By IPS Correspondents
KABUL, Dec 7 2006 (IPS)

NATO’s struggle to defeat a rising insurgency in south and south-east Afghanistan along with its failure to secure additional troops at its summit in Riga are being promoted by many foreign policy experts as a failure for the grouping and a victory for the Taliban and other Islamic extremists.

A setback for NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation), however, should not be confused with a setback for Afghanistan. NATO’s struggle to defend its post Cold War raison d’etre both overstates the organisation’s capacity and responsibility in Afghanistan.

The widely promoted assumption that more NATO troop numbers and U.S. military action is the only remedy for defeating the Taliban threat in Afghanistan is both naive and dangerous. The more NATO expands its operation in Afghanistan and the more the U.S. military pursues its myopic hunt for Taliban and al-Qaeda forces, the more it risks the lives of its own soldiers and the less the international community has to invest in Afghanistan’s National Army (ANA) and police (ANP), reconstruction and fostering civil society.

Each NATO soldier costs an average of 5,000 US dollars a month to maintain in Afghanistan while the average ANA soldier takes home 60 dollars a month. A pay raise plus a more robust training programme for ANA and ANP soldiers would surely attract more Afghans to serving the national army and for those who are already part of it, reduce the high rate of desertion. The resources spent on an expanded NATO and the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan should be replaced with a new, four-step strategy.

The first step of this strategy is perhaps the most difficult because it requires the moral authority and courage of the U.S. to end its “hunt for Taliban and al-Qaeda.” ” NATO cannot assert itself as a stabilising force in Afghanistan as it did in Kosovo and Bosnia, if the U.S. Defense Department is waging its own, parallel, war on terror in Afghanistan.”

Since 9/11, Washington has more or less justified any means in its mission to eliminate al-Qaeda and its Afghan sponsors, the Taliban. In doing so, it has only emboldened its enemies and weakened its allies.

The only thing Washington has to show for its approach is a long list of dead or captured enemy combatants and civilian casualties along with a growing insurgency in Afghanistan’s southern and eastern provinces that is benefiting from the narcotics trade and governmental corruption.

The second step involves a redefined NATO mission. If the U.S. would agree to scale back its own war in Afghanistan, NATO forces could focus on paving the way for a more robust ANA and ANP build-up, mending relations in Afghanistan’s southern belt and applying its technical and engineering resources towards supporting Afghanistan’s lagging reconstruction programs.

The best bet for defeating Islamic extremism, in Afghanistan and elsewhere is to nurture and invest in moderate elements of society. This relates to the third step in the strategy. Such elements of a civil society hold the moral authority, community-based legitimacy and most of all, cultural knowledge to challenge extremist forces.

In the case of Afghanistan, there are a number of progressive Afghan elements which the international community has yet to tap into for support. The reliance on a largely military-based approach the past five years has left little room for such moderating elements to emerge and diffuse tensions.

If Washington and Brussels could find the political courage to take a step back, the public space for moderate players within Afghan society would finally have a chance to play the role they are far better suited to play than any foreign military force.

What has and will continue to embolden extremist movements such as the Taliban and the Hizbi Islami in Afghanistan and al-Qaeda is the international community’s reliance on the military. Islamic extremism and terrorism is nothing but a corrupt state of mind. A military based approach to eliminating extremism is like adding fuel to a fire.

Good intelligence gathering and sharing is still vital to preventing future terrorist attacks and military intervention should be used more selectively, but with more money spent on a military campaign than on strengthening the Afghan state and society by international donors, Afghanistan’s deteriorating security situation should come as no surprise.

Until a greater investment in progressive elements within civil society and the public space for them to manoeuvre is made, any gains made in Afghanistan by the Afghan people, NATO and in the name of fighting terrorism the past five years will be lost.

The fourth and critical step in the strategy involves a genuine commitment from regional neighbours to mature and move from their Cold War era political games to a new era for their citizens.

The 21st century holds a vast array of threats for central and south Asia, far more daunting than terrorism. The world’s largest number of young people face limited economic opportunities, high illiteracy rates, overpopulation, ecological challenges such as water shortages and desertification, major natural disasters and the legacy of armed conflict. Countries playing games with Afghanistan are wasting precious resources and undermining the potential of their own citizens.

Unless the region’s leaders mature and international powers such as the U.S. and NATO give room for positive elements of civil society to emerge, the problems in Afghanistan will pale in comparison to those that are just around the corner. (*(Released under agreement with The Killid Group)

Excerpt: