By Elias Yousif
WASHINGTON DC, Sep 1 2023 (IPS)

In what has become an all too familiar phenomenon, U.S.-trained security personnel have been implicated in the July 26th coup that deposed Niger’s democratically elected president, Mohamed Bazoum.

It is the fifth such putsch in the Sahel since 2020, and just the latest to, once again, upend Washington’s expansive counterterror operations in the region that seems to depend on questionable military partners.

As the Biden administration wrestles with how to respond, it should consider how this latest military takeover reflects on years of U.S. security cooperation in the Sahel and the efficacy of the approach that has defined U.S. engagement with the region.

Overview of U.S. Assistance to Niger and the Sahel

Over the last decade, U.S. security cooperation in the Sahel, and the western Sahel in particular, has grown substantially, reflecting widespread concern about the surge in Islamist militancy in the region.

A mix of armed groups, including those with affiliations with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, have proliferated in the region over the years, carrying out opportunistic attacks, engaging in illicit economic activity, and posing acute challenges to state authority.

Elias Yousif

Programs like the Trans-Sahara Partnership Initiative, Department of Defense building partner capacity programs, and numerous foreign military training operations have been central pillars of the U.S. approach to the region.

Despite being paired with significant amounts of economic and humanitarian assistance, they have anchored bilateral relations between Washington and its Sahelian partners.

Between FY2001 and FY2021, the United States provided the countries of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal at least $995 million in direct security assistance, a figure which likely excludes much of the aid provided through large but opaque Department of Defense capacity building programs.

And between FY2001 and FY2020, the United States provided training to at least 86 thousand trainees in these countries, including 17,643 from Niger.

Substantial Aid But Little Progress

Unfortunately, this assistance has not resulted in commensurate improvements in the security landscape or acted as an effective bulwark against civil-military strife. Whatever tactical advances U.S. assistance has contributed to, on the part of Sahelian security forces, the presence, activity, and power of sub-state armed groups has continued to grow.

Terrorism-related activity in the region has increased by more than 2,000 percent over the past decade and a half, while militant organizations have pursued increasingly bold operations and pseudo-state activities.

At the same time, U.S. security assistance activities have provided material support to military officers who have both engaged in grave human rights abuses or who have gone on to support the overthrow of civilian governments.

In just the last three years, the Sahel has seen five coups, two each in Mali and Burkina Faso and now one in Niger, each of which has involved or implicated officers that received U.S. military training.

Unsurprisingly, these military coups have reflected poorly on U.S. security assistance efforts and exposed severe shortcomings in Washington’s approach to the region.

Although it would be difficult to identify a causal relationship between U.S. training and coup propensity on the part of recipients, repeated putsches by U.S.-backed forces show a lack of discretion in how the United States selects its security partners.

Indeed, the behavior of many of these U.S.-trained forces is far from unpredictable, especially in places where military figures have long played outsized political roles.

More robust, in-depth, and multidisciplinary pre-assessments should better inform the selection of U.S. security assistance beneficiaries and partners, and policymakers should have the courage to use that information to decline invitations to engage in security cooperation when the risk is too high.

More broadly, the highly securitized nature of U.S. engagement with the region places significant emphasis on addressing the symptoms of insecurity and distracts from other lines of effort aimed at issues of governance, peacebuilding, and conflict resolution.

Moreover, the rhetorical and political emphasis Washington has placed on counterterrorism, in addition to overshadowing significant humanitarian and development investments, can also risk securitizing local politics and elevating the political saliency of military leaders over their civilian counterparts.

Indeed, in nearly all of the most recent coups, their military leaders have cited militancy and counterterror imperatives as justification for removing civilian leaders. Without a greater emphasis on governance, civil-military reforms, and defense institution building as a prerequisite to combat-oriented assistance, the United States risks perpetuating conflict and political instability.

Finally, when U.S.-backed security forces engage in coups or grave human rights violations, the United States should be unequivocal in its response. Too frequently, the United States has been willing to voice rhetorical condemnation while discreetly sustaining security cooperation activities.

