By IPS Correspondents
MOSCOW, Feb 15 1996 (IPS)

President Boris Yeltsin’s claim that the START II disarmament treaty is essential to Russian defence is falling on sceptical ears at the parliament (Duma) where deputies’ doubts are putting a Mar. 22 ratification deadline in doubt.

Yeltsin himself set the deadline for ratification of START II, which envisages almost a two-third reduction of Russian and US long-range nuclear arsenals.

Having finally confirmed Thursday that he will stand for re- election in June, the debate over the next two weeks will be seen as a key test of his ability to sell his Washington endorsed post- Cold War policy to a doubtful Russian public.

Signed by Yeltsin and U.S. president Bill Clinton in January 1993, START II requires both to cut nuclear warheads to 3,500 and 3,000 respectively, intercontinental strategic missiles to 1,000 and 736, submarine launched missiles to 1,750 and 1648, air- launched cruise missiles to 750 and 616 each by year 2003.

Yeltsin says START II will enhance, not endanger national security and his new foreign minister Yegevny Primakov has assured Washington that the Duma will quickly follow the lead of the U.S. senate, which endorsed the treaty in January.

But influential parliamentary opposition backed by a large segment of Russian public are already voicing doubts over the START II and especially Yeltsin’s view that it will meet Russia’s national security goals.

“One should be prepared for the ratification process meeting with serious obstacles in the Duma,” warned Viktor Ilyukhin, the head of the Duma Defence Committee. Ilyukhin, who took charge in the wake of the Communists’ resurgence in last December’s general elections, told the national news agency ITAR-TASS that “many Russian military experts openly oppose the ratification or at least want the treaty to be drastically altered”.

Ilyukhin’s views are echoed by Alexei Mitrofanov, a deputy with Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party and the new chair of the Duma Geopolitics Committee.

“Our position on START-II remains unchanged. Maybe the military and diplomats would convince us later, or Americans could give some sound arguments but till now our party believes START-II should not get Duma’s stamp of approval,” he told the daily Izvestia.

According to Mitrofanov, those who voice reservations are not opponents of nuclear disarmament, but, as he warned, “the devil is in the detail”. Mitrofanov insists the treaty should be carefully examined by experts before submission to the Duma debate, as most of the deputies have little knowledge of disarmament issues.

One of the principal objections of START II opponents in Russia is based on the belief that the key disarmament treaty requires use of the most expensive and inefficient way of destroying nuclear weapons, as developed to suit U.S. needs and technology.

Furthermore the U.S. deployment system allows for easier disarmament while Russia must significantly reshuffle its nuclear forces to implement it. But most of all critics say that the START process is a Cold War creation and that it is unsuited to the present-day situation.

“In counting missiles and warheads to be destroyed one should not miss the main point — the whole concept of START-II is becoming obsolete in the context of present Russian-U.S. relations and the state of Russian economy,” says Sergei Solodovnik, of the Russian foreign ministry’s Institute of International Affairs.

He argues that agreed steps on long-range nuclear arms reductions might mean loss of nuclear parity with the U.S., since in theory the effectiveness of the remaining Russian deterrent would be undermined by advanced U.S. anti-missile defences.

To restore the balance within START II’s terms would require a shift in Moscow’s traditional ‘strategic triad’ of land, sea and air launched weapons. The effectiveness of the deterrent could only be assured by further development of air and submarine launched weaponry, suggests Solodovnik. And there is no money in the state coffers for this most expensive of defence options, he adds.

A Russian defence ministry official confirmed to IPS that financial problems threaten implementation even if the treaty is ratified. The implementation programmes for START I, signed in July 1991, are getting only 40 percent of their required funds from the state treasury, he claimed.

“The problems of anti-missile systems, presently discussed in the U.S. are secondary in importance to us compared to START financial issues,” says Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the Duma’s influential International Affairs Committee.

Lukin is in favour of ratifying START II but sets conditions.

“If we do not agree with the Americans at ongoing talks on what types of systems are allowed under the existing anti-missile defence treaty, it would not be possible for us to talk about any cuts in nuclear missiles”.

One of the underlying reasons behind the doubts is a perceived end to the ‘honeymoon’ with the West that began under former president Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s. A sense of injustice, wounded pride and disenchantment with the West, and U.S. policies in particular, runs deep among Russian politicians.

Writing Wednesday in the daily Segodnya, Gorbachev — the architect of the current trend in nuclear disarmament — himself confessed to doubts. He accusing the U.S. of ‘double standards’ by pressing Russia to disarm on one hand while preparing to expand NATO right up to the Russian borders on the other.

Doubting whether international security in the post-Soviet times can be safeguarded with “agreements reached in the past,” he claims that “instead of working on the new security system, the demise of the USSR and weaknesses of Russia were openly used” by the West.

As a result, Gorbachev warns, “we can see noticeable signs of the return of nuclear threat”.

“It is clear that the issue of START-II ratification is going to be a hot issue in parliament, since even those in the Duma, like Lukin, who support the treaty are going to press for changes,” says Alexei Pushkov, Russian ORT TV pundit.

“It is highly probable that the treaty could be ratified only after heavily garnished with amendments, making it unpalatable to Washington,” he told IPS. “In this case the ratification process will be stalled — at least until the Jun. 16 presidential elections in Russia.”

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