-funded research project ENSURED: Shaping Cooperation for a World in Transition at CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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In the low tide, an i-Taukei fisherwoman gathers cockles along the Nasese sea wall in Fiji, a tradition weathered by time and tide. The assessment Climate Change Implications for Fisheries and Aquaculture in the Pacific Island Region looks at women’s contributions across fisheries and aquaculture systems, from harvesting to trade. Credit: Josh Kuilamu/SPC

By Sera Sefeti
SUVA, Fiji, May 4 2026 (IPS)

For generations, Pacific people have understood the ocean not as a resource but as identity, sustenance, and survival. Today, that relationship is being tested in ways science is only just beginning to fully capture.

For the first time in the region’s history, every Pacific Island country now has a clear, data-driven picture of what climate change will mean for its waters and its own Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

This shift marks more than just a scientific milestone. It is a turning point in how the Pacific can understand, manage, and defend its ocean in a rapidly changing climate.

From Regional Averages to National realities

The updated assessment, “Climate Change Implications for Fisheries and Aquaculture in the Pacific Island Region”, builds on a 14-year-old vulnerability study. But unlike its predecessor, this version moves beyond broad regional trends.

It goes deeper into country-specific realities.

In a region where ocean territories dwarf landmass, this matters. The Pacific controls around 27 million square kilometres of ocean, yet only about 2 percent of that is land. Fisheries are not just an industry – they are the backbone of economies, cultures, and food systems.

“This is quite amazing,” says SPC Climate Change Project Development Specialist Marie Lecomte, referring to the ability to assess climate impacts at the EEZ level. “The ocean is so big, and land masses are so tiny… it has always been very difficult to downscale ocean models to something meaningful for countries.”

Now, that gap is beginning to close.

Rising ocean temperatures and changing chemistry are reshaping marine ecosystems, impacting people’s livelihoods and national economies. Credit: Douglas Picacha/IPS

Why This Science Matters Now

For Pacific leaders, the climate crisis is not abstract. It is negotiated in global forums, defended in policy rooms, and lived daily in coastal communities.

Yet one persistent challenge has been the lack of evidence.

This report begins to change that.

It provides:

• Updated scientific data on ocean conditions
• Country-level projections of fisheries decline
• A clearer understanding of how climate change cascades from ocean systems into economies and livelihoods

In doing so, it transforms science into something actionable:

• A diagnostic tool showing what lies ahead
• A planning guide for adaptation
• A negotiation tool for global advocacy

For a region often described as the moral voice of climate negotiations, this evidence adds weight to that voice.

The Pacific controls around 27 million square kilometres of ocean, yet only about 2 percent of that is land. Now each country in the region will have a data-driven picture of the effects of climate change in its waters. Credit: Francisco Blaha/SPC

What the Science Reveals

The findings are sobering.

Rising ocean temperatures and changing chemistry are already reshaping marine ecosystems. The report maps, with unprecedented clarity, a chain reaction: warming waters alter fish biology, leading to fish stocks’ decline, which will ultimately result in the impact on people’s livelihoods and national economies.

At the centre of this crisis are coastal ecosystems, i.e. coral reefs, mangroves, and seagrass beds, the ecological foundations of Pacific fisheries.

These systems are under intense pressure from both climate change and human activity.

“For mangroves, they are also constrained by infrastructure development,” Lecomte explains. “If you build a new hotel, then you get rid of the mangrove.”

For scientists, the assessment Climate Change Implications for Fisheries and Aquaculture in the Pacific Island Region offers the most comprehensive dataset for policymakers and communities. Credit: John Nihahuasi/SPC

Across the Pacific, the risks are not evenly distributed.

Low-lying island nations, already facing sea-level rise and extreme weather, are doubly exposed. Their dependence on fisheries for food and income leaves little buffer against decline.

The consequences are stark:

• Reduced food security
• Declining incomes
• Increased vulnerability of coastal communities

Yet even in this “doom and gloom” narrative, the report resists fatalism. Instead, it offers a framework for adaptation and resilience.

However, in the Pacific, the situation is not starting from zero.

For centuries, communities have managed fisheries through customary practices like tabu areas, seasonal closures, and community governance.

The report reinforces these approaches while introducing new strategies:

• Climate-smart aquaculture
• Diversifying target species
• Improving value chains (earning more from less catch)
• Protecting and restoring coastal/blue ecosystems

It also highlights a critical but often overlooked dimension, which is women’s contributions across fisheries and aquaculture systems, from harvesting to trade work that remain under-recognised despite their central role.

Science, Power, and the Politics of Survival

Perhaps the most powerful implication of the report lies beyond science — in politics.

Despite being one of the most climate-impacted sectors, fisheries are largely absent from global climate negotiations.

This is where the findings become more than a report. It becomes leverage.

With pre-COP discussions and COP31 on the horizon, Pacific countries now have something they have long needed.

“If Pacific delegations can come to pre-COP saying we have the latest science… and we all agree on how we want to act with the regional climate change strategy for coastal fisheries being pre-endorsed,” Lecomte says, “it’s a unique chance to showcase fisheries as part of the ocean–climate nexus.”

Beyond the Data: A Call to Act

This report does not just document change but also demands a response.

It bridges worlds:

• Between science and storytelling
• Between policy and lived experience
• Between global negotiations and village shorelines

For scientists, it offers the most comprehensive dataset yet when it comes to the Pacific and its EEZ; for policymakers, it is a roadmap; for communities, it is a validation of what they already know.

That the ocean is changing and so must we.

But in that change lies something powerful. For the first time, the Pacific is not just speaking from experience. It is speaking with scientific evidence.

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The second quadrennial International Migration Review Forum (IMRF) 2026 will be held at the UN Headquarters in New York from 5-8 May 2026, preceded by a multi-stakeholder hearing on 4 May. This forum reviews progress on the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) and aims to produce an inter-governmentally agreed Progress Declaration to set future migration policy goals.
 
https://migrationnetwork.un.org/international-migration-review-forum-2026

By Simone Galimberti
KATHMANDU, Nepal, May 4 2026 (IPS)

Migration is a strange thing, hard to pin down. It is a complex phenomenon that transforms communities while shaping people’s identities and it is so multifaceted that individuals perceive it and live it in different ways.

It can turn to be a vehicle to security and prosperity for some but, on other hand, it can be also experienced with anguish and fear.

In short, migration is something personal that intimately affects both those settling into a new land and those communities that are supposed to co-exist with them.

A German’s state, Baden-Württembergwill soon will have its first state premier from Turkish origin, Cem Özdemir, a veteran green politician. In the past, Mr. Özdemir, according to DW report, has rejected the idea that he should be considered a “successful model of integration” because he always felt at home.

Özdemir’s unwillingness to be boxed into a fixed category of migrant contrasts those narratives that simplify and demean migration.

As we know, migration has been a toxic and divisive issue in many parts of the West, a dangerous problem that must be stopped at any cost. It is being portrayed through the lens of illegality as an open door that only invites violations of the law, including dangerous criminal activities.

While it is undeniable that security concerns can arise especially when there are massive flows of foreigners enter without papers into a new country, much less discussions are about the positive impact of migrants in the local economy.

But the level of politicization is so high that it ended up defining the whole issue. Migration has become something to be fixed, controlled in many parts of the Global North.

Such a framing ignores the fact that migration also occurs in large quantities also between developing nations and is not only about hordes of people from the Global South pushing their way into richer North.

It is unsurprising that the same logic also disregards the multiple and diverse “push factors” that bring individuals to migrate.

Poverty, discrimination and climate change are forcing millions of individuals to search for better places to live. This view has become so pervasive that it has delegitimized a different conversation, one based on exploring legal pathways to migration.

A different way of talking, discussing and regulating migration is possible.

The United Nations, over the last decades, have been trying to offer a venue to promote an approach leading to safe migration based on human rights, conducive, at least on paper, to a multilateralism centered governance of migration.

While far from being perfect, these mechanisms underpinning it, address migration in a way that goes past the deafening rhetoric that generally characterizes the debate on migration.

Because, as we know, migration if managed properly, taking into account the rights of migrants and bringing on board local communities in the destination countries with investment in social integration, instead offers a potent instrument to fight poverty while contributing to the economies of the Global North.

The International Migration Review Forum 2026 is one of these tools at the disposal of the UN to reframe the conversation about migration.

The United Nations in New York will host, from 5-8 May an essential conversation aimed at reviewing the Global Compact on Migration, GCM adopted on 19 December 2018.

Instead of being seen as an opportunity to reboot the conversation about immigration, this non-binding global blueprint, intended to offer a 360 degree approach to foster international cooperation to effectively and inclusively manage migration, ended up being instrumentalised by cunny politicians.

Since then, unfortunately the GCM has been overshadowed by the relentless politics of immigration based on the logic of “control” that has become more and more mainstream in the European Union and in the United States.

Making things more complicated is the fact that it is fitting for demagogues to conflate the issues of migrants with those of refugees. While these two categories often overlap, legally, they remain different concepts, a fact conveniently ignored by politicians.

It has not always been like this.

The international community, thanks also to a more favorable politics in the USA, on September 19, 2016, had successfully managed to create a united policy framework that would bring together both migration and the refugee’s related policies.

The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants led the foundations not only to the Global Compact on Migration but also to another tool, the Global Compact on Refugees approved just two days before the GCM.

These are two examples of soft law designed to ignite international support and cooperation even if they were criticized as attempts by the Global North of watering down the international human rights framework.

Yet in order for them to remain useful without diluting the international obligations of nations, they must remain as close as possible in terms of implementation.

The central question is if they revitalize and re-balance the conversation on immigration and refugee protection with practical cooperation and synergies among nations.

I doubt that IMRF 2026 can do much to elevate a new discussion about migration and challenge the status quo. After all, GCM has been designed to be structurally weak in terms of its governance.

For example, there is no mandatory reporting for its signatories.

A silver lining in the GCM’s framework is the existence of the United Nations Network on Migration that “coordinates system-wide, timely and practical support to Member States implementing the GCM.

Yet this is the only mechanism where the international community can holistically discuss immigration. No matter how battered the United Nations are amid drastic funding cuts and ongoing discussions about its re-organization and restructuring, multilateralism is needed more than ever in the areas of migration and refugees.

Yet it appears that the UN is not fighting the fight at political levels.

Reading the Report of the Secretary General on the Global Compact on Migration, you do not find a strong, vigorous push back against the politics that tackle immigration as a problem to be controlled.

There is only a small section on Dispelling Misleading Narratives and you could have expected a more punchy style and more space to counterattack this mainstream narrative on migration based on fear.

Perhaps the “immigration as a problem” approach has already metastasized and, inevitably, it adversely influences and restrains the United Nations. The International Migration Organization, the guardian of the GCM, remains a marginal institution within the UN system.

The Office of the High Commissioner on Refugees faced substantial funding cuts and underwent in 2025 a profound restructuring despite its essential role in many humanitarian situations.

At least the former Higher Commissioner, Fillippo Grandi who stepped down at the end of 2025, did not mince his words in criticizing the ways many governments in the West have been dealing with immigration.

“Building walls, sending boats back, offloading refugees and migrants on to other countries –, populists assure voters that controlling everything from borders and immigration numbers to job markets and national security will make their lives better” he wrote for The Guardian in 2024

“Few political tactics succeed like fear. But I can also tell you such claims of control are illusory”. he continued. It is not only the USA which has embraced this tactics.

Civil society organizations across Europe have been recently criticizing the European Union for the way it is drafting its Return Directive that, once approved, would streamline the return of non-EU nationals staying irregularly, including those whose asylum requests have been denied.

Yet amid this gloom, there are some best practices emerging.

Local governments have an important role to play.

The Local Coalition for Migrants and Refugees is showing an interest model to promote a bottom approach to migration. Moreover, some countries are stepping up.

For example, in 2025, Brazil approved a National Plan on Refugees, Migrants and Stateless while Kenya also brought in a new policy that would positively impact the more than 830,000 refugees and asylum-seekers that are hosted in the country.

At the same time, Ecuador reached an important milestone in 2025 with its National Implementation Plan (NIP) of GCM. Similarly, Malawi has finalized its first National Implementation Plan on Migration.

It is too early to see if these plans will be enforced and a lot will depend on the availability of international funding. Despite the constraints, the IOM remains steadfast in its mission of protecting the rights of migrants.

In 2024 a new Strategic Plan that aims at saving lives and protecting people on the move, driving solutions to displacement and facilitating pathways for regular migration, was introduced.

In a world in which 8,000 migrants were officially reported dead or missing worldwide in 2025, bringing the total since 2014 to more than 82,000 and with 117.3 million people worldwide are forcibly displaced, the international communities cannot stay indifferent.

Let’s remind ourselves of the real power of the GCM.

This Global Compact does not only recognize that safe, orderly and regular migration works for all when it takes place in a well-informed, planned and consensual manner. It is also a tool that highlights the role of the international community in helping create conducive policies for individuals to be able to lead peaceful and productive lives in their home nations.

In short, migration should never be an act of desperation.

While there are individuals of migrant origins like Cem Özdemir who offer a glaring example of successful achievements that allow himself to openly reject a stereotyped categorization, there is a sea of vulnerabilities and deaths affecting millions of others who voluntarily or forcibly left their homes.

This is the reason why legal tools like the International Refugees Convention, this year in its 75th anniversary and more limited but potentially useful mechanisms like IMRF this coming week and next Global Refugee Forum (GRF) 2027, do matter and we should all pay attention to them.

Simone Galimberti writes about the SDGs, youth-centered policy-making and a stronger and better United Nations.

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By External Source
May 1 2026 (IPS)

On May 3rd, the world marks World Press Freedom Day – a United Nations observance dedicated to the fundamental principles of press freedom.

First proclaimed by the UN General Assembly in 1993, the day traces its origins to the Windhoek Declaration, adopted by African journalists in 1991, calling for a free, independent and pluralistic press.

In 2026, World Press Freedom Day is observed under the theme: “Shaping a Future at Peace: Promoting Press Freedom for Human Rights, Development, and Security.”

UNESCO says the day is a reminder to governments of their commitment to press freedom. It is also a day of reflection for media professionals, a day of support for media under pressure, and a day of remembrance for journalists who have lost their lives in pursuit of a story.

This year’s global commemoration comes at a time of growing concern.

UNESCO’s latest World Trends Report finds that freedom of expression has declined globally since 2012, while self-censorship among journalists has risen sharply. The report also highlights growing physical, digital and legal threats against journalists.

Between January 2022 and September 2025, UNESCO recorded the killing of 310 journalists, including 162 killed in conflict zones.

The 2026 World Press Freedom Day Global Conference will be held on May 4th and 5th in Lusaka, Zambia, co-hosted by UNESCO and the Government of Zambia.

The conference will bring together journalists, digital rights advocates, policymakers, civil society, researchers and technology experts to discuss how journalism, technology, human rights and information integrity can support more resilient societies.

As conflicts, disinformation and pressures on independent media continue to grow, World Press Freedom Day is a reminder that access to reliable information is not only a media issue.

It is a human rights issue.

A development issue.

And a peace and security issue.

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Displaced mothers and children at a malnutrition treatment center in Chuil, Jonglei State, South Sudan. Credit: WFP/Gabriela Vivacqua

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, May 1 2026 (IPS)

In 2026, the humanitarian situation in South Sudan has taken a considerable turn for the worse, with widespread food shortages, ongoing disruptions to food production systems, and rising rates of malnutrition affecting over half of the population. Compounded by the vast scale of needs and an overwhelming lack of access to basic services, humanitarian experts warn that nationwide levels of hunger are projected to worsen to catastrophic levels if urgent intervention is not secured.

On April 28, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the World Food Programme (WFP) published a joint statement underscoring the escalation of the hunger crisis in South Sudan, noting that approximately 56 percent of the population, or roughly 7.8 million people, are projected to face acute food insecurity by July. They stress that the main drivers of food insecurity are climate shocks, flooding, mass displacement, and protracted armed conflict, all of which hinder effective agricultural yields and reduce food availability for hundreds of thousands of families.

“Hunger in South Sudan is intensifying, not stabilizing,” said Ross Smith, WFP Director of Emergencies and Preparedness. “Between April and July of this year, more than half of the population is projected to face crisis levels of hunger or worse, including people already in catastrophic conditions, where starvation and a collapse of livelihoods are a daily reality. This is among the highest proportions of any country’s population facing crisis levels of hunger today.”

The latest figures from the Integrated Food Security Classification Phase (IPC) show that over 280,000 additional civilians have been pushed into acute food insecurity since late 2025, including 73,000 civilians who are facing catastrophic (IPC Phase 5) levels of hunger. This marks a 160 percent increase from last year’s figures. An additional 2.5 million people face emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels of hunger, and 5.3 million have been reported to rely on unsustainable coping mechanisms to survive.

Children have been hit particularly hard, with UNICEF reporting that approximately 2.2 million children between the ages of six months and five years suffer from acute malnutrition, marking an increase of over 100,000 cases compared to last year. Over 700,000 children are projected to face the highest levels of hunger by July. Roughly 1.2 million pregnant and breastfeeding women are acutely malnourished, which has significantly dangerous, long-term implications for both mothers and children.

“Every day of delayed humanitarian access and supply delivery is a day a child’s life and future hangs in the balance,” said Lucia Elmi, UNICEF Director of Emergencies. “We are calling on all parties to grant timely, safe access to conflict-affected, including areas of displacement, and scale up nutrition interventions. We must act now if we are to save children’s lives.”

Widespread displacement continues to hinder South Sudan’s road to recovery, with rampant insecurity, overcrowding, and a shortage of critical supplies in displacement shelters complicating humanitarian relief efforts. The UN agencies note that nearly 300,000 people have been displaced this year in the Jonglei state alone, with many communities entirely cut off from humanitarian assistance. Numerous families report being unable to access food services due to rising prices, disrupted markets, and economic decline, which has significantly reduced household purchasing power.

Additionally, displaced communities face elevated risks of contracting infectious diseases due to persistent overcrowding and unsanitary conditions. The agencies have recorded a sharp rise in cholera, malaria, and measles infections, particularly among “vulnerable and already acutely malnourished children”. Furthermore, treatment for malnutrition has been severely compromised over the past several months, with a substantial portion of the nation’s healthcare and nutritional support facilities having been damaged or closed entirely due to conflict. Life-saving medical interventions are largely unavailable due to continued shortages of medical supplies.

In April, IPC conducted a detailed Risk of Famine Analysis, assessing hunger conditions across seven counties to determine which regions were at a high risk of developing famine. The analysis identified four counties that are projected to contract famine in the coming months, a significant increase from just one county identified last year. The Upper Nile and Jonglei regions are particularly vulnerable, as the renewed escalation of armed hostilities has driven further displacement and reduced humanitarian reach to the most at-risk communities.

Risks are especially pronounced in Akobo, where IPC projects the return of over 100,000 South Sudanese civilians currently displaced in Gambela and Ethiopia. This large-scale return could further exacerbate hunger conditions, as humanitarian and healthcare personnel face severe shortages of supplies, funding, and staffing in assisting already strained communities.

