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	<title>Inter Press ServiceDISARMAMENT: Spying, Nuclear Power and Sovereignty</title>
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		<title>DISARMAMENT: Spying, Nuclear Power and Sovereignty</title>
		<link>https://www.ipsnews.net/1996/01/disarmament-spying-nuclear-power-and-sovereignty/</link>
		<comments>https://www.ipsnews.net/1996/01/disarmament-spying-nuclear-power-and-sovereignty/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 24 Jan 1996 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>IPS Correspondents</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Headlines]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ipsnews.net/?p=56062</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Senthil Ratnasabapathy]]></description>
		
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><font color="#999999"><p class="wp-caption-text">Senthil Ratnasabapathy</p></font></p><p>By IPS Correspondents<br />VIENNA, Jan 24 1996 (IPS) </p><p>An attempt by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to improve the systems used to monitor nuclear plants around the world, has some member nations nervous about the potential threat this could pose for sovereignty.<br />
<span id="more-56062"></span><br />
IAEA&#8217;s new system would involve environmental monitoring and &#8216;real-time&#8217; surveillance of nuclear plants by remote camera.</p>
<p>&#8216;Safeguards&#8217; officials of the U.N agency are already working to prevent rogue nations from developing clandestine nuclear weapons programmes under a so-called &#8217;93-plus-Two&#8217; scheme. This is a monitoring network designed to open up a wealth of information about countries&#8217; nuclear programmmes &#8212; and give them away if they try to go astray.</p>
<p>What irks some developing nations is a proposal to expand the procedures used to monitor civilian nuclear plants where &#8211; at least in theory &#8211; nuclear technology could be adapted to weapons manufacture.</p>
<p>Their fear is that the electronic spies in the plants will handicap efforts to buy up commercially sensitive technology from the west. Other nations object on grounds their sovereign rights would be violated. And they are also concerned about the principle of having foreign monitors overseeing compliance with the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which they and over 138 other nations have signed in good faith.</p>
<p>Some object to the sheer depth of coverage involved in the IAEA monitoring procedure. &#8220;Some countries are little bit hesitant on having facilities such as university research establishments coming under IAEA safeguards,&#8221; conceded an IAEA spokesman.<br />
<br />
Some think the energies of the IAEA would be better used in stopping theft and smuggling of weapons grade material. More than one nation has raised concern at having an external agency running in its own lines to electronic spies without reference to the authority of the country in question &#8212; even the national post and telecommunications company.</p>
<p>Legal doubts like this have led to the 93-plus-Two programme being divided into two separate parts. (93-plus-Two refrs to the programme&#8217;s original deadline of 1993, which eventually needed an extension of two years to meet.)</p>
<p>Part one of the programme covers the tasks of the agency as envisaged by its original mandate &#8211; to monitor the NPT, allowing it more information on and access to nuclear facilities already under existing IAEA monitoring and the right to conduct inspections without notice.</p>
<p>The second part attempts to meet the desires of the West to rein in alleged maverick would-be nuclear powers such as Iraq and North Korea, where the existing safeguards routine was seen as inadequate. In practical terms the IAEA can only monitor declared sites &#8212; covert operations remain beyond their reach.</p>
<p>Iraq, a signatory of the NPT, had allowed regular IAEA inspections which found nothing suspicious, although in fact Baghdad was carrying out a secret programme in undeclared sites with the intention of making a nuclear bomb.</p>
<p>Details only emerged after the Gulf War ended in 1991 when the IAEA went into the country armed with Security Council resolutions which gave the agency powers going far beyond the existing treaty rights to find and destroy the country&#8217;s nuclear weapons capability.</p>
<p>North Korea has been playing a cat and mouse game with the agency after the latter demanded more access and information as a result of inconsistencies in its nuclear material stock.</p>
<p>Hence the attempt to devise a system of surveillance that will cover all sites where only the possibility of nuclear misuse exists, and environmental monitoring to pick up tell-tale traces of improper nuclear research.</p>
<p>IAEA officials are pressing the agency&#8217;s 35 member board of directors to reach a decision on the second and the final part early this year. They are working on a paper that will summarise the comments and queries of member states to the IAEA&#8217;s own proposals, submitted to the board last month.</p>
<p>IAEA chief Hans Blix has already said he aims to have the second part going by next year. It has already opened up a &#8216;clean laboratory&#8217; south of Vienna, where samples collected in and around nuclear facilities will be examined to detect any evidence of nuclear activity unknown to the IAEA.</p>
<p>Even the most careful handling of nuclear material sends minute traces of radioactive evidence into the environment. Using new technology, the IAEA can identify and date these materials &#8212; even their likely geographical origin by examination of water, plant ad soil samples.</p>
<p>Experiments carried out in about 20 countries, including in Argentina, Britain, Canada, Japan and South Africa have proved successful, IAEA officials have told IPS. According to some reports, present day technology allows such analyses to be conducted from samples collected as far as 60 kilometres from a nuclear facility.</p>
<p>The IAEA itself has successfully been able analyse and trace substances that originated from plants 30 kilometres away, he said. The agency has at the moment around 50 sampling centres along the Euphrates and Tigris rivers in Iraq.</p>
<p>At present, part of the agency safeguard inspectors&#8217; work include installing seals to prevent unauthorised material transfer and cameras which monitor sensitive operations. During their next mission, the inspectors check whether the seals and cameras have been tampered with or not and retrieve the film material for later analysis.</p>
<p>Remote monitoring and real time transmission procedures, however, would change all that. The cameras could simultaneously transmit the data from the remote facility to the IAEA headquarters in Vienna, the official said.</p>
<p>Similarly, said one source close to the agency, IAEA also proposes to install sensors that would trigger off alarms in Vienna if there are any moves to tamper with the cameras and the sensors or to move the nuclear material without warning.</p>
<p>This would allow the agency to immediately call the relevant authorities in the concerned country and check, and it would also cut costs as the necessity for the inspectors to be physically present is reduced.</p>
		<p>Excerpt: </p>Senthil Ratnasabapathy]]></content:encoded>
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