Invoking the need to address terrorism or the infiltration of other competing powers in the region, the familiar turning of the United States’ blind eye in the Sahel has both undermined any meaningful commitment to conditionality in U.S. assistance and sent a troubling signal about the consequences of predatory behavior on the part of U.S. security partners.

The United States should re-orient its strategic calculus and right size how it weighs the risks of shedding abusive security partners against the risks of continuing to partner with forces undermining good governance and human rights.

Elias Yousif is a Research Analyst with the Stimson Center’s Conventional Defense Program. His research focuses on the global arms trade and arms control, issues related to remote warfare and use of force, and international security cooperation and child-soldiers prevention. Prior to joining the Stimson Center, Elias was the Deputy Director of the Security Assistance Monitor at the Center for International Policy where he analyzed the impact of U.S. arms transfer and security assistance programs on international security, U.S. foreign policy, and global human rights practices.

Source: Stimson Center

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By Elias Yousif and Rachel Stohl
WASHINGTON DC, Jul 28 2023 (IPS)

The Biden administration’s decision to provide Ukraine with cluster munitions, a weapon widely banned for the inherent dangers they pose to non-combatants, is risky.

In addition to the immediate and long-term humanitarian consequences, the transfer of clusters jeopardizes the domestic and international political consensus around support for Ukraine which will be instrumental in ensuring military assistance can be sustained for the long haul.

Just a day before triumphantly announcing the final destruction of the remaining U.S. chemical weapons arsenal, the Biden administration revealed it was approving the export of another internationally banned weapon – cluster munitions to Ukraine.

The decision comes in spite of strong opposition from lawmakers, human rights defenders, and even U.S. allies involved in the military aid effort to Ukraine. The controversy reflects the globally recognized risk cluster munitions – projectiles that break apart and disperse dozens of smaller munitions – pose to civilians.

Though some have argued the provision of these intentionally condemned munitions may provide some battlefield advantage to Ukraine, they also pose serious humanitarian and strategic dangers that could jeopardize both civilian protection imperatives as well as the long-term sustainability of Ukraine’s international military aid enterprise.

Cluster munitions are a category of ordinance that breaks apart in mid-air, dispersing smaller sub-munitions over a large area, sometimes as wide as several football fields. Beyond the inherently imprecise nature of these weapons, many of the bomblets they scatter fail to detonate, leaving behind a large blanketing of unexploded ordnance that presents an enduring threat to civilians, especially curious children.

Accordingly, non-combatants make up the vast majority of those killed by cluster munition duds, with tens of thousands of civilian casualties since the 1960’s, including many that occur years after conflict has subsided.

More than 100 countries, including most of the United States’ closest allies, have signed on to an international convention banning their use or transfer and U.S. law prohibits the export of cluster munitions with a dud rate of over 1%, lower than even the most generous estimates of the ordnance being sent to Ukraine.

Additionally, the cluster munitions the United States is sending to Ukraine, known as Dual-Purpose Improved Cluster Munitions (DPICMS), are from old stockpiles with older fuses that have few safety features. DPICM duds are especially dangerous.

The legal and normative taboo, growing international consensus, and U.S. prohibitions surrounding cluster munitions place the Biden administration’s decision to proceed with their transfer to Kyiv in an especially harsh light.

Both Kyiv and Washington have argued that these weapons are essential for Ukraine’s efforts to dislodge occupying Russian forces, especially amidst a Ukrainian offensive that has been proceeding more slowly than its backers had hoped.

Some analysts have argued that these weapons provide a unique battlefield capability for Ukrainian forces, especially in terms of addressing Russia’s extensive networks of defensive trenches.

However, the U.S. government has explained that a major factor in their decision to provide cluster munitions rests on a broader effort to shore up dwindling Ukrainian and Western stockpiles of munitions, allowing the United States to draw from an alternative source without further depleting its own supplies of conventional artillery.

In other words, these munitions are meant to extend the time available to Ukraine to conduct its summer offensive by alleviating a supply crunch in shells made more acute by a slow-moving effort dependent on attrition of enemy defenses.

Despite these military-based rationales, the risks the provision of these weapons pose are both immediate and long-term, with consequences that extend beyond the summer offensive and beyond the war in Ukraine. In the first place, the inherently indiscriminate nature of cluster munitions adds to the civilian protection risks for Ukrainian civilians.

Indeed, cluster munitions used in Ukraine, overwhelmingly by Russian forces but also by Ukrainian troops, have already resulted in numerous civilian casualties. Moreover, the use of cluster munitions will increase the risks to Ukrainian troops by adding especially sensitive unexploded ordnance to already dangerous terrain they will have to traverse as they press forward with their offensive.

It is why, in addition to their humanitarian concerns, many veterans, including Retired Lt. General Mark Hartling, have voiced their own reservations about the transfer decision.

And while it has been suggested that these munitions will be used overwhelmingly in the open countryside and in areas already heavily mined by Russian forces, once these munitions are transferred it will be difficult for the United States to influence how they are employed.

Should fighting move to more densely populated areas, the temptation to continue to use all available weapons will be strong and could result in scenes reminiscent of Moscow’s widely condemned and ongoing use of cluster munitions in urban centers, especially during the early stages of the war.

The Biden administration insists it has assurances from Kyiv that these weapons will be used under strict conditions meant to limit civilian harm. But while Ukraine has taken great pains to limit civilian casualties, its fidelity to past commitments around the use of U.S.-origin weapons has been imperfect, adding to concerns around the efficacy of the risk mitigation measures the Biden team has put in place.

Secondly, using these cluster munitions will complicate and exacerbate what is already going to be a daunting demining enterprise.

Compared to their unitary munition counterparts, cluster munitions scatter far more dud weapons, not only adding to the volume of ordnance that will eventually need to be cleared but also to the challenge of finding them.

Cluster munitions have notoriously high dud rates, with even the most generous assessments placing the figure at between 2-14%. But even those numbers are thought to be undercounts, with significant variation in testing and real-world application, and without any meaningful transparency into how the U.S. government has conducted its assessments.

The administration says that it is transferring munitions with a dud rate of 2.5% – a figure that is both difficult to verify and in violation of U.S. law. Some analysis suggests that the failure rate of the weapons being transferred to Kyiv is far higher, with the potential to litter the region with hundreds of thousands of additional pieces of unexploded ordnance.

Additionally, a rapid expenditure of the supposedly lower dud rate munitions in Ukraine could lead the administration to start drawing down from even higher dud rate stocks, raising the risks of civilian harm and long-term humanitarian dilemmas.

Strategically, the transfer of these controversial weapons systems risks creating fissures in Kyiv’s alliance of international supporters which has been critical to Ukraine’s defense. Consensus among Ukraine’s backers has both enabled a more robust military assistance enterprise and denied from Moscow the opportunity to prey upon political divisions in the West to deter security assistance efforts.

Accordingly, electing to transfer weapons systems banned by most NATO members offers a compelling point of contention among governments aiding Kyiv’s defense, as well as polarizes even further domestic support for backing Ukraine. This is especially true in Europe, where public support for Ukraine remains sizable but divisive.

With no end to this conflict in sight, and with most analysts agreeing Ukraine will depend on international support for the long term, the provision of cluster munitions risks eroding the enduring political support necessary to sustain military assistance to Ukraine for the long haul.

Beyond Ukraine, the transfer of clusters sends a dangerous signal about the United States’ commitment to civilian protection and international norms. Whatever conditions the United States may say it is placing on its package to Ukraine, other governments across the world will feel their justifications for using, stockpiling, or selling cluster munitions are made far stronger.

Undermining the global taboo around these weapons risks making cluster munitions use more likely, including by governments with far less discerning human rights practices.

The Biden administration is well justified in providing Kyiv the means to defend itself against Russia’s illegal war of conquest. Moscow’s irredentism has wrought unimaginable damage to the country and people of Ukraine and shattered global norms around sovereignty, security, and civilian protection.

But beyond creating a lasting, life-threatening hazard for Ukrainian civilians, providing cluster munitions to Ukraine risks eroding the moral authority of the cause, and narrows the reputational gap that has both distinguished Kyiv’s defense from Moscow’s invasion and sustained its lifeline of international military support.

