Opening plenary session, INC 5.2 of the global plastics negotiations, Palais des Nations, Geneva, 5 August 2025. Credit: Craig Boljkovac

By Craig Boljkovac
GENEVA, May 14 2026 (IPS)

Norway’s reported decision to review and place on hold aspects of its funding to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) should be understood as more than a budgetary matter. It is a political signal. It is also a warning that the global plastics treaty negotiations may now be approaching the point at which governments must decide whether the present UNEP process can still deliver the treaty they promised, or whether a different pathway is required.

There should be no misunderstanding. Norway has been one of the strongest supporters of an ambitious global plastics treaty. It co-leads, with Rwanda, the High Ambition Coalition. It has also been the largest listed contributor to the INC process, with UNEP’s donor table showing more than USD 7.2 million in contributions received from Norway as of 25 March 2026.

Its apparent decision to pause or review funding therefore cannot be dismissed as marginal. It comes from a country that has invested politically and financially in the process and that has consistently positioned itself on the side of ambition.

That is precisely why the signal matters.

If Norway is now forcing a moment of reflection, it may be doing the negotiations a service. A process that cannot conclude, cannot decide, and cannot distinguish between genuine compromise and procedural obstruction needs more than another round of careful facilitation. It needs political clarity.

The original mandate was not ambiguous. In March 2022, the United Nations Environment Assembly agreed to develop an international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution, including in the marine environment, addressing the full lifecycle of plastics, with the aim of completing the work by the end of 2024. That deadline has passed.

The fifth session in Busan did not produce a treaty. The resumed fifth session in Geneva did not produce a treaty. INC-5.3 in February 2026 was essentially an organizational session, including the election of a new Chair. We are now looking toward INC-5.4, possibly at the end of 2026 or in early 2027.

At some point, the numbering itself approaches the point of absurdity. INC-5.4 is not a normal negotiating milestone. It is the fourth attempt to complete the fifth session of a process that was supposed to conclude in 2024. This is not multilateral patience. It is clearly a form of procedural dysfunction.

None of this is intended as disrespect toward Ambassador Julio Cordano of Chile, the newly elected Chair of the INC. On the contrary, he has taken on one of the most difficult environmental negotiations in recent memory.

He inherited a fractured process, an absurdly complicated text, deeply polarized delegations, and an increasingly visible divide between countries seeking a full-lifecycle treaty and those seeking a narrower waste-management instrument. This is despite his stated and admirable determination to get the treaty “over the line.”

The difficulty, however, is that all indications suggest that the Chair is pursuing a highly neutral, process-oriented path. That is understandable. A Chair in this setting is expected to maintain confidence across the room, including among delegations whose positions are far apart. But neutrality is not the same as progress.

At a certain point, a too-neutral process can become a shield for those who prefer no outcome, or only the weakest possible outcome. And his treatment of observers, despite recent indications that he will take their views more fully into consideration, still leaves much to be desired in a UN system that contends to be as broadly inclusive as possible.

The gap between the Like-Minded countries and the High Ambition Coalition is not a drafting problem. It is a political problem. One group of countries wants an agreement that addresses the full lifecycle of plastics, including production, design, hazardous chemicals, products, trade, waste, finance and implementation.

Another group seeks to confine the treaty largely to downstream waste management, recycling and national discretion. These are not merely different textual preferences. They are different theories of the treaty. The mandate for the negotiations clearly states that the former, not the latter, is what should be pursued.

If the process continues to treat these positions as equally bridgeable, it will continue to reward delay. Consensus can be a tool for legitimacy. But in this process, it is increasingly at risk of becoming a veto mechanism for the least ambitious actors.

The result is predictable: more informal consultations, more revised texts, more late-night sessions, more statements of disappointment, and still no treaty.

This is why Norway’s move deserves, at minimum, a measure of credit. It has introduced a hard political question into a process that has become too comfortable with postponement. If countries are serious about concluding a meaningful treaty within UNEP, they should do so now. Not after another “informal” round. Not after another partial session. Not after INC-5.5 or INC-5.6. Now.

But if they are not prepared to do so, then high-ambition countries should begin preparing an alternative. The obvious precedent is the Ottawa Process on anti-personnel landmines. When the established disarmament machinery could not deliver a comprehensive ban, a coalition of like-minded governments, supported by civil society and international organizations, moved outside the blocked forum and negotiated a treaty among those prepared to act.

The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature in Ottawa in December 1997 and was later (after agreement was reached) brought back into the broader UN treaty system.

That example is important because it shows that moving outside a blocked UN process is not necessarily anti-UN. It can be pro-multilateralism. The Ottawa Process did not reject international law; it created it. It did not wait for the least ambitious actors to become ready. It allowed the most ambitious actors to move first and then invited others to join.

A plastics “Ottawa Process” would not need to start from zero. The UNEP negotiations have already generated years of technical work, draft text, legal options, coalition positions, scientific input and stakeholder engagement. A like-minded process could take the strongest elements from that work and use them as the basis for an agreed treaty text.

Participation could be open to all states, but on the basis of a minimum level of ambition: full lifecycle coverage; legally binding obligations; controls on problematic products and chemicals of concern; a necessary focus on supply chains; credible implementation financing; and reporting and review mechanisms.