IPC also warns that hunger conditions could escalate to catastrophic levels (IPC Phase 5) in the coming months across multiple areas, including Doma and Yomding in Ulang County; Pulturuk, Waat, and Thol Lankien in Nyirol County; and Kuerenge Ke and Mading in southern Nasir County. All of these regions remain largely inaccessible due to ongoing conflict, which has limited humanitarian reach.

In response, the UN has called for an end to the isolation of these communities in relief efforts, stressing the urgent need for closer monitoring and a strengthened humanitarian response.

“Now, more than ever, we cannot afford to lose the hard-won gains made in recent years, especially as South Sudan works to strengthen its agrifood systems and build on encouraging signs of local agricultural production,” said Rein Paulsen, FAO Director, Office of Emergencies and Resilience. “These gains remain highly vulnerable to conflict, insecurity, and climate shocks—the very forces driving today’s food crisis. We must act urgently and collectively to protect livelihoods, sustain food production, and prevent millions more people from falling deeper into hunger.”

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Press freedom is on the retreat across much of the world.

As documented by recent global surveys authored by the UN and media institutes, the erosion of an independent, fearless and diversified press is a trend that has worsened for well over a decade.

Farhana Haque Rahman

Delivering the 2026 Reuters Memorial Lecture on March 9, Carlos Dada, Salvadoran editor of El Faro, now operating in exile, did not mince his words:

“A far-right, populist, autocratic wave is taking the world by storm and breaking all the rules, and journalists, as in every authoritarian regime or dictatorship, no matter its ideological foundations, are labelled as enemies. Journalism is being criminalized, and our colleagues are being imprisoned or killed.”

Just days earlier, El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele was described by the Autonomous University of Barcelona as imposing one of the most restrictive environments for press freedom in Latin America through a “model of techno-populist authoritarianism”.

World Press Freedom Day, on May 3, has adopted as its declared theme: “Shaping a Future at Peace: Promoting Press Freedom for Human Rights, Development, and Security” – a challenging title given the wars, turmoil and economic crises currently besetting the world.

UNESCO, co-hosting the 2026 conference with the Zambian government in Lusaka on May 4-5, has itself charted a sharp decline in freedom of expression globally. Its 2022/2025 World Trends Report, Journalism: Shaping a World at Peace cites an increase in physical attacks, digital threats, and a surge in self-censorship among journalists.

This crisis is summed up by UNESCO as a “historically significant and unprecedented shift”, noting that for the first time in 20 years non-democratic regimes outnumber democracies. Some 72 percent of the world’s population lives under “non-democratic rule”, the highest proportion since 1978.

This decline in press freedom, plurality and diversity “mirrors broader patterns: weakened parliaments and judicial institutions, falling levels of public trust, and deepening polarization. It has also coincided with setbacks in equality, alongside rising hostility toward environmental journalists, scientists, and researchers”, UNESCO’s report says.

It also warns how “the growing dominance of major technology companies – and the consequences of their shifting policies and practices – have created fertile ground for hate speech and disinformation to spread online.”

In its World Press Freedom Index for 2025, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) says physical attacks against journalists are the most visible violations of press freedom but “economic pressure is also a major, more insidious problem”.

“Much of this is due to ownership concentration, pressure from advertisers and financial backers, and public aid that is restricted, absent or allocated in an opaque manner,” RSF states. “Today’s news media are caught between preserving their editorial independence and ensuring their economic survival.”

“For the first time in the history of the Index, the conditions for practising journalism are ‘difficult’ or ‘very serious’ in over half of the world’s countries and satisfactory in fewer than one in four.”

World Press Freedom Day goes back to a 1993 decision by the UN General Assembly to commemorate the Declaration of Windhoek, a statement of free press principles produced by African journalists in 1991.

But as RSF notes, press freedom in Sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing a worrying decline. The economic score of the index deteriorated in 80 percent of countries in the region.

Overall Eritrea (180th) remained the worst-ranking country. The Democratic Republic of the Congo fell 10 places to 133rd as its economic indicator plummeted. Conflict zones saw sharp declines in press freedom in Burkina Faso, Sudan and Mali with newsrooms forced to self-censor, shut down or go into exile.

“The hyper-concentration of media ownership in the hands of political figures or business elites without safeguards for editorial independence remains a recurring problem,” RSF says, citing issues in Cameroon, Nigeria and Rwanda.

Nonetheless higher-ranking countries, such as South Africa, Namibia, Cape Verde and Gabon “provide rays of hope”, RSF adds.

A clear casualty of the toxic combo of autocratic populists, media-owning cronies and dwindling budgets is coverage of climate change. Even normally heavy-hitting media groups are cutting back their reporting of the global climate crisis in another blow to the key SDG Target of promoting public access to information.

China remains the “world’s largest jail for journalists”, ranking 178th on RSF’s global press freedom index, one place above North Korea.

Bangladesh ranked 149th in the World Press Freedom Index. Following the parliamentary elections in February this year, RSF has urged the new Bangladeshi government to put an end to arbitrary detentions, the instrumentalization of the justice system and impunity for crimes against journalists. Such abuses have caused lasting damage to the country’s press.

Summing up the state of the press following Perugia’s annual International Journalism Festival in April, Carole Cadwalladr, investigative journalist for The Nerve — a “fearless, female-founded, truly independent [UK] media title” – commented: “There’s “not much light in these dark times” while referencing the killing by Israeli forces of over 200 Palestinian journalists and media workers since the Hamas attacks on Israel in October 2023.

But she did feel an “energy” at the festival held in the Italian hill-top city.

“All across the world, there are journalists doing the hard yards of trying to hold power to account,” she wrote. “And increasingly, this is being done by small, insurgent new outlets that are sprouting up because there is a gap that needs to be filled.”

Or as Dada, editor of El Salvador’s exiled El Faro, declared in his lecture:

“We are journalists in resistance. In resistance to the violation of our rights, the shuttering of public information… resistance to limitless power. We practised journalism in democracy for a quarter century. That era is gone. Today, we are a newsroom in resistance.”

Farhana Haque Rahman is Senior Vice President of IPS Inter Press Service and Executive Director IPS Noram; she served as the elected Director General of IPS from 2015-2019. A journalist and communications expert, she is a former senior official of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and the International Fund for Agricultural Development.

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Credit: UN Photo/Loey Felipe

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, May 1 2026 (IPS)

A longstanding rule bars international civil servants from publicly taking a political stand against member states, even against those accused of human rights violations, war crimes and genocide (and even barring staffers from participating in political demonstrations outside the UN).

And more importantly, the rules also forbid UN staffers from campaigning for– or against– candidates for secretary general, including the current race for a new UNSG.

Perhaps that’s a price one has to pay—forfeiting the right to political expression– when you are an international civil servant. But is it worth the sacrifice?

A new circular to UN staffers, released April 29, reiterates these restrictions cautioning against any participation in the run-up to the election of a new Secretary-General later this year.

“As recent and ongoing wars and conflicts continue, the UN remains indispensable as a platform for dialogue, human rights, and collective action and all staff play a vital role in this effort.

While it is understandable that many staff members feel compelled to share views about events that are unfolding, including in personal fora such as social media, we must be mindful at all times of our rights and duties as international civil servants, which require us to act independently and impartially,” says the circular.

Four candidates in the running for the next UN Secretary-General; Michelle Bachelet (Chile), Rafael Grossi (Argentina), Rebeca Grynspan (Costa Rica), and Macky Sall (Senegal). Credit: United Nations

This applies to all public communications (including those shared through personal social media accounts) related to ongoing crises, political matters, and other elections and electoral processes, which should be framed in a manner that is consistent with the Organization’s positions and the statements of the Secretary-General.

Recent instances have also highlighted the need for particular caution with regard to public expressions of support for candidates in the selection process for the Secretary-General.

“Any such expressions—whether explicit or implicit—may be perceived as inconsistent with the independence and impartiality required of international civil servants and risk undermining the integrity of the process”, the circular cautions.

‘Disclaimers indicating that views are expressed in a personal capacity do not absolve us of our obligations under the Staff Regulations and Rules. The standards of conduct apply irrespective of the platform used or the capacity in which views are expressed,” the circular warns.

Dr Palitha Kohona, a former Chief of the UN Treaty Section, told Inter Press Service (IPS):
“It is undoubted that international civil servants must remain above national and sectarian differences. It is this quality that makes them and the Organization credible. Sometimes it may become difficult to remain silent in the face of gross abuses, and these circumstances present a dilemma”.

In this context, he pointed out, it is most important to bear in mind Article 101 of the Charter.

During the time of SG Kofi Annan (1997-2006), a more relaxed atmosphere prevailed and staff were permitted to express their views within their own areas of responsibility.

“Then again, one is constrained to ask whether staff should remain mute when the very fundamentals of the Charter are being violated. Whether they be human rights, or the prohibition or the threat of the use of force, or the commitment to live in peace and harmony,” he argued.

The leadership of the Organization must provide the guidelines within which the staff could express themselves. But not the wishy-washy stuff that we are increasingly getting used to.

But will the leadership ever call a spade a spade, declared Dr Kohona, a former Sri Lankan Permanent Representative to the UN, and until recently, Ambassador to China.

Samir Sanbar, a former Assistant Secretary-General and head of the Department of Public Information (DPI) told IPS: “I recall taking an “Oath of Office”‘ to “exercise in all loyalty, discretion and conscience the functions entrusted to me as an international civil servant of the United Nations, to discharge these functions and regulate my conduct with the interests of the united Nations only in view. and not to seek or accept instructions in regard to the performance of my duties from any government or other authority external to the Organization”.

I am not clear, he said, whether that oath is currently required particularly after several former government officials joined the Secretariat.

Supporting a particular candidate proposed by a government –as officially required– for the post of Secretary General would be contrary to that oath of international civil service, he pointed out.

Recounting his strong personal relationship with a former Secretary-General, Sanbar said: “Kofi Annan was my closest United Nations colleague as we started our work at the same time and progressed together when he headed Peace keeping and I headed Public Information.”

He visited me at home on a Sunday evening, said Sanbar, to inform me of his candidacy for Secretary-General yet graciously agreed that my contacts with the media would not indicate public support until he was elected when we walked to the photo unit on the eighth floor for an official portrait.

Meanwhile, the UN circular also says : “We, as staff members must adhere to the policies set out in the Status, basic rights and duties of United Nations staff members; outside activities. The guidelines for the personal use of social media also include a number of useful tips including on privacy settings, liking or sharing posts, and reminders on information that has not been made public.’

In particular, staff regulation 1.2 (f) provides: “While staff members’ personal views and convictions, including their political and religious convictions, remain inviolable, staff members shall ensure that those views and convictions do not adversely affect their official duties or the interests of the United Nations.

They shall conduct themselves at all times in a manner befitting their status as international civil servants and shall not engage in any activity that is incompatible with the proper discharge of their duties with the United Nations.

They shall avoid any action and, in particular, any kind of public pronouncement that may adversely reflect on their status, or on the integrity, independence and impartiality that are required by that status.”

The “2026 Guidance on Political Activities” issued on iSeek by the UN Ethics Office provides more guidance.

“We, as staff members, are obliged to comply with these provisions. Failure to do so can result in the initiation of a disciplinary process, which may result in disciplinary sanctions being imposed.”

Given the above, please also be aware, in accordance with staff rule 10.1 “Failure by staff members to comply with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, the Staff Regulations and Rules or other relevant administrative issuances or to observe the standards of conduct expected of an international civil servant may amount to misconduct and may lead to the institution of a disciplinary process and the imposition of disciplinary measures for misconduct.”

In addition, affiliate (non-staff) personnel must also comply with the principles set out under the terms and conditions of their engagement as well as the administrative instructions that govern their modality of engagement such as ST/AI/2020/10 on United Nations Internship Programme, ST/AI/2013/4 on Consultants and Individual Contractors, ST/AI/231/Rev.1 on Non-Reimbursable Loan Experts, ST/AI/1999/6 on Gratis Personnel, and the MOU and Conditions of Service guidelines for UN Volunteers.

“This reminder is issued in the interest of protecting both individual staff members and the Organization, and to ensure that the United Nations continues to be perceived as an impartial and trusted institution by Member States and the public”.

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The UN report has highlighted water as the most immediate and severe casualty of this global transition. Mining operations require vast quantities of water and often contaminate local sources. Credit: UNU-INWEH

By Umar Manzoor Shah
SRINAGAR, India, Apr 30 2026 (IPS)

A newly released United Nations report has raised urgent concerns that the world’s push toward clean energy and digital technologies is driving a hidden crisis in some of the planet’s most vulnerable regions, where mining for critical minerals is depleting water supplies, damaging health, and deepening inequality.

The report, Critical Minerals, Water Insecurity and Injustice, released by the United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health (UNU-INWEH), warns that the race for minerals essential to electric vehicles, renewable energy, and artificial intelligence could replicate the injustices of the fossil fuel era.

Demand for these minerals is expected to surge dramatically in the coming decades. According to the report, global demand could quadruple by 2050, with lithium, cobalt, and graphite seeing increases of up to 500 percent. These materials are indispensable for batteries, solar panels, and digital infrastructure.

Prof. Kaveh Madani, UNU-INWEH Director who led the investigation team, says the world lacks an enforceable governance model for critical minerals. Credit: UNU-INWEH

Prof. Kaveh Madani, UNU-INWEH Director who led the investigation team, told IPS News in an exclusive interview that the world is lacking an enforceable governance model for critical minerals.

He said that without binding international agreements, laws, and policies, environmental and health costs—especially water depletion and pollution—are pushed onto mining regions, leaving affected communities without effective accountability or recourse.

“The climate, energy, sustainability, and the so-called “green” policies are narrowly carbon-centric. Demand projections are driven by decarbonisation targets, but water security, health and WASH impacts are not hard constraints in transition planning. As a result, mineral extraction expands even in highly water-stressed regions,” Madani said.

He added that the trade and industrial policies reinforce structural asymmetries and that high-income economies retain control over refining, manufacturing, finance, and intellectual property, while mineral-rich countries are locked into raw extraction with weak benefit-sharing. “Together, these failures reproduce inequality rather than delivering a just transition,” Madani told IPS.

Communities in mining zones are increasingly described as “sacrifice zones”, areas where environmental degradation and human suffering are accepted as the cost of global progress. Credit: UNU-INWEH

The report has further highlighted water as the most immediate and severe casualty of this global transition. Mining operations require vast quantities of water and often contaminate local sources.

Producing just one tonne of lithium requires nearly 1.9 million litres of water. In 2024 alone, global lithium production consumed an estimated 456 billion litres, an amount equivalent to the annual domestic water needs of about 62 million people in sub-Saharan Africa.

In Chile’s Salar de Atacama, one of the world’s richest lithium reserves, mining accounts for up to 65 percent of regional water use, intensifying shortages for local communities and farmers.

Across the so-called Lithium Triangle, spanning Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile, groundwater levels are falling. The report cites evidence of declining water tables and disrupted ecosystems as brine extraction alters underground water systems.

“Everyone needs money. But everyone also needs the basics, like water,” a resident in Bolivia’s Uyuni region is quoted as saying in the report.

Cases of Birth Defects, Miscarriages, and Chronic Illnesses

Toxic chemicals and heavy metals released during extraction often seep into rivers, soil, and groundwater.

The report documents widespread pollution in mining regions such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where cobalt extraction is concentrated. In some areas, rivers have turned highly acidic, with pH levels below 4.5, rendering water unsafe for drinking and agriculture.

Health impacts are severe. In communities near mining sites, 72 percent of respondents reported skin diseases, while more than half of women reported gynaecological problems. Prolonged exposure to contaminated water has also been linked to cases of birth defects, miscarriages, and chronic illnesses.

Children are particularly vulnerable. Studies cited in the report show higher rates of congenital abnormalities in areas close to mining activity, along with increased risks of developmental disorders.

“These are not isolated cases. They reflect systemic health disparities driven by environmental exposure,” reads the report.

Who Benefits and Who Pays?

Beyond health, water scarcity and pollution are undermining traditional livelihoods. Farming, fishing, and livestock rearing are becoming increasingly difficult in mining regions.

In Bolivia, lithium extraction has reduced water availability for quinoa farming, a staple crop. In parts of Africa, declining fish populations have resulted from river contamination, which has cut off a key source of food and income.

In some cases, mining operations displace entire communities. Indigenous populations, whose lands often contain mineral reserves, are among the hardest hit.

The report estimates that more than half of critical mineral projects are located on or near Indigenous territories .

A main finding of the report is the imbalance between who benefits and who pays the price.

While extraction largely occurs in the Global South, the economic and technological gains are concentrated in wealthier nations. Countries rich in minerals often lack the infrastructure and capacity to process them, limiting their role to low-value extraction.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which produces over 60 percent of the world’s cobalt, more than 70 percent of the population lives on less than $2.15 a day.

Meanwhile, the profits flow to multinational corporations and industrial economies that dominate refining and manufacturing.

The report describes this dynamic as a “structural sustainability paradox,” where the environmental benefits enjoyed in developed countries are effectively subsidised by ecological and social harm in poorer regions.

Experts warn that the current trajectory could repeat patterns seen in the fossil fuel industry.

“The clean energy transition is not automatic. Without deliberate policy intervention, it can reproduce extractive colonialism under a new label,” the report states.

Communities in mining zones are increasingly being described as “sacrifice zones”, areas where environmental degradation and human suffering are accepted as the cost of global progress.

The report has recommended stronger international regulations, mandatory environmental standards, and greater transparency in supply chains. It also urges investment in recycling and circular economy models to reduce reliance on new mining, as well as the adoption of technologies that use less water.

Crucially, it emphasises the need to include local communities in decision-making and ensure they benefit from resource extraction. “Achieving climate goals must not come at the expense of those least equipped to bear the costs,” the report reads.

Dr Abraham Nunbogu, UNU-INWEH scientist and the report’s lead author, says legally allocating a share of mineral revenues to water infrastructure, health systems, skills training, and downstream industrial capacity is crucial. Credit: UNU-INWEH

Strategic Policy Needed

Dr Abraham Nunbogu, a UNU-INWEH scientist and the report’s lead author, told Inter Press Service that a practical step to move up the value chain and keep more economic benefits is a strategic industrial policy: using export conditions, licensing, or joint-venture requirements to promote local refining, processing, and manufacturing.

“Second, benefit-sharing and reinvestment mandates: legally allocating a share of mineral revenues to water infrastructure, health systems, skills training, and downstream industrial capacity. Third, regional value-chain cooperation: pooling resources across neighbouring countries to achieve economies of scale in processing and manufacturing that individual countries cannot reach alone,” Nunbogu said.

He added that the final step would be to address power imbalances by linking mineral access to ethical sourcing standards and technology transfer obligations in trade agreements.

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CIVICUS discusses Bulgaria’s Gen Z-led protests with Aleksandar Tanev, founder of Students Against the Mafia, an informal student organisation that took part in mass protests against corruption and state capture.

