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IRAQ: Sunni Resistance Receptive to Sadr Alliance
Analysis by Gareth Porter*
WASHINGTON, May 23 (IPS) - Nationalist Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's bid to unite Sunnis and Shiites on
the basis of a common demand for withdrawal of U.S. occupation forces,
reported last weekend by the Washington Post's Sudarsan Raghavan, seems
likely to get a positive response from Sunni armed resistance.
An account given Pentagon officials by a military officer recently returned
from Iraq suggests that Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar province, who have
generally reflected the views of the Sunni armed resistance there, are open to
working with Sadr.
According to Raghavan's report on May 20, talks between Sadr's
representatives and Sunni leaders, including leaders of Sunni armed
resistance factions, first began in April. A commander of the 1920 Revolution
Brigades, Abu Aja Naemi, confirmed to Raghavan that his organisation had
been in discussions with Sadr's representatives.
Sadr's aides say he was encouraged to launch the new cross-sectarian
initiative by the increasingly violent opposition from nationalist Sunni
insurgents to the jihadists aligned with al Qaeda. One of his top aides, Ahmed
Shaibani, recalled that the George W. Bush administration was arguing that a
timetable was unacceptable because of the danger of al Qaeda taking
advantage of a withdrawal. Shaibani told Raghavan that sectarian peace could
be advanced if both Sadr's Mahdi Army and Sunni insurgent groups could
unite to weaken al Qaeda.
Raghavan reports that the cross-sectarian united front strategy was
facilitated by the fact that Shaibani had befriended members of Sunni
nationalist insurgent groups while he was held in U.S. detention centres from
2004 through 2006. Now Shaibani, who heads a "reconciliation committee"
for Sadr, is well positioned to gain the trust of those Sunni organisations.
The talks with Sunni resistance leaders have been coordinated with a series of
other moves by Sadr since early February. Although many members of Sadr's
Mahdi Army have been involved in sectarian killings and intimidation of
Sunnis in Baghdad, Sadr has taken what appears to be a decisive step to
break with those in his movement who have been linked to sectarian violence.
Over the past three months, he has expelled at least 600 men from the Mahdi
Army who were accused of murder and other violations of Sadr's policy,
according to Raghavan.
The massive demonstration against the occupation mounted in Najaf by
Sadr's organisation on Apr. 9, which Iraqi and foreign observers estimated at
tens or even hundreds of thousands of people, was apparently timed to
coincide with his initiative in opening talks with the Sunnis.
The demonstration not only showed that Sadr could mobilise crowds
comparable to the largest ever seen in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, but also
made clear Sadr's commitment to transcending sectarian interests. The
demonstrators carried Iraqi flags instead of pictures of Sadr or other Shiite
symbols. It also included a small contingent of members of the Sunni-based
Islamic Party of Iraq.
Sadr's decision in mid-April to pull his representatives out of the al-Maliki
government also appears to have been aimed in part at clearing the way for
an agreement with the Sunni insurgents. Leaders of those organisations have
said they would not accept the U.S.-sponsored government in any peace
negotiations with the United States.
U.S. officials have been quietly trying to counter Sadr's approach to the Sunni
insurgents by discrediting him. Sadr went underground in February, fearing
an attempt by U.S. forces to capture or kill him, and the U.S. official line on
Sadr since then has been the persistent claim that he has left Iraq to take
refuge in Iran. That appears to be an attempt to feed into Sunni suspicions of
all Shiite leaders as agents of Iran.
Sadr's aides have repeatedly denied that Sadr has left the country. The speed
with which Sadr's strategy has unfolded in recent months suggests that he
has remained in close contact with his organisation. Relying on electronic
communication with Sadr outside Iraq would be highly risky, given the well-
known capability of U.S. intelligence to intercept any such calls.
U.S. officials have long argued that an early withdrawal of U.S. forces would
leave Sunnis vulnerable to the Shiite security forces and militias. Media
reporting in recent months has portrayed Sunni leaders as not wanting a U.S.
military withdrawal any time soon, because of their fear of Shiite repression in
the absence of the U.S. troop presence.
But a Navy Seal special operations officer recently returned from eight months
in Anbar province, who discussed the situation there with high-ranking
Pentagon officials at the end of April, suggests that that the views of Sunni
leaders are quite compatible with those of Sadr. A source familiar with the
officer's account said the Sunni Sheiks in Anbar have been telling U.S.
commanders that the United States must withdraw its troops, and that the
Sunnis know how to handle both al Qaeda and the Shiites.
The officer also reported that Sunni tribal sheiks have explicitly disavowed the
notion that Sadr is a pawn of the Iranians, insisting instead that he doesn't
like either Iran or the newly-renamed Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq, which
was created in Iran and supported by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards
Corps.
The sheiks have warned their U.S. military contacts against aggressive
military actions against Sadr's followers in Sadr City during the troop surge,
according to the account given by the special ops officer. They said Sadr
hopes such provocative United States actions will ultimately result in a new
Shiite resistance war against U.S. forces, and they urge swift withdrawal to
avoid that outcome.
Sadr's project for a Sunni-Shiite united front against both al Qaeda and U.S.
occupation offers a potential basis for an eventual settlement of the sectarian
civil war in Iraq as well as for U.S. withdrawal. But it could also be the basis
for a new and more deadly phase of fighting if Sadr returns once more to
military resistance.
*Gareth Porter is an historian and national security policy analyst. His latest
book, "Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in
Vietnam", was published in June 2005. (END/2007)
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