The next stage should therefore be framed as a final test. INC-5.4 should be treated as the last credible opportunity for the UNEP process to produce a treaty that reflects the mandate adopted in 2022.

If that session produces only another procedural continuation, or a weak agreement stripped of lifecycle measures, production-related provisions, and meaningful controls on chemicals and products, then high-ambition countries should move immediately toward an Ottawa-style diplomatic track.

The plastics crisis is not waiting for the INC process to resolve its internal contradictions. Plastic production continues to grow, in accordance with targets set by like-minded countries. Waste continues to leak into rivers, oceans, soils and food systems. Communities continue to bear the health and environmental costs. The purpose of the negotiations was to respond to that reality, not to create an indefinite process for describing it.

Norway’s funding decision may therefore prove useful if it forces governments to confront the obvious. Either the UNEP negotiations now become serious, political and outcome-oriented, or the countries that are serious about ending plastic pollution should create a pathway of their own.

That would not be a failure of multilateralism. It may be the only way left to save it.

Craig Boljkovac is a Geneva-based Senior Advisor with a Regional Centre for the Basel and Stockholm Conventions, and an independent international environmental consultant with over 35 years of experience in relevant fields. His opinions are his own. He has participated in several INCs and related meetings for the global plastics agreement.

IPS UN Bureau

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Plastic waste washed up on a beach in India. Credit: Ocean Image Bank/Srikanth Man
 
The international push for consensus on a legally binding deal to end plastic pollution proved beyond the grasp of weary UN Member States meeting in Geneva in mid-August, as they agreed to resume discussions at a future date, according to UN News.
 
“This has been a hard-fought 10 days against the backdrop of geopolitical complexities, economic challenges and multilateral strains,” said Inger Andersen, Executive Director of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). “However, one thing remains clear: despite these complexities, all countries clearly want to remain at the table.”

By Craig Boljkovac
GENEVA, Sep 5 2025 (IPS)

The debacle that was the latest round of negotiations for a global treaty on plastics (including in the marine environment); known as “INC 5.2” has already been written about at length by many colleagues on all sides of the issues. Despite all the very informative posts, articles, and other analyses, I believe I have several key observations to make, particularly about the process to-date.

After being absent from the previous two INCs (INC-4 and INC-5), I may have a slightly different perspective from those who have been completely immersed in the process all the way along. I managed to observe virtually every (painful) minute of INC 5.2, and, below, I list some things that participants may want to consider as the process continues.

Backing up a bit, for those who may be less familiar with the issue, we clearly have a problem with plastics globally. Mounting evidence of the presence of plastics and a clear lack of recycling capacities: from blatantly visible plastics in the marine environment (massive floating gyres of overwhelmingly plastic garbage in our oceans – particularly in but not limited to the Pacific) to the presence of microplastics in our bodies (and those of wildlife as well), including in the placenta and mother’s milk, and the use of clearly harmful chemicals (such as endocrine disrupters released when certain plastics are used) in the manufacture of at least some plastics – has led to decisions on the international level that merely complement significant action at other levels of governance that are already in place.

This situation resulted in the decision, from March, 2022, by the UN Environment Programme’s UN Environment Assembly, to pass a resolution authorizing a negotiating process (the “Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee, or INC) to realize a global plastics treaty by 2024 (a highly ambitious timeline that, to many, was likely unachievable).

And, here we are, late in 2025, after six unsuccessful negotiation sessions and some preparatory work, without an agreed treaty text, and with, it seems, a wide gulf of differences between UN member states that seems, frankly, virtually unbridgeable.

Much has been written about the various positions of UN Members States, who have informally organized themselves (for the negotiations) into the “Like-Minded Group” of countries that want the treaty to focus mainly on waste management and not impinge on their plans to not only maintain, but greatly expand plastics production; and the “High Ambition Coalition” countries who, in part, want a strong global treaty that addresses plastics at all stages of their life cycle, severely limit “single-use plastics” and include human health concerns, particularly with regard to the harmful effects of chemical inputs to plastics production (which the “Like-Mindeds” reject, particularly for what some delegations say is a clear lack of evidence of harm to human health and the environment).

In my long experience with international environmental negotiations under the UN rubric, such differences in positions are not unprecedented, and have been solved by having a team of negotiators that are solutions-oriented, and a secretariat (the UN staff assigned to coordinate and facilitate the negotiations) and chair (usually a diplomat or high-level civil servant from an environment or similar ministry) that work together to bridge differences in a transparent, inclusive, and participatory manner, where trust is built over time and solutions are eventually found.

Something is clearly blocking the process. The secretariat and bureau (including the chair, in particular) have shown commitment, but the goal of an agreed treaty, despite the presentation of many textual proposals by negotiators, several chairs’ drafts, and some movement on at least some of the issues, has not been realized over six energy- and resource-intensive negotiation sessions.

