By IPS Correspondents
BAGHDAD, Jul 4 2003 (IPS)

Long before the U.S.-led coalition forces entered Iraq, one of their first concerns was how Iraq’s Shiite majority would react to their presence, how combative Shiite religious leaders would be, and how much of a destabilising role neighbouring Iran would choose to play.

The jury is out on some of these questions, but others are becoming clearer. U.S. officials seem pleased with some answers, not so happy with the others..

Iraq’s Shiites constitute about 60 percent of the population. They were politically and economically sidelined during Saddam’s 35-year reign. U.S. administrator in Iraq Paul L. Bremer concedes that the Shiites would now have to be given a larger role.

But increased Shiite participation is not prime U.S. concern. What worries Washington is that the Shiites might try to use their majority, and the centuries- old tradition of following religious leaders in Najaf, the world’s centre for Shiite theological teaching, to subvert U.S. efforts to set up a democratic system in Iraq.

So far doomsday scenarios have not materialized. In fact, it can be argued that signs are pointing to the opposite. The Shiites have not turned out to be the main problem. At least, not yet.

Almost all the attacks against U.S. forces have occurred in areas controlled by Sunni Muslims, where Saddam and his cronies had influence. There are signs also that some Sunni Muslims might be receiving financial and material help from Saudi Arabia’s radical Wahhabi Muslims.

”We realize there is some Saudi activity and involvement and we’ve basically told them cut it out,” a senior U.S. official in Baghdad said on condition of anonymity.

Shiite leaders, far from being a monolithic group, have said they want to give the coalition a chance to deliver on its promises, and that confrontation with the U.S. and British armies is not in the cards.

”We took a position some time ago that we will not pursue the path of armed confrontation with the coalition forces, and have been trying to push these forces, which are occupying forces, from Iraq through peaceful means and constructive dialogue,” says Abdel Aziz Hakim, the younger brother of Ayatollah Mohammed Baqer Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).

Ayatollah Hakim spent more than two decades in exile in Iran before returning to Iraq in April. He was seen as a close ally of Teheran who would attempt to establish an Iranian-style Islamic republic in Iraq.

Since his return, however, Ayatollah Hakim has remained mostly in Najaf. A close advisor says daily political operations are now headed by the younger Hakim in Baghdad. Both have said they want to work with other Iraqi groups, and that establishing an Islamic republic modelled after Iran is not their goal.

”Ayatollah Hakim had a religious role in Najaf before he was forced to leave the country,” says the advisor Abdel Hamed Bayati. ”Now that he is back, his natural place is in Najaf and his role there would be to concentrate on religious affairs. Daily political decisions will be made by Abdel Aziz, who in addition to being his brother, is the deputy leader of SCIRI.”

Less certain is the role of the other senior Shiite leader in Iraq, Ayatollah Ali Sistani, believed to be the pre-eminent Shiite leader in Iraq.

Long under house arrest during Saddam’s reign, Sistani is known as a moderate who believes in separation of religion from politics. But earlier this week, he issued a fatwa (religious edict) calling Bremer’s plans ”unacceptable”.

Bremer plans to nominate members of a council later this summer to write a draft of Iraq’s future constitution. People will get a chance to vote on the plan, Bremer has said.

But in his fatwa, Ayatollah Sistani said ”the authorities are not entitled to nominate the members of the assembly charged with drafting the constitutionàthere is no guarantee that such a convention would draft a constitution upholding the Iraqi people’s interests and expressing their national identity, based on Islam and lofty social values.”

Bremer rejected the charge at a press conference this week. He said Iraqis will write the draft and it will include what they wish to include in it.

”Ayatollah Sistani was oppressed during Saddam’s time,” said an aide in his Najaf office. ”And some of the fact that he was not very outspoken can be attributed to that. Now that we are living in a new Iraq, where the Americans say they want to promote democracy, it would be the ayatollah’s right, and our expectation, to become more outspoken.”

But even if religious leaders choose not to confront U.S. forces, some of their followers could take matters in their own hands.

After an explosion destroyed a part of a mosque compound in Falluja earlier this week, U.S. forces and some residents said the mosque stored a small amount of arms and explosives. The U.S. forces blamed the stored explosives for the blast. Followers at the mosque said that a U.S. missile hit the compound.

Finally, and perhaps equally important to Bremer and policymakers in Washington, is the role of Iran and its possible ambitions in a country with which it fought a bloody war for eight years.

Iran has officially denied U.S. allegations that it is meddling in Iraq’s internal affairs. But a visit earlier in June to the Iran-Iraq border post near Khaneqin indicated otherwise.

Ali Behbehani, an Iraqi Shiite who fled with his family to Iran in the 1980s and returned to Iraq last month, said religious leaders in Iran’s holy city Qom were offering Iraqi religious students money to return home and preach Islam.

”The programme was started a month ago by the International Centre for Islamic Studies,” he said. ”They have offered 200 to 300 dollars to Iraqis who volunteer to return to their city of origin and preach Islam for a period of six to nine weeks. After that we can either return to Qom or continue to live in Iraq and earn our living.”

Behbehani said the Qom centre is home to about 500 Iraqi students and about 2,000 international pupils from Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Europe, and the United States. It is not clear whether the Qom centre has similar return programmes for other countries.

”Basically, a ‘Shiite factor’ was a definitive concern in the beginning,” said another U.S. officer. ”But, right now, it has become more of wild card. How will it play out? It depends as much on what the Americans do, as on what they don’t do.”

That comes down to the question whether the Bremer team tries to involve Shiite religious leaders in the political dialogue and meet some of their demands, or sideline them as Saddam did.

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