IPS Special Coverage of Talks between Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tiger Rebels
 
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IPS Special Coverage of Talks between Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tiger Rebels
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News on the
Peace Talks
in THAI

Tamil Tigers Reveal Chinks in Their Armour

Analysis - By Marwaan Macan-Markar

BANGKOK, Jun 27 (IPS) - By setting new conditions for resurrecting the stalled peace talks, the Tamil Tigers have conceded that the world beyond the patch of land they control in northern Sri Lanka is an inhospitable place.

Equally revealing is the fear the Tamil rebels have of public scrutiny of the commitments they have made during the negotiations so far -- in the press conferences that routinely follow each round of talks that began in Thailand in September last year.

In making known these twin concerns - that the peace process should see a drop in the ''internationalisation'' of the talks and an end to the press conference format - the Tamil Tigers have exposed some chinks in their armour.

But there is hardly a hint of such thinking in the bravado of Anton Balasingham, the chief negotiator of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), as the rebels are formally known.

On Wednesday, when his words appeared in a pro-LTTE newspaper in London, there was no sign that the rebels were making a noticeable departure from aspects of the peace process they had readily embraced before.

Balasingham said that the ''excess internationalisation of the peace process by allowing the involvement of powerful extraterritorial forces might complicate the process and upset the balance of equal partnership,'' the 'Tamil Guardian', which espouses the LTTE's cause, reported in its Wednesday edition.

Balasingham also stressed that the LTTE's call for a ''radical overhaul'' of the peace process meant that if talks do resume, the press conferences at the end of each round should no longer be held, the paper disclosed.

The Tiger negotiator made these comments Monday during a meeting in London with Erik Solheim, the Norwegian peace envoy. This statement to the Norwegians, who are the peace brokers in this latest bid to resolve Sri Lanka's two-decade long conflict, was an affirmation that the LTTE rebels are keen on returning to the negotiating table.

But the tougher language that the Tamil rebels speak today cannot hide the tone they struck during the three rounds of peace talks in Thailand and the negotiations that have taken place subsequently in Norway, Germany and Japan.

That is because the LTTE made a valiant effort to gain international legitimacy. After all, the six rounds of talks offered the LTTE a choice platform to gain respect and recognition from the international community.

In fact, Balasingham's remarks at the early round of talks reflected the appreciation the rebels had for the internationalisation of the Sri Lankan peace process - a feature that set this effort apart from previous bids at resolving a conflict that has killed over 60,000 people.

Yet as the LTTE negotiators realised in Norway last year, the door to international recognition was not going to be opened on the simple fact that the rebels had signed a ceasefire agreement and were talking peace with Colombo.

Among the stumbling blocks to this recognition was the LTTE's reluctance to renounce violence.

This was also why the Tigers were not invited to a mini-aid conference in the United States in April. Neither Washington nor New Delhi, which classify the LTTE as a terrorist organisation and have the power to influence the political conditions in Sri Lanka, were going to fall for the rebels' claim that they had changed.

At major donors' meeting in Japan in June - which the LTTE boycotted - the rebels got a further glimpse of how inhospitable the world beyond the terrain they control - the Wanni - could be.

The international community, which pledged an unexpected 4.5 billion U.S. dollars to rebuild war-ravaged Sri Lanka, was keen on seeing the rebels reform. But the Tigers were not prepared to bite.

The LTTE's newfound discomfort with the press conferences that come after each round of negotiations follows a similar pattern.

At the outset, Balasingham lapped up the extensive exposure he received in both the Sri Lankan and international media. The media events also provided the Tiger negotiator a platform to project the LTTE as a willing partner in the peace process and as an organisation willing to change.

Thus Balasingham had announced that the LTTE was prepared to settle for autonomy -- less than a separate state -- and that it was set on becoming a political body, after years as a military one.

The Tigers' desire to end the post-talks press conferences now helps strengthen critics' view that they abhor public scrutiny, just like they refuse to permit views and voices that oppose their thinking in the areas they control in Sri Lanka.

The LTTE is also up against a widening credibility gap due to the pledges it made at these press conferences so far and the reality on the ground they control.

Most glaring, analysts say, is its disrespect toward human rights, despite a pledge made by Balasingham that the rebels will respect political and civil liberties and welcome the presence of an international human rights expert at the talks.

''In both cases, the burden of explanation is with the LTTE, not with the government,'' an official close to Colombo's peace negotiators told IPS. ''After all, it was the LTTE that wanted to internationalise the issue in the first place, and they also wanted to publicise the peace process.''

''They will have to say what they mean by no internationalisation, since that has already taken place,'' he added. ''Does it mean they may not want to deal with foreign facilitators too?'' (END/IPS/AP/IP/HD/WD/MMM/JS/03)

 


TIMELINES

Key Events in the Conflict
A Look at the Peace Negotiations

 

 

 

 

 

 

1985
1st peace talks

1987
2nd try at peace pact signed

1988
new leaders

1990
3rd try at peace

 

 

1994
4th try at peace

 

 

 

 

 

2002
Both sides ready Norway mediates

2003
3rd round peace talks

1948 Indepe-ndence

1956
tensions begin

1972
Tigers formed

1983
ethnic riots

 

 

 

 

 

 

1991
India's PM murdered

1993
Sri Lanka Pres. killed

1995
clashes kill thou-sands

2000
Norway steps in

2001
ceasefire

2002
Sri Lanka lifts banPeace talks begin

Sep. 6, Sri Lankan government lifts the ban on the LTTE