Arguments in favor of providing cluster munitions are narrow in scope and should not outweigh international law, norms, and the long-term interests of Ukraine’s people and its military aid enterprise.

Elias Yousif is a Research Analyst with the Stimson Center’s Conventional Defense Program. His research focuses on the global arms trade and arms control, issues related to remote warfare and use of force, and international security cooperation and child soldiers’ prevention.

Source: Stimson Center, Washington DC

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A wide view of the Security Council Chamber as President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (on screen) of Ukraine, addresses the Security Council meeting on the situation in Ukraine. April 2022. Credit: UN Photo/Loey Felipe

By Elias Yousif
WASHINGTON DC, May 24 2022 (IPS)

Less than halfway through the year, the May 19, 2022 passage of more than $41 billion in emergency funding for Ukraine positions the country to become the largest single recipient of U.S. security sector assistance in 2022.

The latest funding includes at least $6 billion in direct military aid to Ukraine, and billions more for Ukraine and other European partners. Altogether, even a conservative estimate places the value of the military assistance Ukraine will receive in 2022 as equivalent to what the U.S. provided Afghanistan, Israel, and Egypt in FY2020 combined.

In the aftermath of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, Ukraine had already become the most significant recipient of U.S. security assistance in Europe, receiving $2.7 billion in American military aid between 2014 and 2021. But now, those totals are being quickly eclipsed as the United States and its western allies rush billions of dollars worth of weaponry to Kyiv.

The unprecedented sum reflects both the strategic earthquake resulting from Russia’s invasion as well as the West’s evolving assessment of Ukraine’s prospects in its fight with Moscow. With such enormous quantities of weaponry now making their way to Ukraine, it’s worth reflecting on the evolution of this extraordinary surge in international military assistance and its consequences.

What’s Been Committed to Ukraine Since the February 24, 2022 Invasion

After Russia crossed into Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the United States massively expanded its security assistance efforts and began making use of emergency authorities to expedite the transfer of weaponry and equipment to the country.

Since February 2022, the United States has provided $3.9 billion in security sector assistance to Ukraine. In short, in less than three months between February and April 2022, the United States provided one billion more in security assistance than it did in the seven years between 2014 and 2021.

The United States has provided a wide range of weapons and equipment. According to U.S. government reports, as of May 6th, United States had committed the following:

More than 1,400 Stinger anti-aircraft systems

5,500 Javelin anti-armor systems

14,000 other anti-armor weapon systems

700 Switchblade drones and an undisclosed number of Phoenix Ghost Tactical Drones

16 helicopters

Hundreds of High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles

90 155mm Howitzer artillery pieces and nearly 200,000 shells

200 armored personnel carriers

7,000 small arms

50 million rounds of small arms ammunition

The vast quantity of weapons and equipment provided to Ukraine totals over $3.8 billion so far and excludes the billions in military related assistance in the emergency supplemental passed by Congress on May 19.

The new funding package adds an additional $6 billion for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative – the Ukraine-specific program that funds defense acquisition for the government in Kyiv – and an additional $4 billion in Foreign Military Financing for Ukraine and other European allies.

Additionally, the bill adds $9.05 billion to replenish U.S. weapons stockpiles depleted by a series of transfers to Ukraine and other neighboring states. The bill also raises the statutory limit for what the President is permitted to transfer from existing U.S. weapons stockpiles to $11 billion, providing another pool of equipment that the President can draw from.

Arriving at an exact total for military aid committed to Ukraine in the aftermath of this bill’s passage is challenging. Much of the assistance is being made available to Ukraine and “and countries impacted by the situation in Ukraine.”

In addition, the funding for stockpile replenishment may not represent the exact equivalent of military hardware that has already been transferred to Kyiv. Nevertheless, estimates of the aggregate value of military aid committed to Kyiv would likely make Ukraine the largest yearly U.S. security assistance recipient of the 21st century.

The Evolution of U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine

Changes in the scale, scope, and makeup of U.S. security assistance over the first four months of the conflict in Ukraine reflect shifting war imperatives, political realities, and appraisals of potential conflict outcomes.

