Amidst a backdrop of rising food insecurity worldwide and a global food supply chain crisis, many countries are attempting to increase the level of food self-production. One improved input for farming which is receiving renewed attention is improved seed. The two most populous countries in the world, China and India, have recently made ground-breaking moves to improve their competitive position by developing new seeds which will improve their food production and increase resilience to climate change. So far, in 2022, new regulations on using biotechnology (genetic modification and gene editing) have been put in place by both countries to ultimately allow smallholder farmers to benefit from these new seeds.

Paul Teng

The importance of having reliable supplies of improved seeds for farmers has been particularly highlighted in the world’s most populous country, China, where seeds are high on the policy agenda.

In early April 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for working toward food self-sufficiency and developing the country’s seed industry during a visit to a seed laboratory in Hainan Province, southern China. He noted that China’s food security could only be safeguarded when seed resources are firmly held in its own hands. President Xi’s comments come at a time when many countries aim to increase their self-production of food in anticipation of disruptions in supply chains such as those caused by the Ukraine-Russia crisis and the COVID pandemic.

Genevieve Donnellon-May

All the above background factors have led China and India to make important moves to tap a proven tool for developing new crop varieties, namely biotechnology.

In April 2022, China’s agriculture ministry announced plans for the first time after many years of deliberations to approve two new genetically modified corn varieties developed by the Syngenta Group. Earlier, In January 2022, China published new guidelines for the approval of gene-edited plants, paving the way for faster improvements to important food security crops. And this came amid a raft of measures to overhaul China’s seed industry, seen as a weak link in efforts to ensure it can feed the world’s biggest population. China’s Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, Tang Renjian, had likened seeds to the “computer chips” of agriculture.

In an unrelated parallel development, India approved a key change in rules at the end of March 2022 to allow genome-edited plants or organisms without any “foreign” genes to be subjected to a different regulatory process than the one applied to genetically engineered products. As in China, this is anticipated to lead to faster development of new crop varieties that can meet the challenges of climate change and higher yields.

However, not all interested parties support the use of biotechnology to develop new seeds or patenting new crop varieties. Although the evidence is strong that multinational and domestic seed companies have played a major role in lifting crop production through their improved seeds, this has also led to concerns about the control that the private sector may have over this important input for food production. And related to this issue of control of seeds is the patenting of new seeds.

There has been a rise in ‘seed activism‘ and interest in seed sovereignty as part of the pushback against the modern agricultural system that is supported by patented seeds such as hybrids. This pushback has been helmed by groups which exploit the fear (often speculative) that by having control over seeds, a handful of multinational companies, rather than farmers or countries, have control over the global food supply. This omits the reality that farmers have the right to choose whatever seeds to plant and even keep their own seeds if desired. These groups have also failed to recognize that investments to innovate and produce new seeds would not have been possible without adequate protection of seeds as intellectual property. Countries like China and India realise the importance of promoting innovations in the seed industry.

China, in particular, has announced that it aims to revitalize the seed sector, encourage germplasm collection, and strengthen intellectual property protection in the sector. In China, views on the importance of seeds in food security are reflected in various domestic policies such as in 2022’s “No 1 Central Policy Document”, the country’s agricultural blueprint. A top policy priority is the development of the seed industry in China.

The issues of seed sovereignty based on farmer-saved seed, when balanced against the track record of improved seeds from companies which give high yields, are complex. But in the final analysis, farmers will choose the seeds that give them the most assured yields under risky conditions, even if they have to pay for such seeds. This has been the case with almost all the developed and developing countries with food surpluses for export, such as the U.S.A., Canada, Brazil and Argentina. And consumers, as well as food importers are those who benefit by there being more food at affordable prices.

The first “Green Revolution” in Asia which took off in the 1970s was based on improved seeds of wheat and rice, bred using technologies which were novel at that time. However, towards the latter part of the last millennium, the need for more novel technologies to improve crops became obvious as yield gains were stagnating in many crops. The challenges facing all smallholder farmers arising from changes in climate, pests and natural resource depletion are becoming more intense and frequent. And unless new seeds are developed and made available to farmers in shorter timeframes, it is the consuming public that will suffer the consequences of reduced, unreliable food supply and higher prices.

The conundrum is how to balance local ownership of seed sources which are commonly unimproved and low-yielding with improved high-yielding seeds developed by seed companies (either domestic or multinational) using modern science. Ultimately, smallholder farmers worldwide deserve new “seeds of hope”.

Paul Teng is Adjunct Senior Fellow, Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies at Nanyang Technological University Singapore. He has worked in the Asia Pacific region on agri-food issues for over thirty years, with international organizations, academia and the private sector.

Genevieve Donnellon-May is a master’s student in Water Science, Policy and Management at the University of Oxford. Genevieve’s research interests include China, Africa, transboundary governance, and the food-energy-water nexus.

IPS UN Bureau

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

The recently published “No 1 central policy document” (“No 1 document”), China’s national blueprint for rural policy, further demonstrates Beijing’s commitment to safeguarding food security and advancing rural revitalisation. The document’s release comes against an increasingly complicated geopolitical environment which, along with factors, such as disruptions to the global food chain supplies and worsening climate change impacts, have forced Beijing to rethink how its national goals can be achieved.

Genevieve Donnellon-May

The recently published “No 1 document” by the State Council, China’s cabinet, further demonstrates Beijing’s commitment to safeguarding food security and promoting rural revitalisation. The “No 1 document” is usually the first policy document to be released by the Chinese central government at the beginning of each year. As China’s annual rural policy blueprint, it sets out agricultural and rural development plans and tasks related to “the three rurals” (“三农”) (agriculture, rural areas, and farmers) for the coming year.

The areas of focus in this year’s “No 1 document” can be divided up into two major categories: safeguarding food security and supporting rural revitalisation:

1. Safeguarding food security

Increasing agricultural production

Aside from encouraging the continued diversification of food imports to enhance China’s food security, boosting agricultural production at home remains a top priority. With grain self-sufficiency as the main overarching goal of China’s food security strategy, China has undertaken enormous political and fiscal efforts alongside spatio-temporal changes in China’s grain production patterns to strengthen its grain production.

Under this year’s “No 1 document”, China will continue to stabilise the full-year grain sown area and keep annual grain output above 650 billion kilograms. These goals follow the Chinese central authorities’ announcements of various plans and policies to encourage domestic agricultural production, including a new grain security law, annual grain production targets, and planting acreage targets. As Chinese president Xi Jinping and other top Chinese officials have publicly noted, such policies will ensure that “Chinese bowls are mainly filled with Chinese food”.

Vitalising the seed sector

In recent years, the importance of the seed sector has grown, with top policymakers noting its significance to safeguarding food security and national security. Last year, for instance, China’s Minister for Agriculture and Rural Affairs, Tang Renjian, highlighted seeds as a critical component of food security. Minister Tang noted the importance of seeds, calling them “the ‘computer chips’ of agriculture,” and cultivated land, the “‘lifeblood’ of food production.”

As part of the efforts to safeguard China’s food security, the Chinese government will introduce measures to vitalise the seed sector according to the “No 1 document”. This includes but is not limited to undertaking efforts to strengthen intellectual property (IP) rights protection in the seed sector and advancing progress on agricultural seed sources.

2. Rural revitalisation

The Chinese government will continue promoting rural revitalisation as part of efforts to avoid the re-emergence of widespread poverty in the countryside. First put forward by President Xi in 2017 as a vital national initiative, rural revitalisation is a critical component of the Chinese government’s 2020-2025 work plan. The strategy aims to turn China into “a modern, socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious” by 2049. As highlighted in the “No 1 central policy document, ” a primary aim of the rural revitalisation strategy is the push for digital rural transformation. Notably, the document proposed establishing measures to help rural households at risk of falling back into poverty.

In addition, this year’s “No 1 document” has set out policies to support the rural economy and the sustainable development of the countryside. The overarching aim of this is to solve China’s imbalanced and inadequate development issues in agriculture, rural areas, and rural residents. Aside from boosting domestic agricultural production, this also includes, for instance, encouraging the development of the solar power industry in various regions for a sustained source of additional income for residents. Further supporting other income streams for residents and the digital rural transformation, the policy document encourages promoting e-commerce and live streaming in the countryside. This may boost the sales of domestic agricultural products, which would further intersect with other policies such as dual circulation.

By undertaking such initiatives, the gap in living standards between urban and rural residents and between richer and poorer provinces may be reduced. This could thus mitigate the consequences of China’s rising socio-economic inequalities such as social, economic, and political instability.

