December 6 is observed as ‘Democracy Day’ in Bangladesh, a day that marks the overthrow of military rule of General H M Ershad through a popular urban uprising in 1990. It was the culmination of years of protests demanding democracy, at least the right to express opinions without fear, to vote in freely held elections, to elect civilian governments and to hold the leaders accountable.

Mass rally of Dhaka blockade on November 10, 1987.

While the observance of the day is a reminder of the movement against military authoritarianism, particularly the Ershad regime, it is well to remember that it was only one episode of the long struggle for democracy in the country. After all, the Bangladeshi state was founded on the basis of democratic aspirations and democracy, which have been included in the Constitution as one of the state principles. Periodic popular uprisings, the presence of a plethora of political parties, and widespread participation in national elections until 2014 are indicative of the aspiration. It is not an exaggeration to say that in the past twenty five years, democracy has remained under stress.

Since 2013, the nation has plunged into an unusual political environment. The unprecedented election of 2014 remains at the centre of this unusual situation. Several episodes of violence, for example, the Islamists’ deadly protests against the verdicts of the International Crimes Tribunal in 2013, protests against the election in 2014 by the main opposition party, and serious deterioration of law and order for three months in 2015 during the opposition-led blockade in the wake of the anniversary of the controversial election, have cost the nation dearly.

These unfortunate developments have been accompanied by an increasing use of force by the government, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. Media are either muzzled or have adopted an unstated policy of self-censorship in fear of retribution. The space for civil society, once a vibrant arena of debate and social movements, has contracted. Overall, the space for dissent has shrunk remarkably, thanks to the intolerance of the government on the one hand and both militant and mainstream Islamists, on the other. The use of extremist rhetoric has increased markedly and been accepted as a natural mode of political discourse.

Thanks to the 2014 election, the Parliament has become a one-party institution due to the absence of an effective opposition. The ruling Bangladesh Awami League (AL) seems to be engaged in decimating the main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) through persecution and frivolous cases against its leaders. One cannot ignore that BNP’s political miscalculation, wrong strategy, and inept tactics have also contributed to its plight. The ruling party’s success in marginalising the main opposition BNP, at least in the short term, is a combination of these factors. But the overall impact of this growing authoritarian bent of the government and weakening of the opposition is that the mainstream political arena is being hollowed out: neither the Parliament nor the street is the arena of politics.

Concurrently, the country witnessed the dramatic growth of militant groups and experienced audacious attacks. Killings of bloggers and individuals with unorthodox views have been followed by murders of foreigners and a high profile attack on a café on July 1, 2016. Some of these militant groups claimed to have organisational connections with international terrorist groups, which the government denied.

Against this background one can ask: Does the environment within the mainstream politics and mode of governance reflect the popular aspiration?

Generally speaking, there are two strands of discussions on democracy in Bangladesh; either they provide the description of events since 1990 or they focus on the normative qualities of democracy. Both discussions ignore what the people view as the characteristics of democracy. In my recently published book, Bangladesh: A Political History of Bangladesh Since Independence (London: I B Tauris, 2016) I have examined the popular views expressed in 13 surveys conducted by different national and international research organisations between 1996 and 2013. Here I highlight a few findings that deserve our close attention, particularly in the context of the extant political environment.

That these surveys demonstrate a wide and unwavering support for democracy among Bangladeshi citizens should come as no surprise. In a survey conducted by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in late 2003, nearly two-thirds of the respondents (62 percent) chose a ‘government ruled by democratically elected representatives’ as the preferred system of governance. As for other choices, a ‘government ruled by Islamic law, with respected religious figures as leaders’ was favored by 21 percent, followed by ‘a government ruled by a military leader who got things done’ at 11percent and ‘a non-elected government ruled by specialists, experts, and business leaders who know what it takes to develop a country’ at three per cent. A decade later, the sentiment remained almost the same; a survey by the Pew Research Center in 2013, showed that 70 percent of Bangladeshis preferred democracy as opposed to 27 percent who preferred a ‘strong leader.’

What prompts such overwhelming support for democracy? Respondents of the USAID survey gave democracy strong marks for being the best system for protecting individuals’ rights and freedoms (79 percent), ensuring equality of all citizens (69 percent), providing order and security (69 percent), keeping the country united (68 percent), and solving community problems because it gives everyone the chance to speak about their concerns and interests (59 percent).

