The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami originating in an earthquake in the sea off Sumatra in Indonesia devastated 12 countries, including Indonesia, Thailand and Sri Lanka. As an immediate response, the periodic Asian Wetlands Symposium held in 2005 (in India) recommended, among others, to “prioritize the natural coastal defenses through greenbelt/coastal ‘bioshield’ development…… In connection therewith, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015) identified as one of four priorities the matter of ‘investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience’.”

Amado S. Tolentino Jr.

Early this year, the Asean Institute of International and Strategic Studies, a consortium of Asean think tanks, concluded that one of the key challenges to Asean is “adapting to climate change:……Asean needs to be prepared for the real possibility that global mitigation efforts are not sufficient. Efforts to adapt to the effects of climate change and disasters will increasingly demand greater coordination and the pooling of resources.”

In the light of scientific information that natural disasters are projected to intensify in Asia, the ADMER could be utilized for disaster prevention and mitigation purposes even if the agreement leans heavily towards disaster preparedness and emergency response, i.e. faster movement of relief goods, better utilization of civilian and military response, etc. ADMER could serve as the basis for Asean’s active role at disaster risk reduction by incorporating effective wetlands management strategies for climate change resilience.

Disaster risk reduction, according to ADMER, means “a framework of elements considered with possibilities to minimize vulnerabilities and disaster risks to avoid, through prevention or, to limit through mitigation and preparedness the adverse impacts of hazards within the broad context of sustainable development.”

Wetlands, on the other hand are among the world’s most valuable ecosystems, providing so may benefits to people. As defense fortifications, wetlands, particularly mangroves, proved excellent defenses against the onslaught of typhoons and tsunamis as proven by the earthquake occurrence mentioned above. Scientists explained that the roots of vegetation in Asian mangroves and other forest wetlands helped to hold the sediments in place against the impact of strong winds, waves and currents. Additionally, wetlands are the “kidneys of the earth,” purifying water and waste from both natural and human sources. As “biological supermarkets,” wetlands provide a wide variety of flora and fauna. Wetlands act as natural dams, absorbing heavy rainfalls, preventing flood downstream; helps shoreline stabilization and erosion reduction. Wetlands help recharge groundwater aquifers too. Most important of all, wetlands provide livelihood to many people.

Aside from mangroves, wetlands include swamps, marshes, mudflats, floodplains, peatlands, estuaries, rivers, lakes and many more generally described as “where water meets land.”

ADMER is replete with provisions which could be used by Asean countries in refuting the claim that while emergency response is almost well attended to from the local to the national government level, much remains to be done in regard to a) cooperation in developing and putting into effect solutions to reduce disaster impacts; b) development of strategies to identify, prevent or reduce disaster risks and losses; c) prevention and mitigation legislation, regulations, policies, plans, programs and strategies; and d) raising public awareness about disaster prevention and mitigation.

In pursuit of this, Asean countries could very well incorporate wetlands for disaster risk reduction and build resilience in their legal agenda. For instance, the strategy of planting mangrove saplings should be a continuing year-round activity in the long and extensive coastlines of countries comprising Asean. Likewise, massive planting of high-quality and commercially productive variety of bamboo could be introduced in riverbanks/river basins and lakeshores as a technique not only to withstand environmental disturbances but also to preserve and rehabilitate freshwater sources and lakes and provide added source of income to people.

Take note that Asean is not only about economic partnership, trade liberalization and economic integration. It is also about environmental security. In that regard, Asean’s environment program, conceived in the early 1980s, has metamorphosed to include an Asean Working Group on Coastal and Marine Environment.

Hosting Asean@50 gives President Duterte a historic opportunity to influence the future direction of Asean vis-à-vis disaster risk reduction, an area where Asean lags behind in terms of prevention and mitigation projects to better achieve climate change resiliency.

It should be borne in mind, however, that building a disaster-resilient Asean needs partnerships among governments, private sector, NGOs, LGUs, and other institutions with clearly defined roles not only in disaster response but also in disaster prevention and mitigation. To begin with, a program on the values and functions of wetlands for disaster risk reduction and onwards to consolidating resilience endeavors among Asean countries on the same track could be embarked on and, in the process, highlight also the need to scale up adaptation to climate change. Indeed, Asean-wide advocacy initiatives about wetlands for disaster risk reduction would do well to invigorate efforts in the region to give climate change resilience the priority that the issue deserves.

