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INDIA/US: Last Ditch Push For Nuclear Deal By Praful Bidwai NEW DELHI, Feb 22, 2008 (IPS) - With the presidential race gathering momentum in the United States, a last ditch effort is being mounted to push through the controversial U.S.-India nuclear cooperation deal, before the window of political opportunity slams shut in Washington.
The latest impetus for this comes through a meeting that three top-level visiting U.S. senators, led by the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Joseph Biden, had with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Feb. 20, during which they warned that time is running out for Indian leaders to complete the necessary steps before the agreement can be ratified by Congress.
Biden said he told Singh that "it was critical if India wanted that deal, that they move on it relatively soon, within a matter of weeks. You cannot run the clock out and expect us to be able to get it done’’.
The senators said that unless India sends the deal back to Washington, preferably by early May, and latest by early June, it would be practically impossible for U.S. Congress to ratify it: "If it is not ratified by Congress by July-end (when Senate goes into recess), there is no prospect" of it being ratified during the tenure of the Bush administration.
Biden was accompanied by John Kerry, Massachusetts senator and the 2004 Democratic presidential candidate, and Chuck Hagel, a leading Republican, from Nebraska.
Biden also warned: "If we do not have the deal now, it is highly unlikely that the next president will present the same deal to India.’’
According to Biden, Prime Minister Singh appeared to be "optimistic" about the deal: "We asked him whether the deal was over, and he said no."
Indian officials have begun discussing ways of accelerating the negotiation process. Driving their calculation is the assessment that if a Democrat wins the U.S. presidential election, the U.S. administration will take a second, critical, look at the deal. Traditionally, the Democrats accord a higher priority than the Republicans to issues like nuclear disarmament, arms control and the comprehensive test ban treaty.
But Indian leaders are worried that excessive U.S. pressure will provoke a strong domestic reaction and prove counter-productive. The Congress party, which leads the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition, has rejected anything approaching an ultimatum, and said that the deal would happen on India's terms. "The question of the U.S. putting a deadline doesn't arise,’’ a spokesman said.
"Yet, many Indian policymakers absolutely dread the prospect of Barrack Obama winning the Democratic nomination, and then the U.S. presidential election," says M. V. Ramana, a nuclear affairs analyst based at the Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies in the Environment and Development in Bangalore. "They are terrified that he will be hostile to the deal and introduce all kinds of conditions for its ratification, which will effectively kill it."
Already, the deal faces stiff domestic opposition. Both the Left and the Right have warned the UPA coalition government against proceeding with the deal. The Left parties' support is critical for the survival of the UPA government.
In the external arena, India has to cross two hurdles before the agreement is sent to the U.S. Congress for ratification. First, India must conclude a special inspections (safeguards) agreement pertaining to its civilian nuclear programme with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), based in Vienna.
Secondly, New Delhi must also secure full exemption for its future nuclear trade from the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, a 45-nation voluntary association of governments, which lays down strict conditions and guidelines for nuclear commerce so that material from civilian programmes is not diverted to military uses.
India started talks with the IAEA in November, but four rounds of negotiations have not produced an agreement. Officials of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, meeting in New Delhi early this month, believe that the agreement could take two to three more rounds.
The Vienna talks have run into two problem areas: India's insistence on guarantees of uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel and equipment, and India's demand that it must have the right to take "corrective measures" in the event that foreign supplies are disrupted.
"The first difficulty is a generic one," says Ramana. "That is because the IAEA is not a supplier of fuel or other nuclear materials. The second will create a special precedent for India, which could be used by other states, especially those which would like to develop a nuclear weapons capability clandestinely."
U.S. pressure in favour of completing the deal has mounted significantly in recent weeks. Earlier this month, U.S. Ambassador to India David Mulford twice warned that "time is of the essence".
He described the "123" bilateral agreement signed under the deal as India's "passport to the world", and added: "If the best deal is not processed in the present Congress, it is unlikely that the deal will be offered again to India. It certainly would not be revived and offered by any administration, Democratic or Republican, before the year 2010, which is after the life of this administration."
Mulford's remarks were followed by White House press secretary Dana Perino, who said: "This agreement is one that we have done very carefully, to the State Department, and trying to work with India. We would hope that they would see the benefits that, and we continue to work with them to try to make it happen.
Ten days ago, US undersecretary of state for political affairs Nicholas Burns also warned in London that the nuclear deal must be completed quickly: "We don't have all the time in the world…"
However, India's Atomic Energy Commission chairman Anil Kakodkar has put a brave face on the issue by saying that efforts to complete the would go on regardless of regime change in the U.S.: "It is a step-by-step process and takes time… I don't want to say whether the deal will be seen through before or after the Bush presidency… we will continue to talk with the U.S."
However, all concerned in India know that a political push from Bush is essential for the deal's ratification. Besides, the very survival of the UPA government will be threatened if it pushes the deal through in the teeth of opposition from the Left parties.
The government has agreed to place whatever agreement it reaches with the IAEA in a joint committee of the UPA and the Left.
The Left's leaders are clear about rejecting "any deadline imposed by the U.S." They have warned that they would announce the formal death of the deal by the end of March or early April, when India's two major Communist parties hold their congresses.
"The UPA seems confused. It is gambling on negotiating a deal that it can somehow sell to its opponents and allies," says Ramana. "This is a risky gamble. Perhaps the best it can hope to do is to lay the ground for future negotiations by completing an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA. But as things stand now, the chances of being able to win domestic acceptance for the deal appear very thin.’’
(END)
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