These surveys also revealed what Bangladeshis mean by democracy. Weighted narrowed responses of the Governance Barometer Survey Bangladesh 2010 (conducted by BRAC University) showed that 80 percent of respondents felt elections were the critical ideal of democracy, followed by free public debate (71 percent), rule of consent (60 percent), ability to participate in decision making (50 percent), and ability to access information on government activities (40 percent).

In a survey conducted by the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) in 2000, where respondents were provided with a list of fundamental rights and were asked, ‘How important is it to you that the following rights be respected in Bangladesh?’ Rural respondents picked ‘one can choose from several parties and candidates when voting’ overwhelmingly while urban respondents indicated ‘honest elections are held regularly’ as the most important right.

As for the attributes of democracy, the Global Survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2002 showed that Bangladeshis identified three major attributes of democracy: people can openly criticise the government (81 percent); there are honest, two-party elections (71 percent); and free press/the media can report without censorship (64 percent).

A similar perception is found in the survey among the younger population. ‘Giving Youth a Voice: Bangladesh Youth Survey of 2011′ informs us that “when defining democracy, a wide majority stated that elections are a core parameter”. The report states, “Our survey reflects that Bangladeshi youths’ perceptions about democracy are mainly defined by having free and fair elections. When ranked, this was given first priority by an overwhelming majority of 65 percent, in addition to 18 percent who ranked it either second (8 percent) or third (10 percent). Among all other options, rule by consent and access to information have been top priorities.”

While these numbers and the details of these surveys may seem overwhelming, taken together they provide a clear message: democracy is not an abstract idea to Bangladeshi citizens. Bangladeshis’ view of democracy as a competitive pluralistic political system which holds regular free elections, protects individual’s rights and freedoms, and allows citizens to express opinions freely without fear of being persecuted, either by the state or by the non-state actors.

As the country observes ‘Democracy Day’ in 2016 it is worth remembering this message.

The writer is Professor and Chair of the Department of Politics and Government at Illinois State University, USA. His recent publications include the coedited volume ‘Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Bangladesh’ (London: Routledge, 2016).

Photo: Dinu Alam on Facebook/Dinu Alam on English Wikipedia (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Rally_of_Nov_10,_1987_-_1.jpg), „Rally of Nov 10, 1987 – 1“, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/legalcode

This story was originally published by The Daily Star, Bangladesh

As targeted killings of individuals with unorthodox views and members of minority communities continue unabated in Bangladesh, so does the debate on whether international terrorists have made inroads to the country. The question has been whether the claims of the Islamic State (IS) and Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) of their presence in Bangladesh should be taken at face value. In the past months, both these organisations have been claiming responsibility for a series of killings. Until recently, these claims have not been accompanied by justifications, but that pattern seems to be changing. The AQIS affiliate Ansar-al Islam, issued a long statement after the murder of Xulhazs Mannan, an LGBT activist and USAID staff member. The government, on the other hand, has continued to deny the existence of these organisations and insists that these are the acts of ‘homegrown’ militants. In April, the English magazine of the IS, Dabiq, published an interview with the so-called Amir of the Bangladeshi chapter of the IS to bolster its presence. Ansar-al Islam claims to represent the AQIS in Bangladesh. This is a mutated version of the organisation Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), which came into being in 2007.

Both the denial of any external connections of Bangladeshis, and insistence that the IS/AQIS has recently made inroads in the country, seem to disregard the historical background of militancy in Bangladesh. Bangladeshi militants had regional and extra-regional connections since their inception in the mid-1990s. It is worth recalling that the genesis of Islamist militants can be traced back to the Afghan War (1979-1989) in the late 1980s. The fountainhead of the militant groups in Bangladesh, Harkat-ul-Jihad al Islami Bangladesh (HuJIB), emerged in public on April 30, 1992 through a press conference at the National Press Club in Dhaka. A group of so-called volunteers, who participated in the Afghan War in the previous years, arranged a press conference in the wake of the fall of Kabul to the Afghan Mujahedeen. Although the rudimentary form of the HuJI began in Pakistan in 1980, it was formally established in 1988. It expanded in the following four years, as the HuJI leadership wanted to reach out to other parts of South Asia. This led to the establishment of the HuJI in Bangladesh. The initial goal was to use Bangladesh as the launching pad for destabilising neighbouring Myanmar.