Hopefully, the recommendation is realized soon because Asean remains vulnerable to natural disasters. But through multi-stakeholder engagement, improvements can be made at a much faster pace so the region can have a much needed disaster-resilient system.

This story was originally published by The Manila Times, Philippines

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is distinctly maritime. Even the less maritime-based Myanmar and Cambodia and landlocked Laos depend on the sea for national revenue.

Amado S. Tolentino Jr.

Actually, ASEAN’s thrust towards improvement of its navies’ regional inter-operability is drawn more to offset threats at sea such as kidnapping, piracy, smuggling, human trafficking, illegal fishing and even illegal fuel transfers in ports and harbors. A recent incident which rekindled the debate about maritime security in ASEAN waters, i.e. the Sulu Sea and the Sulawesi-Mindanao tri-border maritime zone, was the beheading of a kidnapped Canadian citizen in Sulu a year ago despite a search-and-rescue operation mounted by the navies of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. As a consequence, the three countries agreed to establish a coordinated maritime patrol regime to stem the increasing number of kidnappings in the region modeled after the Malacca Strait Patrols coordinated by Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. The patrols being conducted by the navies of these three countries are done within their respective national maritime boundaries with no country taking command of another’s maritime assets or personnel.

Overlapping maritime boundaries and territorial disputes, however, constrain effective naval cooperation in the region. Malaysia and the Philippines have overlapping claims in a number of areas in the South China Sea while Indonesia and Malaysia are in dispute over parts of the Celebes Sea and an area off the Kalimantan coast. The situation also hampers dealing with transnational crimes and militant groups.

Be that as it may, ASEAN countries have committed to bilateral and multilateral defense and diplomacy forums to enhance cooperative activities and capabilities. One such is the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting – Plus (the 8 Plus countries are Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Russia and the United States). The forum is about peacekeeping operations, military medicine, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, counter-terrorism, mine countermeasures and maritime security.

Hosted by the Royal Brunei Armed Forces and the Singapore Armed Forces, the forum conducted a maritime security and counter-terrorism exercise involving all 18 forum members in May 2016. Exercise serials included counter-piracy drills, search-and-rescue scenarios and coordinated ship “storming” operation on a simulated hijacked vessel sailing in international waters in the South China Sea.

Aside from different levels of military capabilities, ASEAN countries have a mosaic of cultures, legal systems and military operational procedures. Thailand, Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore maintain a level of naval sophistication, including maritime surveillance and modern war-fighting capability, while others are still in conventional capabilities and the rest barely capable of conducting operations beyond their coastlines. Thus, to compensate for the capability gap, some countries have resorted to developing greater levels of naval cooperation. Vietnam, for instance, has coordinated patrol initiatives with Malaysia and Cambodia. Recently, a two-way communication link was set up with Brunei and the same is planned with Indonesia.

Bridging some of the challenges result in improvement of naval interoperability even if the approach in use leans more toward cooperation between Asean member states or between members of extra-regional navies as discussed above (Asean Defense Ministers Meeting – Plus).

Apart from combined military exercises, in existence are: i) The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia. It is about maritime information sharing and naval dialogues to enable maritime law enforcement agencies to respond individually or collectively to maritime security challenges. Eight ASEAN countries are signatories, with Indonesia and Malaysia not participating. ii) The Information Fusion Center at Singapore’s Changi Naval Base. It brings together naval liaison officers from around 20 countries, including ASEAN countries, with the task of serving as direct link back to national headquarters and serves as the focal point for maritime crisis response. (iii) The ASEAN Information Sharing Portal which facilitates information exchange between various operational centers within ASEAN navies. The portal can be accessed even via smart phones of individual officers. (iv) The ASEAN Navy Chiefs Meeting which serves as a platform for discussion among ASEAN naval chiefs to advance naval and maritime security cooperation.

Strides in interoperability extends to a limited form of capacity-pooling in submarine search-and-rescue arising out of concerns over the safety of submarine operations. While Singapore has the region’s only submarine rescue capability, the pooling scheme will greatly improve the other ASEAN navies operating submarines in Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam.

Could an enhanced regional security community emerge out of the expanding opportunities at ASEAN naval interoperability?

Ambassador Amado Tolentino incorporates ASEAN environmental law in his current lectures at the San Beda Alabang School of Law.

This story was originally published by The Manila Times, Philippines