Aleksandar Tanev

What brought you to activism and these protests?

I am a Russian-Bulgarian citizen, because my father is Bulgarian and my mother is Russian. I lived in Bulgaria until I was about five years old and then moved to Russia, where I lived until a few years ago. From around the age of 12 I became interested in politics and started asking questions. I took part in my first protest in Russia at age 17 and participated in campaigns for independent parliamentary candidates. When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, my life changed drastically. On the first day I took part in a protest that turned out to be my last. I immediately started receiving threats, and on the same day I received a draft notice from the military registration office. I decided to leave.

Bulgaria was one of the first countries to suspend flights from Russia. But my brother, who was doing an internship at the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told me a humanitarian flight was being organised to evacuate Bulgarian citizens. I managed to sign up and flew to Sofia. I started a new life in Bulgaria, remembering the language and meeting new people.

When I arrived, I found so many people had been exposed to Russian propaganda. I had to explain over and over what the real situation in Russia was. For two and a half years I worked at the Bulgarian Red Cross helping Ukrainian refugees. I enrolled at Sofia University and gradually reintegrated into my home country.

When the protests broke out, I was in Germany and saw the photos and videos of young people taking to the streets. I thought the time had finally come to do something. What triggered the protests was a government budget that included tax increases but no institutional reforms. People may struggle to understand complex political issues, but when the government takes money from them, they understand. Very quickly, the protest went beyond the trigger issue and turned into a protest not just against the government, but against a whole system of corrupt governance and state capture.

At that moment, I realised students were the driving force, and started an informal group called Students Against the Mafia. We told major media about it and began preparing our first action. We attached a three-by-four metre banner reading ‘Students Against the Mafia’ to the balcony of Sofia University’s rector’s office while an international conference was being held inside. We held a student march and joined the big protest.

What’s the current level of trust in institutions?

Bulgarians, including young people, are very disappointed by the actions of those in power. Bulgaria is a parliamentary democracy and people had a lot of expectations when it joined the European Union (EU) but have since become increasingly disappointed. Trust in state institutions is overall very low, and so is trust in civil society organisations and other parts of society. This is dangerous, because it may mean a loss of trust in democracy.

People don’t really understand the difference between government and civil society. They think NGOs are organisations created by the government to control society or financed by foreign states to lobby for their own interests. There is very little critical thinking. People don’t fact-check information and instead absorb propaganda and dangerous narratives.

My personal goal is to try to bring back trust in civil society, showing that civil society groups are instruments of people power. That’s why we show our faces, our goals and our actions.

Who took part in the protests?

Very different parts of Bulgarian society protested, and with very different ideas. There were pro-European people, Eurosceptics and people who had never been interested in politics before. What united them was that they were tired of the injustice of a system in which you can’t change anything for the better because power is captured by a small elite.

Politics is a revolving door: Boyko Borissov, the prime minister at the time, was prime minister three times, and his party was in power for over a decade. Delyan Peevski, leader of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, was sanctioned under the US Magnitsky Act for corruption in a controversial scandal, representing a merger between political power, media influence, institutional dependence and impunity. The same group of politicians captured the government, parliament and the most important institution, the courts. This meant that change wasn’t going to come from institutions.

While protesters had many different complaints and demands, they all shared the hope for normal governance and the feeling that this couldn’t go on.

How were protests organised, and what role did social media play?

The first big protest was half organised, half spontaneous: the call came from a political party, but it echoed well beyond party supporters, so the turnout was much bigger than anybody expected. It was a broad national protest.

The organiser was the pro-European, anti-corruption coalition We Continue the Change – Democratic Bulgaria. After the party made the announcement, people started sharing it on social media and in personal conversations, and soon there was this protest energy in the air. Everyone was talking about it.

In between protests, people waited for the signal from this political party to come back out. We didn’t think to organise our own protests. Instead, we prepared actions and performances to stage at the next protests the party organised. And each time, more and more people came, because those who had previously protested shared the call within their own small networks.

Social media helped us enormously, because traditional media in Bulgaria is captured too. Corrupt politicians have a strong influence over traditional television channels but they don’t control social media. So Facebook, Instagram and other platforms filled the space of independent media. On social media, we can share and talk freely. To Gen Z protesters, the protests became an extension of this space: they came to the protests to speak their minds.

One problem was that during the protests, the internet was very slow. We thought the authorities caused this deliberately, but it’s also possible mobile operators simply couldn’t handle so many people in one place. Either way, social media was key to the success of the protests.

Do you agree with the label that these were Gen Z protests?

I do. In fact, to one of the protests we brought a five-metre banner that read ‘Gen Z is coming’. It was shown by the Daily Mail, Reuters and other international media.

While I think the label is correct, we shouldn’t interpret it literally. Many different age groups took part in the protests. What made them Gen Z protests was the participation of so many young people who gave them a face of hope. But it was only because all Bulgarian society joined in that we succeeded in bringing down the government.

What risks did protesters face?

Honestly, compared to Russia, the risk wasn’t very high. But that doesn’t mean everything was okay. For instance, some students faced pressure from their universities not to go to protests. Students who helped me spread the word about Students Against the Mafia at their university got warnings from the administration not to do it again. That’s not acceptable. Students have the right to express their opinions freely, including through protest.

Provocateurs showed up towards the end of each protest. They covered their faces and brought some kind of explosives, and police started beating protesters. Because of this, most regular people left after a couple of hours. We think these provocateurs may have been sent by the parties in power to discredit protests.

Some people were unnecessarily scared. I protested very actively and nothing happened to me, though I should be honest that when you become visible, that gives you a degree of protection, and this may not be true of everyone.

What did the protests achieve, and what comes next?

The government fell. That’s a big achievement. And Bulgarian society woke up. A lot of people who previously thought politics was something dirty, something separate from their personal lives, understood they had a responsibility.

But there’s still a long way to go. All this protest energy needs to be transformed into electoral energy. Power is built not only in the streets but also within institutions. If we don’t turn this energy into votes, all the effort will have been useless. Voter turnout in the last election prior to the protests was under 40 per cent. This is not representative democracy; it is a disaster. We cannot expect change to happen when only 40 per cent of voters actually turn out.

Diaspora voting rights are also under threat. The opposition Revival party proposed limiting polling stations outside the EU to just 20 locations, far too few for the large Bulgarian communities in the UK, the USA and elsewhere. The proposal was backed by most governing parties; only Peevski opposed it. Revival’s stated aim was to limit votes from Turkey, which tend to go to Peevski’s party. But the measure would hit all diaspora communities: over 60,000 voter applications were submitted for the 19 April election, over twice the figure from the previous election. Unlike voters in Turkey, who can travel to Bulgaria to vote in person, those in the UK and USA cannot. This was a deliberate attempt to suppress the votes of people who have left and who tend to vote for change.

Following the main protests, we also started organising actions against the chief prosecutor, Borislav Sarafov, the one who ultimately decides whether a corruption case will be investigated. According to Bulgarian law, a temporary chief prosecutor can only hold the post for up to six months. But now they say that this law doesn’t apply to him because he was already in the role when the law was passed. So this temporary prosecutor can now potentially stay in this position for life. We have held four or five protests against him, but so far we have not succeeded.

What keeps me going is the desire to live in a fair society where the state is at the service of the people, and not the other way around. But in a democracy, you have to change things yourself. You can’t wait for someone to do it for you. Living in Russia, I understood that if you don’t fight for justice and truth, there is always a danger that power will take over everything. There’s this phrase I keep coming back to: if you are not interested in politics, politics will start to take an interest in you. That’s my motivation.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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Gen Z protests: new resistance rises CIVICUS | State of Civil Society Report 2026
‘People reacted to a system of governance shaped by informal powers and personal interests’ CIVICUS | Interview with Zahari Iankov 18.Dec.2025
Bulgaria: stuck in a loop? CIVICUS Lens 24.Oct.2022

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Coming from an island in southern Chile, where the sea is not an industry—but it is daily life, work, food and memory. Growing up in a family that is part of an artisanal fishers’ cooperative. Learning from a young age how to cultivate oysters, work with mussels, and understand the rhythms of the sea.

Yohana Coñuecar Llancapani

It is this same knowledge that we brought from Chile to Barcelona, to the Global Seafood Marketplace. As a Chilean delegation made up of Indigenous leaders and small-scale fishers, we were not just attending a trade fair—we were opening a conversation that has too often been left out of these spaces.

The Seafood Expo Global has established itself as one of the main platforms where the future of the global fishing industry is shaped. It is a space where standards, innovation, efficiency and markets are discussed. Yet one dimension continues to remain secondary: the role of Indigenous peoples who sustain marine ecosystems and inhabit the very spaces where the industry operates.

From Chile, our participation seeks to contribute to this debate from a strategic perspective. It is not about confronting the industry, but about demonstrating that its long-term sustainability depends on integrating other forms of knowledge and governance.

The industry has made progress in sustainability criteria, but often from a technical standpoint. What is still missing is the recognition that the spaces where it operates are not merely production zones, but inhabited territories. The knowledge developed by coastal communities is not just tradition—it is a living system of management.

In Chile, the Indigenous Coastal Marine Spaces (ECMPOs) have shown that it is possible to articulate conservation, productive use and territorial governance. However, the amendments currently under discussion to the Lafkenche Law send a worrying signal: instead of strengthening an instrument that has contributed to sustainability and territorial governance, there is a risk of weakening it in response to short-term production pressures.

This is not just a regulatory debate. It has direct implications for the stability of the industry. That is why we seek to bring this conversation to a global stage. And the space we are bringing to the Global Seafood Marketplace in Barcelona is not a traditional stand—it is an invitation to pause, to sit down and to engage in dialogue.

We want decision-makers in the industry to listen to these experiences. To understand that behind every product there are territories, people and ways of life. That their decisions have real impacts.

But we also want to show that there is an opportunity here.

Integrating Indigenous traditional knowledge is not only a matter of justice—it is a strategy for the sector’s real sustainability. It helps ensure continuity, traceability and quality over time. It is also a smart economic decision.

The ocean is not infinite. And we need new ways of relating to it.

From our territories, this is already happening. The question is: is the global industry willing to listen?

Yohana Coñuecar Llancapani is Mapuche Williche leader from Llanchid Island, Hualaihué, Chile

IPS UN Bureau

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Over recent decades, agricultural commodities have been transformed from goods into financial assets. Markets anticipate future disruptions and push prices up faster than underlying conditions would justify. Credit: Bigstock

By Mihaela Siritanu
LONDON, Apr 29 2026 (IPS)

As the United States and Israel’s 2026 attack on Iran remains on pause, most eyes have fixed on oil. Tankers reroute around the Strait of Hormuz, oil benchmarks climb, and insurance costs spike. But while the headlines focus on energy, warning signs are already flashing from the food commodities markets.

Middle East tensions continue to escalate, but global wheat and maize supplies remain relatively well stocked and production has not been significantly disrupted. Yet UK wheat futures have risen to almost £183 per tonne — their highest level since mid-November — after rising more than £2.60 in a single week. At the same time, fertiliser prices — a key input for future harvests — have doubled since the start of the year, even though the main impacts on crop production have yet to materialise.

These are early warning signs — not of a harvest failure, but of how today’s food system responds to crisis. Food prices are beginning to rise, with the FAO Food Price Index steadily increasing in February and March 2026, even though crops have not yet failed, harvests have not collapsed, and global production remains broadly stable. The crisis is unfolding in real time, before any physical shortage has fully materialised.

Of course, real factors matter — but they operate very differently. When oil prices rise, they feed into food production through higher fertiliser costs, more expensive transport, and increased energy use on farms.

But these are gradual pressures: they work their way through the system over months, as farmers purchase inputs, plant crops, and bring harvests to market. Prices linked to these costs would normally rise slowly, in step with actual changes in production.

Instead, prices are moving immediately, driven less by current shortages than by expectations of what might happen. Markets anticipate future disruptions and push prices up faster than underlying conditions would justify. In this system, financial markets are no longer simply reflecting reality — they are actively reshaping it.

Over recent decades, agricultural commodities have been transformed from goods into financial assets. Wheat, maize, and rice are now traded not only by farmers and merchants, but by hedge funds, investment banks, and institutional investors seeking returns.

In wealthier countries, higher food prices squeeze household budgets. In much of the Global South, where food accounts for a larger share of income, the same increases can push families into hunger. Import-dependent countries must pay prices set on global markets even when local supply conditions remain stable

Financial instruments such as commodity index funds channel large volumes of capital into these markets, often detached from real supply and demand. Large trading firms straddle both physical and financial markets, allowing them to profit from volatility, rather than mitigate it.

When geopolitical shocks occur, this capital moves quickly. Investors position themselves ahead of expected disruptions, driving up futures prices that then feed through to importers, retailers, and consumers. The Iran crisis is therefore not just raising costs, it is activating a financial system primed to amplify them.

The consequences are global but uneven. In wealthier countries, higher food prices squeeze household budgets. In much of the Global South, where food accounts for a larger share of income, the same increases can push families into hunger. Import-dependent countries must pay prices set on global markets even when local supply conditions remain stable.

These pressures do not remain purely economic. Food price spikes can have destabilising political effects. Rising costs of staple foods have long been linked to social unrest, including in the lead-up to the Arab Spring, when increases in bread prices contributed to protests across North Africa and the Middle East. This reflects a broader pattern in which rising food costs – amplified by market speculation – increase the likelihood of unrest by intensifying existing social and economic grievances.

This helps explain a persistent paradox: hunger continues to rise in a world that produces more than enough food. The problem is not simply production, but access – and increasingly, how prices are formed.

That system was built over decades: on one hand through the deregulation of commodity markets in the Global North, which opened the door to large-scale speculative investment, and on the other, deregulation exported globally through IMF and World Bank programmes that promoted market liberalisation, privatisation, and the dismantling of public price stabilisation mechanisms, leaving many countries exposed to volatility.

The emerging food price pressures linked to the Iran conflict should therefore be understood as more than a temporary shock. They are a warning signal. If prices can spike before shortages occur, then food insecurity is no longer just a matter of supply. It is a function of how markets are organised.

Until that system is addressed, each new geopolitical crisis — whether in Iran or elsewhere — will continue to reverberate through food markets in ways that deepen inequality and intensify hunger. The next food crisis is not just growing in the fields. It is already being priced in.

Mihaela Siritanu is the Economic Governance and Financialisation Lead at the Bretton Woods Project.

On 25 March 2026 in Somalia, Nasra and Muslimo, both in Grade 8, attend class at Kabasa Primary School in Dollow. The school serves children from displaced and host communities. Through education, safe spaces and life-skills programmes, UNICEF supports girls to stay in school, build confidence and pursue their aspirations despite the challenges of drought and displacement. Credit: UNICEF/Nahom Tesfaye

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Apr 29 2026 (IPS)

The escalating global climate crisis has led to an increase in the frequency of climate-induced natural disasters, affecting millions worldwide. As governments struggle to keep up due to persistent funding shortfalls and inadequate preparedness and response mechanisms, education systems in Eastern and Southern Africa continue to deteriorate, pushing millions of children into displacement and poverty, further deepening long-term inequalities.

These are detailed out in a April 20 policy brief from UNICEF and global consulting firm Dalberg, titled Protecting Children’s Learning Futures: Quantifying Climate-Related Loss and Damage in Eastern and Southern Africa. The report analyses data from Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Mozambique, and Zambia, examining how increasingly destructive climate shocks are destroying educational infrastructure and limiting growth opportunities for the most vulnerable populations, including girls, children with disabilities, and other marginalised communities.

Through this report, UNICEF and Dalberg stress the urgency of building climate-resilient educational systems that promote human development, economic growth, and long-term self-sufficiency. Without immediate humanitarian intervention, it is projected that hundreds of millions of children are at risk of falling behind in their education by 2050, resulting in billions of dollars lost in development and poorer life outcomes.

“Children are paying the highest price for a crisis they did not create. For the first time, this report shows the scale of climate-related loss and damage to education, yet the impact on children remains largely invisible in financing decisions,” said Etleva Kadilli, UNICEF Regional Director for Eastern and Southern Africa.

“Without stronger prioritization in climate finance, education will continue to bear the brunt of climate impacts, driving repeated disruption,” Kadilli continued. “We must design education systems that anticipate shocks, protect early and foundational learning, and keep schools open. Otherwise, the true cost of climate loss and damage will be measured in lost human potential.”

Eastern and Southern Africa are among the most climate-sensitive regions in the world, home to roughly one-third of the world’s most vulnerable countries. According to UNICEF, since 2005 the region has experienced over 700 extreme weather events, roughly 75 percent of which are attributed to climate change, affecting over 330 million people and causing over 40,000 deaths.

As of 2024, climate-induced natural disasters have caused approximately USD 1.3 billion in damages, largely driven by widespread damage to school infrastructure and expenses related to establishing temporary learning facilities. Since 2005, extreme weather patterns have disrupted the education of over 130 million children, resulting in a total estimated loss of USD 120–140 billion in future earnings.

Without urgent intervention, UNICEF projects that these losses could rise to between USD 3.3 and 3.8 billion by 2050, nearly tripling in the most vulnerable contexts. This is equivalent to approximately 440 to 520 million students being stripped of their education, with projected losses in future earnings reaching between USD 260 to 380 billion.

Additionally, persistent climate shocks in Eastern and Southern Africa have been linked to declining school performance, compromised safety, and reduced well-being among school-aged children. According to the report, widespread heatwaves are associated with reduced cognitive performance, lower test scores, and diminished teaching performances among educators.

UNICEF has also reported rising rates of absenteeism and increasing psychosocial challenges, driven by the destruction of schools and the loss of supportive social networks. Schools themselves have become increasingly dangerous for both students and teachers, as damaged infrastructure and heat stress further limit access to safe, equitable, and quality education.

“Many people in the climate movement assume that people who are impacted by climate change are more worried about it, but that is not the case, including in frontline communities,” said Jennifer Carman, Director of Survey Strategy at the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication (YPCCC) at the Yale School of Environment. “Instead, people in frontline communities are more worried about hazards that directly affect their day-to-day lives, like extreme heat and power outages — and these hazards are made worse by climate change.”

Such daily struggles faced by children as a result of climate-driven disruptions to schooling manifest in heightened protection risks. A significant portion of school-aged children in these regions have been forced to relocate multiple times, essentially eliminating their access to structures of supervision, stability, and peer support. Additionally, the climate crisis continues to erode livelihoods, intensifying economic instability across many communities, and elevating children’s vulnerability to exploitation, including rising rates of child marriage, child labour, gender-based violence, and recruitment by armed coalitions.

These risks disproportionately affect girls, children with disabilities, and displaced communities. Despite this, as of 2023 estimates, less than 2.4 percent of funding from critical multilateral funds was allocated toward “child-responsive interventions”, while support for education-specific programs has remained minimal. This is relatively low when compared to national spending for other sectors, such as healthcare. UNICEF estimates that if education programs received adequate support, it could close the USD 97 billion funding gap that is needed to achieve the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4 targets in low- and middle-income countries.

