It was recently reported that U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) commander Adm. Bill McRaven and Deputy Director of Operations Brig. Gen. Sean Mulholland want to establish a worldwide network linking special operations forces (SOF) of allied and partner nations to combat terrorism.

If created, the network would comprise regional security coordination centres, organised and structured similarly to NATO SOF headquarters in Mons, Belgium.

According to Mulholland, these centres would not be command-and- control nodes but rather centres for education, networking and coordination to gain regional solutions for regional problems.

Mulholland estimated it would cost less than 30 million dollars a year to operate and maintain each regional node, although that is a figure that some observers consider laughably small.

SOCOM plans to stand up the first one in Miami-based U.S. Southern Command later in 2013, with Mulholland tapped to command integrated SOF in Central and South America.

This plan may seem ultra-ambitious but given the demand on and pace of U.S. SOF activities in recent years it hardly comes as a surprise. The forces will be conducting missions in 120 countries by year’s end, up from about 75 currently. And while they account for only three percent of the military as a whole, they make up more than seven percent of the forces assigned to Iraq and Afghanistan.

This activity is increasing as the U.S. Special Operations Command’s budget is set to remain flat. The command’s fiscal 2013 budget request is 10.4 billion dollars – essentially the same as its current budget. But the budget for the Special Operations Command has more than quadrupled since 2001, as has the number of deployments.

The new edition of Joint Publication 3-05, published in April for Special Operations, lists 11 “core activities” versus 9 in the previous edition, reflecting the addition of “security force assistance” – aiding the development of foreign security forces – and counterinsurgency.

SOCOM, based in Tampa, Fla., has about 66,000 military and civilian personnel. At any given time, 54,000 are training or redeploying, and 12,000 are deployed around the world. About 9,000 are in Afghanistan.

SOCOM expects to add about 8,800 troops over the next four years – 2,500 this year, 2,300 in 2013, and 2,000 in 2014 and 2015. Planned additions to the SOCOM force structure include:

U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC): Increases the authorisation for one Special Forces Battalion (the fifth of the five mandated by the 2006 QDR); increases aircrews assigned to the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment; increases 75th Ranger Regiment personnel; increases military personnel for the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade and the 4th Military Information Support Operations (MISO) Group; and increases authorisations for military personnel providing combat support/service support to USASOC.

Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC): Increases authorisations to provide support for the 1st Special Operations Group, 1st Special Operations Wing, 27th Special Operations Group, and 352nd Special Operations Group.

But because the selection process can take weeks, and training generally takes at least two years, the new troops will not provide immediate relief for the majority of special operators that are deployed.

Some past SOF officials worry about the impact of the increased demand on SOF capabilities.

In a Feb. 14 Foreign Policy article titled “SOF Power”, retired Lt. Gen. David Barno, a former Army Ranger and former commander of U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan, said the Barack Obama administration has not adequately addressed important questions about the impact on the culture of special operations forces.

The high demand for special operations over the past decade has contributed to a shortage of adequate support, such as helicopters dedicated to special operations forces, he said.

The example people point to happened last August when 30 troops, including 22 Navy SEALs, were killed in Afghanistan when Taliban fighters shot down their helicopter – a Chinook, which typically is used for heavy transport and flown by a conventional crew.

One does not have to look hard to find examples of U.S. SOF around the world.

In Yemen, as part of the escalation of the United States’ covert war there, at least 20 U.S. special operations troops have used satellite imagery, drone video, eavesdropping systems and other technical means to help pinpoint targets for an offensive. The U.S. forces also advised Yemeni military commanders on where and when to deploy their troops

President Obama said in 2010 that he had “no intention of sending U.S. boots on the ground” to Yemen. But retired Army Gen. David Petraeus, now head of the CIA, offered to secretly put U.S. special operations troops in the country, leaked State Department cables show. Then-President Saleh rebuffed his proposal.

Obama later authorised a small team of special operations trainers to help Yemeni forces take on Al-Qaeda. Based mainly in the capital, those trainers were withdrawn last year but apparently began to filter back early this year.

In early May the Wall Street Journal reported that U.S. military leaders have developed new proposals to speed the deployment of U.S. SOF to a growing number of the world’s trouble spots.

Under the new military plan, U.S. SOF would deploy either as strike groups or trainers for local armed forces. The proposal fits with a new Pentagon military strategy put in place by President Obama in January that advocates greater use of special-operations forces.

The plan for special-operations forces would streamline procedures in the defence department for deploying troops, relaxing review processes and giving regional U.S. commanders greater ease of access to special-operations forces and equipment.

Currently, staff officers in the Pentagon review most requests to deploy troops around the globe. The system has been criticised for duplicating the Special Operations Command’s planning process, but defenders say that getting Washington’s input on troop movements, however small, is critical.

Under the new proposal Adm. McRaven would assign SOF to the military’s various combatant commanders. In the event of a crisis, the combatant commander could order those units to a trouble spot without going through a formal process to request forces.

Adm. McRaven would have the power under the new proposal to deploy more forces during a crisis or conflict, without going through the formal Pentagon approval process. The plan also would allow SOCOM to move support assets, aviation units, surveillance equipment and intelligence specialists into trouble spots to aid commando teams.

But critics say regional commanders may not be aware of the wider strategic signals moving assets around the globe might send to other nations. Review of all deployments, these officials say, is a critical safeguard against the U.S. inadvertently exacerbating regional tensions.

(END)

Despite renewed media speculation regarding possible Israeli attacks against Iran’s nuclear facilities as early as this spring, scepticism that such a campaign could actually be successfully carried out remains relatively high, raising the question of whether there is more bark than bite to Israeli threats.