The “No 1 document” for 2022 further emphasises China’s inter-connected ambitions of encouraging rural revitalisation and safeguarding food security. Although the blueprint sets out policy goals to transform China and the lives of its rural residents while also protecting food security, realising these goals will not be without challenges. For instance, the push to increase domestic agricultural production to safeguard food security may encounter difficulties from factors including higher fertiliser costs, severe land and water contamination, water insecurity, and more frequent and extreme climate change-related events. This could also influence the success of the rural revitalisation strategy with, for instance, poor harvests and increased production costs alongside outbreaks of zoonotic diseases impacting the ability of farmers and other rural residents to earn money.

Furthermore, questions may be asked about the long-term sustainability of both significant aims. Noting the output target in the “No 1 document”, how much water and energy are needed for Chinese farmers to meet these targets? How much energy and water will be required to carry out rural revitalisation? Will competing domestic demands between urban, industry, and agriculture affect its success? How may this impact the food-water-energy nexus? To what extent could the expected energy consumption of rural revitalisation and increased agricultural production hinder Xi’s declarations that China will reach peak carbon emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060? To what extent can increased agricultural production in China safeguard the country’s food security and support rural revitalisation?

IPS UN Bureau

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

Food security has long been a high priority for the Chinese central government and has been linked to China’s national security in recent years. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs recently released a national five-year plan under which China will seek to maintain a target to produce 95 percent of the protein domestically until 2025: China aims to become self-sufficient in poultry and eggs, 85 percent self-sufficient for beef and mutton, 70 percent for dairy, and 95 percent self-sufficient in pork. These targets intersect with many of the Chinese central government’s current aims to meet the growing demand for protein and dairy, safeguard food security, and other major policies.

Genevieve Donnellon-May

China is also the world’s fourth-largest dairy producer and the second-largest in Asia. However, it is still the largest importer of dairy products.

Dual circulation and self-sufficiency to safeguard food security

Increasing self-sufficiency in protein and dairy fits in with Beijing’s “dual circulation” development strategy and food security aim which seek greater self-reliance, including in agricultural production, to reduce external uncertainties.

Higher grain demand to feed China’s livestock

To achieve the self-sufficiency targets in protein, China will likely increase its animal feed. Currently, China holds significant quantities of the world’s grain reserves. According to data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, by mid-2022, China is expected to have 69 percent of the world’s maize (corn) reserves and 37 percent of its soybeans. As an official from China’s National Food and Strategic Reserves Administration noted recently, supply in the domestic grain market is “fully guaranteed” while grain reserves are at a “historical high level”.

China’s push for greater self-sufficiency in protein and dairy may result in even greater imports of grains, potentially resulting in higher global food prices and China controlling a greater share of the global livestock feed. However, the Chinese central authorities are further encouraging domestic production through a new grain security law, annual grain production targets, planting acreage targets, and the expansion of growing areas.

Challenges

Aside from outbreaks of African Swine Fever, China is also facing many other pressures, leaving domestic food production unable to maintain current lifestyles and consumption habits. For instance, China is grappling with land, energy, and water insecurity issues. Such concerns are compounded by climate change impacts, extreme weather events, a smaller rural workforce, and shifting demographics. Noting China’s climate change commitments and green agenda, how much water and energy are needed for Chinese farmers to meet these targets? To what extent could the new self-sufficiency targets hinder China from reducing its carbon emissions?

Potential solutions

Cultivated (lab-grown) meat

One potential (partial) solution is the domestic production of cultivated meat. Lab-grown meat aims to overturn traditional animal agriculture by replacing slaughterhouses with laboratories. It could help meet growing consumer demand for meat while avoiding diseases, antibiotics, growth hormones, and greenhouse gases associated with livestock farming.

Despite regulatory approval for the commercial sale of cultivated meat in China having not yet been given, other alternatives (e.g. plant-based meat) are already available in China. Additionally, the inclusion of cultivated meat and “future foods” for the first time in the recently released five-year plan from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs suggests that regulatory approval may soon be granted.

Smart farming and agricultural technology (agtech)

Another potential (partial) solution is smart farming to increase both the quality and quantity of agricultural produce while optimising the human labour required by production. It is already in place in various parts of China, including in Heilongjiang Province, Chongqing Municipality, and Zhejiang Province.

