Credit: Sergei Gapon/AFP via Getty Images

By Andrew Firmin
LONDON, Feb 7 2025 (IPS)

Alexander Lukashenko will soon begin his seventh term as president of Belarus. The official result of the 26 January election gave him 86.8 per cent of the vote, following an election held in a climate of fear. Only token opposition candidates were allowed, most of who came out in support of Lukashenko. Anyone who might have offered a credible challenge is in jail or in exile.

No repeat of 2020

In office since 1994 as the so far only president of independent Belarus, Lukashenko is by far Europe’s longest-serving head of state. The 1994 vote that brought the former Soviet official to power was the country’s only legitimate election. Each since has been designed to favour Lukashenko.

He only faced a serious threat in 2020, when an outsider candidate, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, was able to run a campaign that captured the popular imagination. Lukashenko’s response was to arrest opponents, repress protests, restrict the internet, deny access for electoral observers and then blatantly steal the election.

When people took to the street in mass protests against electoral fraud, Belarus seemed on the brink of a democratic revolution. But Lukashenko’s government launched a brutal defence, using security forces to violently attack protesters and arresting over a thousand people. It dissolved opposition political parties and raided and shut down civil society organisations: over a thousand have been forcibly liquidated since 2020.

Lukashenko’s regime has gone after those in exile, kidnapping and allegedly killing Belarusians abroad. Belarus is among the 10 states most engaged in transnational repression. They authorities have also deprived the estimated 300,000 people who’ve fled since 2020 of their ability to vote.

By embracing repression, Lukashenko made a choice to abandon his policy of balancing between the European Union (EU) and Russia. When the EU imposed sanctions in response to the 2020 election fraud, Russia offered a package of loans. In 2022, when Russia launched its full-scale assault on Ukraine, some of its forces entered Ukraine from Belarus.

Shortly after Russia began its full-scale invasion, a constitutional referendum held in Belarus, marked by the same lack of democracy as its elections, formally ended the country’s neutrality and non-nuclear status. In December 2024, the two states signed a security treaty allowing the use of Russian nuclear weapons in the event of aggression against Belarus, and Lukashenko confirmed that the country hosts dozens of Russian nuclear warheads.

Belarus has also been accused of instrumentalising migrants to try to destabilise neighbouring countries. In 2021, it relaxed its visa rules for people from Middle Eastern and North African countries and encouraged flights to Belarus. Thousands were taken to the borders with Lithuania and Poland and left to try to cross them in desperate conditions, freezing and without essentials, subjected to security force violence on both sides. Migrants were unwitting pawns in Lukashenko’s game to strike back at his neighbours. Attempted crossings and human rights violations have continued since.

Renewed crackdown

Just to be on the safe side, Lukashenko launched another crackdown in the months leading up to the election. The intent was clearly to ensure there’d be no repeat of the expression of opposition and protests of 2020.

Starting in July 2024, Lukashenko pardoned around 250 political prisoners, releasing them from jail. His likely aim was to soften international criticism in the run-up to the vote. But these weren’t the high-profile prisoners serving long sentences, such as Nobel Peace Prize winner Ales Bialiatski, a founder of the Viasna Human Rights Centre, who received a 10-year sentence in 2023, or protest leader Maria Kolesnikova, sentenced to 11 years in 2021. Those pardoned had to publicly acknowledge their guilt and repent.

The freed jail spaces were quickly filled, with over a hundred friends and relatives of political prisoners detained. In February 2024, authorities detained at least 12 lawyers who’d defended political prisoners. In December, they arrested seven independent journalists. Belarus has the world’s fourth highest number of jailed journalists.

People have been jailed merely for following Telegram channels deemed ‘extremist’ or making social media comments. Over 1,700 people reportedly faced charges for political activities in 2024. Prison conditions are harsh. People may be forced to do hard labour, kept in solitary confinement, sent to freezing punishment cells, denied access to their families and have medical care withheld.

On election day, Lukashenko’s dictatorial style was on full display. He held a press conference where he promised to ‘deal with’ opposition activists in exile and said they were endangering their families in Belarus, adding that some opponents ‘chose’ to go to prison. He also didn’t rule out the prospect of running for an eighth term in 2030.

Time for change

Lukashenko promises more of the same: continuing autocracy and closed civic space. For generations of Belarusians who’ve known nothing but his rule, and with opposition voices so ruthlessly suppressed, it may be hard to imagine anything else. The possibilities opened up in 2020 have been ruthlessly shut down.

But the wheels of history will keep turning, and the 70-year-old dictator won’t last forever. Some kind of cessation of hostilities in Ukraine may well come this year, forcing Lukashenko to make friends beyond Vladimir Putin. If Russia winds down its booming war economy, the ensuing economic shock in Belarus, which largely depends on Russia, could trigger public anger.

Meanwhile, potentially increased scrutiny could come from the International Criminal Court: in September 2024, the government of Lithuania requested an investigation into crimes against humanity allegedly committed by Belarusian authorities. If this move gains momentum, Lukashenko could find himself in an uncomfortable spotlight. States could also intensify sanctions: Canada and the UK have done so following the election.

If Belarus attempts to reengage with them, democratic states should insist that no thaw in relations is possible without tangible human rights progress . This should start with the release of all political prisoners, guarantees for the safety of exiled activists and a reversal of attacks on civic space.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

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