Overview of the Club des Pins, venue of the First Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77, held in Algiers, Algeria from 10 to 25 October 1967. Credit: National Center of Archives, Algiers, Algeria/ Group of 77

By Branislav Gosovic *
GENEVA, Mar 18 2021 (IPS)

I observed the Group of 77 (G77) shortly after the 1964 Geneva Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the 1968 UNCTAD 2 in New Delhi and the 1972 UNCTAD 3 in Santiago. The Group was influential at the time, benefiting from several factors helpful for its functioning which are no longer present, namely:

High level leadership.

Major developing countries and their leaders, who spearheaded the establishment and rise of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and then of G77, maintained close interest in activities of the two groupings. They also believed in the importance of collective action of the Global South at the UN, and provided high level political drive and direction. This kind of involvement of leaders has not been common recently.

UNCTAD Secretariat support.

The G77 enjoyed substantive and logistical back-up from the UNCTAD secretariat in Geneva, and in New York where its Division on Development Finance was located. This secretariat was staffed by committed personalities, both from the North and the South, with required expertise and political outlook.

The UNCTAD secretariat acted as a “public service” offered by the UN to developing countries to assist them in their unequal, political and economic encounter with the B Group of developed countries, who controlled the world economy and were unhappy to see the Third World pressing its demands in an organized manner in the UN.

The UNCTAD secretariat also provided G77 with intellectual back-up, and assisted it to mount initiatives in trade, finance and development fields. It also offered the infrastructure, logistical and administrative support necessary for Group’s functioning.

Following the launch of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the General Assembly, and of other joint NAM – G77 initiatives when the two groupings worked closely together, the B Group launched a drive to weaken and gradually end UNCTAD secretariat’s support for developing countries’ group actions arguing that this favouritism was contrary to the “neutral” posture international civil servants were required to assume in the North-South tug-of-war.

Official logo of the Group of 77 since 1967

Focussed, limited of agenda.

In the beginning, the G77 agenda was focussed on trade and development within purview of UNCTAD. This helped the Group evolve its positions on key items of interest to developing countries, i.e. commodities, manufactures, invisibles, development finance, transfer of technology, restrictive business practices, as well as to organize its work, to involve developing countries governments in Group action, and to mobilize expertise and human resources required.

Activities of the Group were structured by Trade and Development Board, standing committees and conferences held every four years, patterned on the1964 Geneva Conference.

This provided a framework and timetable for a continuing process and a set of objectives for Group’s work. As the principal locus of G77 activities gradually shifted to UN HQs in New York in early 1970s and scope of its work diversified, the Group was not able to evolve its own strong support structure needed to cope with many demands of the wide-ranging UN agenda.

A few years later, I was on the South Centre staff when it cooperated closely with the Group of 77 (1991-2005), as well as with NAM, during the chairmanships of Indonesia and Colombia (1992-1998). To the extent of its limited capacities, the Centre served as their detached “outfit” to undertake assignments.

There was a demand for Centre’s “pro bono” services and its contributions were used and appreciated, illustrating the need for continuous substantive support for both G77 and NAM in their work.

Today, the twin groupings of the Global South confront a wide-ranging global agenda, acting on two parallel tracks: G77 is predominantly concerned with the socio-economic questions, while NAM is focussed on political and security issues.

Raúl Prebisch, first Secretary-General of UNCTAD, attending the First Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77, held in Algiers, Algeria from 10 to 25 October 1967. Credit: National Center of Archives, Algiers, Algeria/ Group of 77

The two domains overlap and are interrelated, and should be dealt with in an integrated, coordinated manner. While the relations between them are cordial, coordination is ad hoc and close working relations needed to deal with these questions are lacking.

It is not easy to keep up successfully with demands that the panoply of issues on UN agenda present, more so as the Global South does not have its own organization to back it up.

The G77 relies on the support of its own valiant very small technical secretariat and keeper of its institutional memory, which however does not have substantive capacities necessary to deal with multiple needs.

NAM, in turn, has traditionally eschewed having its own institutional support and depends on the foreign ministry of the country which happens to chair the Movement during a given three-year period.

The importance of greatly improved organization of developing countries at the global level has been self-evident for decades. It is essential for achieving their greater cohesion and utilizing more fully the potential of South-South cooperation, and for increasing their collective and national influence and role in the United Nations and on the world scene.

It is also necessary for exercising political and intellectual counterweight vis-à-vis the domineering, well-organized and equipped North.

When chairing the South Commission, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, used to say “Countries and peoples of the South must work together and stand up to be counted!”

He felt that a global organization of the South would help the Third World to stand up, interact, think, work and act together, and play an important role in giving direction to multilateral policies and in shaping global futures.

It can be argued that by not building purposefully their institutional strength in the world arena, the developing countries have in effect disempowered themselves. Still, much can be done today to improve the presence of the Global South on the world scene. Developing countries have the means, resources and brains for this historic undertaking and necessity.

The idea of establishing a global organization of the South is now six decades old. When the matter was raised in the South Commission, Manmohan Singh, member of the Commission and its Secretary-General, felt that this was unrealistic given myriads of obstacles, but concluded “unless someone was to serve it to developing countries on a silver platter”.