The earliest days of the war following Russia’s invasion in February 2002 were characterized by positional urban fighting and small unit tactics. The United States, Kyiv, and other international partners were focused on equipping forces defending key urban areas with weaponry that could be quickly delivered and used without significant sustainment or training need.

The result was thousands of shoulder-fired anti-armor and anti-air missiles, thousands of small arms, and millions of rounds of small arms ammunition pouring into the country. Just over two weeks after the beginning of the conflict, by March 16, 2022, U.S.-origin equipment committed to Ukraine included:

600 Stinger anti-aircraft systems

2,600 Javelin anti-armor systems

Tactical drones

200 shotguns

200 machine guns

40 million rounds of small arms ammunition

1 million grenade, mortar, and artillery rounds

While the United States did provide a handful of rotary aircraft and armored personnel carriers, much like Ukraine’s other military patrons, Washington was acutely concerned that the provision of more advanced or heavy weaponry could provoke an escalation from Moscow.

In striking the balance of providing weapons to help Ukraine defend itself, Washington sought to test the limits of assistance without sparking a wider war or a direct retaliation from the Kremlin, especially as President Putin rattled his nuclear saber.

Those sensitivities were on full display after a surprise proposal from Poland to transfer some of its Soviet-era fighter jets to Ukraine in exchange for new U.S. aircraft was shot down by the Biden Administration for fear it was too direct an incitement of Russian animosity.

Those calculations changed in late March, as stiff Ukrainian resistance and failures in the Russian assault allowed Kyiv to withstand much of the Kremlin’s initial offensive, especially around the capital.

Incapable of managing their stretched logistics and maintaining pressure around so many axes of advance, Russia elected to withdraw from significant portions of the country and re-orient their war effort toward seizing the country’s east and, potentially, coastal south.

The battlefield transition also catalyzed a transition in Washington’s view of the conflict and the nature of its security assistance to Ukraine. Strategically, it crystallized assessments that Ukraine and its government would survive the conflict with significant territory under its control and could potentially reclaim some areas it lost to Russia in the conflict’s initial phase.

With the imminent and existential threat relatively at bay, and with somewhat more generous time horizons, new opportunities to consider security packages with more advanced weaponry with longer lead times became viable.

Additionally, a battle for Ukraine’s east represents a fundamentally different operational context. Far from the positional urban fighting that Ukraine was able to master early on, the famed Eurasian steppe presents new advantages for Russia.

Shorter supply lines, a more concentrated frontline, and open terrain that advantages Russia’s mechanized armor and long-range heavy firepower will create significant tactical challenges for Ukrainian defenders.

As Ukraine’s foreign minister put it to a NATO gathering, “the battle for Donbas will remind you of the Second World War with large operations, thousands of tanks, armored vehicles, planes, artillery.”

Accordingly, in this new phase of the conflict, the United States has dramatically enhanced its security assistance to Ukraine, expanding to newer, more advanced weapons systems that speak to the particular battlefield realities of this new phase in the war.

With battlefield outcomes now being determined by the accuracy and range of heavy weaponry, the U.S. has committed additional artillery, air defense systems, advanced radar systems, more rotary aircraft, and a slew of never before seen drones that will see some of their first combat in Ukraine.

The change reflects both the new battlefield challenges Ukraine will face in the Donbas, but also the view from Washington that Russia’s warnings against providing additional weaponry to Kyiv are mostly rhetorical.

In addition, the United States has expanded its assistance in non-material but strategically significant ways. Perhaps most important has been Washington’s provision of real-time intelligence to Ukrainian forces.

Reports suggest that Ukraine has made use of the information to target high-ranking Russian military officials and to sink Russia’s famed Black Sea flagship, the Moskva. The U.S. has also begun providing training to Ukrainian troops on some of the new weapon systems they are set to receive, though the training continues to take place outside of Ukraine.

Extraordinary Authorities

Since 2014, the United States has relied on a handful of conventional security cooperation and assistance authorities to support Ukraine’s defense and security forces, including Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, and the purpose-built Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.

These programs followed typical Congressional appropriations processes and reflected a more methodical approach to building Ukrainian security capacity.

However, current events have changed the traditional assistance model. In late 2021, as the U.S. intelligence community became convinced that a Russian invasion was imminent, the United States faced a new urgency to shore up Ukrainian defenses against the substantially more developed military might of the Kremlin. The Biden Administration reached for new and exceptional tools to get hardware to Ukrainians quickly.

The most prominent of those exceptional tools has been the Presidential Drawdown Authority, which allows the Executive Branch to take weapons, ammunition, and other materiel from existing U.S. stocks and provide them to other countries without congressional authorization.

The Biden Administration has invoked the authority ten times for Ukraine since August 2021. To put that in context, a 2016 Government Accountability Office report found that the authority was invoked just 11 times between 2011 and 2015. The authority offers some advantages in the current context, including reducing lead times for materiel from months or years to days and weeks.

Additionally, in March 2022, the President invoked an emergency authority under the Arms Export Control Act, which allows the Executive Branch to bypass the statutorily mandated congressional notification process and proceed immediately with an international arms sale or export.

The authority requires the Executive to certify that an emergency exists that creates a national security imperative for the immediate sale or export of defense articles or services without the typical 15-30 pause for notification and congressional consideration.

The authority has only been invoked on a handful of occasions, including in 2019 when President Trump controversially used it to transfer munitions and other defense articles to members of the Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen without congressional notification and despite strong congressional opposition.

Congress has also passed an updated version of the World War II-era Lend Lease Act, authorizing the Administration to provide military equipment to Ukraine and other countries in the region on an indefinite basis and without the need to come back to Congress for additional funding. During the Second World War, President Franklin D. Roosevelt used the statute to arm Britain and, to a lesser degree, Russia.

In addition, with the passage of the most recent 41 billion dollar package, the President has now submitted and been granted two emergency supplemental funding requests to Congress amounting to more than $54 billion related to Ukraine including at least $32.3 billion for European theatre defense and security assistance.

Conclusion

The war in Ukraine has fundamentally shifted the focus of U.S. military assistance. For the first time in the 21st century, the largest recipient of U.S. security assistance is not in the Middle East or Central Asia, but in Europe.

The war in Ukraine has become the defining foreign policy priority of the Biden Administration, and with a growing consensus in Western capitals that the end to the war is nowhere in sight, it is likely that the volume of military assistance the United States provides to Ukraine will continue to climb.

Elias Yousif is a Research Analyst with the Stimson Center’s Conventional Defense Program. His research focuses on the global arms trade and arms control, issues related to remote warfare and use of force, and international security cooperation and child-soldier prevention. Prior to joining the Stimson Center, Elias was the Deputy Director of the Security Assistance Monitor at the Center for International Policy where he analyzed the impact of U.S. arms transfer and security assistance programs on international security, U.S. foreign policy, and global human rights practices.

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On 5 March 2022 in western Ukraine, children and families make their way to the border to cross into Poland. Credit: UNICEF/Viktor Moskaliuk

By Elias Yousif
WASHINGTON DC, Mar 11 2022 (IPS)

Conventional arms have been a central, and at times controversial, component of the U.S.-Ukraine relationship since 2014. Indeed, former President Trump’s impeachment proceedings originated with an alleged quid-pro-quo related suspension of military aid to Ukraine.

But as Russia’s military buildup on Ukraine’s eastern border expands and as fears of an invasion grow, 2022 headlines are again turning to Washington’s security cooperation with Kyiv.

Overview of U.S.-Ukrainian Military Assistance

U.S.-Ukrainian security cooperation is a relatively new defense relationship, beginning in earnest only after popular protests ousted Ukraine’s former President, Victor Yanukovych, and Russia forcefully annexed Crimea in 2014.

With persistent Russian efforts to reclaim its area of influence in Ukraine through military and non-military means, the United States has substantially expanded its security assistance to Kyiv, amounting to more than $2.7 billion since 2014.

U.S. military assistance has come, principally, from the Department of Defense’s Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative ($1.35 billion) and the Department of State’s Foreign Military Financing program ($721 million).

Those packages and several others, including from the International Military Education and Training program, made Ukraine among the most significant recipients of U.S. military aid, ranking 7th globally between FY2016-FY2020 and the largest such recipient in Europe, according to the Security Assistance Monitor.

Beyond the dollar amounts, the U.S. has provided foreign military training to at least 10,629 Ukrainian trainees between FY2015-FY2019.

But diplomatic sensitivities with Moscow moderated the early provision of U.S. military aid, and limited U.S. assistance to non-lethal equipment, including unarmed drones, counter-mortar radars, night vision devices, and armored Humvees.

That policy was reversed under President Trump, and in 2017 the U.S. began providing millions in lethal assistance, including Javelin anti-tank missiles – a sensitive defense technology that held symbolic significance for both Russia and Ukraine, as it had generally been reserved only for close U.S. allies and NATO members.

The transfer signaled a sharp departure from the previous policy and made a clear political statement. Even with the resumption of lethal assistance to Ukraine, stipulations for its provision were stringent and aimed at preventing a reprisal or escalation from Russia.

The Javelin missiles, for example, were required to be stored in Western Ukraine, away from the front lines of Ukraine’s fight with Moscow-backed separatists and its border with Russia.

Assistance in the Context of Russian Troop Concentrations

As Russia amassed troops and conducted large scale military exercises on Ukraine’s eastern border throughout 2021, the U.S. simultaneously expanded its military assistance. In November 2021, both Washington and Kyiv signed the U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership, which provided clear U.S. security commitments to Ukraine.

The agreement clearly articulated that the purpose of continued U.S. assistance was aimed at “Countering Russian Aggression.” In January 2022, with tensions along Ukraine’s eastern border at an all-time high, the U.S. began delivery of an additional $200 million in lethal and non-lethal aid directly from Department of Defense stockpiles. Ninety tons of that equipment had reached Ukraine’s border by the last week of January.

And the U.S. is not alone in sending military hardware to Ukraine. A handful of Baltic allies have been cleared to re-transfer U.S. origin weapons systems to Kyiv, including additional Javelin missiles as well as Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and related equipment. These weapons have increasingly aggravated Russia as the transfers underscore enhanced Ukraine-NATO security cooperation.

Britain, Turkey, the Czech Republic, and Germany have also all provided both lethal and non-lethal military assistance, including drones, anti-tank missiles, artillery, and training.

Even with transfers from other partners, the U.S. remains Ukraine’s largest military aid benefactor, approving $650 million in defense assistance to Kyiv in just the past year – a bilateral high. However, despite the large quantity of weapons flowing into Ukraine, the Kyiv insists it needs more.

Aims and Efficacy of U.S. Security Cooperation

Consecutive U.S. administrations have used security assistance as both a practical and political measure of support for Ukraine and, as the State Department puts it, its effort “to advance its Euro-Atlantic aspirations in support of a secure, prosperous, democratic, and free Ukraine.”

But while some analysts have praised defense reforms undertaken by Ukraine and its armed forces, particularly given the corroded state of Ukraine’s defense capabilities in the aftermath of its 2014 transition, U.S. security assistance has not ended the conflict in the country’s east or averted the current crisis with Russia.

Perhaps most importantly, some have argued that U.S. and European efforts to support a reorientation of Ukraine towards the West and integrate its defense architecture into NATO have contributed to this moment of crisis, and convinced Moscow it must act decisively to pre-empt the irreversible drift of its former stalwart ally.

Regardless, a Russian invasion would represent a qualitatively more significant defense threat than the static conflict with foreign backed separatists, and there are scant suggestions that a few short years of U.S. assistance would allow Kyiv to meaningfully thwart a concerted military push from Moscow.

Accordingly, all eyes remain on the diplomatic efforts underway between U.S. and Russian envoys with hopes that the worst can be averted.

Elias Yousif is a Research Analyst with the Stimson Center’s Conventional Defense Program. His research focuses on the global arms trade and arms control, issues related to remote warfare and use of force, and international security cooperation and child soldiers prevention. Prior to joining the Stimson Center, Elias was the Deputy Director of the Security Assistance Monitor at the Center for International Policy where he analyzed the impact of U.S. arms transfer and security assistance programs on international security, U.S. foreign policy, and global human rights practices.

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