“Without systematically integrating education into climate finance and policy frameworks – including efforts to avert, minimize and address loss and damage – countries risk remaining trapped in repeated cycles of disaster recovery spending rather than sustained resilience building, allowing climate shocks to compound disruptions to learning and generate significant non-economic losses for children and their future opportunities,” the report states.

Figures from UNICEF show that investing in education can yield substantial returns, with every USD 1 invested generating $2 to $13 in avoided losses. With the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) Board meeting in Livingstone, Zambia, from April 22 to 24, humanitarian organizations and world leaders are aiming to broaden global conversations that are essential in shaping recovery and resilience efforts that could build a brighter future for children in these regions.

Through such dialogues, UNICEF urges governments, stakeholders, and donors to strengthen the integration of education within national climate frameworks, which can be done by explicitly referencing education in National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to unlock access to “climate and loss-and-damage financing”.

UNICEF also advocates applying a climate-risk lens to domestic education financing, which could help ensure that budget allocations to education sectors are climate-informed and adequately support children’s foundational education and the continuation of their education in the long term.

Furthermore, UNICEF stresses the importance of scaling and better targeting international climate finance for education by encouraging major funding mechanisms to allocate resources for education. FRLD is one such example, financially supporting “unavoidable losses” when education systems are not adequately structured to withstand climate shocks.

“These frameworks should therefore clearly articulate how countries will protect education systems from climate-related loss and damage and strengthen learning continuity, enabling governments to align financing from multiple sources – including climate funds and private sector investment – toward sustained and risk-informed education investments that strengthen education systems and reduce future climate-related impacts,” the report states. “Such investments today can help break this cycle by safeguarding learning, reducing future fiscal pressures and protecting children’s development on which long-term human development depends.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

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Picture alliance/AA/Royal Court of Saudi Arabia. Source: International Politics & Society
 
The war with Iran is exposing deep fractures beneath the surface of Gulf unity. Still, cooperation remains the only viable option.

By Sebastian Sons
BONN, Germany, Apr 29 2026 (IPS)

While the world watches the Strait of Hormuz and the discord in negotiations between Iran and the United States, the role of the Gulf states is fading into the background. Iran’s attacks on the Arab Gulf states have triggered a threefold shock.

First, their business model – built on free trade routes, logistics, energy, tourism and entertainment – is under strain. Second, they are losing the confidence of international investors as safe havens, undermining their narrative as a reliable bulwark against the chaos in their neighbourhood. And lastly, their strategy of shielding themselves from external threats through comprehensive diplomacy, de-escalation and dialogue is at stake.

Influential mediators such as Qatar and Oman have come into the crosshairs of the war, as has Saudi Arabia, which only in 2023 resumed relations with Iran precisely to prevent such a scenario of regional escalation. This threefold shock is now forcing all Gulf states to rethink their security architecture in order to better protect themselves in the future.

Contrasting strategies

At present, it appears as though each ruler in the Gulf is pursuing their own strategy, relying on their own instruments and forging their own alliances. This is particularly evident in the case of the Gulf heavyweights Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

The Saudi kingdom sees itself more as an actor committed to de-escalation, coordinating closely with regional players such as Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan.

Despite considerable frustration with the Islamic Republic, which has torpedoed any rapprochement in recent weeks, diplomatic relations with Tehran have not been severed. Instead, Riyadh recognises that some form of modus operandi with Iran will remain necessary.

The UAE, by contrast, has sharpened its rhetoric towards Iran in recent weeks, is increasingly adopting a confrontational stance and emphasises that Israel and the United States will assume an even more dominant role in the region after the war.

These differing positions point to deep-seated divergences between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, which had already become apparent before the war. In Yemen, the rivalry between the two regional powers escalated in December, culminating in Saudi Arabia publicly criticising its Emirati ‘brother’ and taking military action against its local partner, the Southern Transitional Council.

In Sudan, both governments support opposing sides – the UAE backs the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), while Saudi Arabia supports the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) – further fuelling the humanitarian catastrophe three years into the bloody civil war.

The Gulf states are not striving for pure harmony, but rather pursuing similar interests through different instruments.

The two states also pursue contrasting strategies towards Israel. While the UAE signed the Abraham Accords in 2020 and continues to maintain diplomatic and economic ties with Israel, Saudi Arabia has positioned itself as an active defender of the Palestinian cause since Hamas’s attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 and rejects any normalisation of relations with Israel.

These differing positions also reverberate beyond the region. Saudi Arabia, for example, criticised Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in December 2025, where the UAE operates an important port — another illustration of the growing divergence between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

Two rival axes thus appear to have emerged, further consolidated by the current war. On one side stands Saudi Arabia as the representative of a more restrained approach to regional policy, working with partners such as Oman, Qatar, Pakistan and Turkey to pursue assertive diplomacy.

On the other side, the UAE – particularly the powerful emirate of Abu Dhabi – has adopted a policy of interventionist strength against Iran and Islamist movements, a stance that is supported in varying degrees by Kuwait and Bahrain. Along these axes, a regional arms race could intensify, economic rivalry could grow, and hyper-nationalism could deepen, leading to further hardening and polarisation of positions across the Gulf.

Yet this seemingly irreconcilable confrontation overlooks the fact that the Gulf states are not striving for pure harmony, but rather pursuing similar interests through different instruments. Their approach is based on a pragmatic both-and strategy that relies on flexible alliances to achieve their objectives. In fact, their goals are not as divergent as often assumed, but can be summarised as three core priorities: preserving national legitimacy, maintaining regional stability and safeguarding economic development.

These are all threatened by the war, creating a natural interest among the Gulf states in avoiding lasting harm to one another — or even outright conflict.

Competition does not preclude cooperation

The Gulf states have a long and shifting history of conflict and rapprochement. Disputes over borders, rivalries between ruling dynasties and families, conflicts over resources and trade routes, and competing approaches to developing their oil- and gas-dependent economies have repeatedly led to periods of defamation, demonisation and disintegration.

Most recently, the so-called Gulf crisis from 2017 to 2021 shook Gulf unity, when the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Egypt imposed an air, sea and land blockade on Qatar. Despite these cycles of tension and reconciliation, the Gulf states have proven remarkably resilient, not least because of their ability to adapt flexibly to new challenges.

They must now demonstrate this capacity more than ever. The current war represents a pivotal moment in Gulf history, redefining how their both-and strategy can remain effective. To ensure this, they may increasingly rely on comprehensive deterrence, flexible alliances and diplomacy, which could lead to closer cooperation in certain policy areas.

This may include enhanced military cooperation, aimed at strengthening national security through regional defence capabilities and reducing dependence on the United States.

The development of a joint drone programme and protection against attacks on maritime security, desalination plants and future technologies are in the interests of all Gulf states — despite their differences in dealing with Iran. The same applies to other areas.

The war, through the sinking of tankers and the deployment of mines in the Persian Gulf, could seriously endanger an already fragile environment. Environmental disasters such as oil spills must therefore be prevented, which can only be achieved through collective action.

The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has made it abundantly clear to most Gulf states how dependent they are on this sensitive maritime chokepoint for their energy exports.

The impact on the collective psyche of Gulf societies should not be underestimated either. Addressing this will require joint efforts in trauma recovery. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has made it abundantly clear to most Gulf states how dependent they are on this sensitive maritime chokepoint for their energy exports.

Alternatives are scarce, benefiting primarily Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait are being cut off from international maritime trade. Alternative trade routes are therefore essential, but can only be developed through partnership.

Plans for such routes have existed for years and could gain renewed momentum in the context of the crisis — whether in energy, transport or the construction of a Gulf railway network. Saudi Arabia, for instance, is planning new logistics corridors with Egypt and Jordan to enhance its independence.

At present, all Gulf states are suffering from declining revenues from oil and gas sales, tourism and financial services. Overall, economic growth in the region is projected to fall in 2026 from an expected 3.7 per cent to just 1.4 per cent. In Qatar, economic output could shrink by as much as 13 per cent, in the UAE by 8 per cent and in Saudi Arabia by 6.6 per cent.

This will likely lead all Gulf states to invest more cautiously and more selectively — particularly at home. The more they channel their reduced funds domestically, the fewer resources will be available for the urgently needed reconstruction in regional crisis zones such as Syria.

Here too, closer coordination in development cooperation could prove beneficial, as was the case during the Gulf crisis within the framework of the Arab Coordination Group, which brings together the development funds of all Gulf states alongside regional donor organisations such as the Islamic Development Bank.

These examples demonstrate that competition does not necessarily preclude cooperation, but rather depends heavily on context. The existing divergences among the Gulf states should therefore not be seen as set in stone, but as part of a complex process of negotiation and adaptation in times of crisis.

Alliances are shifting, leading to profound transformations that are particularly affecting the Gulf states. They will not abandon their both-and approach, but will recalibrate it. Whether they act against or alongside one another will depend more than ever on circumstances and the instruments they choose — resulting in a dynamic that could combine partnership with simultaneous polarisation.

Dr Sebastian Sons is a scientist at the CARPO research institute and conducts research primarily on the economic, foreign, social, development and sports policy of the Arab Gulf monarchies.

Source: International Politics and Society. Brussels

IPS UN Bureau

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Coastal villages throughout the Solomon Islands rely on selling fish for household incomes. Selling fish in Auki, Malaita Province, Solomon Islands. Credit: Catherine Wilson/IPS

By Catherine Wilson
SYDNEY, Australia, Apr 29 2026 (IPS)

It is an invisible contaminant that has been found in fisheries, an essential part of the food chain for many Pacific Islanders. Mercury, emitted from fossil fuel power generation and other industrial processes around the world, has now penetrated marine ecosystems in the Pacific Islands with detrimental consequences for people’s health and wellbeing.

But island states, supported by scientific expertise at the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Program (SPREP), the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and funding by the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the world’s largest multilateral fund  for the environment, are implementing the action needed. The Mercury Free Pacific campaign is forging progress to protect islanders and their natural habitats from poisoning.

“Our communities face mercury risks from two main sources: what we eat, fish, and what we use in our homes and workplaces,” Emelipelesa Sam Panapa, Chemical Management Officer at the Department of Environment in the Polynesian atoll island nation of Tuvalu, told IPS. “Fish is the most widespread and challenging risk. It is not just food; it is central to our culture, livelihood and food security.”

The Mercury Free Pacific Campaign has brought together Pacific Island nations and the expertise of the SPREP and UNEP and been made possible with funding by the GEF. Credit: GEF

Mercury is a natural element in the Earth that has been released into the atmosphere for millennia through volcanic events and rock erosion. But human-generated, mostly industrial, processes have accelerated the build-up of mercury emissions. Metal processing facilities, cement works, the production of vinyl monomer and coal-fired power stations are the biggest contributors to the high levels of mercury in the atmosphere today.

From 2010 to 2015 alone, global anthropogenic mercury emissions rose by 20 percent, reports the UNEP. Coal-burning processes account for about 21 percent of all emissions. And this is projected to increase if a further 1,600 planned coal-driven power stations, on top of the existing 3,700 worldwide, are built. Already mercury in the atmosphere is about 450 percent above natural levels, reports UNEP.

After travelling long distances, mercury emissions then deposit in oceans. And toxicity begins when natural bacteria in aquatic environments mix with mercury, transforming it into Methylmercury, which is a neurotoxin. In the Pacific region, Methylmercury has contaminated beaches, coral reefs and fisheries, including swordfish, shark, tuna and mackerel, that are commonly consumed daily. Seafood is an important source of protein for up to 90 percent of Pacific Islanders and contributes to cash-based livelihoods for about 50 percent, reports the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO).

Today mercury is named one of the top ten chemicals of concern to public health by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the danger is especially acute in women and children. It can, in higher doses, inflict damage on cardiovascular organs, kidneys and the nervous systems of pregnant women and subsequently affect organ development of the foetus.

A fisherman on the coast of Funafuti, Tuvalu, throwing a weighted net out into the seawater, a traditional form of fishing. Credit: Rodney Dekker / Climate Visuals

The results of a medical study conducted by the Biodiversity Research Institute (BRI) confirmed health concerns.  Testing for traces of mercury in 757 women, aged 18-44 years, in the developing island states of the Caribbean, Indian and Pacific Oceans, including the Cook Islands, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Tonga and Marshall Islands, revealed that 58 percent possessed a level in their bodies that exceeded the safe threshold of 1ppm Hg. Researchers concluded the most likely cause was the high consumption of contaminated fish. In comparison, women who consumed lower amounts of fish and seafood recorded the lowest levels of mercury.

However, islanders also encounter toxicity in their households. Mercury is used in the production of common imported consumer products, such as fluorescent light tubes, electrical switches, dental amalgam fillings and skin lightening cosmetics. But it is when these products reach the end of their lives and are discarded that mercury is at risk of lingering indefinitely in the environment.

“The core of the problem is that mercury-added products are not being separated from municipal solid waste, and there are no local facilities for the environmentally sound disposal of mercury waste,” Soseala Tinilau, SPREP’s Hazardous Waste Management Advisor, told IPS. Also, “medical waste incineration sites are identified as potential sources of mercury emissions to the air.” And in some locations, raw sewerage flows have contributed mercury waste due to affected products being washed down drains into waterways and the sea.

A challenge is that waste management systems in many Pacific Island countries are constrained by lack of capacity, technology, resources and infrastructure. “There are no local facilities for the environmentally sound disposal of mercury waste. Therefore, a system for packing, exporting and disposing of this waste in an approved facility abroad is a critical need,” Tinilau specified.

Fisheries, susceptible to mercury contamination, are a major source of food and protein for Pacific Islanders. Fish market, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea. Credit: Catherine Wilson/IPS

Several years ago, numerous Pacific Island states, including Kiribati, Palau, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu, joined the Minamata Convention. The first global agreement to reform the ways in which mercury is used, phase it out in industries and develop better waste management practices, among other measures, came into effect in 2017.

Now governments in the region are drawing further on the power of multilateral collaboration in the Mercury Free Pacific initiative. The expansive mandate of the GEF-funded project includes conducting national surveys of mercury contamination, educating local communities about the risks, reviewing exposure to mercury-added consumer products, reforming waste management practices and assisting governments to develop relevant legislation.

The GEF is funding US$12.6 billion in environmental projects currently underway globally, which are expected to generate a further US$80.5 billion in co-financing. And it has a long view of its commitment to the Mercury Free Pacific project through its GEF Islands program, with goals outlined until at least 2030.

Anil Bruce Sookdeo, the GEF’s coordinator for Chemicals and Waste, elaborated that in the Pacific the GEF has provided US$1.5 million for gathering mapping data, its analysis and developing action and remedial plans in eleven Pacific Island nations, including the Federated States of Micronesia, Samoa, Kiribati, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

A further US$2 million is allocated to supporting national responses, such as devising effective legislation, community awareness programs and improving waste management processes. The campaign “represents a long-term regional objective, rather than a time-based project and requires sustained commitment and coordinated action by Pacific countries, regional institutions and partners,” he emphasised.

GEF funding has empowered Tuvalu, a country comprising nine coral islands and 11,800 people in the South Pacific, to make strides in its whole-of-society response to the issue.  The government has been able to strengthen its capacity and expertise, organise media awareness campaigns and oversee consultation with industries, communities and civil society organisations.

“For the first time, we have a national estimate of where mercury is coming from…we are beginning to understand the risks to our people and we have a roadmap for future action,” Panapa said in outlining the benefits of the Mercury Free Pacific initiative. At the same time, “these efforts represent the beginning of a longer journey to build community understanding and change behaviours related to mercury-added products, waste disposal and dietary choices.”

But a mitigation goal at the top of the list is to prevent mercury from reaching the islands. “Making marine life safe from mercury contamination is not about eliminating mercury already present in the ocean, but about preventing further contamination and managing the risk of exposure,” Tinilau said.

This means, among other measures, restricting the importation of mercury-added consumer products and galvanising global action to halt mercury emissions. Global consensus on phasing out coal-fired power stations and reforming industrial processes would be a start.

Pacific Island countries are demonstrating the political will and action with “regional coherence, national ownership and sustained momentum toward reducing mercury risks to human health, the environment and food systems in the Pacific,” emphasised Sookdeo from the GEF. Now, big emitters need to heed the urgency of reducing emissions at their source.

Notes: The Eighth Global Environment Facility Assembly will be held from May 30 to June 6, 2026, in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.
This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.

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Seychelles’ pioneering blue bond offers a compelling lesson in practical ocean finance. Credit: Michaela Rimakova/Unsplash

By James Alix Michel
VICTORIA, Seychelles, Apr 29 2026 (IPS)

As the world prepares for the Global Environment Facility (GEF) meeting in Samarkand next month, Seychelles’ pioneering blue bond offers a compelling lesson in practical ocean finance.

For small island states, the ocean is not merely a natural resource; it is the foundation of national life, economic opportunity, and long-term resilience against climate threats.

As President of Seychelles, I introduced the blue economy as a national vision as early as 2008. I did so because I believed then—as I do now—that for an island nation spanning 1.4 million square kilometers of ocean, sustainable development must begin with responsible stewardship of our marine resources. Our future depended on learning how to protect biodiversity, manage fisheries sustainably, and build economic models that serve both present needs and future generations. This vision positioned Seychelles as an early advocate for integrating ocean health with national prosperity.

That vision was not developed in isolation. It was strengthened through deliberate steps and high-level conversations that bridged policy ambition with financial innovation. A key milestone came with the debt-for-nature swap, finalized with the Paris Club creditors and The Nature Conservancy in 2014. This landmark agreement restructured approximately US$21.6 million in debt, freeing resources for marine conservation and climate adaptation. It directly led to the creation of SeyCCAT, the Seychelles Conservation and Climate Adaptation Trust, which has since become a vital mechanism for channeling funds into ocean protection, sustainable fisheries, and resilience projects.

As President, I also discussed the blue bond concept directly with the then Prince of Wales, Prince Charles, during the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Sri Lanka in November 2013.

Meeting with the Prince of Wales in Sri Lanka in 2013 at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM). Credit: James Alix Michel

His International Sustainability Unit was already promoting innovative ocean finance mechanisms, and our conversation highlighted the urgent need for small island states to access capital markets tailored to blue economy priorities.

This exchange, combined with early engagement from the World Bank and Commonwealth partners, helped refine the idea into a viable sovereign instrument. It underscored a growing global recognition that traditional financing was inadequate for the unique challenges of climate-vulnerable, ocean-dependent nations.

The blue bond represented the culmination of this journey. Structured with technical support from the World Bank, a US$5 million guarantee from the multilateral lender, and a US$5 million concessional grant from the GEF, it raised US$15 million from private investors including Calvert Impact Capital, Nuveen, and Prudential Financial.

On 29 October 2018, Seychelles launched the world’s first sovereign blue bond at the Our Ocean Conference in Bali — an event I had the privilege of attending. This was not just a financial milestone for Seychelles; it was a global proof of concept for ocean-positive investment.