Accepting the validity of his perceptive observation, one should consider how to provide a “silver platter” that would help leapfrog potential obstacles and opposition to the idea, and revitalize the process of gradually building-up this still-missing, South-South piece of global governance architecture of such great importance.

In the rise of the Global South, a primordial role was played by a few visionary national leaders (Nasser, Nehru, Tito) who contributed to conceptualizing ideas and goals, and then spearheaded the initiative to translate these into practice by launching NAM in 1961 and via NAM paving the way for emergence of G77 in 1964.

Later, such was the case of Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, former Prime Minister of Malaysia, who sought and got support of 1986 Harare NAM Summit for the establishment of the South Commission, and then convinced Mwalimu Nyerere to accept to be its Chairman.

During his chairing of the South Commission, Mwalimu Nyerere grasped the critical role of organizational support for the Global South and devoted the last decade of his life to this idea, which resulted in establishing the South Centre as an IGO intergovernmental think-tank of the Global South.

This was a major breakthrough, but only a first step which did not match the modest “South Secretariat”, a medium sized (35 professionals) multifunctional set-up recommended by the South Commission in its report 1990 “The Challenge to the South”.

At the 2000 South Summit in Havana, a group of developing countries’ leaders headed by President Obasanjo of Nigeria, then chair of G77, launched the initiative to upgrade the institutional machinery of the Global South by “taking over” the South Centre and transforming it into a “coordinating commission” for improving implementation and follow-up of agreed policies and decisions of the Summit.

However, since it was poorly conceived, covertly prepared without any consultation with those concerned, and foisted on the Summit at the last minute, the idea was opposed by many countries and did not get off the ground.

The next upcoming South Summit, on hold due to covid19, offers an opportunity to launch a thorough preparatory, coordination and consultation process required for establishing an Organization of the Global South. Drawing on the rich experiences accumulated, and lessons learned, it could agree on a project and a facility for such an organization.

An innovative institution is needed to serve as the home of the Global South, a nursery of ideas and initiatives of common interest, and a reference point on complex issues on the UN agenda.

For a start, functions of a “South secretariat” recommended in the South Commission’s 1990 report “The Challenge to the South”, a high-level panel, including some elders who have taken part in earlier endeavours and persons with hands-on-experience of South-South cooperation, can be set up to launch this project of historic importance for the Global South in its efforts to overcome dependence and figure prominently in the changing world geo-political map.

* Branislav Gosovic was on the staff of UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UN Environment Programme (UNEP), UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), and South Commission. His last post, before retirement, was with the South Centre in Geneva 1991-2006.

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At the 8th Meeting of the South Commission, Havana , Cuba , July 1990. Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, Chairman of the South Commission, President Fidel Castro of Cuba, Manmohan Singh, Secretary-General of the Commission, Carlos Fortin (right) and Branislav Gosovic (left), of the Commission staff.

By Branislav Gosovic *
GENEVA, Feb 18 2019 (IPS)

Initially, in its BAPA+40 follow-up, the Group of 77 should address – in its own circle and in a comprehensive manner – the challenges and opportunities facing South-South cooperation.

The BAPA+40 Zero Draft Outcome Document—to be adopted at the upcoming conference on the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA+40) in Argentina March 20-22– is much like a conference report intended to accommodate different points of view.

It is neither a visionary policy nor substantive action-oriented agenda needed to bolster South-South cooperation (SSC) and give it greater importance in the United Nations system, which would normally be expected from a once-in-a-decade high-level UN conference.

Having been drafted carefully to take into account views and sensitivities of the developed countries, which have not been overly enthusiastic about South-South cooperation, the document could not give adequate prominence to preferences and position of developing countries, the major interested party and leading force of that cooperation.

Initial comments on and reactions to the Zero Draft reflect continuing disagreements and underlying policy differences between the South and the North regarding the nature and objectives of South-South cooperation.

Given – (a). the contents and policy limitations of the Draft Outcome Document, which largely delimit the final outcome of the Conference; (b). the traditional misgivings of the developed countries about SSC and their efforts to constrain its development; (c). the political and institutional obstacles that limit the UN role and engagement of its staff in promoting SSC; and (d). the absence of a comprehensive, up-to-date South platform for SSC and the differences that exist among the South’s large and diverse constituency – the Group of 77 would do well already now to begin preparing for the period following BAPA+40.

Initially, in its BAPA+40 follow-up, the G77 should address – in its own circle and in a comprehensive manner – the challenges and opportunities facing South-South cooperation.

Taking into account the outcome of the 2019 Buenos Aires Conference and the lessons learned during its preparatory process, proceedings and negotiations, a new effort should be undertaken to elaborate a G77 South-South cooperation policy platform and agenda for action.

In this context, it is important to recall the G77 1981 Caracas Conference on Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries (ECDC), which followed the 1978 Buenos Aires Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC).

Both Conferences were part and parcel of the Global South’s New International Economic Order (NIEO) initiatives during that period. The Caracas event had to be organized outside the UN, but it relied on logistical and substantive support of the UNCTAD Secretariat.

The goal was to carry on with the process beyond what had been possible to achieve in Buenos Aires and in the framework of the UN itself. The Caracas Programme of Action on Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries (A/36/333) was adopted.

