Attendees at the NPT Review Conference side event titled 'Preventing Nuclear Use and Escalation: Lessons from Nuclear Close Calls. ' Credit: Naureen Hossain/IPS

By Naureen Hossain
UNITED NATIONS, May 8 2026 (IPS)

The consequences of nuclear warfare would transcend borders and the impact would be felt across generations. Yet knowing this, member states, including nuclear-armed states, are increasingly flouting the nuclear taboo, while also relying heavily on deterrence to prevent fallout.

Throughout the Cold War period, there were stories of nuclear “close calls”—moments where the world could have been plunged into nuclear warfare were it not for human intervention or sheer luck. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the Petrov incident of 1983 may be more well-known examples from history, but others may also reveal what lessons should be taken from these ‘close calls.’

At the sidelines of the 2026 NPT Review Conference, academics, government and civil society convened to discuss just that. On May 1, at an event convened by Soka Gakkai International (SGI) and the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), people came together to deliberate over past and present efforts to prevent nuclear escalation. The panelists argued that these stories demonstrate how nuclear deterrence may not be an effective security strategy towards disarmament or even nonproliferation.

Chie Sunada, Director of Disarmament and Human Rights, SGI Peace Center, speaks in a panel on nuclear escalation risks. Credit: Naureen Hossain/IPS

“The history of close calls—Cuba, Petrov, Black Brant—and many other less well-known events does not tell us that deterrence works. It tells us that deterrence has, on a number of documented occasions, almost failed,” said George-Wilhelm Gallhofer, Director for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in Austria’s Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs. “Luck is not a security strategy. And yet, the global security order, 60 years on, still rests on it.”

Gallhoffer went on to suggest that the nuclear taboo needs to be reinforced once more by promoting honest dialogue between nuclear powers and non-nuclear states, where the non-nuclear states remind all parties of the stakes at play. Doctrines like the NPT and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) should be regarded as security treaties, not only moral or ethical frameworks.

Elayne Whyte, a professor at Johns Hopkins and former UN Ambassador of Costa Rica, also echoed this sentiment, adding that the issue of nuclear danger is just as rooted at the societal level as it is through legal frameworks. The shared understanding of nuclear danger is not only produced through weapons systems or treaties but also through decision-makers and the values of society.

“It is [the] 21st century; we also have to acknowledge that the erosion of the nuclear taboo cannot be separated from the wider nationalist trends that rank human lives unequally and make it easier to imagine that mass destruction inflicted on others is […] tolerated,” said Whyte.

Emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence threaten to further complicate nuclear escalation, wherein nuclear states, in an effort to stay ahead of the curve, adopt these technologies for their perceived potential to reduce the human margin of error. The automation of decision-making in nuclear weapons use is not entirely new, as was seen in 1979 and 1980, when the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) received several false alarms through errors in their missile warning system.

Yanliang Pan, a research associate at CNS, remarked that these cases proved that automated systems would still be susceptible to automation bias and compressed decision-making time, thus increasing the likelihood of accidents. Although humans should still have ‘meaningful’ control over decisions of nuclear use, Pan noted that these close calls occurred while humans were in control. “We should be talking about the effect of automation on the reliability of human control, rather than simply human control as an antidote to automation,” said Pan.

At present, academic research can uncover recurring patterns in how nuclear close calls were handled and what that can tell decision-makers about risk reduction in this space. According to Sarah Bidgood, a postdoctoral fellow at the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, recent studies have looked into how there might not be a singular framework for crisis management that could apply across nuclear close calls. When it comes to crisis management and risk reduction, the dynamics of previous nuclear close calls do not exist in a monolith, but there are variations in the outcomes instead. The lessons that leaders take from such situations may not lead to a shift away from nuclear weapons. Instead, these events may reinforce what leaders already think about the risks and benefits of nuclear weapons. If a leader regards nuclear weapons for a perceived strategic value, then after a close call, they may be just as likely to embrace new capabilities that would allow them to threaten the use of weapons across multiple levels of conflict. Bidgood raised the question of what this scenario would mean for the future of risk reduction in the present geopolitical environment.

“We need to be quite skeptical of this conventional wisdom that we often hear in our community… which is that to get arms control and risk reduction back on track, maybe we need another event like the Cuban Missile Crisis. Because if my theory is right, what this tells us is that the next crisis could just as easily lead us farther down a very, very different path. And that’s something that I don’t think we as scholars or practitioners have really accounted for,” said Bidgood.

Such near-misses may often be thanks to individual human judgement calls rather than the positions of nuclear states. Chie Sunada, Director of Disarmament and Human Rights at the SGI Peace Center, recalled the example of an incident during the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, where a near-miss also brewed in the Pacific, which would have targeted an uninvolved third party. During this time, U.S. military bases hosted nuclear missiles in Japan that were powerful enough to level cities. The base in Okinawa received what seemed like authenticated launch orders. However, the most senior field officer on site, Captain William Bassett, found discrepancies with the launch orders and the missiles’ readiness level, including that the missiles at this base were primarily targeted at China. So he ordered subordinates to stand down.

Sunada warned that the sense of urgency that informed decisions on nuclear de-escalation was missing from the current discourse and that the reality of nuclear fallout and the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would be “fading into abstract history.” She urged that nuclear disarmament education would be a “vital mechanism” for maintaining “strategic restraint” by recognizing that a key element for its success is empathy for the pain of others, which is itself a form of deterrence.

“We cannot continue to outsource our survival to luck,” said Sunada. “We urge all state parties to recognize that risk reduction requires more than just adjusting military doctrines. It requires a fundamental shift in how we understand these weapons, driven by education. By cutting the chain of hatred and nurturing the heart that cherishes and is respectful to others, we achieve the ultimate disarmament and pure, proper peace education.”

Note: This article is brought to you by IPS Noram in collaboration with INPS Japan and Soka Gakkai International in consultative status with ECOSOC.

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