The operation of the HuJIB expanded further after it established relationships with the local militant organisation Jamaat-ul-Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB). The JMB was founded in 1998 but was named as such three years later. The founding of the JMB was a culmination of a series of meetings between Sayekh Abdur Rahman and a number of Islamist leaders and Ulema in 1996. These meetings brought Mufti Hannan and Abdur Rahman together. On January 19, 1996, law enforcement agencies busted a training camp in a remote part of Cox’s Bazar and arrested 41 armed militants. The camp was originally thought to be a training camp of Rohingya rebels based in Bangladesh. When these militants were being tried at a local court in Cox’s Bazar, Abdur Rahman was sent as the HuJIB representative to monitor and help the accused. This turned out to be the beginning of a long relationship between JMB and the HuJI-B.

The external connections of the potential militants of Bangladesh began in earnest in 1997-98. The connection established between Indian citizen Syed Abdul Karim Tunda and Abdur Rahman is a watershed moment in the history of militancy in Bangladesh. Tunda, who has been in Indian custody since 2013 on a number of terrorism charges, is alleged to be an operative of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayeba (LeT). Indian intelligence sources insist that Tunda entered Bangladesh in 1994 and operated from there for quite some time. In any case, he was the bridge between Abdur Rahman of the JMB and the LeT and Hafiz Saeed. Indian intelligence agencies had claimed that Thadiyantavide Nazir of the Lashkar-e-Tayeba, allegedly connected to the 2008 bomb blasts in Bangalore, had travelled to Bangladesh.

The presence of regional militants in Bangladesh became publicly known in 2008 and 2009. Abdur Rauf Merchant and Jahed Sheikh, two Indian militants, were arrested in Bangladesh. Between May and September 2009, six members of the so-called Aref Reza Commando Forces (ARCF), including Mufti Obaidullah were arrested. Some of these militants admitted that they were living in Bangladesh for some time; for example, Obaidullah claimed to be in Bangladesh since 1995 and another member of the group Habibullah claimed to be residing since 1993.

The other source for the connections between the Bangladeshi militants and outside groups was the presence of the Rohingya rebel groups in Chittagong Hill Tracts. HUJI’s primary goal was to establish contact with these rebel groups. Interestingly, Rohingya rebel groups, Bangladeshi militants and northeast Indian rebel groups, such as the ULFA, had reportedly worked together to procure weapons from black markets in Southeast Asia and used Cox’s Bazar’s remote shoreline as the drop-off point before being distributed. This shows that cooperation among militant groups across the border does not have to be based on ideological affinity; instead other factors can and do bring these groups together.

In the age of globalisation, exportation of terrorism does not require physical presence of operatives of international terrorist groups in a country. There are many ways of indoctrination and recruitment. Ideas of extremism to identification of targets can well be coordinated from distant lands. A number of attacks in various parts of the world have already demonstrated that the internet as a vehicle is quite effective. The phenomenon called ‘lone wolf’ is pertinent here. As such, the characterisation of ongoing militancy as a combination of global and local – a ‘glocal’ phenomenon, as Habibul Haque Khondoker writes in a local English daily – is apt.

There is no denying that there are Bangladeshi citizens willing to join the ‘Global Jihad’ and bring it home. A survey of newspaper reports published between July 2014 and June 2015, shows that law enforcing agencies arrested 112 alleged ‘militants’. Of these, 22 individuals were identified as either connected to or aspiring to be connected to ISIS, 12 reportedly tried to travel to Syria. Two rounds of arrests of Bangladeshis in Singapore, in December last year and in March this year, also show that expatriates can become vehicles for radicalisation. There have been instances of British-Bangladeshis joining the Syrian war from the United Kingdom. Indian investigators have claimed that Bangladeshi militants, particularly the JMB, have been known to operate from India, particularly in West Bengal.

As such Bangladeshi militants’ external connections should not be viewed as an entirely new phenomenon. This is not to underestimate the significance of connections with the IS or AQIS, instead to underscore that given the history such links would require few efforts. If individual acquaintances of the past metamorphose into an organisational tie, the situation will take a turn for the worse, perhaps slide down to an unmanageable level. The IS/AQIS is capable of providing additional resources and a global stage for these menacing groups. It is a matter of time and opportunity before such a tie can flourish. Therefore, it is imperative to acknowledge that denial cannot be a strategy, and that it is necessary to act in earnest.

The writer is professor and chair of the Department of Politics and Government at Illinois State University, USA. He is the co-editor of the Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Bangladesh (2016).

This story was originally published by The Daily Star, Bangladesh