It broadened the concept to incorporate “economic cooperation among developing countries” beyond the politically and substantively restricted “technical assistance”, projects-centred approach dealt with in Buenos Aires (A/CONF.79/13/Rev.1).

However, the concept of ECDC could not properly be institutionalized in the UN framework due to the opposition of the developed countries. Indeed, in the institutional-reform sweep in the 1990s, driven and inspired by these countries, even the UNCTAD Unit on ECDC was closed.

As part of its continuing initiative in the UN, the Group of 77 began to champion a broader concept, namely “South-South cooperation”, elaborated in the 1990 Report of the South Commission, The Challenge to the South. In 1994, G77, in its Ministerial Declaration, urged the UN to convene an international conference on South-South cooperation in 1996.

The resolution on South-South cooperation adopted subsequently by the UN General Assembly, inter alia called on the UN Secretary-General, in preparing his report on the state of South-South cooperation, to keep “in view the proposal to convene an international conference on South-South cooperation”.

This non-committal wording reflected the lack of developed countries’ support for the idea. And, in fact, it took nearly 15 years before such a conference could be held in the UN – the 2009 Nairobi High-level Conference on South-South Cooperation – and before the concept of South-South cooperation was anointed in this Organization.

One can argue that the suspicion harboured by key actors in the North vis-à-vis SSC has not basically changed, even though these countries now exhibit a greater tactical flexibility due to the changing realities, including the emergence of and the challenge posed by “the rising South”.

Given the differences of outlook between the North and the South, and political and administrative constraints that UN organizations and staff experience in their work to advance the process of South-South cooperation and to assist the developing countries in this domain, a satisfactory outcome of the three-day BAPA+40 North-South encounter does not seem likely from the point of view of the Group of 77.

It would, thus, be propitious for the Group to begin considering a similar approach to the one it had adopted after the 1978 Buenos Aires TCDC Conference, when it decided to hold its own ECDC conference in 1981 in Caracas.

In view of the existing situation, possibly in the final stage of the 2019 Buenos Aires Conference, the Group of 77 should highlight the coming 40th anniversary of the 1981 Caracas Conference by announcing the launching of its own South-South follow-up, as a sequel to BAPA+40.

In this way, G77 and its member states would commit themselves to review and formally consider the nature of South-South cooperation and its role in development and in the evolving geopolitical setting.

This would be a collective undertaking, pursued within one’s own circle and policy space, with the goal being to elaborate a Global South’s policy and action-oriented agenda for South-South cooperation, without the developed countries present to influence the parameters of that cooperation.

While centred on SSC actions and needs within the Global South, the proposed follow-up would also need to address, as a separate issue, the role of the UN and UN system in actively supporting South-South cooperation, as an important dimension of international development cooperation and, indeed, of democratic global governance.

Two events already on the agenda could contribute to the follow-up process in the initial stage. The Group of 77 ministerial conference, planned to mark the 55th anniversary of the Group’s establishment, could consider SSC issues and follow-up to BAPA+40, including the re-launching of some ideas and projects agreed on in the past but not implemented.

Also, as suggested by the G77 Geneva Chapter in its comment on the Zero Draft, the next quadrennial UNCTAD conference, UNCTAD XV in 2020, will be an opportunity to pave the way for a far more active policy and substantive and action-oriented role of the UN by entrusting UNCTAD with some key domains of SSC.

These include ECDC, trade, finance, investment, technology, services, and regional and sub-regional integration, in which it had played an important and pioneering role in the past.

UNCTAD XV would also be an appropriate forum where to consider the larger institutional issue, namely of a leading role that UNCTAD, in partnership with and the support of the UN regional economic commissions and the South-South economic groupings, could play in spearheading and energizing the role of the UN and UN system in support of SSC.

When considering a possible G77 follow-up process to BAPA+40 and how to deal with shortcomings and weaknesses that have affected SSC and how to reinvigorate it in the coming period and beyond, the issue that merits priority attention is the need for institutional self-empowerment of the Global South, which is seriously handicapped by not having its own global institution, one similar to the North’s OECD.

A strong organization of the South is a sine qua non of the necessary drive and long-term institutional leadership and focus for the evolving process of South-South cooperation.

This institutional deficiency cannot be overcome by relying solely on the UN, especially in its present vulnerable situation when it is under the pressure of the key developed countries. Nor can one expect this function to be undertaken by individual developing countries.

A collective self-organization at the global level is of utmost priority and importance, including for a common review of the problems and challenges faced, for distilling common views and positions, and for the participation of all countries of the Global South.

BAPA+40 and its follow-up process in the fold of the Group of 77 would provide a political impulse to inaugurating a vital action for establishing an organization that would serve as the Global South’s own lead mechanism in the promising and all-important domain of South-South, as well as international and multilateral cooperation, an organization that would work in parallel with, complement and stimulate the efforts of the UN family as a whole.

A decision to establish a major, significant global organization of the Global South for South-South cooperation would represent a landmark event on the world scene.

In conclusion, it can be argued that, despite problems and political tensions within the South, between and within its countries, often with the involvement of actors from the North, and also despite crises in the global economy and turbulences in the multilateral system of international cooperation, the overall context today is favourable for South-South cooperation.

