By IPS Correspondents
ISTANBUL, May 29 2002 (IPS)

If politics brings together strange bedfellows, a fine example is the precarious relations between Turkey and an enlarging European Union.

Turkey remains a formal candidate for accession. But Turkish entry into EU, if it ever happens, is far, far away, and Turkey may acquire a unique status that may last many years: not a full member but a ‘permanent’ candidate for full membership.

Some fundamental differences between Turkey and the EU may well be irreconcilable. Despite declarations to the contrary, religious and cultural differences play a role. But the biggest question is whether both need or want each other that badly.

For EU, a Turkey within would bring strength if it has global power ambitions, but Turkey could also be too big to digest. For Turkey, it would mean the realisation of an “impossible dream” of most policy-makers, but it may indigestible to its populace, at least on EU terms.

Behind a facade of unity, even the Government is split, leading the non-political President to summon all major parties to harmonise the country’s policies towards the EU.

As relations stand, far from negotiating entry of a country that has been an “associate member” since 1963, applicant since 1987, in a Custom Union since 1996, and candidate for full membership since 1999, the two sides dispute even the date when negotiations could begin. Turkey wants a date, the EU says not yet.

Turkey missed the boat when it turned down an invitation to join the EU along with Greece in 1978. The beginning of negotiations now hinges on Turkey meeting the “Copenhagen criteria”. That means in effect Western-style human rights in statute and practice. These would include a reduced role for the military, education and broadcasting in languages other than Turkish, abolition of the death penalty, and a solution to the Cyprus impasse (the southern Greek part is internationally recognised and on the verge of full membership, while the northern Turkish third is in limbo).

The demands amount to a tall order for a society that by time-honoured tradition upholds human duties over rights. European and Turkish analysts believe that Turkey, with a major effort, can eventually meet these demands, but not now.

At the moment, there are questions whether it actually wants to.

If it fails, a major contributing factor would lie in the “Kurdish problem” and Turkey’s fear that formal Kurdish-language teaching and broadcast would lead to separatism. That is a view pushed by the military, which still discreetly oversees politics, and a key right-wing coalition partner, but disputed by EU and some Turks themselves. A planned visit by Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh fell through because she wanted to go also to Kurdish-populated areas.

Abolition of capital punishment – death penalty is still in the books but no one has been executed since 1984 – would spare the life of convicted Kurdish guerrilla leader Abdullah Ocalan. That is opposed vehemently not only

by the military and the coalition partner, but by a wide spectrum of Turkish people. Some favour doing away with capital punishment except for conviction on terrorism charges – or after Ocalan is hanged.

A sceptical military, some in the bureaucracy (both would lose their privileged positions in full EU membership) and a right-wing party keeping the government in office are firmly opposed to EU membership. But a majority of Turks (up to 70 per cent) favour EU membership, surveys show.

But many in Turkey believe also that Europeans do not really want the country fully within EU. Through centuries of conflict, Europeans have seen Turks as “foreigners” and still do, surveys indicate.

The Secretary-general of the powerful National Security Council, Gen. Tuncer Kilinc, publicly expressed his disappointment with the EU recently. “I believe that the EU will never accept Turkey,” Gen. Kilinc said. “Thus Turkey needs new allies and it would be useful if Turkey engages in a search that would involve Russia and Iran.”

He was politely talked down by a worried government that has, on paper, made EU membership a national objective. A more viable alternative to the EU appears to be a strategic relationship with the U.S., which has less interest in the Kurdish issue or the death penalty than the EU.

The official EU view is that Turkey’s obligations are no different from any other candidate, and if it meets them, there is no reason it will not achieve full membership.

But commentators say this view clashes with an undercurrent of concern in admitting a nation of almost 70 million, with 98 per cent of the population Muslim. They recall that former leaders within the EU such as Jacques Delors and Helmut Kohl saw religion as an obstacle to Turkey’s admission (Kohl’s son eventually married a Turkish Muslim).

A question asked often is, that if Turkey is in, would Denmark or other countries with small populations like to see Turks moving in freely? That would certainly end any labour shortage, but it would create social issues. And if Turkey is in, where does the EU stop? Why not Morocco, Tunisia or others?

The EU may have little to gain from a Turkey within. But it would have trouble adjusting to the entry of a nation whose rural force is equal to the number of agricultural workers in the entire EU.

The pro-EU forces in Turkey believe that after turning down a rare invitation once, this could be Turkey’s best, if not last, chance while the EU contemplates enlargement.

Full member or not, Turkey stands to gain in any attempts to meet the EU criteria. If rejected, Turkey would still have modernised a society in ways that would be impossible without such an objective.

And, some commentators also say, what is wrong with a modern Turkey with one foot in Europe and the other in Asia – a reality already reflected in the suspension bridges linking Europe and Asia over Istanbul’s majestic Bosphorus Straight. Not fully one, or the other, but also special to both.

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