Launch of the Seychelles Blue Bond in Bali at the Ocean Conference in 2018. Credit: James Alix Michel

The bond’s structure was as innovative as its purpose. Proceeds were allocated to expand marine protected areas to 30% of Seychelles’ exclusive economic zone, improve fisheries governance, and develop sustainable blue economy sectors like eco-tourism and seafood value chains. Managed through SeyCCAT and the Development Bank of Seychelles, the funds supported grants and loans for projects that delivered measurable environmental and economic returns. Investors benefited from blended finance that de-risked the instrument, while Seychelles gained long-term capital for priorities that traditional aid could not address.

For small island developing states (SIDS), this model holds profound significance. Nations like Seychelles grapple with high public debt (often exceeding 60% of GDP), acute climate exposure, a heavy reliance on marine resources for 20-30% of GDP, and limited fiscal space. Conventional loans and grants are frequently too rigid, too short-term, or misaligned with ocean realities.

The blue bond demonstrated that sovereign debt instruments can be repurposed for sustainability, attracting private capital while advancing public goods like biodiversity protection and community livelihoods.

Its broader impact extends beyond the US$15 million raised. The Seychelles blue bond lent credibility to the blue economy as a bankable asset class, inspiring subsequent issuances by Gabon (2022), Ecuador (2024), and others. It proved that nature-based solutions and financial innovation are complementary, not competitive. By linking debt restructuring, conservation trusts, and market-based finance, Seychelles created a replicable blueprint that has influenced global discussions at forums like the UN Ocean Conference and G20 sustainable finance tracks.

Yet this success should not be romanticized. Innovative finance alone cannot resolve systemic inequities in the international financial architecture. Blue bonds require robust institutions, transparent governance, technical capacity, and a pipeline of investable projects—foundations that not all SIDS possess. Seychelles benefited from strong political commitment, capable partners like the World Bank and GEF, and a pre-existing conservation framework. Without these, such instruments risk becoming symbolic rather than substantive.

This is precisely why the GEF assembly in Samarkand is so timely. Oceans face escalating crises: overfishing depletes 35% of stocks, plastic pollution chokes marine life, warming waters trigger coral bleaching, and habitat loss threatens 40% of global biodiversity. Yet ocean finance remains woefully inadequate—less than 1% of climate finance targets marine ecosystems, despite the ocean’s role in absorbing 25% of CO₂ emissions and producing 50% of planetary oxygen.

Samarkand offers a platform to scale solutions like Seychelles’ model.

The GEF, as a catalytic funder, should prioritize blue finance architecture for SIDS and coastal states. This means expanding blended finance facilities, providing first-loss guarantees, offering concessional capital, and building capacity for project pipelines. It also requires policy reforms to integrate blue bonds into debt sustainability frameworks, ensuring they complement—rather than compete with—multilateral debt relief initiatives.

Seychelles took a calculated risk in 2008 by centering the blue economy in national strategy. We persisted through debt swaps, presidential diplomacy, and patient institution-building. The blue bond was the reward: a tool that converted vulnerability into opportunity.

As delegates converge on Samarkand, let Seychelles’ story serve as both inspiration and imperative. The blue economy will not thrive on declarations or pilot projects. It demands instruments that harness private capital for public purposes, turning ocean ambition into enduring action. Seychelles opened the door.

The GEF and global community must now widen it—for islands, for coasts, and for the shared blue planet we all depend on.

Note: The Eighth Global Environment Facility Assembly will be held from May 30 to June 6, 2026, in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.

James Alix Michel is the former President of Seychelles (2004–2016) and a global advocate for the blue economy, ocean conservation and climate resilience.

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Children involved in the UActive visit a school in the Mykolaiv region that Russian forces destroyed. It cannot be rebuilt. Credit: UActive

By Ed Holt
BRATISLAVA, Apr 28 2026 (IPS)

“What’s important is to make sure that you can immerse yourself in an environment that is positive for your mental health and wellbeing,” says Olena*.

Olena, from Ukraine’s Kharkiv region, was just 12 when Russia’s full-scale invasion of her country began on February 24, 2022. Over the last four years she has seen all her close friends leave the small town she lives in, most to move abroad, and experienced deadly bombings by Russian forces on her home town.

Meanwhile, much of her schooling in that time has been online because the permanent threat of shelling makes it unsafe for authorities to keep her school open.

She admits all this has taken a toll on her mental health.

“I had the most devastating experience when my town was bombed and some people were killed. The sound of explosions and drones causes constant tension still,” she tells IPS.

“I miss having all my friends here. Before the war, we used to spend so much time together – walking around the city, celebrating each other’s birthdays, and simply sitting somewhere and talking for hours. Now many of them are abroad, building new lives. I’m happy they are safe, but I deeply miss the feeling of unity,” she says.

“And for almost four years we [kids in the town] have been studying online. We see our classmates much less, and simple things like chatting during breaks or working on group projects feel like something from another life. We grew up faster than we expected.”

Olena is just one of millions of children in the country whose lives have been upended by the conflict.

As the full-scale invasion goes into its fifth year, research shows the devastating effect it has had on Ukrainian children, displacing millions, plunging many into poverty, and exposing them to the loss of loved ones and other trauma. Meanwhile, 1.6 million have had their education disrupted due to displacement, facility damage, and insecurity. According to UNICEF, one in three children are unable to attend in-person school full-time and more than 1,700 schools have been damaged or destroyed. The Save the Children group has said that Ukrainian children missed 20 percent of lessons during the last academic year alone because of frequent air raid warnings.

Meanwhile, Save the Children has estimated that over a million children have spent hundreds of days with either no or limited face-to-face teaching as schools have moved to online learning for security reasons since the start of the war. This came not long after schools had finished lengthy periods of online learning implemented during the Covid pandemic, meaning some children have had little in-class learning since 2020.

All this has taken a huge toll on the mental health of children and adolescents, local and international groups working with kids in the country have said.

According to UNICEF, a third of households have reported children displaying signs of psychosocial distress.

“Children’s mental health is increasingly under strain. The constant fear of attacks, displacement, endless sheltering in basements, and isolation at home with limited social connections have left children and adolescents struggling,” Toby Fricker, UNICEF Ukraine Chief of Advocacy and Communication, told IPS.

This has been expressed in a variety of emotional and physical expressions of symptoms, mental health experts have said.

These include irritability and emotional instability, particularly among adolescents, and social withdrawal.

“It can be said with sad certainty that since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia, which is now in its fifth year, the most common issues observed among adolescents are increased anxiety, fear, and chronic stress related to a constant sense of danger and uncertainty. Many teenagers experience emotional exhaustion, sleep problems, difficulties with concentration and learning, as well as decreased motivation,” Daria Lavrenko, a psychologist in the Kyiv region who works with children aged 12 to 18 who have been displaced from regions near the frontlines, told IPS.

Children participate in UActive programmes which include rebuilding infrastructure damaged in the war. Credit: UActive

“Manifestations of social isolation and difficulties communicating with peers have also become quite common, largely due to prolonged distance learning, frequent air raid sirens, and the loss of a familiar school environment. In addition, adolescents often show deep grief reactions due to the loss of relatives on the frontline or as a result of Russian attacks on civilians. Increased irritability, emotional instability, and difficulties with emotional regulation are also frequently observed, which are natural psychological responses to the prolonged traumatic experience of war,” she said.

But severe somatisation of symptoms, including facial tics, involuntary head movements, and speech disorders, have also been frequently reported. Sleeping disorders are common, especially among young children.

“These are common reactions when the body is suffering the consequences of mental health strain,” Viktoria Kondratyuk, a psychologist who works with the humanitarian group War Child on projects in Ukraine, told IPS. “It affects the immune system, weakens it, and that’s why you see so many [children] getting sick, especially in the winter],” she added.

Since the full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian government has moved to increase provision of mental health support through the approval of key legislation and the implementation of a nationwide mental healthcare programme.

At the same time, NGOs are working with regional administrations and local communities to improve public access to mental health services and psychosocial support, including providing informational and educational activities and integrating psychosocial support into existing social and educational services. It is hoped this will expand access to assistance for vulnerable groups and greater support for children and adolescents.

However, problems with access to such services, and recognition of mental health problems by those affected, mean many children are not getting the help they need, experts say.

“Many teenagers who experience psychological difficulties as a result of the war do not receive the help they need in time. This is partly due to limited access to specialists in certain regions where infrastructure has been damaged or where there is a shortage of mental health professionals. At the same time, attitudes toward mental wellbeing remain an important barrier,” said Lavrenko.

“Some teenagers avoid seeking help because they fear judgement, do not want to appear ‘weak’, or believe that their experiences are not serious enough. In addition, prolonged life under the conditions of war changes how young people perceive their own emotions. Many painful feelings—such as fear, anxiety, and helplessness—may be minimised or suppressed as the psyche attempts to adapt to constant danger and maintain the ability to function. This is a natural psychological defence mechanism; however, it can also lead to children and adolescents remaining without the support they need for long periods of time.

“Furthermore, adults do not always immediately notice or correctly interpret children’s emotional difficulties, as they themselves are often exhausted by the ongoing traumatic reality of war,” she said.

Lavrenko added that a different approach needed to be taken to mental health care given that Ukraine has been at war for so long.

“Under current conditions, improving adolescents’ mental health cannot be limited only to traditional approaches to psychological care. Ukraine is living through a full-scale war for a fifth year, and in this context, support for mental health often comes from things that are considered a normal part of life for teenagers in other countries: the ability to study consistently, communicate with peers, participate in extracurricular activities, think about the future, and make plans for their careers. This is why it is extremely important to create and expand programmes aimed at addressing educational losses and restoring opportunities for adolescents to socialise,” she said.

IPS spoke to a number of teenagers in different parts of Ukraine about mental health and access to services for them and their peers.

While not all have accessed specific mental health services, some said they had and that it had helped them. Some said they felt there was adequate access for them to psychosocial services, but others said it was woefully lacking, especially in schools where they felt it should be either discussed in classes more frequently or even taught formally as a subject.

“Teachers rarely discuss this in schools – it needs to be made part of the curriculum,” Andrej*, 16, from the Kyiv region, told IPS.

However, all of them pointed to the benefits of the kind of programmes referred to by Lavrenko.

The teenagers who spoke to IPS were involved in one such programme, UActive, in which children participate in initiatives helping rebuild towns and cities damaged by fighting.

They all said the project had given them a sense of purpose and hope for the future.

“Being part of UActive became a source of hope. It reminded me that even in dark times we can build something meaningful. Through our meetings and projects, I felt unity, support, and real motivation to act instead of just worrying,” said Olena.

“Some special sessions organised by UActive orientate toward working with different aspects of mental health… encouraged me to seriously analyse my mental health and seek support when I need to,” Nadezhda*, a teenager from Kyiv, told IPS.

Organisations involved in projects for children in the country told IPS that programmes focused on child mental health could have a profound effect on improving child wellbeing.

“For adolescents, civic engagement helps them connect with their peers and find a sense of purpose amid the uncertainty of war. UNICEF’s UPSHIFT programme is one example of this, where we train youth teams and equip them with the skills they need to lead and implement projects that support the needs of their communities. Such activities also provide a sense of purpose at a time when they feel like they have little control over their lives and the situation unfolding around them,” said Fricker.

However, while both the children and organisations which spoke to IPS said access to such programmes and other forms of psychosocial care are key to helping children at the moment, they also believed that ultimately the best way of improving child mental health would be for the war to end.

Even then, though, experts believe that even after an end to the fighting, people will be struggling with mental health problems related to the conflict for many years to come.

“When a child lives for years in an atmosphere of danger, loss, instability, and constant stress, it inevitably affects the development of their psyche, their sense of safety in the world, and their ability to trust in the future. In terms of long-term consequences, some teenagers may continue to experience heightened anxiety, difficulties with emotional regulation, challenges in relationships, or uncertainty about their future for many years even after the war ends,” said Lavrenko.

She added though that there was hope that with proper action now, some of the worst long-term effects among children might be mitigated.

“It is important to remember that the human psyche has significant potential for recovery, especially when adolescents receive support, a stable environment, access to education, and opportunities for socialisation. This is why it is extremely important to invest in programs that support children and adolescents now, helping them gradually regain a sense of safety and build a healthy future,” she said.

*Names of all children have been changed for security reasons.

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Bangladesh remains one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Its corruption perception index (CPI) score, 24, is 18 points below the global average score of 42, and 21 points lower than the Asia-Pacific region’s average of 45. One of the main sources of corruption is over-priced aid-funded projects as they lack competitive bidding. Projects funded through Government-to-Government deals drive up costs by more than 400% compared to more transparent alternatives, and around 35% of project costs are lost to corruption and inefficiency.

Anis Chowdhury

Complicity

Development partners – traditional and non-traditional – cannot deny their complicity. The most culpable is the World Bank, followed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The shares of Bangladesh’s external debt liabilities to them are around 29%, 23% and 18%, respectively, totalling 70% of total external debt. Russia and China are Bangladesh’s main non-traditional development partners, with their respective shares of total external debt at 11% and 7%. All donors offered loans rampantly to the fascist regime to achieve their strategic and business interest, ignoring its extensive corruption and wide-spread human rights violations.

The World Bank briefly demonstrated its adherence to responsible lending principles when it cancelled $1.2 billion IDA credit for the Padma Bridge project in 2012, citing high-level corruption allegations. But its lending subsequently increased as if to expiate itself for the cancellation of the Padma Bridge loan. Mr. Hasan, one of the most corrupt ministers in the deposed Hasina Government, boasted, “once the World Bank cancelled its credit to finance Padma Bridge but now [in 2023] it has proposed to provide $2.25 billion”. To embarrass (or absolve?) the Bank, Sheikh Hasina presented a picture of the Padma Multipurpose Bridge to World Bank President David Malpass at the loan signing ceremony.

While Dhaka boasted that the Padma Bridge project was “entirely funded” by the government, China Exim Bank in fact provided $2.67 billion preferential buyer’s credit. The project costed approximately $3.6-$3.9 billion, nearly 3 times the initial estimate of $1.2 billion (the amount sought from the World Bank), largely due to corruption. The cost over-run triggered crises in both the forex and local currency markets, leading to the erosion of the country’s foreign exchange reserves.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided the lifeline at the dying hours of Hasina’s kleptocratic regime when it approved $4.7 billion in January 2023 with some vague conditionality, such as raising revenues, implementing structural reforms to create a conducive environment to expand trade and foreign direct investment, deepening the financial sector, and developing human capital.

The IMF chose to turn a blind eye to widespread corruption, including the looting of banks by the regime’s cronies, gross violations of human rights and election engineering to hold on to power. Can the IMF absolve itself of responsibility for enabling the survival of the collapsing repressive and corrupt regime to commit human rights violations and abuses during the mass uprising against it a year and half later?

Old habits die hard

Corruption in Bangladesh has deep roots; corruption’s tentacles have reached almost the entire body polity of the country to become a ‘social culture’. Nevertheless, the Interim Government, led by Nobel Laureate Professor Yunus, took some bold reform initiatives to strengthen the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) and the integrity of the financial sector.

Thus, it is deeply disappointing that the newly elected government replaced the highly professional central bank governor with a failed business person with no background in banking or international macroeconomics within the first week of assuming power. A loan defaulter himself, the new governor immediately relaxed the loan rules. The government also amended the Interim Government’s Bank Resolution Ordinance to allow the return of the restructured banks to previous owners who looted these banks.

These changes, together with the new government’s rejection of the Interim Government’s ordinances concerning the ACC, the independence of judiciary and the human rights commission, are clear signs of the old habits’ refusal to die and the persistence of corruption.

Another old habit, i.e., addiction to loans (so-called aid), denies to die. As of April 2026, the External Relations Division (ERD) of the Ministry of Finance has been instructed to look for up to $3 billion from development partners. Interestingly, the ERD’s main activity is foreign fund searching through its ‘fund searching committee’ which meets periodically to review (code name for naming and shaming section chiefs) its monthly loan signing targets. Instead, the ERD should have been focusing on fostering and strengthening economic relations – trade and investment – as its name implies.

One direct damage of aid addiction is the lethargy in mobilising domestic resources – Bangladesh’s tax-GDP ratio (around 7%) is not only low compared with the averages for low-income countries (13.5%) and middle-income countries (18.9%), but has also been declining from its peak of around 9% in 2012 since its borrowing from development partners accelerated.

Of course, the other collateral damage is the persistence of corruption. IMF research finds that countries with “voracious” and “fractious” politics divert large amounts of public resources to unproductive transfers to powerful interest groups.

Development partners’ responsible roles

All development partners – multilateral and OECD DAC members – ostensibly are in favour of “good governance”, meaning against corruption. The World Bank “considers corruption a major obstacle… to promoting shared prosperity”. The IMF views corruption as “a major obstacle to economic growth, stability, and development”. The ADB “maintains a zero-tolerance stance against corruption, viewing it as a major obstacle to development, poverty reduction, and economic growth”.

Unfortunately, the evidence of their complicity presented above tells a different story from their avowed anti-corruption posture. This casts doubt on their role as development partners. Global evidence shows that donors do not systematically allocate aid to less corrupt countries.

The citizens of the country expect that development partners remain true to their declared anti-corruption stance and advance concessional loans provided the government commits to strict monitorable anti-corruption measures and deep structural reforms. In particular, urgently needed funds should be considered if:

• Ordinances of the Interim Government designed to strengthen anti-corruption measures, protect human rights and ensure judicial independence are ratified by the Parliament;
• amendments to the Bank Resolution Ordinance are repealed; and
• a professionally competent and experienced person with high integrity is appointed as central bank governor.

To achieve deep structural reform, the focus should be on strengthening domestic revenue mobilisation and reorientation away from the aid-dependent development model to a trade and investment led development model. Therefore, development partners should open up their markets, encourage investment in productive sectors and help develop Bangladesh’s productive capacity.

On the other hand, if they remain complicit and advance loans in a highly corruption-prone environment, any future pro-people government will have the right to declare such loans as “odious” and to refuse repayment obligation.

Anis Chowdhury, Emeritus Professor, Western Sydney University (Australia). He held senior UN positions in Bangkok and New York and served as Special Assistant to the Chief Advisor for Finance (with the status and rank of State Minister) in the Professor Yunus-led Interim Government. E-mail: anis.z.chowdhury@gmail.com

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Credit: UNICEF/Giacomo Pirozzi
 
The niqab is a full-body Islamic piece of clothing, worn by some women in devout Muslim communities, and which covers the whole body, leaving only a narrow slit for the eyes. French full-body veil ban, violated women’s freedom of religion, says the UN Human Rights Committee.

By Lina AbiRafeh, Azza Karam and Henia Dakkak
NEW YORK, Apr 28 2026 (IPS)

The veil has been lifted—but not the one you think.

Not the veil the West has spent decades weaponizing. The veil now exposed is the one that concealed Western feminism’s selective solidarity—its silence on the women it was never truly fighting for. The “othering” of women from the South West Asian and North African region. In other words: us.

In Against White Feminism, Rafia Zakaria offers a powerful critique of how mainstream feminism often reinforces white supremacist, colonial, and patriarchal logics. The suffering of women of color becomes useful—deployable.