On the geopolitical front, the spread of right-wing populism and the migrant crisis, as well as major political and economic changes in the North, are reflected in the mounting global interventionism, the negative attitude towards the developing countries’ aspirations, and the disregard for multilateralism and values on which the United Nations is founded.

This will require of the developing countries actively to seek solutions through South-South cooperation, collective self-reliance, solidarity, an overarching political stance and initiatives regarding global concerns and issues.

Excerpt:

Global South-South Development Expo 2018. Credit: UNOSSC

By Branislav Gosovic *
GENEVA, Dec 21 2018 (IPS)

The upcoming conference on the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA+40), scheduled to take place in the Argentine capital on 20-22 March 2019, ought to be more than just another UN conference where the developing countries assemble to present their demands and seek support from the North.

Also, it must not turn out to be a replay of the 2009 1st UN High-level Conference on South-South Cooperation*, i.e. an anodyne event in terms of impact and follow-up, though such a scenario may be preferred by some, risk of which exists since the 2019 gathering is also scheduled to last only three days, not enough time for genuine deliberations and negotiations.

Therefore, it is up to the developing countries to build up BAPA+40 into a major global event.

a. South-South cooperation and the United Nations system

One of the key objectives of the Global South at BAPA+40 should be to place South-South cooperation at the very centre of the UN system of multilateral cooperation.

The UN system needs to recognize the diversity and broad spectrum that SSC subsumes, to resist the limits being imposed on SSC and it being distanced and cut off from its original institutional and political roots and aspirations.

The United Nations ought to introduce clear and specific measures and programmes, necessary human and financial resources, and mandates by “mainstreaming” and “enhancing support” for SSC in every organization and agency of the UN system, to have them incorporate the needs and objectives of South-South cooperation.

It needs also to be reiterated that South-South cooperation is not a substitute for North-South development cooperation, but a parallel and new sphere of multilateral cooperation that opens new and promising opportunities, stimulates North-South cooperation, and provides alternative and innovative approaches in development cooperation.

In the fold of the UN, a significant, yet very limited step to mainstream South-South Cooperation has been taken by upgrading the UNDP Special Unit for TCDC first into a Special Unit for South-South Cooperation and then into the UN Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC).

This cannot and should not be the end-station, but needs to be followed up ambitiously and seriously at the global level, by appointment of a UN Secretary-General’s high level representative who would provide political vision for South-South cooperation and the establishment of a UN specialized entity within the UNDP platform or in the UN Development System (UNDS) in the making, whose mission would be to promote South-South cooperation, as recommended by the Group of 77 Ministerial Meeting.

Any such entity would need to have its own intergovernmental machinery, a major capital development fund for South-South projects, and fully staffed substantive secretariat equipped to perform a number of important functions, including initiating and funding projects, undertaking research, maintaining a data base on SSC and a directory of national actors involved in SSC, and publishing a regular, periodic UN report on South-South Cooperation called for by G77 Summits.

A suggestion has been floated to consider entrusting this task to UNCTAD, given that its mandate concerning North-South issues has been eroded and its role marginalized.

Such a central entity for SSC would need to be backed, at the regional level, by greatly strengthened and invigorated UN regional economic commissions in the South.

These Commissions are the principal UN bodies based in and with a full knowledge of their respective regions. Their key mission should be the promotion of South-South cooperation or “horizontal cooperation”, as traditionally referred to in Latin America.

The proposed structure, drawing also on UN specialized agencies in their areas of competence, would have as one of its tasks to support and energize sub-regional, regional and inter-regional South-South cooperation.

Regular, high-level UN conferences on South-South cooperation would need to be convened, and a consolidated and regular substantive, analytical and statistical UN report on the state of South-South cooperation will need to be prepared.

b. Global South and South-South cooperation

Given the overall global context, the developing countries cannot rely solely on the United Nations, even if and when the suggested institutional improvements are approved and become operational.

South-South cooperation is an opportunity for the Global South to contribute to achieving a number of outstanding goals and aspirations and be a vehicle for reshaping the global system.

For this to happen, however, what is needed on the part of the developing countries is hard work, mobilization of resources and of collective power, major and sustained efforts and commitment/obligation to pursue and attain a series of objectives that need to be identified and agreed on.

In their efforts to follow this advice, in addition to many practical obstacles and problems, the developing countries would also encounter opposition and doubts within their own ranks, not to mention a frontal or undercover resistance by actors of the North.

This resistance would especially come from those who would consider every major move in that direction as a potential threat to their own interests and global designs, and would, very likely, take steps, including within individual developing countries, often with local support and even via ”inconvenient” regime and leadership change, to influence and embroil the collective efforts.

What matters, however, is that today the Global South has the resources and collective power to move forward, and that this is not a “mission impossible”, as some who are familiar with problems and difficulties encountered in South-South cooperation efforts and undertakings and the building and management of joint institutions might point out. There is little that stands in the way of:

• Undertaking a critical, in-depth review and analysis of: South-South cooperation, important actions and proposals agreed on over the years and their implementation, experiences, public attitudes, performance of individual countries, functioning of joint institutions and mechanisms of cooperation and integration, main obstacles and shortcomings that call for action, including the all too frequent difficulties or failure to follow up on important decisions taken at the political level.

