What
will the Doha round deliver?
By Jonathan Hepburn and Chistophe Bellman
Rich and poor countries alike are locked
in battle over farm subsidy spending in negotiations
at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in Geneva,
where a July 17 draft text by the chair of the
agriculture negotiations has sparked renewed controversy
between delegates.
Trade-distorting farm subsidies in developed
countries tend to depress world prices, thereby
undercutting both small farmers and exporters
in developing countries who cannot compete with
European or US treasuries. Although the scale
of the problem is hard to ascertain, developed
countries are estimated to have spent US$378 billion
in total farm support in 20041.
WTO statistics indicate that from 1995-2001 three
subsidisers were far ahead of the pack: the EU
(US$96bn), the US (US$66bn) and Japan ($42bn),
with no other country spending more than $8bn.2
Payments tend to be heavily concentrated on a
handful of crops, and represent a large share
of farmers’ overall income (see figure 1):
in the US, wheat, rice, corn, soybean and cotton
accounted for 93 percent of total commodity programme
payments from 2002-053.
Despite public perceptions to the contrary, they
also disproportionately favour large farms, which
receive the lion’s share of subsidies in
both the US and EU.

Agriculture at the WTO: sixty years
of trade distortions
Sixty years of trade negotiations - under the
WTO and its forerunner the GATT - have bequeathed
only minimal controls on agricultural subsidies.
While successive negotiating rounds established
rules for other subsidy types and slashed industrial
tariffs to all-time lows, ‘exceptional’
treatment for agriculture meant that farm subsidies
were not disciplined until the Uruguay Round of
negotiations ended in 1994. Developing countries
now complain that the trade-offs being asked of
them in the current Doha Round are disproportionate.
Their tariffs on industrial and agricultural goods
must be subject to substantial cuts, say rich
countries, if agricultural subsidies and tariffs
in the developed world are to be reduced.
Unlike in past trade negotiations, developing
countries have organised themselves into powerful
coalitions aimed at reforming existing trade distortions.
In particular, the G-20 – bringing together
Brazil, India, China and 17 other developing countries
– has insisted on reform of developed country
subsidies as a condition for any deal.
The chair’s text: attempting to
find a compromise
The July 17 text from the chair of the farm trade
talks reiterates provisional agreements on eliminating
export subsidies by 2013, and details new disciplines
on export credits and some of the more perverse
effects of food aid. Although relatively small
in size, these subsidy types are widely believed
to distort trade the most.
More controversial have been the cuts in the
maximum permitted levels of overall trade-distorting
support (OTDS)4
: for the US, the text proposes either a 66 or
73 percent reduction, bringing the cap down to
$16.4bn or $13bn respectively. Although lower
than the $22.5bn ceiling which the US has proposed
formally, and the $17bn figure it has broached
unofficially, both levels remain higher than the
roughly $12 billion cap sought by the G-20. They
also exceed the $11 billion that the US is estimated
to have effectively spent on trade-distorting
support last year. For the EU, the text foresees
either a 75 or 85 percent cut - higher than the
70 percent cut proposed by Brussels. EU subsidies,
although higher than those in the US, have been
seen as less controversial by trade delegates,
mainly as the former are already being reduced
through an ongoing reform process. While the larger
cut would eat into actual EU spending levels,
the smaller one would again enable existing spending
to be maintained or even increased (see figure
2).
Figure
2: The chair’s text: cuts envisaged
in EU and US trade distorting support |
|
*EU: OTDS actual spending levels for 2008
are estimated to be €26 billion for EU-25,
based on the Fischler CAP reform.
** US: OTDS actual spending levels for 2006
are estimated to be US$10.8 billion, based
on trading partners’ estimates. |
How can change occur?
For real reform to take place, agricultural trade
policy needs to be influenced by domestic constituencies
that favour change. The EU has undertaken a series
of major reforms to its Common Agricultural Policy
since 1994, moving from a price support system
towards direct payments to farmers which it claims
are not more than minimally trade distorting.
No comparable process is underway in the US. Indeed,
the House of Representatives, the lower chamber
of Congress, recently voted largely to continue
and expand lavish agriculture subsidies over the
next five years. The farm bill approved by the
House now faces revision in the Senate and a veto
threat from the White House, which has called
for modest reductions in order to insulate farm
spending from WTO challenges.
So what hope can the poor have for any change
in the current rules? The mushrooming number of
bilateral and regional deals offers no opportunity
to ease subsidy spending, which can only be negotiated
effectively in a multilateral setting. At the
same time, WTO negotiations have shown themselves
to be more successful at consolidating domestic
reforms than at initiating them. In the absence
of real subsidy cuts, a Doha deal would therefore
only preclude future backsliding, preventing a
return to the bloated farm support budgets of
the past. If this is the case, litigation under
the organisation’s Dispute Settlement Process
might become the most promising avenue to prompt
subsidy reforms: in particular, some now expect
the Brazilian and Canadian challenges to US cotton
and other subsidies to succeed in spurring change.
Further Information:
The July 17, 2007 text by Ambassador Crawford
Falconer, chairperson of the agriculture negotiations,
is available from the WTO at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/chair_texts07_e.htm
Background explanations of many of the issues
and technical terms in the agricultural negotiations
are available at the WTO website at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd00_contents_e.htm
1 - OECD Total
Support Estimate for agriculture for 2004.
2 - WTO, World Trade Report 2006.
3 - US Department of Agriculture (USDA).
4 - In WTO jargon,
OTDS is the sum of different subsidy categories
considered to be trade distorting (such as the amber
or blue boxes); it excludes payments which ostensibly
cause not more than minimal trade distortion and
are therefore permitted without limits (green box). |