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MIDEAST: Saudi-U.S. Realignment Political, Not Military, Strategy
Analysis - By N Janardhan
DUBAI, May 2 (IPS) - The ''mutual agreement'' to end U.S. military
operations in Saudi Arabia is a win-win formula guided at one level by
political considerations and at another level by a warning to Riyadh that
it should cooperate better in the ''war against terror'' at another.
The ''diminished security threat'' explanation is an eyewash, according
to political analyst Victor Shalhoub. He was referring to Washington's
claim that with Saddam Hussein - who had threatened to invade Gulf
countries in the past - now gone, there is little benefit from the
military alliance.
For the U.A.E.-based Shalhoub, the term ''mutual agreement'' is
significant because it reflects that Washington now feels more comfortable
dealing with another Gulf country, Qatar, just as Saudi Arabia is relieved
to be able handle domestic issues without U.S. troops on its soil.
Explaining that contention, he says: ''Since Sep. 11, there has been a
steady deterioration in bilateral ties. Washington's demands for a
crackdown on Islamists and push for political reforms were getting
difficult for Riyadh to meet because of the prevailing anti-U.S. sentiments
at home arising from the Arab-Israeli conflict and deepened by the U.S.
attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq.''
With 15 of the 19 Sep. 11 hijackers identified as Saudi citizens and in
the U.S. view little action taken on this within Saudi Arabia, Washington
was also under criticism from its own quarters for being too lenient with
the Gulf country - the United States' biggest oil supplier.
''With Iraq occupied and its oil reserves - the second largest in the
world - under U.S. influence, Washington's reliance on Riyadh
diminishes,'' Shalhoub continues. He adds that with no political or
economic strings attached to ties with Qatar, the United States would be
able to operate without ''making any compromises''.
For Riyadh, since Washington is advocating political reforms as the best
cure to neutralise Islamist influence, the absence of U.S troops on its
soil - long a magnet for criticism from critics - will make the ''Saudi
attempt at changes appear more indigenous and credible,'' Shalhoub added.
In January, according to a 'New York Times' report, Saudi Crown Prince
Abdullah had conceptualised a plan to use the announced departure of U.S.
forces to conduct a series of elections for provincial assemblies. The goal
would be to create a fully democratic system of regional and national
assemblies over six years.
The presence of U.S. troops in the kingdom - home to Islam's holiest
sites - has irked Saudis, a sentiment that people like Osama bin Laden,
whom Washington accuses of masterminding the Sep. 11 attacks, capitalised on.
The ruling House of Saud, nervous about an internal revolt by al-Qaeda
sympathisers, had been against a security arrangement based on the presence
of an outside military power to protect its domestic interests.
According to the new arrangement, about 500 U.S. personnel would remain
to train Saudi soldiers and take part in joint exercises.
The decision ends a relationship that peaked in 1991, when Washington
used Saudi Arabia as a launch pad for the Gulf War to beat back Iraqi
troops from Kuwait, and reached its nadir after Sep. 11, 2001.
U.S. military personnel in Saudi Arabia doubled to 10,000 from 5,000
during the Iraq war this year, but Riyadh refused to allow its bases to be
used for the air strikes against that country in March.
The pullout of U.S. forces was in the making for more than a year, but
was hastened by the events in Iraq.
In January 2001, U.S. Sen Carl Levin had said that the United States may
pull its forces out of Saudi Arabia and find ''a more hospitable'' base.
This was followed by a 'Washington Post' report about how Riyadh may itself
call for U.S. troops to leave.
At another level, however, Shalhoub feels that the pullout is a veiled
threat to Saudi Arabia. ''It is their way of telling the Saudis that they
mean business - the military campaign which ousted Saddam Hussein's regime
in Baghdad could be unleashed again, targeting even Riyadh if the need
arises.''
In that concealed threat lies the potential for the bilateral ties to
deteriorate further rather than improve, says the analyst.
The decision to shift the U.S. regional air force headquarters from
Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia to Al Udeid air base in Qatar this week is
not sudden too. The logistical transfer had begun in March last year to
bypass Saudi objections to military action against Iraq.
Analysing the gains for Qatar, the editor of the U.A.E.-based 'The Gulf
Today', P V Vivekanand, says: ''Doha has been positioning itself to be a
key U.S. ally for some time.''
The ''turning point'', he says, was the Arab backing that Manama
received in the Hawar islands case, which was settled in Bahrain's favour
by the International Court of Justice in 2001. Since then, it moved into
top diplomatic gear to outsmart the others.''
Qatar's advantage is that it is seen in Washington as a more stable and
willing host. The emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, has received
strong U.S. backing since he unseated his father in a bloodless coup in
1995, and introduced democratic reforms. Moreover, while calling for an
independent Palestinian state, he has also been an advocate of ties with
Israel.
Referring to unconfirmed reports that the United States was planning to
establish permanent access to at least four military bases in Iraq,
Shalhoub says they would have little practical use, as opposed to the
utility value of the Saudi base in enforcing the ''no-fly zone'' in
southern Iraq.
''But bases in Iraq will serve a strategic purpose by helping to breathe
down the necks of Syria and Iran, both countries on Washington's hit
list,'' he adds. (END/2003)
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