The image of the veiled, victimized woman, waiting to be saved, has long justified wars, interventions, and foreign policies driven not by liberation, but by imperial ambition. When these women resist on their own terms, they are ignored or discredited.

This pattern is not new. It is structural. Discrimination is embedded in the system. Palestine has simply made it undeniable. The silence that followed stripped away any remaining illusion that “we are in this together.” Feminist solidarity, it turns out, has limits—and some of us were never included.

That is the veil we lift today.

We speak as Arab women aged 50–65, activists and feminists with over a century of combined experience across 90 countries. We now live in the United States, where these contradictions are stark. We have paid a price for insisting on integrity. So have many others.

Across conversations with colleagues and communities, the message is consistent: the system is not broken—it functions exactly as designed.

Early feminist movements everywhere have grappled with patriarchy, sometimes resisting it, sometimes accommodating it. In the West, this struggle has often aligned uncomfortably with white supremacy.

In formerly colonized regions, patriarchy cannot be separated from colonialism, racism, or imperialism. These systems are intertwined; dismantling one requires confronting them all. This is where Western feminism consistently falls short.

Today, little has changed. The language is more polished. The imagery more diverse. But the underlying structures—and the values sustaining them—remain intact. Nowhere is this clearer than in how women from the South West Asian and North African region are treated by movements that claim to champion them.

The same logic that invoked Afghan women to justify military intervention now watches Palestinian women document their own destruction while offering silence—or excuses.

The data reflects this reality.

In the United States, anti-Muslim and anti-Arab discrimination rose sharply in 2024. The Council on American-Islamic Relations recorded 8,658 complaints—the highest since it began tracking in 1996. Employment discrimination alone accounted for 15.4% of cases. In 2025, these numbers climbed again. Rhetoric has consequences.

But numbers only tell part of the story. Women’s voices tell the rest.

One Arab aid worker described being sidelined after speaking publicly about Palestine following October 7:

“When I spoke about Ukrainian women, it was welcomed. When I spoke about Palestinian women, it was suppressed. I lost my work.”

Others describe being silenced on social media, accused of saying too much—or too little. Some were advised to remove their hijab for safety. Others were warned to avoid expressing views altogether to protect institutional reputations.

Yet another was denied the right to exercise leadership among her own staff, because as a Muslim from the Arab region, her ability to clearly articulate opinions, exercise judgement, and make decisions, was deemed ‘abusive’. One woman was denied employment because her call for “ceasefire and humanitarian aid” was deemed “too political.”

Western feminism often recoils at these truths. Yet Palestine is not only a political issue—it is a feminist one. All struggles against oppression are interconnected. Justice cannot be selective, even if its application often is.

Feminism demands confronting power, violence, and dehumanization wherever they occur. Palestinian women live at the intersection of multiple forms of oppression—patriarchy, occupation, militarization—and resist across all of them.

A feminism that ignores this reality is not feminism. It is complicity.

As Teju Cole describes, this is the logic of the “white savior industrial complex.” It operates through what can be called gendered orientalism: women from the South West Asian and North African region are portrayed as victims of culture, religion, or men—but rarely of bombs, sanctions, or occupation. This framing preserves the West as liberator while erasing its role in producing violence.

In the United States, the language differs but the outcome is the same. Conservatives fear Islam; liberals seek to save us from it. Both deny our agency. Both silence our voices.

We are rarely represented as we are: organizers, scholars, community leaders, mothers, activists, feminists.

This silence must be named clearly. It is not neutrality. It is complicity.

The credibility of any feminist movement rests on whether it stands with all women—especially when doing so is politically inconvenient.

We have paid the price for this failure: in erasure, in exclusion, in lost friends, in being told our grief is too complex and our politics too divisive.

What passes for solidarity is often conditional. It appears when it costs nothing and disappears when it demands accountability. Women from the South West Asia and North Africa were welcomed when our oppression reinforced dominant narratives. We became inconvenient when our liberation required confronting Western power itself.

Kimberlé Crenshaw introduced intersectionality to describe how overlapping identities produce compounded forms of discrimination. What we are witnessing now is an intersectional crisis: women from those regions face discrimination based simultaneously on race, religion, gender, and geopolitics. The very movement best equipped to confront this has gone largely silent.

From decades of work in conflict settings, one truth is clear: women from South West Asia and North Africa do not need to be singled out for ‘saving’.

We need the violence to stop.

We need colleagues to speak our names when it is difficult. We need those marching for human rights to recognize that feminism that excludes Gaza, Beirut, or Tehran is neither feminism nor human rights. It is branding—a convenient narrative that avoids confronting deeper structures of power.

Palestine has revealed a deeper truth: these systems were never designed to serve everyone. They were built by—and for—those in power.

What is required now is not reform at the margins, but a reckoning.

Solidarity demands accountability. If women’s rights are human rights, then they must apply to all women—without exception.

Lina AbiRafeh – Better4Women – Azza Karam and Henia Dakkak– Lead Integrity: House of Wisdom.

IPS UN Bureau

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By HMGS Palihakkara
COLOMBO, Sri Lanka, Apr 28 2026 (IPS)

As delegates from 191 countries, including the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, gathered Monday at UN headquarters for a month of diplomacy at the Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the stakes could hardly be higher.

They meet in the shadow of a war of choice, waged by the United States and Israel against Iran—ostensibly to prevent nuclear proliferation. It is a war steeped in tragedy and laced with irony. The human toll and global economic costs speak for themselves.

The irony is starker.

The United States, a principal depositary of the NPT, unilaterally caused the collapse of a UN-authorised agreement it had itself initiated to verify Iran’s non-nuclear status—the JCPOA. Having done that, the US, alongside Israel—a state that rejects the NPT—now bombs a hitherto NPT-compliant Iran to achieve the same end: a non-nuclear Iran.

This oxymoronic irony lies at the heart of America’s war of choice. Waged in the name of non-proliferation, it may accelerate the very outcome it seeks to avoid. By demonstrating that even a state short of nuclear weapons can be subjected to unilateral unauthorised force, Washington risks sending a stark message: survival may depend not on restraint and diplomacy, but on possession of the bomb.

This paradox exposes a longstanding fragility in the global nuclear matrix. Built around the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s safeguards regime, it rests on a bargain: non-nuclear states forgo weapons in exchange for security assurances, access to peaceful nuclear technology and good-faith progress towards disarmament.

This system, discriminatory but functional, endures only so long as it is seen as credible. When a treaty-compliant non-nuclear state becomes the target of military action over suspected ambitions, that credibility erodes.

At the centre of this erosion is the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Before the conflict, Iran’s posture was widely understood as “hedging”—developing technical capacity without crossing the weapons threshold.

This allowed Tehran to retain leverage while avoiding the full costs of weaponisation. But hedging depends on a shared understanding: that ambiguity will be tolerated—or at least not punished with illegal use of force.

War shatters that assumption. The lesson is stark: nuclear latency does not deter attack; nuclear possession might. The comparison with North Korea is instructive. Its overt arsenal has largely insulated it from large-scale intervention despite decades of hostility with Washington.

For policymakers in Tehran—and elsewhere—the implication is difficult to ignore. If ambiguity invites vulnerability, clarity in the form of a deterrent may appear rational. Nuclear weapons risk being recast from political liabilities into strategic necessities.

The damage extends beyond Iran. The non-proliferation regime has long depended on the belief that compliance will not be punished. Yet recent history has already weakened that assumption. Ukraine relinquished the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal in the 1990s in exchange for security assurances, only to face Russian invasion decades later.

Libya abandoned its programme and soon after saw regime collapse following the US initiated external intervention. These precedents have chipped away at trust.

Against this backdrop, war with Iran reinforces a troubling pattern: states without nuclear weapons appear vulnerable, while those with them appear secure. This is the opposite of what the non-proliferation regime is meant to uphold.

Officials at the IAEA have warned such dynamics could trigger a “domino effect”, with multiple countries reconsidering their options. Across the Middle East and beyond, governments are quietly reassessing their assumptions.

Military aggression also reshapes domestic politics in ways that complicate non-proliferation. External pressure strengthens hardliners while marginalising advocates of engagement. This is not unintended but predictable. Hardliners are less inclined toward compromise and more likely to view nuclear weapons as essential to survival.

The space for diplomacy narrows as nuclearisation gains appeal. War, in other words, transforms not just capabilities but preferences.

There is also a practical limit to military solutions. Airstrikes can damage or even ‘obliterate’ facilities, but they cannot erase knowledge. Scientific expertise cannot be bombed out of existence. Indeed, intervention may accelerate the very processes it seeks to halt by pushing them underground. A programme once visible to inspectors may become more secretive and harder to monitor.

The regional implications are equally concerning. The Middle East is already marked by rivalry and fragile security arrangements. An Iranian move towards nuclear weapons—especially one accelerated by conflict—would likely prompt countervailing responses.

Saudi Arabia and Turkey have both signalled they would not remain passive. The result could be a cascading arms race, turning an already volatile region into a multipolar nuclear environment.

This is a classic security dilemma: one state’s attempt to enhance its security leaves others feeling less secure, prompting reciprocal measures that leave all worse off. By seeking to eliminate a potential threat through unauthorised force, the United States may multiply such threats. Instead of one threshold state, the region could face several.

These dynamics point to a deeper flaw: the belief that military force can resolve nuclear proliferation. Nuclear ambition is not merely technical; it is a political response to insecurity. Bombing addresses symptoms, not causes.

Without addressing the security concerns that drive states towards nuclear capabilities, coercion alone cannot produce lasting results. All successful non-proliferation goals-ranging from NPT to JCPOA- were reached through calculated diplomatic negotiations, not by military means.

Past experience underscores this. Diplomatic agreements, however imperfect, have constrained nuclear programmes. The collapse of the JCPOA removed mechanisms that had limited Iran’s activities. In the absence of a credible diplomatic alternative, military action amounts to little more than a delay—buying time at the cost of increasing long-term incentives to pursue nuclear weapons.

The war also risks reinforcing the perception that international law is subordinate to power politics. If rules can be bypassed by powerful states, weaker ones are unlikely to rely on them. Instead, they may turn to capabilities that cannot easily be neutralised. Nuclear weapons become not just tools of deterrence, but symbols of sovereignty and survival.

Perhaps the most enduring impact will be psychological. States learn from precedent. From Iraq to Libya to Ukraine—and now Iran—a pattern appears: vulnerability invites intervention, while nuclear capability deters it. This conclusion may be uncomfortable, but it reflects a cold logic of international politics. Once such a perception takes hold, it is difficult to reverse.

For this reason, the war may prove a watershed moment not only for Iran but for the global non-proliferation regime. It alters perceptions of risk and security in ways that favour proliferation over restraint. Even states with no immediate intention of pursuing nuclear weapons may begin hedging against a future in which international guarantees appear unreliable.

The tragedy is that a policy intended to prevent proliferation may instead accelerate it. By undermining trust, empowering hardliners and reinforcing deterrence logic, the United States risks achieving the opposite of its stated aim. Even if military action sets back Iran’s programme in the short term, the long-term consequences may be far more damaging.

A more secretive, more determined and more widely emulated pursuit of nuclear weapons would not represent a victory for non-proliferation. It would mark its gradual unravelling—an “own goal” in geopolitical terms.

If the aim of non-proliferation is to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, this conflict points in the opposite direction. It suggests that security cannot be reliably guaranteed by treaties or norms alone, and that in an uncertain world the ultimate insurance policy remains the bomb.

That message will resonate far beyond Iran. Its consequences may shape nuclear choices for decades.

The question the Iran war poses to the world is not polemical but stark: is it a new normal that a depositary state of the NPT and a covert nuclear power not party to the treaty can preclude diplomacy and bomb their way to non-proliferation?

If the current NPT Review Conference in New York, like its predecessor conferences, fails to reach consensus on the way forward for the Treaty’s three pillars—non-proliferation, peaceful nuclear cooperation based on sovereign equality, and disarmament—it will amount to an answer in the affirmative, to that question. This may then signal the onset of the treaty’s terminal decay.

HMGS Palihakkara is a former Sri Lankan Ambassador to United Nations; one time Chair /Member of UNSG Advisory Board on Disarmament; a member of the UN Intergovernmental Panel updating the ’Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons’; Advisor to the President of the 1995 NPT Review & Extension Conference.

IPS UN Bureau

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Photos of former Secretaries-Generals in the UN’s public lobby.

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Apr 28 2026 (IPS)

The race for the next UN Secretary-General has, so far, attracted only four candidates—perhaps with more to come in an unpredictable contest.

But most of the candidates have played it safe – avoiding controversial issues and circumventing the wrath of the US whose veto can demolish the chances of any candidate by a single stroke in the Security Council.

The Trump administration has taken a vociferous stand against some the longstanding basic principles and goals advocated by the UN, including combating climate change, promoting gender empowerment and supporting equity and diversity in the world body.

“This ‘climate change,’ it’s the greatest con job ever perpetrated on the world, in my opinion,” Trump was quoted as saying.

“All of these predictions made by the United Nations and many others, often for bad reasons, were wrong. They were made by stupid people that have cost their countries fortunes and given those same countries no chance for success. If you don’t get away from this green scam, your country is going to fail.”

Trump has also initiated a comprehensive, government-wide rollback of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) programs, signing executive orders in January and March 2026 to eliminate DEI offices, initiatives, and training in federal agencies and among contractors.

The policy emphasizes “merit-based” opportunities over DEI and gender empowerment goals, restricting federal funding in the US for, and requiring contractors to stop, “racially discriminatory” DEI activities.

Who, amongst the candidates, will publicly stand on these issues, defying the US?

As of last week, the four candidates vying to succeed António Guterres as the next UN Secretary-General, starting January 1, 2027 were:—Michelle Bachelet (Chile), Rafael Grossi (Argentina), Rebeca Grynspan (Costa Rica), and Macky Sall (Senegal).

Mandeep S. Tiwana, Secretary General CIVICUS, an alliance of civil society organizations, told Inter Press Service (IPS) the United Nations was born out of the horrors of the Second World War, which witnessed cruelty and human rights violations on a monumental scale.

“It is telling that the candidates’ vision skirted addressing impunity for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, the very violations that are weakening the promise of the United Nations today.”

Most candidates, he pointed out, come with years of experience within the system. But experience within a broken system is not the same as the capacity to repair it.

“What the world needs is not another politician or diplomat driven by pragmatism alone, but a leader with a moral vision grounded in a human rights framework, one willing to confront eye-watering inequality, the rise of misogyny, environmental degradation, and the normalization of might-is-right conduct in international affairs”, he said.

“Almost all presentations were made under the long shadow of a possible veto, a reality that shapes what candidates say and, more importantly, what they do not”.

Civil society has been actively calling for straw polls to be held at the General Assembly, giving member states beyond the Permanent P5 and the Elected E10 a formal opportunity to indicate their candidate preference.

That effort has not succeeded, he lamented, whether through a General Assembly resolution or any other mechanism, and that failure is its own indictment of how the selection process is structured.

People across the world need a leader who can drive change through their moral authority and serve as the conscience of the world. At this stage, each of the candidates could have done more to demonstrate that they possess the courage and conviction required to do that. said Tiwana.

Instead, they appeared to play to the gallery of powerful states when they could have been speaking to the people who need a functioning and relevant United Nations in the second quarter of the twenty-first century” declared Tiwana.

Ian G Williams, a longtime commentator covering the UN since 1989 and currently President of the Foreign Press Association (FPA), told IPS, so far, it’s a very uninspiring and, dare one say, “mature” field.

Maybe there should be as much pressure for “youth’s” turn, as there is for a woman, not least since both female candidates are of pensionable age. The “most difficult job in the world” is not one for Donald Trump’s contemporaries!

The hustings had four announced candidates, but as the Book of Proverbs says, “Where there is no vision, the people perish: but he that keepeth the law, happy is he.”

“None of the candidates offered a vision: their presentations had all the breadth and depth of an application for deputy head of corporate Human Resources,” said Williams, who covered four previous SG elections– BBG, Kofi, Ban and Guterres.

Even the candidates who showed signs of integrity, keeping the law, seem to be missing the vision thing and, frankly, keeping the law is a stretch for candidates who want to avoid a veto from the P5, he pointed out.

“So, in a field of lame horses, the three-legged one might limp home, and that could be Mackie Sall, who is not a woman, not Latin American and does not have the support of his own country or region. His big benefit is that he passes the traditional UN promotion test of not being remembered for anything in particular.”

In an in-depth analysis, Williams said Bachelet has the credentials, but for obvious reasons camouflaged her vision while Rebecca Grynspan is an uninspiring apparatchik who has presided over the effectual dismantlement of UNCTAD, the development agency that had been in the sights of Washington for decades.

While one cannot hold family connections against her, many countries might also worry about the optics of an SG whose sister is an Israeli settler in the West Bank. However, she is backed by her government unlike some other candidates.

Indeed, it could be a plus for Bachelet that Chile’s new reactionary government pulled its endorsement, just as the Argentine Grossi’s backing by Millei, and thus implicitly by Trump, is not exactly a vote winner.

Looking at the heavily handicapped slate so far, said Williams, it’s good that there are nominations waiting in the wings.

Barbadian PM Mia Amor Mottley would be an ideal candidate – ticking both the vision and law boxes. A woman from the Latin American and Caribbean region, (whose ”turn” it is for the position) and whose otherwise disqualifying integrity might pass the Trump test by speaking English and being accoladed by no less that the American Enterprise Institute! However, she has just won re-election in her homeland.

Another candidate who is reportedly waiting to declare, said Williams, is Ecuador’s María Fernanda Espinosa, former GA President, who is missing support from her own government, but has other supporters, is young, a woman and a Latin American and who has shown both vision and integrity.

However, he pointed out, the odds are against anyone desirable surviving the vetting and vetoing from this US administration, and they would be unlikely to survive scrutiny by Moscow or Beijing, Russia and China, pay lip service to the international order, and might be prepared to sacrifice their immediate prejudices for the greater good.

Overall, the question is whether the UN is redeemable without finding a way to bypass the veto. At one time the US realized the advantages of maintaining the UN as thin blue fig leaf for its actual hegemony, but it no longer sees the need to cover its rampant MAGAhood, declared Williams.

A list of former UN Secretaries-Generals follows:

• Ban Ki-moon (Republic of Korea) who served from January 2007 to December 2016;
• Kofi Annan (Ghana) who held office from January 1997 to December 2006;
• Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Egypt), who held office from January 1992 to December 1996;
• Javier Pèrez de Cuèllar (Peru), who served from January 1982 to December 1991;
• Kurt Waldheim (Austria), who held office from January 1972 to December 1981;
• U Thant (Burma, now Myanmar), who served from November 1961, when he was appointed acting Secretary-General (he was formally appointed Secretary-General in November 1962) to December 1971;
• Dag Hammarskjöld (Sweden), who served from April 1953 until his death in a plane crash in Africa in September 1961; and
• Trygve Lie (Norway), who held office from February 1946 to his resignation in November 1952.

