By IPS Correspondents
ISLAMABAD, Oct 2 1995 (IPS)

It has been a long hot summer for troubled Afghanistan with no let up in the severe strife between its warring factions that erupted after the ouster of the pro- Communist regime in Apr 1992.

But the emergence of a new alliance in the country with the consequent changes in the relationship of major international players who have high stakes in the region, may augur for a drastic shift the course of events.

The emergence as a dominant power of the Taliban religious militia comprising students from Islamic schools in Pakistan and the consequent tensions between Islamabad and Kabul on the one hand and Islamabad and Tehran on the other, are a case in point.

Though Pakistan denies it, most of the other international players in the region accuse it of backing the Taliban, who were first heard of only a year ago, with military and other support.

Having overrun most of Western Afghanistan, including the city of Herat and the strategic second largest airbase, Shindand last month, the Taliban now stand poised to enter Kabul. Fighting is currently on in the strategic Sanglakh valley, 20 kms west of the Taliban-controlled provincial capital of Maidan Shahr.

The Taliban have threatened to attack the capital from near Maidan Shahr in the West and Logar province in the South.

The Taliban today control 13 of Afghanistan’s 32 provinces, while President Burhanuddin Rabbani controls Kabul and five other provinces and Uzbek warlord Rashid Dostam’s writ runs in eight provinces.

The Taliban and Dostam have joined hands with Rabbani’s arch-rival Gulbadeen Hekmatyar of the Hizb-I-Islami, to mount what is being termed as the “decisive” assault on Kabul.

Interestingly, the Taliban are ethnic Pushtoons who are fighting the primarily Persian speaking Tajik Government of Burhanuddin Rabbani. The Tajiks and Uzbeks are known to be traditional rivals.

Prior to the capture of Herat, the Taliban were flexing their military muscle through the capture of a Russian cargo plane which was forced down at Kandahar in Eastern Afghanistan close to Pakistan.

The plane was said to be carrying 30 tons of ammunition from Russia for the Rabbani regime in Kabul. The capture of this large stock of ammunition, together with the fact that the Taliban air force is equipped with six MIG planes, is a pointer to the emergence of the Taliban as a premier political and military force in Afghanistan.

The Shindand Air base, 120 kms south of Herat, was captured along with a booty of 41 planes. On Sep 8, just three days after the Taliban’s capture of Herat, Gulbadeen Hekmatyar, proposed an alliance in a public speech between his organisation and the Taliban.

“Together we can take Kabul in two days,” boasted Rabbani’s arch rival.

These developments on the ground have coincided with the sharp deterioration of relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The day after the Taliban’s capture of Herat, which the Kabul regime attributed to Pakistan’s covert support and sponsorship of this group, an angry mob stoned Pakistan’s Embassy in Kabul, shot dead one of its staff, physically assaulted at least two dozen personnel, including the Ambassador and the Defence Attache, and ransacked the building.

This was the second assault on the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul since the Rabbani regime took over, the first being in February, 1994. This incident provoked a sharp backlash from the Pakistani Government, which accused the Rabbani regime of instigating the attack — a charge denied by the Kabul authorities.

Iran, which has been supporting Rabbani’s Shi’ite Jamait Islami, was disturbed by the Taliban’s success so close to its borders with Afghanistan. It views the Taliban as an anti-Iran religious and political grouping whose main interest would be to establish a base for anti-Iran operations from Afghanistan.

The Iranians also accuse Pakistan of backing the Taliban. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Sardar Assef Ali visited Tehran last month in order to allay Iranian apprehensions in this regard. He said the Pakistan government was not involved in any activity aimed at the encirclement of Iran.

But, the daily English language ‘Iran News’, published from Tehran which is widely believed to reflect the views of the country’s foreign ministry said, “‘Pakistan’s stand on the Taliban is contrary to its traditional friendship with the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

In an interview with the same newspaper published later, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati echoed Kabul’s allegations about Pakistani links with the Taliban saying that “Foreign countries should not meddle in Afghan affairs and the experiences of the past have shown that foreign interference in the country’s internal affairs only complicates the situation”.

Iran is also opposed to Pakistani efforts to induct former Afghan king, Zahir Shah who is living in exile in Rome, into Afghan affairs. Pakistan’s interest in the former king was evident from the month-long visit to Pakistan in July and August of Zahir Shah’s special envoy and son in law, Sardar Adbul Wali.

The Kabul regime also opposes the involvement of Zahir Shah in resolving the country’s civil war and Rabbani, backed by Iran, is likely to make an all out effort to halt the Taliban advance.

In a related development, international mediation efforts on Afghanistan have stepped up with the arrival in Pakistan of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) Secretary General Hamid Al-Gabid and the special envoy of the United Nations Secretary General, Mehmood Mestiri.

Prior to the arrival of these mediators, the Afghanistan Foreign Minister, said, “Mehmood Mestiri must put foreign interference in Afghanistan at the top of his agenda”, which everyone read as an indirect criticism of Pakistan.

He said, “Unless foreign interference in Afghanistan is stopped, there is no basis or hope for security in Central Asia”.

The foremost task among these mediators, particularly the UN envoy, is perceived as preparing the modalities for transition to an interim, national government, which in turn, would provide the framework for elections where all Afghan factions would readily participate.

An essential prerequisite of any such effort would be to get President Rabbani to step down from office since his term expired on December 28, 1994, but his stay in office continues to be extended because of the in-fighting among Afghan factions.

This seems to be an uphill task, more so, when developments on the ground in Afghanistan in recent weeks seem to have overtaken the rather slow paced work of diplomats and mediators and could even lead to a major re-arrangement of the forces at work in the strife-torn country.

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