• Focussing on how to resolve the issue of lack of adequate financing for South-South cooperation, activities, projects and institutions, probably one of the most serious practical obstacles standing in the way of SSC being put into practice as desired and called for.

• Inspiring, informing about and involving in the South-South cooperation project the public and individuals; with this in mind, applying capacity-building and training to raise the awareness of the existing experiences and opportunities; using to this end also educational, marketing, media and public relations approaches, which are so common in contemporary society and are used not only to advertise and publicize goods and services, but also political and social goals and causes, in this case the common identity of the South as an entity.

• Setting up a South organization for South-South cooperation, and pooling together and networking intellectual and analytical resources available in the South and internationally to staff and support the work of that institution.

• Placing on the agenda the challenge of intellectual self-empowerment of the Global South and the harnessing of its intellectual resources and institutions into an interactive network for support of common goals and collective actions.

• Evolving, at the highest level, a representative system of political authority (e.g., heads of state or government, one delegated from each region) for regular and ad hoc communication, consultations and contacts, for meetings to assess progress in the implementation of agreed SSC goals, and for communication/interaction with all heads of state and/or government in the Global South.

• Based on the workings and experience of the South Commission, of the now defunct UN Committee on Development Planning and of the G77 High-Level Panel of Eminent Personalities of the South, to consider establishing a permanent South-South commission or committee to bring together, on a regular basis, high-stature personalities and thinkers from the South to reflect and deliberate on challenges faced by the developing countries and by the international community.

• Elaborating and agreeing on a blueprint for national self-empowerment for South-South cooperation, to guide and be used as a reference by the individual developing countries in line with their own characteristics and capacities, and transforming this blueprint into a legal instrument binding for all developing countries.

• Nurturing, training and educating future cadres and leaders for South-South cooperation, directly exposing them to and familiarizing them with different problems and different regions of the South, and, when they are ready, deploying them in national, sub-regional, regional and multilateral, including UN, settings.

• Focussing on the role of “digital South-South cooperation” in the promotion and energizing of all forms of South-South cooperation, including closer contacts, communication, information sharing and interaction, mutual understanding between and among the peoples and countries of the South, transfer of technology, and education and culture.

• Calling for closer cooperation between and joint initiatives of G77 and NAM, an important pending political and institutional topic on the agenda of the Global South.

There is little new in the above suggestions, which draw on practical experiences and have been articulated over the years and in different contexts. What they propose is within reach, is doable, and would represent a major “leap forward” for South-South cooperation.

What is needed today is firm political will, long-term vision and determined initiative for a group of the South’s countries and leaders to launch such a process on the desired track and, most importantly, sustain it with the necessary political commitment and financial and institutional support.

The 2019 Buenos Aires Conference in March next year is an opportunity for the South to stand up and raise its collective voice, as at the very beginnings of South-South cooperation in Bandung (1955), Belgrade (1961), Geneva (1964) and Algiers (1967).

* This article is a shortened version of the concluding pages of an extensive essay “On the eve of BAPA+40 – South-South Cooperation in today’s geopolitical context”, which was published in VESTNIK RUDN. International Relations, 2018, Volume 18, Issue 03, October 2018, pp. 459-478, the international journal of the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (RUDN), formerly Patrice Lumumba University, in a special volume to mark the 40th anniversary of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action. (See http://journals.rudn.ru/international-relations/article/view/20098/16398 )

Excerpt:

Srun Srorn, a trainer for the E-learning project, walks teachers at Koh Kong High School in Cambodia through a new online sexual education curriculum. Credit: Michelle Tolson/IPS

By Branislav Gosovic *
VILLAGE TUDOROVICI, Montenegro, May 28 2015 (IPS)

The Internet – and the applications that it has spawned – is the single most important technological innovation that has brought together and interlinked humankind in a real, tangible and interactive way.

Among other benefits, it has:While having a universal presence in each country and in the life of the majority of humankind that enjoys its amenities, the Internet is untouchable, controlled by someone somewhere who is invisible and unknown.

• Made possible instantaneous worldwide communication and interaction
• Simplified and facilitated many previously time consuming, onerous and costly tasks
• Enabled a networking that can serve as a means for building a global community, and developing understanding and cooperation
• Created the “Internet dependence” for the well-being and functioning of society, economy, and daily life and existence of individuals, which has generated a common and shared interest in keeping the Internet functioning, in good order, and continuously improving it.

The Internet has meant a “great leap” forward for humankind and made it possible for it to “leap-frog” and “short-circuit” many of the obstacles and challenges that it had faced earlier on its road to a shared but uncertain future.

However, this great technological communication advance has not been accompanied by a corresponding socio-political leap of systemic change, and the Internet has been weighed down by the legacies of the past and the nature of the existing world order.

Rather than aiming to place the promise and capabilities of the Internet at the disposal of enlightened, common global objectives of humankind and to subject it to democratic multilateral governance, some of the key actors seem to view it primarily as their own property.

They want to be in charge of it and use it for their own strategic ends and objectives, for global expansion and dominance, and the exploitation of new technological possibilities to harvest the planet for what amounts to unlimited creation of wealth, including via virtual means, and massive “invisible” transfer of resources to the core countries of the North.