IPS UN Bureau Report

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The January 2026 US National Defense Strategy (NDS) departs significantly from those preceding it, including from Trump’s first term. Is it deliberately misleading? Or is actual policy, including war, being driven by other considerations?

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Much like the latest National Security Strategy (NSS), released by Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Marco Rubio in December 2025, the NDS claims to be about putting ‘America First’.

Both documents promise ‘no more business as usual’. They claim to change decades of strategy, supposedly in the national interest. Unlike earlier US military blueprints, the NDS is filled with vague rhetoric and eschews interventions abroad.

But in Trump 2.0’s first year alone, the US bombed ten countries, threatening at least four more, all in the Americas. Despite scant mention in both documents, the US-Israel war on Iran resumed on 28 February!

Europe
The NDS claims the US is reducing its direct military role in Europe but still wants to be influential.

It pledges to remain central to NATO “even as we calibrate US force posture and activities in the European theater” to meet US priorities.

Nurina Malek

The NDS blows hot and cold on Europe’s aggressive support for Ukraine’s Zelensky, envisaging a reduced troop presence on NATO’s borders with Ukraine.

Many European allies complain the Trump administration has created a ‘security vacuum’ by leaving Europe to confront Russia with uncertain US support.

They also complain about Secretary Pete Hegseth’s insistence on “credible options to guarantee US military and commercial access to key terrain”. The NDS insists on more than access to Greenland and the Panama Canal.

Issued days after Trump claimed he had a “framework of a future deal” on Arctic security with NATO chief Mark Rutte, he insisted it ensured the US “total access” to Greenland, long a territory of NATO ally, Denmark.

However, Danish officials insisted formal negotiations had not yet begun. Trump also threatened European nations opposing his Greenland plan with tariffs.

Western Hemisphere
The NDS supports the NSS and Trump’s ‘Donroe doctrine’ focus on the Western Hemisphere, envisaging the Americas as the US backyard.

In his January Davos speech, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney noted that recent US actions are disrupting established international norms.

The NDS was issued three days later, after a week of tensions between the White House and its Western allies. Cooperation with the Americas, including Canada, is conditional, to “ensure that they respect and do their part to defend our shared interests”.

It warns the US will “actively and fearlessly defend America’s interests throughout the Western Hemisphere. And where they do not, we will stand ready to take focused, decisive action that concretely advances US interests.”

Trump had declared the US should retake Panama and its Canal, accusing the government of ceding control to China. Later, however, Trump was more ambiguous about ‘taking back’ both the country and the canal.

Many also doubt Trump’s intentions in kidnapping Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, ostensibly for trial on drug charges in the US.

Asia-Pacific
The previous NDS, issued in 2022 under then-President Joe Biden, had deemed China the US’s principal threat. Biden also embraced Trump 1.0’s Indo-Pacific alliance to encircle China.

In contrast, the new NDS describes China as an established power in the Indo-Pacific region that only needs to be discouraged from dominating the US and its allies.

The goal “is not to dominate China; nor is it to strangle or humiliate them… This does not require regime change or some other existential struggle…President Trump seeks a stable peace, fair trade, and respectful relations with China”.

The NDS even proposes “a wider range of military-to-military communications” with Chinese counterparts! The U-turn followed the administration’s retreat from its threatened tit-for-tat tariff escalation after China’s successful retaliation.

Biden’s 2022 NDS promised the US would “support Taiwan’s asymmetric self-defense”. The new NDS offers no such assurances to the self-governing island province of China, which Beijing warns it will take by force if necessary.

The NDS also calls for “a sharp shift – in approach, focus, and tone”, insisting US allies must take more responsibility for countering adversaries such as China, Russia and North Korea.

It insists, “South Korea is capable of taking primary responsibility for deterring North Korea with critical but more limited US support”.

Cutting costs of empire
Like Trump, the new NDS wants allies to pay much more for US ‘protection’.

It echoes his frequent criticisms of allies for taking advantage of previous administrations to subsidise their defence and being ungrateful for US protection.

But the terms of such subordination remain ambiguous and arbitrary, even extortionate and corrupt. Gulf monarchies may now regret their generous donations to the president, apparently to little avail so far.

Trump’s treatment of allies, the Netanyahu-led war on Iran, and continuing US-led efforts to ‘contain’ China suggest both documents offer poor guidance to knowing and understanding, let alone anticipating, US policies abroad.

Nurina Malek is an economics graduate of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, currently working on policy research at the Khazanah Research Institute.

IPS UN Bureau

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Frontispiece of Tom Paine’s Common Sense

By Peter Costantini
SEATTLE. USA, Apr 27 2026 (IPS)

This is the third part of a three-part commentary. Read Part 1: No Kings? Meet King Don and King John – Part 1 of 3,   Part 2 of 3

Whose head?

In foreign relations, as in immigration, King Don the Con appears to be channeling King John the Bad and often surpassing him.

However, our wannabe monarch should consider one more exemplar, this one fictitious: Lewis Carroll’s Red Queen could be another spiritual ancestor of the Golden Emperor. After all, his Bling Dynasty has been a creature of fiction more than fact.

Carroll wrote in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland:

“Let the jury consider their verdict.” the King said, for about the twentieth time that day.
“No, no!” said the Queen. “Sentence first—verdict afterwards.”
“Stuff and nonsense!” said Alice loudly. “The idea of having the sentence first!”
“Hold your tongue!” said the Queen, turning purple.
“I won’t!” said Alice.
“Off with her head!” the Queen shouted at the top of her voice. Nobody moved.

As we’ve seen, King Don has demonstrated a similar disdain for legal niceties. “Sentence first—verdict afterwards” could be the motto of much of his foreign policy as well as immigration enforcement. He often skips indictment, trial, and verdict, and jumps straight from accusation to carrying out the sentence.

There is one striking difference between the two monarchies, though: the Red Queen’s courtiers understood that she was not playing with a full deck, and so they ignored her ranting. The Golden Emperor’s toadies are too cowardly to tell him that he’s acting increasingly unhinged, and have become immune to shame about their North Korea-like sycophancy. A possible exception is “Secretary of War” Pete Hegseth, who may be even more deranged than his boss. His speeches sound like they’re written by a B-grade action-movie screenwriter torqued on crank. Economist Paul Krugman said in an interview that some people in the Pentagon are calling him the Secretary of War Crimes.

In the summer and fall of 2025, Trump marshalled a massive armada of ships, air power and troops in the southern Caribbean. The official name was Operation Southern Spear, and they were clearly positioned to threaten Venezuela. But while they were waiting to carry out the eventual abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro Moros, Trump reportedly ordered them to unleash military strikes against small boats that he said were smuggling drugs.

Instead of ignoring the President, as the Red Queen’s courtiers did, Hegseth and Secretary of State Marco Rubio obediently began extrajudicial executions of civilians in small boats. The victims reportedly included sailors, fishermen, bus drivers, laborers, and possibly some small-time smugglers.

The Defense Department reportedly confirmed to Congress that as of March 17 the U.S. military had killed at least 157 people in military strikes on 47 alleged drug-smuggling vessels in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific. More strikes have allegedly occurred since, raising the death toll to at least 163 people.

As an Elizabethan connoisseur of royal mayhem might have put it: “As flies to wanton boys are we to King Don. He kills us for his sport.”

If Trump had wanted to make a serious case to the world that he was actually combatting drug smuggling, he could have ordered normal policing operations: intercept and impound the boat, display the packets of drugs and weapons captured, perp walk the smugglers and publicize their indictments and convictions. However, the his government has not publicly presented evidence that drugs were being smuggled or that the crews were connected with drug cartels or terrorists.

U.S. forces did not give the boats or crews a chance to surrender. They simply blew them (and any evidence of their alleged crimes) to smithereens. In one case, they reportedly slaughtered two survivors of an initial strike who were still clinging to the wreckage. Some boats were apparently carrying more people than would be needed for a crew, so perhaps some were just passengers. In another strike in which two survivors were rescued, they were not arrested by the U.S., but instead returned to their respective countries, Colombia and Ecuador. This was an improbable outcome if they were in fact smugglers or terrorists.

Here’s the lowdown: regardless of whether the crews or passengers were smuggling anything, they were civilians. Even if a war had been in progress, it would have been illegal under international and U.S. military law to kill non-combatants. But this was not a war with a foreign government, nor an attack on the U.S. by terrorists. Given that many of the strikes killed four or more people, the customary threshold for mass homicide, the operation should be investigated as serial mass murders.

Even before the strikes began, the senior Judge Advocate General (JAG, a military lawyer) at the U.S. Southern Command in Miami questioned the legality of the strikes and voiced concerns that they could amount to extrajudicial killings, NBC News reported. This JAG’s opinion was reportedly overruled by more senior officials.

Many other military lawyers and other officials also voiced concerns about the strikes’ legality up their chains of command. The “Former JAGs Working Group”, formed by victims of Hegseth’s earlier mass firings of JAGs, issued a statement that it “unanimously considers both the giving and the execution of these orders, if true, to constitute war crimes, murder, or both.”

Questions about the operation’s legality also apparently troubled the head of the U.S. Southern Command. Admiral Alvin Holsey abruptly announced that he would step down from his post in December, without offering any explanation for his decision. But the New York Times reported that Holsey, too, had expressed concern about the legality of the killings. This brought him into conflict with Hegseth and the White House. Ultimately, Hegseth pushed out the Admiral.

Six Democratic members of Congress who are veterans made a video that simply told serving military members: “Our laws are clear: You can refuse illegal orders.” This is advice commonly given to soldiers. Trump responded hysterically on Truth Social: “SEDITIOUS BEHAVIOR, punishable by DEATH!”, and reposted another user: “HANG THEM GEORGE WASHINGTON WOULD !!” [Buchanan 11/20/2025]

Trump reserved his nastiest blast of vitriol for the only U.S. senator in the group, Mark Kelly of Arizona, a retired Navy combat pilot and astronaut. Defense Secretary Hegseth moved to demote and censure Kelly and reduce his retirement pay. In February, a federal judge temporarily blocked the demotion and criticized Hegseth for trying to punish a veteran and member of Congress for First Amendment-protected speech. Ironically, the attacks on Kelly seem to have supercharged his political fund-raising and helped establish him as a credible Democratic presidential candidate for 2028.

The rationales for killing civilians on small boats followed an opportunistic trajectory: first frame the strikes as tools to intimidate Maduro, then claim to be interdicting drug smuggling to save American lives. Next up the ante to fighting narco-terrorists. Finally, admit that the main goal of the whole operation was to take back oil from Venezuela that somehow belonged to the U.S.

After the abduction of Maduro, the usefulness of boat strikes to intimidate the now deposed president, if it ever existed, should have expired. But since then, Trump has continued to claim he is protecting U.S. citizens from “narco-terrorists” by destroying small boats.

The U.S. Southern Command claims with each strike that it is targeting boats along “known smuggling routes” that U.S. intelligence has identified. But it has yet to provide evidence that these boats were actually carrying drugs – perhaps because it is hard to collect it when the boat is blown to bits remotely from the air. And whether or not smuggling goes on along those routes, people living on the coasts of Latin America use small boats for public transportation, carrying legal goods, fishing, and many other purposes. Unsurprisingly, some may follow the same routes that smugglers use (as I have witnessed traveling in a small passenger panga on the Caribbean).

As the case of the Venezuelan deportees established, Venezuela is not a major drug producer; it serves primarily as a conduit for illicit substances produced elsewhere in South America and bound for European markets, not the U.S. Furthermore, in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific, the main drug being moved is cocaine, which is rarely fatal for users. The fentanyl that Trump flagged as responsible for tens of thousands of deaths in the U.S. is produced almost exclusively in Mexico and smuggled into the U.S. from there.

As a congressional interrogator at a hearing on the strikes asserted, any amounts of drugs the strikes may have destroyed were insignificant, and are having no impact on the volume or price of drugs entering the U.S.

Furthermore, small boats are only one of numerous modes of drug transport from South to North America and Europe. Drug enforcement has been playing Whac-A-Mole for a half-century with submersibles, commercial shipping, air freight, small planes, drones, tunnels, parcel post, package express, U.S. citizen travelers, and the list goes on. Despite high-profile drug seizures, arrests of drug lords, and spasms of violence, drug markets keep calm and carry on. Meanwhile, fatal overdoses, almost exclusively from fentanyl, spiral upward.

And narco-terrorism? Sorry, but in the non-fiction world, organized crime and terrorism are fundamentally different beasts.

Big drug cartels resemble legal transnational corporations in many ways. Their main purpose is to make money – and then they have to launder it, which also requires business acumen. They have vast decentralized networks that include voluntary and involuntary sub-contractors and investors. They spin off subsidiaries in different countries. They can be very violent when competing over plazas, treating migrants as a profit center, or responding to attacks by governments, but usually they want to run their businesses without visibility or drama. The most successful organized crime executives have been the cagey facilitators and deal-makers.

Occasionally, when the gangs have become stronger than the police forces, governments have had to use the military to confront them. But only patient use of law enforcement tools like the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act and socio-economic programs to offer foot soldiers ways to get out of the life can ultimately disentangle their roots from society.

On the other hand, organizations that practice terrorism use violence or the threat of it for political, social, or ideological purposes. They want to visibly menace and destroy their enemies, and they are not primarily concerned with making money.

Many political movements from the American Revolution onward have practiced terrorism – in that case against Tory sympathizers with the British crown. And as in most wars, the British army also practiced terrorism against civilian colonists. Whether a given armed group is classified as terrorists or freedom-fighters generally depends on which side of the conflict the observer stands.

Organized crime may sometimes pursue socio-political objectives, and terrorists may sometimes use illicit activities to fund themselves. But defending against each phenomenon requires very different approaches. The Global War on Terror and the War on Drugs have both been long-running failures because neither terrorism nor organized crime can be eliminated militarily.

When King Don calls an organization “narco-terrorists”, he is simply slapping a label on it that gives him legal cover for using military force to blow things up and kill innocent bystanders. (“Oopsie!”, as his buddy Bukele might say with a smirk.) And as a bonus, the violence may distract his followers from his rich stew of corruption, juicy emoluments and tender pardons garnished with a soupçon of Epstein.

Despite the smoke screens, international efforts to hold Trump responsible for serious human rights violations have begun in a few venues.

A panel of experts convened by the United Nations Human Rights office in September 2025 concluded that the boat strikes violated the right to life under international law and the law of the sea. Their statement asserted: “International law does not allow governments to simply murder alleged drug traffickers. Criminal activities should be disrupted, investigated and prosecuted in accordance with the rule of law, including through international cooperation.”

The U.S. had accused the Venezuelan criminal gang Tren de Aragua of mounting “an ‘invasion’ or ‘predatory incursion’ of the U.S., at the behest of the Venezuelan Government.” But the experts found that “There is no evidence that this group is committing an armed attack against the U.S. that would allow the U.S. to use military force against it in national self-defence.”

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, an organ of the Organization of American States, also held a hearing on the boat strikes in March. It heard testimony from several human rights organizations and the U.S. government. “We are doing everything in our power to hold the Trump administration responsible for its egregious violations of both U.S. and international law”, Jamil Dakwar of the ACLU testified. “These extrajudicial killings,” said Angelo Guisado of the Center for Constitutional Rights, “were poorly veiled cover to justify the illegal overthrow of the Venezuelan government, as admitted by White House Chief of Staff Susie Wiles.” A State Department spokesman responded: “The IACHR lacks the competence to review the matters at issue.” He also accused the Commission of interfering in domestic litigation.

The Trump administration has not released the names of the slain. But a few families have come forward to identify their loved ones. Human rights groups are representing two of them seeking redress from the government.

Although we have focused on the boat strikes as Trump’s most literal implementation of “Off with their heads!”, the operation that they were supposedly a warm-up for – the ousting of Venezuela’s president – also resulted in pointless and illegal bloodshed.

On January 3, 2026, Trump cried “Havoc!” and let slip the dawgs of Delta Force. The U.S. invaded Venezuela, abducted its president, Nicolás Maduro, and charged him in a U.S. court with heading a drug-smuggling cartel and illegally possessing firearms. During the operation, U.S. officials estimated that at least 75 people were killed by U.S. forces. The Venezuelan defense minister later said that 83 were killed and more than 112 injured by U.S. forces. He confirmed that the operation killed 47 of its personnel, and the Cuban government said that 32 of the dead were Cuban citizens. Some reports have suggested that additional civilians may have been killed.

As mentioned previously, an investigation by U.S. intelligence services had already found that the Venezuelan government did not direct or cooperate with Tren de Aragua, and was instead generally hostile towards the gang. So whatever his other faults, Maduro was evidently not a drug lord.

These charges also beg the question of how a president who is the commander-in-chief of an army and under protection of a presidential guard can be guilty of illegally possessing firearms. Stay tuned to Maduro’s trial in federal court in New York City for more details.

In any case, just for the record, it is generally illegal under international law for one country to invade another, kill its citizens, and capture or assassinate its leaders.

To understand Operation Southern Spear, it may help to compare the capture and abduction of Maduro with Trump’s pardon of Juan Orlando Hernández, the former president of Honduras, who was convicted in a U.S. court of large-scale drug trafficking and imprisoned. His brother Tony had already suffered the same fate.

Trump’s pardoning of JOH at the same time he was detaining Maduro on similar charges was widely seen as contradictory. But on the contrary, the message was eloquent: the law means nothing, and King Don the Con doesn’t care if friends break it. All that matters, even if you’re a convicted narco, is that you shamelessly genuflect to him and declare undying fealty.

Despite U.S. criticism of the Maduro government, the abduction of the Venezuelan president left his vice-president in charge as the temporary president, and did not remove any other high officials from the existing Venezuelan government. So much for régime change.

In an outburst of candor, Trump confirmed afterwards that his main motivation was to force Venezuela to give back “our oil” to the United States. This was apparently done under what he calls the “Donroe Doctrine”. The reality was that since long before Maduro, Venezuela had expropriated the assets of some foreign oil corporations, as many developing countries have done. But Trump conveniently omits the backstory that foreign oil companies had originally expropriated Venezuela’s oil from Venezuela. This was fueled by concessions from dictators in the first half of the 20th Century. [Wolfe 1/9/2026]

Treachery, lechery, mendacity and cruelty? Sorry, King John the Bad: in immigration, foreign policy and many other domains, King Don the Con has elevated those qualities far above your crude medieval badassery.

Kings and laws

When the New York Times asked Trump if there were any limits on his global powers, he replied: “Yeah, there is one thing. My own morality. My own mind. It’s the only thing that can stop me. … I don’t need international law.”

It is true that Trump has a finely calibrated moral compass. The problem is that it always points to himself.

Conservative jurist J. Michael Luttig laid out the challenge starkly: “Once more, we must ask, as Lincoln did, whether a nation so ‘conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal,’ can long endure. …We have been given the high charge of our forebears to ‘keep’ the republic they founded a quarter of a millennium ago. If we do not keep it now, we will surely lose it.”

