SRI LANKA: Keeping Watch over a Tenuous Ceasefire Far from Easy

by Amantha Perera

COLOMBO, Aug 6 (IPS) - The refusal of Tamil Tiger rebels to dismantle a camp in northern Sri Lanka highlights the supposed clout - as well as weaknesses - of Scandinavian peace monitors whose presence is supposed to keep the ceasefire going.

The multinational Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM), as the monitors are called, ruled as early as Jun. 26 that a new Tiger camp in Manirasakulam in the north-eastern Trincomalee district lies in government-controlled territory - and must be removed.

But despite several communications by the SLMM, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), as the Tigers are officially known, have refused to budge. In the ceasefire agreement signed by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe and LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran in February 2002, both parties agreed to abide by the SLMM's rulings. However, this has not happened.

The Tigers argue that the camp in Manirasakulam, surrounded by several Sri Lankan Army camps, has been in existence for a while and that they have just moved in after an absence.

But the lack of action on the SLMM's findings brings to the fore questions about how the ceasefire is being implemented - and the role of the SLMM that is supposed to ensure that it is followed.

It has created a problem for us. With the LTTE not moving from the camp, next time the other side will not listen to us. It has undermined our role, Hagrup Haukland, the deputy head of the SLMM, told IPS.

The SLMM, which consists of 53 monitors drawn from Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Iceland and Norway, have repeatedly come under pressure to keep the former warring parties apart.

Away from the glare of television cameras that have followed the negotiators for the Tigers and the Sri Lankan government since peace talks began in September 2002, the ceasefire between them has been much harder to keep going on the ground.

The tussle over the Tigers' camp in Manirasakulam is but the latest in a string of incidents that have threatened the ceasefire - including the bombing and destruction of LTTE ships suspected of arms smuggling by the Sri Lankan Navy.

The ceasefire, the longest in Sri Lanka's history, continues today even if the Tigers, citing lack of progress, suspended participation in the talks in April. But many are asking what the real role and utility of the SLMM is.

I wonder whether the SLMM ever looks at itself in the mirror. It most certainly is suffering from a wimp factor, said Dayan Jayathileke, a senior lecturer attached to the political science department of Colombo University.

Jayathileke said that while the SLMM has been strict with the government side, it has not shown the same attitude in dealing with the LTTE.

He was referring to SLMM's request to inspect the Sri Lanka Navy's logbooks following a sea confrontation between the Tamil Tigers and the Navy earlier in the year. Will the SLMM demand the same from Soosai (the Sea Tiger commander)? he asked.

Opposition legislator Sarath Amungama agrees with proposals that the composition of the SLMM be changed to include regional powers like India, which had previously intervened in the Sri Lankan conflict.

The SLMM has overstepped its mandate, Amungama told IPS, referring to a suggestion by the SLMM to declare parts of the sea firing areas for the LTTE's naval wing.

Many Sri Lankans' perceptions of the SLMM also differ.

I think they (SLMM) try to do the job but are scared of the LTTE, said Upul Jayathileke, who hails from the majority Sinhala community. But Kandiah Ganesharatnum, a Tamil from the northern Jaffna peninsula, said, ''The SLMM is doing their job pretty well''.

A recent poll conducted by the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), a Colombo-based non-government organisation, found that while 32.1 percent agreed that the SLMM was impartial, 30.1 percent disagreed. Almost 75 percent of Tamils polled perceived the SLMM as impartial.

Meantime, the impasse over the camp in Manirasakulam has put the monitors in an unenviable situation.

The SLMM is still waiting for the reaction of S P Thamilselvan, leader of the LTTE's political wing, to its latest communication on the matter. It is advisable for the parties concerned to leave the matter (of the camp) aside, he said of it recently during a tour of Trincomalee.

Haukland said he is not sure what action can be taken if the LTTE insists on remaining in the camp.

For now, Jayalitheke and Amungama say the way to make the most of the SLMM's presence is for it to become more assertive. It should make sure its rulings are adhered to either through sanctions or through elements of coercion, Jayathileke said.

But such a changeover looks unlikely - and far from easy. As the impasse over the camp persisted, media reports hinted at the SLMM suggesting the use of force to enforce its ruling. The reaction of the Tamil Tigers was equally drastic.

S Pulideevan, who heads the LTTE's Peace Secretariat, raised the issue of using force with Haukland and Defence Secretary Austin Fernando during meetings in Colombo two weeks ago.

Pulideevan told Fernando that if the government had any intention of using force, it should give the LTTE two weeks' notice as per the ceasefire agreement. In effect, Pulideevan was citing sections in the agreement that dealt with the breakdown of negotiations -- and the resumption of war.

The government and the SLMM moved quickly to dismiss reports that the use of force was an option.

Ironically, Pulideevan was in Colombo to discuss plans for the resumption of peace talks. The LTTE is planning to hold a discussion with legal experts in Paris to draft a response to the government's proposals on an interim administration in the Tamil-dominated areas.

These discussions are seen as the first step towards the resumption of talks. But while the deadlock on the talks may be starting to unwind, the one over the LTTE's camp seemed to be getting even tighter.

We are waiting till the SLMM and the Norwegians act on the ruling (on the Manirasakulam camp), said a high-ranking officer with the Sri Lankan Army. (END/IPS/AP/IP/HD/EU/AP/JS/03)