The resulting situation has been depicted aptly in the recent draft, “Tunis Call for a People’s Internet”, circulated at the Workshop “Organizing an Internet Social Forum – A Call to Occupy the Internet”, held at the April 2015 World Social Forum. It merits to be quoted:

“The Internet today has become an integral and essential part of our daily lives, more and more of our activities are organized through and around the virtual spaces, the networks, online services and the technology it comprises.  It has restructured the very way in which we live, work, play and organise our societies. In many aspects, this is so even for people who at present have no direct Internet access.

At the same time, we are alarmed to see how both our private and public spaces are being co-opted and controlled for private gain; how private corporations are carving the public internet into walled spaces; how our personal data is being manipulated and proprietised; how a global surveillance society is emerging, with little or no privacy; how information on the Internet is being arbitrarily censored, and people’s right to communicate curtailed; and how the Internet is being militarized. Meanwhile, decision-making on public policy matters relating to the Internet remains dangerously removed from the mechanisms of democratic governance.”

The Internet has become controversial not only because of the hegemonic attitude of the key country and because of the free hand given to its monopolistic global Internet-based corporations, but also because it is rooted in and fueled by larger controversies, including decades-old, unresolved development issues.

This includes the questions of transfer of science and technology, intellectual property regimes, and international regulation of transnational corporations, all of which have been on the international agenda for five decades without any visible progress having been made.

There is also the question of “ownership” and “participation”. There is a complete dependence on the Internet worldwide, an addiction that cannot be shaken off. While having a universal presence in each country and in the life of the majority of humankind that enjoys its amenities, the Internet is untouchable, controlled by someone somewhere who is invisible and unknown.

This dependencia when it comes to the Internet governance and control exercised by the interlinked centres in the North, which include military and security apparatus as well as cyber-corporations, produces a palpable feeling of discomfort, frustration, helplessness, exposure and loss of sovereignty, especially but not only in the developing countries.

Drawing on past experiences, principles of the U.N. Charter, and the developing countries’ initiatives for the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and New International Information Order (NIIO), one can arrive at some conclusions and recommendations regarding a reform of the Internet and the bolstering of its usefulness to the international community and its common goals, including improved functioning of human society.

The aim should be to defuse the mounting conflict and discontent through political and conceptual liberation of the Internet by making it into a global public good and service within the U.N. framework, with specific objectives and functions directed at satisfying the needs of humankind and helping to overcome problems and challenges, including those stemming from past history and uneven progress and development of the international community.

The Internet should be declared as the common heritage of humankind, a global public good and service embedded within the framework of the United Nations.  This implies and requires, among other things:

• That the Internet becomes part of the U.N. family by creating a UNINTERNET organization in the framework of the U.N. General Assembly, one inspired by democratic governance and solidarity of humankind
• That the Internet management and innovation be shared and participatory, and that they involve both public and private entities in cooperative endeavours
• That current international intellectual property regime undergoes a major review and fundamental modifications
• That income generated by the Internet, including by global taxation of profits made by services that it enables, be used for global causes of public good within the framework of the United Nations and that in this manner the Internet becomes a major source of international funding for public purposes, including those related to overcoming poverty, sustainable development and climate change, food security, education and health, which now get a few drops from these massive global flows via philanthropic gestures of some who have become enormously wealthy thanks to the Internet
• That the Internet global infrastructure be public property of the international community and that international non-profit enterprises be established under the U.N. auspices to provide Internet services, software and applications that would be in the public domain
• That new modes of international accounting and regulation be evolved, as a means to obtain a global overview and control of the financial flows and services via the Internet
• That a set of goals and objectives of the Internet be elaborated and adopted as the U.N. Declaration or Charter on the Internet, which would serve as the basic reference and guide for the Internet’s future development, management and operation.

Given the recent developments on the world scene, the overall context seems to be ripening for advocating the above approach, which implies a major departure from the present practices and would be a serious competitor to the existing North- and private corporations-dominated Internet.

It would also represent a return to the basic values embodied in the U.N. Charter and the decades-long U.N.-based efforts to evolve democratic and equitable world economic and political order.

Edited by Kitty Stapp

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Children surf the net in a remote island community in the Philippines where fishing is the main source of income. Credit: eKindling/Lubang Tourism.

By Branislav Gosovic *
VILLAGE TUDOROVICI, Montenegro, May 21 2015 (IPS)

More than four decades ago, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) launched the concept of a New International Information Order (NIIO).

Its initiative led to the establishment of an independent commission within the fold of the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), which produced a report, published in 1980, on a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO).Incomprehensible to the general public and not suitable for consideration in multilateral policy forums, the Internet governance deliberations have largely been under control of the world superpower and its cyber mega-corporations from Silicon Valley.

The report, titled “One World, Many Voices,” is usually referred to as the MacBride Report after its chairman.

The very idea of venturing to criticise and challenge the existing global media, namely the information and communication hegemony of the West, touched a raw political nerve, apparently a much more sensitive one than that irked by the developing countries’ New International Economic Order (NIEO) proposals.

A determined, no-punches-spared counteroffensive was launched by the Anglo-American tandem, which silenced UNESCO, effectively banning the MacBride Report and excluding the concept of NWICO from the international discourse and U.N. agenda.

