By IPS Correspondents
ANKARA, Jan 21 2008 (IPS)

A day after French President Nicolas Sarkozy expounded on his plan for 2008 and coined the term “policy of civilisation”, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan presented his road map for the new year, which he baptised the “national restoration plan”.

That was on Jan. 9. Two weeks later, in either country, neither the media nor public opinion appear to have retained the respective messages, perceived more as political marketing talk than shake-up blueprints.

This is probably good news for Sarkozy, whose Jan. 8 New Year’s encounter with the press at Elysée palace was rated by analysts as controversial and led to subsequent statements to correct “misunderstandings”.

But in the case of Erdogan, who tried hard to boost confidence amongst his people, such quick oblivion of his ‘restoration vision’ indicates that Turkish citizens are deeply aware of the realities their country is likely to face this year.

The action plan put forward by the government acknowledges the weaknesses in the social and political systems, and tries to instil hope in the minds of the citizens.

Of its 145 chapters, the bulk concern social welfare. Unsurprisingly, considering that Erdogan is leader of the Justice and Development (AK) Party, successor to the Welfare Party, whose electorate has traditionally come from the Eastern Anatolian populations that largely survive thanks to state aid.

Turkey, under AKP rule from 2002 to date, has done very well economically. It has had robust growth for 23 consecutive quarters. Gross national income per capita has risen from 2,400 dollars in 2000 to just under 7,000 dollars in 2007. The ratio of national borrowing to gross national product has improved from 78.3 to 40 percent, while Turkey’s debt to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has fallen below 8 billion dollars from 23 billion dollars in five years.

With such economic performance, and optimistic forecasts by foreign financial institutions for 2008, why then so much emphasis on state welfare?

As in other fast growing emerging economies, wealth is not distributed equitably among all stakeholders. While Istanbul begins rivalling Manhattan and Hong Kong in luxury real estate construction, the southern and eastern provinces descend into relative poverty day by day. As many of these regions are also home to large groups of ethnic Kurdish Turks, the risk of social unrest in the future is now becoming a probability.

Although the action plan tries to make citizens, who are getting closer to Western levels of prosperity in the large cities and the Aegean coast, sensitive to the disparities in their society, it seems to lose clarity when it comes to other issues close to the heart of all Turkish people, regardless of their origin or condition.

Homeland security and individual freedoms preoccupy most of them more so than the construction of nine universities in provinces that never had one, or the Southern Eastern Anatolia development project, launched in 1971 but far from being near completion, which were presented as this year’s priorities.

Homeland security rhymes with getting rid of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), an outlawed separatist armed militia operating out of Northern Iraq. Last November the Turkish parliament gave the long-awaited green light to the country’s armed forces (TSK) to begin hostilities against PKK positions in Iraq.

Although the government has displayed unreserved support to the operation and the TSK, Erdogan’s plan is frugal in information about the longer-term strategy for resolving the Kurdish problem. After President Abdullah Gul’s visit to Washington at the beginning of January, it is speculated here that a major cross-border operation will take place in the spring. Ethnic Kurds in Turkey, generally supportive to AKP, however, favour a political solution. The Prime Minister will certainly need a great dose of creativity in order to keep all sides happy.

Individual freedoms and constitutional reforms were used as pre-electoral rhetoric during the July 2007 legislatives, both to unite the Turks behind Erdogan and as proof of further democratisation of the country to its Western allies and critics.

The European Union, membership to which has been the Prime Minister’s battle horse in his foreign policy for the past five years, is regularly critical of the slow pace of law making to bring Turkey closer to the EU’s democratic standards.

One particularly slippery subject is the contemplated repeal of article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code (TPC) that defends “Turkishness” from public denigration of the Turkish Republic and all its institutions, including but not limited to the parliament and the armed forces.

As there are no definitions for either Turkishness or denigration, the line between the latter and peaceful criticism is very thin. The text, which lacks legal clarity, has been interpreted variably by prosecutors and judges and resulted in painful trials, and often imprisonment, of intellectuals. Orhan Pamuk, Nobel Prize winner in literature, came very close to being sentenced for a comment he made in one of his books about the Armenian massacre of 1915 by former Turkish leader Enver Pasha’s administration.

Article 301 provides for prison sentences ranging from six months to three years, augmented by one-third in the event the offence is by a Turkish citizen abroad.

Amnesty International has repeatedly claimed that “Article 301 poses a direct threat to freedom of expression, as enshrined in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and in Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).” Turkey is a signatory to both conventions.

The government has often taken a position indicating its will to eliminate the article. But the current action plan is less categorical, and a revision seems to be the preferred approach. There is, in fact, resistance to change by certain political parties and the military, and in the past few weeks radical politicians and academics have spoken openly against its repeal. Whatever his true intention, Erdogan will need a large cup of courage to make his decision.

When in April 2007 the premier was faced with a quasi-ultimatum from the head of the General Staff Yasar Buyukanit, who opposed the election of AKP leader and Islamist Abdullah Gul to the presidency, Erdogan announced in response that he would have a new constitution put to referendum.

Gul was elected head of state by the parliament in August last year, and the TSK was given authorisation in November to start a full-scale offensive against PKK guerrillas within Northern Iraq. The tension between the government and the army has, for the moment at least, been toned down. And the constitution is being drafted, and redrafted, by academics, with limited input by the opposition parties and civil society.

But opponents to a new text are now becoming vocal. Last week Hasim Kilic, head of the Constitutional Court, went public with the argument that a new constitution would create trouble in the country. He thinks that mild maintenance and repair of the current document is preferable to an overhaul, in the sake of pubic peace.

The actual constitution was adopted following the military coup Sep. 12, 1980. It has undergone minor changes over the years, but the majority of Turks think it is still a long way from European-style charters.

As the new year settles, structural domestic matters and unresolved foreign policy issues such as Cyprus, the EU, and relations with neighbouring countries make the road to restoration look increasingly bumpy.

Excerpt: