IPS Special Coverage of Talks between Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tiger Rebels
 
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News on the
Peace Talks
in THAI

SRI LANKA: Row over Military Territory Tests Peace Talks

By Marwaan Macan-Markar

NAKHON PATHOM, Thailand, Jan 6 (IPS) - After an initial smooth run, the Sri Lankan peace talks entered its fourth round here Monday with negotiators up against the first major hurdle that will test their keenness to stay on course.

Early indications suggest that the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil Tiger rebels are prepared to use this round of talks to find common ground on a contentious issue - a row between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan army over territory the military occupies in the Indian Ocean island's northern Jaffna peninsula.

''Nobody is threatening to walk out of the talks. Nobody is exerting pressure on the other side,'' said Gamini Lakshman Peiris, Colombo's chief negotiator, at the end of the first session of the current round of talks, which run from Jan. 6-9.

''The parties recognised that there are very complex considerations involved. And there is a firm resolve on both sides to hold fast to the process and to make progress,'' he added.

As significant was Peiris' perception of his counterparts: ''There is nothing uncompromising or rigid about the attitude'' of the Tamil Tigers.

This reflects a spirit of understanding on the part of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), as the separatist rebels who have been waging an almost two-decade war with government troops are officially known.

This is because in the run up to the peace talks, being held at a riverside resort 32 kilometres west of Bangkok, LTTE chief negotiator Anton Balasingham had sounded defiant.

He declared that the LTTE will neither disarm nor decommission its heavy or light weapons as the army has suggested to enable Tamil civilians to resettle in the area held by troops, known as a high security zone (HSZ).

Such seeming anger arose in reaction to a point of view that was aired in mid-December by the military commander of government troops in Sri Lanka's north, who proposed that the de-escalation of the army in the north be linked to the decommissioning of the LTTE's weapons.

''The commander's view is understandable for two reasons,'' said Iqbal Athas, defence correspondent for 'The Sunday Times,' an English-language weekly in Sri Lanka. ''To do otherwise will leave the army vulnerable in the north, because if the talks fail the army will be an easy target for the LTTE.''

The commander's view, he adds, also reflects a political reality in the Jaffna peninsula. ''The writ of the Sri Lankan government in Jaffna runs through the army and the police.''

The disputed area covers over 160 square kilometres, or close to 18 percent of Jaffna's some 880 sq km of land. Nearly 40,000 government troops have been stationed there, and they guard, among other things, the region's only available airport and a key seaport.

The LTTE views the opening of this swathe of terrain to the people as essential to the process of normalisation that has been initiated since the two warring parties signed a ceasefire agreement in February last year.

This push to enable civilians to return to their homes in Sri Lanka's war-torn north and east -- the region where the Tigers wanted to carve out the separate state of Tamil Eelam -- received a boost after Colombo and the LTTE started their peace talks at a Thai naval base in September last year.

According to the Tigers, over 100,000 people used to live in the HSZ. The government's estimates are lesser, at 80,000 people, while the army puts the number at 36,000.

The LTTE's argument, however, has failed to impress the international Sri Lankan monitoring mission (SLMM), a multi-member Nordic team assigned to oversee the February truce.

The SLMM was not in favour of a one-sided de-escalation of forces – opening up army-controlled areas to civilians without the LTTE reciprocating - because it would upset ''the balance of forces''.

''The balance of forces is the basis of the ceasefire agreement and disturbing that balance is disturbing the ceasefire,'' Maj Gen Trond Furuhovde, chief of the SLMM, said in a statement on Dec. 26. The Tigers bristled at that.

Yet Kethesh Loganathan of the Centre for Policy Alternatives, an independent Colombo-based think tank, feels that there should be no undue worry about this turn of events.

''The dispute over the security zones serves as a reality check to a process that was going on fast track, often exceeding expectations,'' he said. ''Now they are coming down to the ground realities to face contentious issues that have to be addressed.''

How the two sides overcome this hurdle will test how they are going to address many more thorny problems that will emerge down the road, he adds. ''Such talks rarely proceed smoothly.''

During the first three rounds of talks, the first two in Thailand and the third in Norway, both negotiating teams struck a note of compromise that fed hopes that the Sri Lankan conflict, which has killed over 64,000 people, was finally on course to a settlement.

Thus far, the LTTE has scaled down its demand from seeking a separate state to substantial regional autonomy instead. It has also agreed to transform itself into a political force and expressed willingness to explore a solution to the conflict within a federal system of government.

Colombo, in fact, was hoping to take the peace process forward by using the current fourth round of talks to chart a course for a mutually agreeable form of federalism and also address the human rights issues in need of attention in north-east Sri Lanka.

However, the issue of how to resolve the security zone issue threatens to overshadow such plans. This matter is due to be taken up in Tuesday's discussions, when the two teams tackle the resettlement of Tamil civilians in the war-raged regions.

''We are going to discuss them, but not to the exclusion of all other issues,'' Peiris said, adding that those who thought that the talks ''will break down over the high security zones issue'' have been ''disappointed''. (END/IPS/AP/IP/MMM/JS/03)


TIMELINES

Key Events in the Conflict
A Look at the Peace Negotiations

 

 

 

 

 

 

1985
1st peace talks

1987
2nd try at peace pact signed

1988
new leaders

1990
3rd try at peace

 

 

1994
4th try at peace

 

 

 

 

 

2002
Both sides ready Norway mediates

2003
3rd round peace talks

1948 Indepe-ndence

1956
tensions begin

1972
Tigers formed

1983
ethnic riots

 

 

 

 

 

 

1991
India's PM murdered

1993
Sri Lanka Pres. killed

1995
clashes kill thou-sands

2000
Norway steps in

2001
ceasefire

2002
Sri Lanka lifts banPeace talks begin

Sep. 6, Sri Lankan government lifts the ban on the LTTE