The neo-liberal globalisation and neo-con geopolitics tide was on the rise and reigning supreme on the world scene.

The common front of the South was wavering and unsure vis-à-vis the well orchestrated challenge from the North and its multilateral arsenal deployed via the Bretton Woods and WTO troika – and, indeed, via the global media it controlled.

On the defensive and in retreat, with individual countries and their leaders targeted, pressured and tamed, the Global South lowered its profile and, facing stonewalling developed countries, it effectively shelved much of its 1960s/1970s agenda, including its quest for NIIO.

A decade ago, at the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), the developing countries did not have the collective will and were not prepared and organised to raise and press these broader issues.

They focused on the “digital divide”, as their key concern, which, although important, was not politically sensitive and did not represent a challenge to the existing global information order.

The rise and evolution of the Internet found the South ill-prepared to deal in a comprehensive manner with its implications, challenges and opportunities that it presented, not only for the developing countries individually and collectively, but also for the world order – economic, information and political – and for humankind in general.

The U.N. was marginalised and not allowed in depth to analyse and in an integrated, cross-sectoral and sustained way to deal with the Internet, and as a result did not provide a focus and platform that could have prompted and assisted the Global South in building and evolving its own case and vision.

The Internet-related debates and analyses have largely been focused on and limited to highly specialised and technical, often esoteric, acronym-dominated questions of its governance, which, though of vital importance, has helped to conceal or bypass many fundamental concerns.

Incomprehensible to the general public and not suitable for consideration in multilateral policy forums, the Internet governance deliberations have largely been under control of the world superpower and its cyber mega corporations from Silicon Valley, and the US-centric nature of the Internet has been defended tenaciously and preserved.

The WSIS+10 Review will be taking place shortly. There is an apparent attempt by the West – assisted by its transnational corporations (TNCs) dominating and providing key services on the Internet – to minimise the political importance and limit substantive outputs of this event.

The Group of 77 (G77) and NAM have to focus not only on the non-implementation of the Tunis agenda, but also to work out their position concerning the basic, underlying issues, including the linkages between the Internet and the international development agenda, and, more broadly, the Internet’s relevance to the international economic and political order and world peace.

There is the risk that WSIS+10 Review may turn out to be a missed opportunity for the South, and yet another encounter forced to remain within the parameters drawn and preferred by the traditional, well-entrenched masters of the global information and communication order.

Waiting one more decade for the next WSIS+20 Review may not be a recommended approach given the global economic and geo-political trends.

This relative circumspection of the Global South regarding the nature and future of the Internet is compensated in part by the voices coming from some sectors of the civil society that dare stray beyond what is allowed and permissible under the reigning global paradigm.

Thus, for example, the workshop “Organizing an Internet Social Forum”, held at the 2015 World Social Forum (WSF) in Tunis, articulated an alternative vision of an Internet and its directions for the future radically different from the current dogma.

And, an international conference on the Internet as a Global Public Resource was recently hosted by government of Malta and DiploFoundation.

“Global public resource” is a term akin to “global public goods”. The latter is a concept first launched by the U.N. Development Programme (UNDP) but expurgated from its work and the U.N. discourse during the recent period, probably seen as unsuitable and a threat to the ideological purity of the privatisation gospel, a move to accommodate the political predilections of dominant elites and the current doctrinaire aversion to anything “public”.

To move the global debate and multilateral negotiations in a desired direction largely depends on the developing countries as a collectivity, the Global South.

These countries need to grasp the gravity of the systemic issues involved, on par and indeed in some ways more important than those of the traditional international economic, financial, political and social agendas.

The moment is ripe for them to brush up on the original NAM NIIO initiative and the Report of the McBride Commission on NWICO, and consider their relevance in the age of the Internet.

They should work on an alternative vision of the Internet, its functions and governance, which should evolve into the backbone of a future global information and communication order needed in a multipolar world of the 21st century.

Currently, the Internet remains a prisoner of the dominant neo-liberal paradigm and its mantras forced upon the planet by the Western powers and in the service of their global, geopolitical and corporate interests. It needs to be liberated from these shackles.

Debate and study that view the Internet from humankind’s point of view need to be launched. This will require the Global South to do its homework in depth and fully on the implications and potential roles of the Internet, in order to prepare its platform and press for the initiating of all-inclusive multilateral negotiations and debate.

The BRICS countries together possess the necessary expertise, experience and power to provide the leadership and motor force for mobilising the Global South’s collective stand and action on the Internet.

With the high likelihood that the core countries of the West will react negatively, pressure individual developing countries (as appears to have been the case with Brazil, which has lowered its traditionally forceful public stance on Internet issues), and that obstacles within the U.N. system will persist, doing something concrete independently, via South-South cooperation will be required, and indeed is the only way out of the current impasse.

Here many options exist, including creating supporting institutions and expert bodies and organising regular deliberations, at both technical and political levels.

Bridges should be built with the progressive civil society and possibly with some like-minded countries in the North that are not too happy with the existing system.