The Tehran Research Reactor where uranium enriched to 20 percent is used to produce medical isotopes. Credit: Jim Lobe/IPS

It cannot expect a repeat of 1981 when the Israeli air force destroyed the Osirak reactor at Al-Tuwaythah, just south of Baghdad.

The Iranians are aware of both Israeli capabilities and the U.S.-made precision-guided penetrating munitions in the Israeli inventory. The Iranian programme has been dispersed all over the country – estimates range between 12 and more than 20 locations – and the facilities have been built with U.S. and Israeli capabilities in mind and are protected by modern Russian air defence systems.

The single most critical element of the Iranian programme is thought to be the Natanz facility. The heart of the facility is the centrifuge area, located in an underground, hardened structure.

But even if Israel tries to limits the target set, it would still have to attack other facilities besides Natanz. For example, the newer Fordow fuel-enrichment plant near Qom, where Iran has already moved 3.5-percent enriched uranium from Natanz, is built into the side of a mountain and is heavily fortified. There is a uranium conversion plant at Isfahan, a heavy-water facility being constructed at Arak and centrifuge factories outside Tehran.

The straight-line distance between Israel and Natanz is almost 1,609 kilometers. Since the countries do not share a common border, Israeli aircraft or missiles must fly through foreign – and hostile – airspace to get to the target.

The least risky method of striking Natanz is with Israel’s medium- range ballistic missiles, the Jericho II or III. It is believed that the Israeli missiles can reach Natanz. However, to travel that far the missiles will have a limited warhead weight, and it is doubtful that these warheads will be able to penetrate far enough underground to achieve the desired level of destruction.

Thus, an attack by the Israeli air force’s U.S.-made fighter-bomber aircraft is the most likely option. The Israelis have 25 F-15I and about 100 F-16I jets.

The F-15I is capable of carrying four metric tons of fuel in its internal tanks, conformal fuel tanks (CFT), and detachable tanks. This enables it to fly about 4,450 kilometers. With midair refueling, the range can be extended further.

The F-15I can carry a very wide range of weapons such as various guided missiles and bombs, as well as iron bombs. All in all, the plane can carry about 10 metric tonnes of munitions.

The F-16I has an extended flight range that reportedly allows Israeli forces to attack targets well within Iran without having to refuel. Use of could CFT extends its effective mission range up to 50 percent. The baseline model has a combat radius of 1,370 kilometers with two 907-kilogramme bombs and two air-to-air missiles, with 3,936-litre external tanks.

Assuming an air attack, the question is how will the aircraft fly from their bases in Israel to a target located 322 kilometres miles inside Iran?

They could go either through Saudi Arabia or Iraq, possibly even using Jordanian airspace as well. Either route is a one-way trip of about 1,931 kilometers.

To overfly Saudi Arabia the strike aircraft depart southern Israel, enter Saudi airspace from the Gulf of Aqaba or Jordan, fly 1,287 kilometers miles of Saudi airspace to the Gulf and then 483 kilometers into Iran.

Since the Israeli air force does not operate stealth aircraft, there is a reasonable expectation that at some point the aircraft will be detected over Saudi Arabia. Whether Saudi defences could – or would – be able to stop the Israelis is uncertain. Given Saudi fears over Iran’s nuclear programme, perhaps they would turn a blind eye and claim ignorance.

If they chose to traverse Iranian airspace, the strike aircraft depart southern Israel, cross 483 to 644 kilometers of Saudi airspace or a combination of Jordanian and Saudi airspace, and enter Iraqi airspace as soon as possible, continue across 805 kilometers of Iraq to the Persian Gulf and then on to the target.

Entering Iran from Iraqi airspace would be politically delicate. Although U.S. troops are no longer there, traversing Iraqi airspace would not be possible without the knowledge, and most likely the permission, of the United States.

The key question is whether Israel’s fighter-bombers can conduct this mission without refuelling. Combat radius – the distance an aircraft can fly and return without refueling – is difficult to calculate, and depends on weapons payload, external fuel tanks, mission profile, etc.

The best “guesstimate” of the combat radius of the F-15I and F-16I, outfitted with conformal fuel tanks, two external wing tanks and a decent weapons load, is almost 1,609 kilometers. Either of the two possible flight routes above is about 322 kilometers further than that. To make up for the shortfall, the aircraft could be fitted with an additional external fuel tank, but this will require a reduction in the weapons load. Given the accuracy of the weapons in the Israeli inventory, that might not be problematic.

However, if the aircraft are detected and intercepted, the pilots will have to jettison the tanks in order to engage their attackers. Dropping the tanks will prevent the aircraft from reaching their target.

Air refuelling is a limitation for the Israelis. In recent years Israel has acquired five C-130 and four to seven Boeing 707 tanker aircraft. However, the tankers would have to refuel the fighters in hostile airspace. The 707 is a large unarmed aircraft and would be very vulnerable to air defences.

Theoretically, the Israelis could do this, but at great risk of failure. If they decide to attack Natanz, they will have to inflict sufficient damage the first time – they probably will not be able to mount follow-on strikes at other facilities.

The ultimate question, of course, is once Israeli planes have flown back, won’t Iran be able to repair the damage and accelerate the nuclear programme? Or does Israel assume that the U.S. will pick up where they left and start a long-term war with Iran?

*David Isenberg is an adjunct scholar with the Cato Institute and a contributor to the Straus Military Reform Project at the Center for Defense Information.