IPS Special Coverage of Talks between Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tiger Rebels
 
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News on the
Peace Talks
in THAI

Spirit of Inclusion Augurs Well for Peace Talks

Analysis - By Marwaan Macan-Markar

SATTAHIP, Thailand, Sep 16 (IPS) - The presence of Rauff Hakeem, leader of Sri Lanka's largest Muslim political party, among the negotiators at the talks between Colombo and separatist Tamil rebels here places this round of peace negotiations in a league of its own.

Until today, the seats at the negotiating table to strike a peace deal in Sri Lanka's two-decade long ethnic conflict had been reserved for representatives who articulated the concerns of the country's two main communities -- the Sinhalese, the majority community, and the Tamils, the largest minority.

The protagonists during the peace talks in 1985, 1987, 1990 and 1995 were the Sri Lankan government, seen as defending the Sinhalese position, and the Tamil Tiger rebels, who articulated the Tamil cause.

The current shift has, on the one hand, succeeded in underscoring the spirit of inclusion in this fifth attempt at resolving this South Asian island nation's conflict.

On the other, it offers a clear signal that the concerns of the Muslims, the second largest minority, have to be factored in from the outset if the country is to achieve a lasting peace.

Muslims make up seven percent of Sri Lanka's 19.6 million people, while the Tamils account for 18 percent, and the Sinhalese comprise 74 percent.

G L Peiris, head of the Sri Lankan delegation at the talks, made specific mention of Hakeem's presence in the talks.

''This arrangement would no doubt ensure the continuance of a constructive and meaningful dialogue. We are mindful that any substantive structural and institutional arrangement that may be evolved should provide for the rights of all communities,'' Peiris said.

''It (Muslim representation) will give the talks more credibility, more legitimacy,'' Rauff Hakeem, leader of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and a Cabinet minister, told IPS on the eve of the peace talks at Sattahip, a Thai naval base 30 kilometres east of the popular tourist seaside destination of Pattaya.

''There wasn't such a spirit of accommodation before, and Muslims felt their concerns were ignored,'' Hakeem said.

''The Muslim question has to be factored into the talks, particularly in relation to matters such as their security and identity,'' agreed Kethesh Loganathan, a peace and conflict resolution analyst at the Centre for Policy Alternatives, a Colombo-based think tank.

''Multi-track approaches to negotiations are essential to ensure durable peace,'' Loganathan said.

While there was little doubt about including Hakeem in the Sri Lankan government's three-member negotiating team, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), as the rebels are officially known, had sent out mixed messages on this issue until the last hour.

So when the Tigers finally agreed to a Muslim presence at the talks, they succeeded not only in ensuring a new dimension to the talks. The move also helped the Tigers earn credit as a separatist movement willing to be flexible on some fronts -- a sign that augurs well for the negotiations.

That announcement of Hakeem's inclusion came on Sep. 3, following a discussion Hakeem had with Anton Balasingham, the LTTE's chief negotiator, in London.

But Hakeem and the LTTE negotiators still have a long road to travel in order to make the Muslim presence at the talks meaningful, particularly for Muslims in the country's eastern and northern provinces, where the Tigers have been waging a separatist war with the Sri Lankan forces to create the state of Tamil Eelam.

Muslims have been subject to Tiger attacks during the last 12 years of the Sri Lankan conflict, which since 1983 has resulted in over 64,000 deaths.

The latter half of 1990 was the worst, when the Tigers gunned down and killed over a hundred Muslims at prayer in two mosques in the eastern province, and when the Tigers drove away at gunpoint over 70,000 Muslims from their homes in the northern province.

Because conflict between the Tigers and Muslim civilians is often overshadowed by bloodletting between the Sinhalese-dominated Sri Lankan state and the armed Tamil minority, negotiators at the previous peace talks have spent most of their efforts on finding solutions that largely address the concerns of the two main communities.

But since Dec. 24 last year, when the Tigers took the first step toward initiating the current peace process by unilaterally declaring a ceasefire, Sri Lanka has been given steady reminders that marginalising theTiger-Muslim dispute will be counterproductive to achieving a comprehensive peace deal for the country.

In mid-April, LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran stepped in with his own contribution on how to accommodate Muslim concerns in the current peace efforts.

During an unprecedented meeting in his jungle hideout with Muslim political leaders, including Hakeem, Prabhakaran said that the Tigers are now encouraging the thousands of Muslims driven out from the northern province to return home.

That announcement was accompanied by the Tiger leader's assurance to Hakeem that the LTTE cadres would not extort money from Muslims in the eastern province.

Shortly prior to that, Prabhakaran issued an apology to the Muslim community for the manner in which they had been victimised in provinces where the Tigers have been fighting to establish the state of Eelam, a Tamil homeland.

While these recent actions add to other overtures by the Tigers to suggest that they are sincere in pursing peace this time around, they do not address a key concern of Muslims in Sri Lanka's eastern province.

Muslims are a third of the population of the eastern province, home to the greatest concentration of Muslim in the country.

Sri Lankan Muslims fear becoming a minority - and thus open to persecution -- in a future political administration controlled by the Tigers, not least because of proposals that the rebels run an interim administration in the north and east.

Addressing these fears is precisely where the inclusive spirit of the current peace process helps.

The door has been opened for Hakeem, as a Muslim leader, to play as pivotal a role as the other negotiators representing Tamil and Sinhalese interests, in securing a peace deal that is meaningful to all three of Sri Lanka's main ethnic communities. (END/IPS/AP/IP/CR/MMM/AAG/JS/02)

 


TIMELINES

Key Events in the Conflict
A Look at the Peace Negotiations

 

 

 

 

 

 

1985
1st peace talks

1987
2nd try at peace pact signed

1988
new leaders

1990
3rd try at peace

 

 

1994
4th try at peace

 

 

 

 

 

2002
Both sides ready Norway mediates

2003
3rd round peace talks

1948 Indepe-ndence

1956
tensions begin

1972
Tigers formed

1983
ethnic riots

 

 

 

 

 

 

1991
India's PM murdered

1993
Sri Lanka Pres. killed

1995
clashes kill thou-sands

2000
Norway steps in

2001
ceasefire

2002
Sri Lanka lifts banPeace talks begin

Sep. 6, Sri Lankan government lifts the ban on the LTTE