Edited by Kitty Stapp

Excerpt:

By Branislav Gosovic * and - -
GENEVA, Sep 1 2006 (IPS)

Given the pressures to which the UN is subjected, and the current threats to the very character and underlying values of the international system, the election of a new Secretary General is of great significance, writes Branislav Gosovic, author of books on UNCTAD and UNEP and numerous articles. He headed the South Centre Secretariat 1990-2005. In this article, Gosovic writes that unipolarity and \’\’pensee unique\’\’ have put serious constraints on the SG and the Secretariat and reduced the policy space for their action. Furthermore, North-driven reforms supposedly intended to give greater discretionary authority to the SG risk facilitating unilateral political and administrative influence over the Secretariat. The South will need to protect the multilateral character of the UN Secretariat — the only permanent multilateral structure with a universal, holistic task — from efforts to reduce it to a merely administrative/management function and make it serve the interests of a few powerful actors. It will need to press for greatly strengthening the Secretariat and so provide the Secretary-General with institutional support inter alia to contribute to evolving democratic forms of multilateral statecraft and global governance.

The UN General Assembly is electing the seventh Secretary-General (SG). Given the pressures to which the UN is subjected, and the current threats to the very character and underlying values of the international system, the election is of great significance.

The UNSG is the only world leader mandated to champion global common interests and public purpose. The SG heads the Secretariat — the brain and motor of the organisation, the repository of institutional memory and continuity. The UN Charter bestows on the UNSG the unique opportunity to project ”peaceful power” in the world arena, guided by the principles and purposes of the UN.

However, unipolarity and ”pensee unique”, seeking global hegemony, have put serious constraints on the SG and the Secretariat and reduced the policy space for their action.

Furthermore, North-driven reforms supposedly intended to give greater discretionary authority to the SG risk facilitating unilateral political and administrative influence over the Secretariat.

The Assembly thus faces a dual challenge. The first is to elect as the SG a person with a profound moral and political commitment to the UN’s mission and principles as well as the knowledge, skills, experience, and political outlook needed to inspire and lead the organisation. This could prove difficult because in the Security Council’s backroom process, dominated by the five permanent members, some favour personalities likely to be compliant with certain centres of power.

Measures are thus needed to democratise the process and increase the role of the General Assembly in the election of the SG. The first step would be eliminating the Security Council veto over re-election of the incumbent, which would give the SG greater latitude for action during his first term and free him from having to make commitments to the big powers to avoid getting vetoed.

No matter how strong the personal qualities, once elected the UNSG would find it difficult to succeed unless provided with appropriate tools and support, while easing current constraints that ensnare the incumbent in multiplying tasks and growing management cum administrative duties.

The second challenge for UNGA is thus to begin considering ways to create an enabling environment for leadership by the Secretary-General. Frequently proposed measures include:

– Providing adequate funding to facilitate the undertaking of tasks and continuous institutional development needed to cope with an expanding and diversifying agenda;

– Placing at the SG’s disposal a well-staffed and funded and substantively strong Secretariat, composed of a highly-qualified, motivated staff that is creative and genuinely committed to internationalism and representative of the diversity of the global community;

– Restoring policy and substantive responsibility to the UN in key economic areas including money, trade and finance, science and technology, transnational corporations, and creating the institutional and intellectual capacity necessary for the UN to play an effective role in shaping multilateral policies and globalisation processes;

– Ensuring that the UN is free from conditionalities set by major contributors by reducing the role of voluntary funding, setting a ceiling for individual country contributions to the regular budget, and introducing automatic sources of finance by taxing the use of global commons and certain global economic transactions, in combination with appropriate intergovernmental control of expenditures;

– Expanding the SG’s latitude for action, for example, to place items on the agendas of the UN General Assembly and Security Council; seek advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice; borrow funds for specified crises; and coordinate the policies of UN specialised agencies.

An issue that needs to be addressed concerns the impacts and demands on the Secretariat –the UNSG office in particular– from the host country government and political environment. UNGA action is needed, including possibly moving the UN headquarters to another location.

It is also essential that the SG not focus predominantly on crisis management and administrative matters. A crucial task involves building durable foundations for peace and international cooperation by providing leadership in bridging the widening gaps between the North and the South. This calls for partiality, advocacy, and full engagement on pressing global, systemic issues.

To serve as an agent of progressive change, the UNSG needs to lead in the generation of ideas and global strategies; raise international awareness of key global issues; and promote consensus-building, international law, and the basic principles of UN Charter, including the now-challenged principle of universality.

The above suggestions may sound illusory given the headlock some have on the organisation. Yet, they are in the interest of the entire international community, including those very few who will oppose them adamantly. The status quo dictated by power realities is not cast in stone. It can be changed with perseverance and global public awareness and action. Representing the moral and political force of the overwhelming majority of humankind, the South looks to the UN in its quest for change and a better world. It has a vital role to play through the UNGA electing Secretaries-General with the intellectual capacity and global vision needed to confront the challenges facing the international community and in particular developing countries.

Equally important, with the support of civil society and the like-minded North, the South will need to protect the multilateral character of the UN Secretariat — the only permanent multilateral structure with a universal, holistic task — from efforts to reduce it to a merely administrative/management function and make it serve the interests of a few powerful actors. It will need to press for greatly strengthening the Secretariat and so provide the Secretary-General with institutional support inter alia to contribute to evolving democratic forms of multilateral statecraft and global governance, one of the key challenges in the new century. (END/COPYRIGHT IPS)

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