Why is this the case? A few thoughts/observations from my side (the list is not comprehensive):

1) Apart from some closed events earlier on in the negotiations, there now seems to be an almost total lack of intersessional activities (both formal and informal) essential for the further building of trust and understanding of each other’s positions (although some may be planned but are not yet announced). Regional efforts, in particular, might help to bridge some of the wide differences that are apparent, even within regions (where there is clearly a lack of consensus as well).

2) There has been a clear lack of transparency and communication in/from both subsidiary groups (such as contact groups, where various issues are “unpacked” and grouped for more detailed negotiations) and, more significantly and consistently, at the broader level (directly led by the chair/bureau and supported by the secretariat) such as plenary sessions (which were few and far between and even resoundingly brief – one was 43 seconds at the latest INC). Relatively untransparent processes have worked in the past (such as with the climate change negotiations); but from what I understand there was more trust and confidence in the chair/bureau and secretariat than exists in our present negotiations.

3) The chair, bureau and secretariat were always present, but rarely available. The absence of regular plenary sessions was keenly felt. There was also a clear lack of consistency in the way contact groups operated – some put textual proposals on a screen for all to see and negotiate with; while others simply heard interventions and then came out with proposals for text at the very end (not the most transparent of ways to operate!). In addition, there was a heavy reliance on informal negotiations throughout (this became apparent with news, in the final plenary, of a long, closed negotiation on the final day chaired by Chile and Japan). A lot seemed to be going on, but only a limited number of participants (including a fair number of government delegations that I conversed with) seemed only vaguely aware of them, if at all.

4) During the course of this, the sixth negotiating session, positions taken by both the Like-Minded Group and the High Ambition Coalition more closely resembled opening salvos that one might expect would be typical of the early stages of negotiations – not positions that would still be raised at such a late stage, when one would expect at least some compromises to have been made along the way. To me, this is symptomatic of a lack of trust in the process to-date.

This apparent situation (lack of clear negotiating milestones/organization, lack of visibility of the chair and lack of transparency) seems to have, in my opinion, possibly been used by delegations to hold back on reaching any sort of even basic compromises.

How to solve this as we try to move forward?

1) Make every possible attempt to put into place a proper, formal, and transparent intersessional process (along with informal and regional activities as needed), even if it results in a significant delay until the next INC (5.3). A rumour is going round that INC 5.3 may be scheduled for February, 2026. In my opinion this is far too soon if a properly designed intersessional process, focused on bridging the key gaps and reaching some sort of consensus, at least informally, is to be realized. An adequate “break” is needed to clearly think through all the options. If needed, even keep bringing in the UN Secretary-General to “knock heads together” to find some compromises in advance of the next negotiations. And report back to all INC participants regarding the process of intersessional work on a regular basis.

2) Hold in-depth “debriefs” and “lessons learned” sessions for the secretariat and bureau, with additional participants from the INCs who have valuable observations to contribute (both from government and observer delegations). A suggested focus could be on how to expand the obvious organizational strengths of the secretariat into other areas, such as a finer level of facilitation aimed at bridging differences among delegations through improved intersessional activities (see 1), above).

3) Without formally reopening the original (2022) resolution, seek backing from UNEA-7 for the original mandate (since delegations have clearly not followed the original resolution, particularly regarding the scope of the convention, during the INCs. A complementary resolution which could guide member states towards a possible framework convention would also allow negotiation of the difficult and time-consuming issues in a more extended, party-based process.

4) Once experiences and lessons learned are gathered, consider holding a special, more internally-focused intersessional process between secretariat and the chair and bureau, in order to have a detailed set of lessons learned so far, and to try to readjust the relationship as we move forward. Perhaps such a process could have a trusted and even renowned external facilitator that could help find some new and more effective way of working together. Such trust-building exercises were essential in other forums that I have participated in (although they were done more up-front, towards the beginnings of such processes, it’s never too late!).

5) At the next, eventual INC (presumably 5.3 will take place), put into place more plenary time (at least brief plenaries) where regular updates can be given. This would display more transparency, potentially build more confidence in the process, and benefit small delegations in particular, who cannot cover the breadth of different negotiations we saw in previous INCs.

In conclusion, there is no doubt in my mind that we have a huge task still at hand, but not an insurmountable one. Recently, Forbes published what I think is a fantastic, forward-looking piece that basically says the “train has left the station” for the plastics industry. Even if the global process fails (which I firmly believe will not happen), at other levels of governance from California to the EU and beyond, clear commitments have been made that are even above and beyond the current UNEA mandate.

This will drive the investments and planning of the industry for decades to come. The writing is on the wall. Now is the time to find compromises at the global level (even a framework treaty like the Paris Agreement on climate change would be a good start!) to ensure a sustainable future for all in this field. Otherwise, we may be facing a failure that results in a long-term stalemate where no treaty (or alternative) is agreed for the foreseeable future.

¹ https://www.forbes.com/sites/trondarneundheim/2025/08/16/plastics-manufacturing-at-crossroads-pivot-to-lead-or-lose/

Craig Boljkovac is a Geneva-based Senior Advisor with a Regional Centre for the Basel and Stockholm Conventions, and an independent international environmental consultant with over 35 years of experience in relevant fields. His opinions are his own. He has participated in several INCs and related meetings for the global plastics agreement.

IPS UN Bureau

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau