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MIDEAST: Palestinians Scoring Own Goals
Analysis by Mel Frykberg
RAMALLAH, May 26 (IPS) - While the U.S. appears to be optimistic about Israeli-Palestinian peace talks,
inter-Palestinian rivalry, a recalcitrant Israeli government, and an international
community with its own agenda could well scuttle a settlement.
For the first time in decades the U.S., under President Barack Obama's new
administration, appears to be putting pressure on Israel through Prime
Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and his new hard-line and far-right
government.
Netanyahu has effectively started a crisis in further negotiations with
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas's Palestinian Authority (PA), which
controls the West Bank.
Abbas has stated categorically that he will not continue peace negotiations
with Israel if it refuses to concede to a two-state solution and to freeze
illegal settlement construction in the West Bank. Netanyahu has refused to do
either, despite this being endorsed by both the administration in Washington
and the international community at large.
But Israel's intransigence might be overshadowed by the inability of the two
major Palestinian factions, the PA-affiliated Fatah, and the Islamic resistance
organisation Hamas, which controls Gaza, to reach agreement on a unity
government.
The fourth round of unity talks in Cairo last week ground unsuccessfully to a
halt, as predicted by political pundits and analysts. Both major Palestinian
factions appeared more keen on jockeying for power and prestige than on
putting the Palestinian cause first.
The final nail in the unity coffin was hammered in last Tuesday when Abbas
swore in a new government in Ramallah. The new government was not only
rejected by Hamas, as expected, but by many in Abbas's own Fatah faction,
and by several other Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) factions, who
have decided to boycott the government.
Abbas's new cabinet grew from 16 ministers to a more representative total of
20. But two Fatah members turned down Abbas's invitation to join the new
government. Fatah is the largest faction of the PLO.
Another PLO faction, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP),
refused to join, as did the Palestinian People's Party (PPP). Three major
Palestinian unions slammed the new government.
Their rejection was based on accusations of nepotism, cronyism, and lack of
accountability or transparency, as the old Fatah guard ensured its seats at
the expense of younger members.
Hamas's rejection of the government, reiterated during the Cairo talks, was
based on what it termed its "illegitimacy". The resistance group (which is not
part of the PLO) won free and fair democratic elections in January 2006.
Abbas formed a new emergency government shortly after Hamas ousted the
PA in Gaza in a coup in June 2007. Under Palestinian law an emergency
government is legitimate only for 30 days. Thereafter a new government has
to be democratically formed. This never happened.
There is also a vast chasm between Hamas and PA ideology. The less
compromising Hamas leaders will only agree to a ten-year tadhiya or long-
term ceasefire with Israel but will not recognise it as a legitimate state.
Less hard line factions within Hamas have agreed to a Palestinian state given
the internationally recognised borders of 1967, implicitly accepting the
existence of Israel, though within its old borders. The six-day war launched
by Israel in 1967 led to capture of huge tracts of Palestinian and other Arab
territory.
Hamas delegates in Cairo refused an Egyptian proposal to form a Gaza
security force jointly with its PA rivals, according to PA intelligence chief
Majed Faraj. The Gaza leadership also rejected the return of PA officials to
monitor the Rafah-Egypt border as outlined in a PA-Israel agreement in
2005.
Another disagreement was on electoral reform. Fatah wanted 85 percent
proportional representation, and 15 percent individual constituency, while
Hamas wanted 60-40 respectively.
Critics argue that the PA has been far too compromising with Israel. It has
continued to negotiate with the Jewish state despite Israel's abrogation of
basic Palestinian rights.
These have included accelerated settlement building and expropriation of
Palestinian natural resources in the Palestinian territories in flagrant violation
of UN Security Council Resolutions and international law.
So why did Abbas proceed with forming such an unpopular government
when it appeared doomed before its conception? The failure of the latest
round of unity talks in Cairo was a contributing factor. But international
pressure and the need to appear legitimate are probably the major reasons
behind the PA leader's decision.
Abbas is due to meet Obama in Washington shortly, and needed to show a
government with more legitimacy than his previous emergency government
which resigned twice during the first rounds of unity talks.
The caretaker government led by Abbas never had the support of the
Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) which is dominated by Hamas. But it is
the Fatah bloc of the PLC, which has now turned on Abbas.
The PA is dependent on international donors, without which it would
collapse economically. And most of this international community, especially
the U.S. and Israel, do not support a unity government which includes
Hamas, further minimising PA incentives for unity.
The chances of Abbas's new government winning support from the
Palestinian public appear slim even if Israel and its U.S. supporters are
pleased. But if it can stand up to Netanyahu by stopping expansion of the
settlements, ensuring financial stability, and working towards unity with
Gaza, there is a small window of opportunity.
(END/2009)
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