The millions of partisans of No Kings and other resistance initiatives are working overtime to organize the massive and diversified political insurgency necessary to throw King Don the Con into the toxic waste dump of history and to re-establish something resembling the rule of law. Some of the political opposition seems to be slowly awakening from its torpor and showing signs of life. However, if the MAGA fever has not broken by 2028, I fear that our democracy and human rights will be languishing in hospice.

The last word goes to Tom Paine, the sharp-tongued English pamphleteer who lit a fire under colonial revolutionaries in 1776 with Common Sense: “[A]s in absolute governments the King is law, so in free countries the law ought to be King; and there ought to be no other.”

This is the third part of a three-part commentary. Read Part 1: No Kings? Meet King Don and King John – Part 1 of 3, Part 2 of 3

About the author

A worker operates a geothermal pipeline at the Laudat plant in Dominica, part of a clean energy project supported by the Global Environment Facility. The project illustrates the kind of system-wide transition GEF-9 aims to scale across small island developing states. Credit: Alison Kentish/IPS

By Alison Kentish
SAINT LUCIA, Apr 27 2026 (IPS)

The gap between global environmental ambition and real-world progress is widening, with less than five years left to meet key climate and biodiversity targets.

Against that backdrop, attention is increasingly turning to how international environmental finance can deliver faster, deeper change on the ground.

Earlier this month, nations pledged $3.9 billion to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) for its latest funding cycle, known as GEF-9, running from July 2026 to June 2030.

The new cycle is being positioned as part of the response to lagging global environmental action. The GEF will aim for an important upscaling of conservation efforts across terrestrial and marine environments and, importantly, will also aim to influence and transform how economies produce, consume and develop.

What GEF-9 Is Trying to Change

The Global Environment Facility is the world’s largest multilateral environmental fund, supporting developing countries to meet commitments under multilateral environmental agreements on climate change, biodiversity, land degradation, chemicals and ocean governance.

That comprises six global environmental agreements, including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity.

But officials say GEF-9 reflects a shift in thinking, adding that incremental environmental action is no longer enough to keep pace with accelerating ecological decline.

“The global community has set very ambitious goals for 2030 and, regrettably, we are nowhere close to achieving them,” said Fred Boltz, Head of Programming at the GEF. “As a consequence, the shared environmental challenge we now face is to manage a changing Earth system to sustain a healthy planet for healthy people.”

In this context of change and uncertainty, existing approaches have reached their limits.

“Upscaling conventional solutions is not sufficient to address our planetary-scale, existential challenge,” Boltz said.

From Projects to Systems Transformation

At the core of GEF-9 is a deliberate shift toward what the organisation describes as “systems transformation”, consistent with the GEF Integrated Programs (IPs) which are an important complement to funding traditional environmental projects that are necessary but not sufficient to address planetary challenges.  Systems transformation through the GEF IPs aims to change underlying incentives, institutions and pathways that currently drive climate change, ecosystem and biodiversity loss, land degradation, and pollution.

Rather than treating environmental damage as a series of isolated problems, the GEF IPs are built around the idea that economies themselves must be reshaped to operate within ecological limits. That includes the major systems that determine environmental outcomes at scale: food systems and agriculture, urban development, production supply chains, and land, water and ocean use.

The approach reflects what GEF describes in its strategic framework as a response to “accelerating global environmental crises” and the need for a more integrated response that aligns multilateral environmental agreements and development efforts.

“In addition to conserving the most important areas, restoring degraded ecosystems and preserving the adaptive capacity of our Earth, we must urgently focus on transforming human production and consumption practices,” said Boltz, pointing to the scale of change required to meet global environmental targets.

Under GEF-9, this shift is being operationalised through four linked pathways.

The first is expanding and diversifying environmental finance, including through blended finance models that combine public funding with private investment to close persistent financing gaps.

The second is embedding nature more directly into national development planning, ensuring environmental priorities are not treated as stand-alone goals but integrated into economic decision-making, fiscal policy and sector planning.

The third focuses on what the GEF calls “valuing nature in the economy”, including internalising the value of nature in economic designs and decisions, mobilising private capital, and aligning investment flows with environmental agreements through tools such as natural capital accounting and nature-positive value chains.

The fourth is broader “whole-of-society” engagement, which places Indigenous peoples, local communities, civil society, youth and women more centrally in the design and implementation of environmental programmes. The GEF considers that, as stewards of the Earth, all of them must take part in its conservation while also benefiting from the wealth of nature.

Taken together, these approaches reflect what the GEF describes as a shift toward nature-positive development. This is where economic growth and environmental protection are no longer treated as competing priorities but as interdependent goals.

Rather than funding isolated conservation projects, GEF-9 is therefore designed to operate across entire landscapes and seascapes, recognising that ecosystems, economies and communities are deeply interconnected and must be managed as such.

A Shift in How Environmental Finance Works

A key change under GEF-9 is how environmental action will be financed.

The fund is expanding its use of blended finance by combining public funding with private investment to unlock significantly larger flows of capital.

While earlier cycles used this approach in limited ways, GEF-9 is expected to scale it up as part of a broader strategy to close persistent environmental financing gaps.

Boltz said the focus is now on upscaling and transformative change rather than incremental gains.

“We are really focusing on transforming human production and consumption practices and operating at a scale in the conservation of ecosystems that enables planetary adaptation to a changing climate and to unrelenting human demand for ecosystem goods and services,” he said.

New financial instruments, including outcome-based bonds and nature-linked investment mechanisms, are also expected to play a greater role in attracting long-term private capital.

What It Looks Like on the Ground

In practice, the shift is already visible in energy transitions in small island states.

In Dominica, geothermal energy development supported through GEF-linked financing is expected to replace around 65% of fossil fuel-based electricity generation.

The impact goes beyond emissions reductions.

For island economies dependent on imported fuel, such transitions can reduce energy costs, ease fiscal pressure and improve resilience to global price shocks.

“This systems transformation benefits the environment in Dominica and benefits the global community by reducing greenhouse gas emissions while also ensuring lasting human benefits for the people of this island nation, in turn increasing the likelihood of success and sustainability for those investments,” Boltz said.

GEF-9 approach. Graphic: IPS

Integration Replaces Silos

Another defining feature of GEF-9 is integration across sectors and across the GEF “family of funds” – a shift away from treating the conservation of biodiversity, land and ecosystems, marine and freshwater systems, chemicals and waste management, and climate change mitigation and adaptation as separate sectors with distinct investments and isolated efforts.

Instead, projects are increasingly being designed to address these challenges together, reflecting the reality that environmental systems do not operate in isolation.

The approach is driven by both efficiency and impact. Combining interventions is expected to deliver multiple benefits at once, while avoiding fragmented efforts that can undermine long-term results.

Under this model, a single intervention can generate overlapping gains across different environmental priorities. Mangrove restoration, for example, can strengthen coastal protection against storms, support biodiversity habitats and store carbon. Sustainable agriculture initiatives can improve food security while also reducing pressure on soils, forests and freshwater systems.

The approach is also linked to broader GEF-9 priorities around scaling impact across landscapes and seascapes, rather than limiting action to protected areas or project boundaries. That includes managing ecosystems as connected systems, where upstream land use, coastal resilience and marine health are interdependent.

Boltz said this shift reflects how environmental pressures are actually experienced by countries on the ground.

“Countries face a spectrum of environmental challenges that do not neatly fall into different categories and the GEF must operate and support the achievement of lasting environmental outcomes in this reality,” he said.

Focus On Vulnerable Countries and Communities

The new cycle also places stronger emphasis on countries and communities most exposed to environmental risks, reflecting greater equity in how global environmental finance is distributed.

Small island developing states and least developed countries are expected to receive a larger share of resources under GEF-9, alongside increased support for Indigenous peoples and local communities who are often on the frontlines of conservation but historically underfunded.

Boltz said this shift is now embedded in the fund’s programming priorities, including a formal commitment to expand Indigenous-led environmental action.

“We have committed to an aspirational target of 20% of GEF financing to support Indigenous peoples’ efforts in environmental stewardship across the GEF family of funds. We have also significantly expanded a dedicated financing instrument to support Indigenous peoples’ stewardship. That has increased fourfold. It was 25 million in GEF-8. It’ll be 100 million in GEF-9.”

He added that the increase reflects growing recognition that environmental outcomes are stronger when local and Indigenous communities are directly resourced and involved in decision-making, particularly in areas such as forest management, land, water and ocean stewardship and biodiversity protection.

What Success Will Look Like

By 2030, success under GEF-9 will not be measured only by financial commitments or project delivery.

Instead, it will be judged by whether structural changes begin to take hold, whether energy systems become cleaner, ecosystems more resilient and economies less damaging to nature.

Boltz said the benchmark is long-term transformation.

“Success looks like maintaining the core elements of what is necessary for a vibrant and resilient planet,” he said, pointing to shifts in the conservation of large marine, terrestrial and freshwater systems and transformations in food systems, supply chains, and urban development.

Why It Matters Now

With global environmental targets under increasing pressure, GEF-9 represents a test of whether international finance can move at the speed and scale required to influence real-world systems.

The initial $3.9 billion commitment pledged by GEF donors in April secures the financial foundation for the next cycle, but it also raises expectations about delivery.

For countries already experiencing the impacts of climate change, particularly small island states, the question is no longer about ambition.

It is about whether systems can be reshaped quickly enough before environmental thresholds are crossed.

Note: The Eighth Global Environment Facility Assembly will be held from May 30 to June 6, 2026, in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.
This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.

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Excerpt:

Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, at a press conference on the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Credit: Eskinder Debebe/UN Photo

By Naureen Hossain
UNITED NATIONS, Apr 27 2026 (IPS)

The Eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will meet at the United Nations in New York from 27 April to 22 May 2026. State parties to the treaty will meet with the urgent aim of finding common ground on the issue of nonproliferation.

“The NPT is very often referred to as a cornerstone of the international disarmament and nonproliferation regime and also a very important pillar of international peace and security,” said Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA).

The NPT came into effect in 1970 and was extended indefinitely in 1995. This landmark international treaty calls for all signatories to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and promote nuclear disarmament above all and encourages pursuing more peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It remains the only legally binding agreement that nuclear powers adhere to, with 191 states, both nuclear and non-nuclear, as signatories to the treaty. Review conferences are typically held at five-year intervals beginning in 1970 (the conference originally scheduled for 2020 was delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and was later held in 2022).

The president of the conference is Do Hung Viet, the Permanent Representative of Vietnam to the UN. The conference is expected to begin with a general debate during the first week, which will be followed by thematic discussions under each of the three pillars of the Treaty.

It will be attended by high‑level representatives, including Ministers of Foreign Affairs, as well as senior representatives of key international organizations. Side events will be held in parallel to the thematic discussions by attending members of civil society. This year’s conference will assess the implementation of the NPT since the last review conference, which ended without countries reaching a consensus on the final outcome document.

Ahead of the conference, Nakamitsu spoke to reporters at UN headquarters on 24 April. She remarked that state parties should take this meeting as an opportunity to converge on common ground when it came to nonproliferation. Ultimately, country representatives would want to avoid both an increase in proliferation and the intentional use of nuclear weapons. It will be a collective responsibility, said Nakamitsu, for the state parties to reach a consensus on the outcome document.

The NPT Review Conference will convene during a period of deepening geopolitical tensions, where major nuclear powers are embroiled in regional conflicts. The current military conflict in Iran and, in particular, the war in Ukraine from 2022, have caused shifts in countries’ attitudes about nuclear proliferation.

Some experts have claimed that the situation has led to a start of a new arms race as more countries hold discussions around “improving” nuclear weapons and even outright expanding into procuring nuclear arms themselves, as some see weapons as the “ultimate guarantor of national security”. Nakamitsu acknowledged this as a “proliferation driver”, or growing public sentiment for nuclear proliferation, irrespective of the formal governments’ position on the NPT. She also expressed concern over the increased rhetoric that threatened the use of nuclear weapons, warning that the more nuclear weapon states there were, the greater the risks of nuclear weapons being used by mistake or by miscalculation.

“[The] prevention of nuclear weapons’ use will have to become also one of the key focuses of the conference because when it comes to nuclear weapons, again, it’s not just one or two countries’ security; it goes beyond the borders. It is the security of all of us,” said Nakamitsu. “We need to put to rest the wrong narrative that more nuclear weapon states would guarantee our security.”

A “shared sentiment in crisis” within all state parties may in fact encourage them to “protect and maintain” the NPT. Despite this, Nakamitsu warned that with a growing leniency around nuclear weapons, this poses a risk to the gains made right after the end of World War II and throughout the Cold War.

In the current strategic security environment, the rapid rise of certain technologies will also be a factor in discussions. The advent of artificial intelligence has sparked great debate within the international community for its application in certain sectors and the risk of misuse without the proper guardrails.

It was only in December 2024 that the UN General Assembly passed a resolution that detailed the use of AI in the military domain and ‘its implications for international peace and security’, though it should be noted that there is no reference to the use of AI in the context of nuclear weapons.

When asked whether the issue of AI in the military-nuclear nexus would be discussed during the NPT conference, Nakamitsu noted that the integration of AI in the nuclear command and communications channel is “beginning to be discussed on different platforms”, and further consultations would also be held in Geneva this year. The NPT conference may not be the forum for further discussions around this issue or regarding AI governance in the military context. However, this is something that state parties recognise will require investigation, including when it comes to placing guardrails on the use of AI in the military domain.

“There is an increasing awareness that when it comes to nuclear weapons’ command and control, obviously humans have to retain oversight,” Nakamitsu told Inter Press Service.

The challenges facing the international world, particularly in the context of the conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, are placing “significant stress on the treaty,” according to Nakamitsu.

But it is also what makes the NPT review conference and its outcomes all the more relevant. A shared understanding that nuclear proliferation will only lead to further instability and insecurity is what will push member states to engage in critical dialogue over the next four weeks. This must also yield a shared commitment to uphold the principles of the NPT by the end.

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Credit: Phil Nijhuis/ANP via AFP

By Andrew Firmin
LONDON, Apr 27 2026 (IPS)

Yasmin Ullah, from Myanmar’s persecuted Rohingya minority, is determined to see justice. On 13 April, she filed a complaint alleging genocide against Myanmar’s president, Min Aung Hlaing, to Indonesia’s Attorney General’s Office. Min Aung Hlaing led the 2021 coup that ousted a democratically elected government and this month was named president following a sham election held amid intense repression, rubber stamping the army’s continuing grip on power. However secure he appears in his position, Yasmin Ullah’s legal action offers hope his impunity may not be guaranteed.

The complaint accuses Min Aung Hlaing of genocide against Rohingya people, a predominantly Muslim ethnic group denied citizenship despite being long established in Myanmar. He’s accused of being responsible for the burning of Rohingya villages, forced evictions, killings and mass rape in a 2017 military operation, during which around 24,000 Rohingya people were killed and over 700,000 forced to flee. The UN’s fact-finding mission and its Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar have extensively documented atrocities. Civil society has played a key role in gathering testimonies from survivors and preserving evidence.

The case was made possible by changes to Indonesia’s criminal code that came into effect in January. While civil society has raised concerns about revisions to other parts of the code that restrict Indonesian people’s ability to speak out and protest, this particular change stands out as a positive development, enabling people to bring charges against alleged perpetrators of atrocities in other countries under the principle of universal jurisdiction.

Universal jurisdiction on the rise

Universal jurisdiction applies to crimes under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, on the grounds that these crimes are an offence against humanity as a whole and as such aren’t bound by borders.

Some states, including France and Germany, have passed laws to enable universal jurisdiction prosecutions. Many powerful states however still refuse to recognise the principle, citing national sovereignty, the long-established doctrine of immunity for heads of state and the potential for prosecutions to be politically motivated.

Yet the question of whether government leaders should be immune from prosecution has increasingly been contested. Immunity wasn’t granted when leaders of Sierra Leone and former Yugoslavia were prosecuted for crimes committed during civil wars, and the Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court (ICC), removed the principle of immunity where it has jurisdiction. Ironically, the Trump administration, which resists international accountability over its officials, may have contributed to further eroding the doctrine of immunity by abducting Venezuela’s president Nicolás Maduro and placing him on trial for drug trafficking.

Universal jurisdiction cases have increased since the end of the Cold War. Belgium, Finland and Germany convicted people for their role in the Rwanda genocide. Switzerland secured the first guilty verdict for crimes committed in the Liberian civil war, while France convicted another Liberian war criminal in 2022. Germany convicted a Bosnian paramilitary soldier of genocide and, in 2021 and 2022, found two Syrian officials guilty of atrocity crimes.

Hopes of justice

Rohingya people have no hope of justice in a country that refuses even to recognise them as citizens, so diaspora civil society organisations are seeking it wherever they find opportunities. In 2025, an Argentinian court issued arrest warrants against Min Aung Hlaing and other senior Myanmar officials on crimes against humanity and genocide charges, in a case brought by a Rohingya organisation. Earlier this year, a human rights organisation filed a criminal case against the Myanmar regime in Timor-Leste. When authorities appointed a senior prosecutor to examine the case, Myanmar retaliated by expelling Timor-Leste’s ambassador.

These efforts complement proceedings in international courts. In 2024, the ICC issued an arrest warrant against Min Aung Hlaing for crimes against humanity, while in January, hearings began at the International Court of Justice in a case brought by the Gambian government accusing Myanmar of breaching the Genocide Convention. It isn’t a question of choosing between national jurisdictions and international courts, but rather of taking every avenue available to demand justice.

Universal jurisdiction has its limits. Those accused tend to be safe when they hold power; when states have successfully prosecuted perpetrators, it’s after they’ve lost the power that enabled their crimes. Currently, this means attempts to hold Israel’s leaders accountable for the genocide in Gaza, such as arrest warrants a Turkish court issued against 37 officials, only have symbolic value. Cases motivated by political point-scoring also risk discrediting the principle, as when a body created by Malaysia’s former prime minister Mahathir Mohamad found an array of US officials guilty in absentia, without legal basis or consequence.

Actions under universal jurisdiction, when targeted at evident offenders, can nonetheless help build moral pressure and signal that justice may eventually come. At a time when the brutal and illegitimate Myanmar regime is buttressed by China, India and Russia, and with the USA easing its pressure in pursuit of economic benefits, it matters that other countries keep holding the line, isolating the junta and exposing its atrocities.

It matters all the more when pressure comes from Southeast Asian countries, depriving the Myanmar regime of the excuse that human rights accountability is a western imposition. Two members of the Association of Southeast Asian nations, Indonesia and Timor-Leste, have now taken action against a fellow member. But other attempts in the region have faltered. Philippine authorities declined to proceed when five survivors of atrocities filed a case in 2023, while an investigation civil society filed with Indonesia’s national human rights commission that same year, alleging that Indonesian companies were supplying military equipment to Myanmar, has so far seen no progress.

As 2026 president of the UN Human Rights Council, Indonesia is uniquely placed to take the lead in the pursuit of justice for atrocity crimes. Indonesian authorities must treat this case as a priority and give it the attention and resources it needs.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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