By IPS Correspondents
SANTIAGO, Jan 7 1997 (IPS)

The autonomous branch of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR-A) may have masterminded a successful jailbreak, but will it be able to reform as a politico- military group in Chile?

The press, politicians and police are all worried about the resurgence of the FPMR-A since four of its leaders were air-lifted out of prison in a helicopter on Dec. 30.

For many of them, “Rodrigism” had become almost a romantic memory in the annals of Chile’s political history, following successive divisions and splits in the group, and the imprisonment of its most radical militants.

These included Ricardo Palma, Mauricio Hernandez, Pablo Munoz and Patricio Ortiz – the four guerrillas who sailed to freedom in the bullet-proof basket suspended over the high-security prison last Monday.

By ironic coincidence, only a few hours earlier, the Central Bank had announced the upcoming launch of new two thousand peso bills carrying a portrait of Manuel Rodriguez on the back.

The name of this mythological freedom fighter of the independence era (1814-1818) was adopted by the young left-wingers who started an armed campaign to destabilise the dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet (1973-90) in 1982.

Born in the heart of the Communist Party, which in 1980 opted for “popular rebellion” against Pinochet, the FPMR fighters were trained in Cuba and the Soviet Union, and were baptised by fire during the Sandinista offensive in Nicaragua.

The guerrilla leadership of the new movement had a vast support base amongst the young repressed university students and the poor neighbourhoods, and the FPMR established an identity of its own, on the fringes of the Communist leadership.

The frustrated attempt against Pinochet, on Sept.7, 1986, where a “Rodrigist” commando group killed five of the dictators escorts, wounding another 11, was a clear demonstration of the strength the group had accumulated.

But this event, which could have meant the consecration of their political proposal, marked the beginning of decadence in the FPMR, strengthening the so-called democratic opposition, which was seeking an end to the dictatorship via elections.

The defeat of Pinochet in the presidential plebiscite of Oct.5, 1988 endorsed the peaceful route to democracy and fed divisions between one political wing and other autonomous and belligerant factions within the front.

The latter two made the headlines in late October 1988, with the armed take over of the police prison in the frontier town of Los Quenes, unleashing a repressive campaign which cost the life of its leader, Raul Pellegrin.

Despite its internal crisis, the FPMR continue to be newsworthy, above all in February 1990 during the closing years of the dictatorship, when 48 of its members tunneled their way out of a State prison.

The group formally divided in 1990, when the bulk of its members laid down their arms and opted for a political solution under the name of the Patriotic Manuel Rodriguez Movement (MPMR).

The “autonomous” section, meanwhile, called for continued armed action, and in mid-1990, they kidnapped businessman Cristian Edwards, keeping him hostage for three months and earning 1.5 million dollars in ransom fees.

Also in 1990, the FPMR-A killed former dictatorship strong man, Roberto Fuentes and the retired Caribineer colonel, Luis Fontaine, in their “popular justice” strikes against human rights violators.

The most impressive action of the “Frontists” took place on April 1, 1991, with the murder of right-wing senator Jaime Guzman – former advisor of Pinochet and founder of the Independent Democratic Union – in the street in Santiago.

It was now that “the Office” came into operation, an ad-hoc organism created by the Patricio Aylwin government to disband the remnants of the extreme-left groups still active in the nation.

Some 87 insurgents were imprisoned between 1991 and 1994, and it was thought the FPMR-A, the Lautaro Youth Front, the remnants of the Revolutionary Left Movement, and even the “Raul Pellegrin column” – another branch of “Rodrigism”- had all been practically destroyed.

The four FPMR-A fugitives were all to some extent involved in the attacks on Fuentes, Fontaine and Guzman, along with the kidnapping of Edwards, although in the last two cases there were at least another three rebels on the run for these crimes before last Monday’s escape.

During 1996, police experts called attention to the style of some bank raids, with shot guns and gunmen wearing full-face balaclavas, fitting better into the description of “terrorist” than that of common criminal.

At the time, even within the security bodies, the leading theory was that these bands were stragglers from the insurgent groups who had opted for a life of crime in order to make a living.

Today, the leading hypothesis is that these assaults helped finance the rescue of the FPMR-A members, after a year of careful planning where they rented a helicopter, three safe-houses and bought two cars.

Interior Minister Carlos Figueroa, classed the assault on the high security prison as “notable,” for the high level of professionalism of the attackers, stressing that no one on either side had been wounded.

Over the last week, Chile has rung with rhetoric on “the resurgence of terrorism,” fired by concern the FPMR-A may be reforming.

President Eduardo Frei began a round of consultations Monday looking for “national consensus on the war against terrorism,” to include the other State powers, the parties, unions, business sector and the Armed forces through the National Security Council.

However, within the right-wing opposition, Justice Minister Soledad Alvear stressed what had happened here on Dec. 30 “was not a terrorist act, but a jailbreak.”

Meanwhile, deputy Camilo Escalona, leader of the Socialist Party, and human rights organisms said left-wing violence in Chile was a consequence of the “State terrorism established by the (Pinochet) dictatorship.”

In any case, the FPMR-A has won itself the air of being a terrorist because of its action under the Patricio Aylwin transition democracy (1990-1994), especially the murder of Guzman, which was classed as a “provocation” working in favour of the right.

Hernandez, one of the four fugitives, said a year ago the attack on Guzman had been a “political mistake,” and it is commonly held the FPMR-A will have to heal the wound of this action before it can regain its political presence.

“Flavia,” a supposed representative of the insurgent leaders, said Monday to Chilean daily “La Tercera” that the FPMR-A has no plan to “return to traditional armed action” and will be pressing for “the inclusion of popular organisations.”

Everything indicates the “Frontists” have great operational capacity and are highly professional with their arms, but they are conscious that the flight-path to be political rebirth is far more difficult than an air attack on a high security prison.

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