Expanding smart farming practices and agtech would intersect with China’s other major aims, including agricultural modernisation and the national transportation networking planning outline (2021-2035). This may also reduce concerns brought on by the labour shortage while also meeting growing food demands.

Genetically modified (GM) crops

To meet increased demand for animal feed, the Chinese government may consider the commercial planting of GM crops. Although commercialisation has not been approved due to public opposition to GM food. Nonetheless, the country’s top policymakers have urged progress in biotech breeding. Announcements from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs further suggest that China is preparing to allow greater use of GM technology in agriculture.

Achieving greater self-sufficiency in meat and dairy is ambitious and intersects with many of China’s other significant policies. Increasing domestic production and reducing reliance on exporting countries also means that millions of tonnes of meat may be imported by other countries, potentially affecting both global market supplies and prices. However, these self-sufficiency targets may encounter difficulties from external factors, such as the higher cost of fertilisers, which could add to production costs.

Innovative solutions and technological developments in China, including lab-grown meat and other alternative proteins (e.g. insect-based ingredients and plant protein) may also help to satisfy consumers’ growing demand and domestic production. If regulatory approval is granted, China may become the world’s leader in this area, further supporting domestic production by establishing ‘agricultural Silicon Valley hubs’ for research and development. Nonetheless, concerns over the sustainability of innovative solutions and food safety may need to be addressed.

Genevieve Donnellon-May is a research assistant with the Institute of Water Policy (IWP) at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. Her work has been published by The Diplomat, Inter-Press Service, and the Wilson Center’s China Environment Forum.

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

Safeguarding food security has long been a critical priority for the Chinese central government. President Xi’s latest comments and meetings demonstrate continued concerns at the top about China’s food security. Ahead of the 20th National Congress this year and the release of the No 1 policy document, there are already several hints regarding what the Chinese central authorities could prioritise in terms of food security for this year and beyond. Other factors, including the potential influences of gene-edited plants, commercialisation of genetically modified (GM) crops, and of a Russia-Ukraine conflict should also be considered.

Genevieve Donnellon-May

Similarly, the recent Central Rural Work Conference, which usually sets out agricultural and rural development plans and tasks related to “the three rurals” (“三农”) (agriculture, rural areas, and farmers), also emphasised the importance of safeguarding food security and achieving self-sufficiency.

Potential themes in 2022 concerning food security

1. Safeguarding food security
Safeguarding food security will likely remain a key objective as it is needed to ensure social stability and has also been publicly linked to China’s national security by President Xi. Food security is one of the six guarantees (六保) made in April 2020 in response to COVID-19 and changes to the global food supply chains. Recent public comments from China’s top leaders show that importance has not waned and that there is a more significant push to safeguard food security, which will continue in 2022 and beyond. For instance, the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, Tang Renjian, called seeds “the ‘computer chips’ of agriculture” and cultivated land, the “‘lifeblood’ of food production.”.

2. Grain security and increased agricultural production
Grain security has long been a top priority for the central authorities in China. Indeed, “food security” (粮食安全) translates as “grain security” in Chinese. With grain self-sufficiency as the main overarching goal of China’s food security strategy, China has undertaken enormous political and fiscal efforts alongside spatio-temporal changes in China’s grain production patterns to strengthen its grain production. And these efforts have, to some extent, paid off. For instance, between 2003 and 2013, China’s domestic grain production rose from 430 million metric tons to over 600 million metric tons.

To encourage domestic production of grains, the Chinese central authorities have put forward various policies and plans. For instance, in January 2021, the National People’s Congress began drafting a new grain security law. Following this, grain security was also listed in the Chinese central government’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) draft with China aiming to meet an annual grain production target of more than 650 million metric tons. Additionally, under the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs’ current Five-Year Agricultural Plan (2021-2025) on crop farming, China will stabilise its annual grain output and beat a target of 700 million metric tons by 2025.

Two key areas of grain security in China are soybeans and corn:

A) Soybeans
Soybeans are used in animal food, human food, and industrial products. Meanwhile, soybean oil is the primary edible oil in China, accounting for about 40% of the total oil consumption in the country. Although China is the world’s fourth-biggest soybean grower, the country is also the world’s largest soybean importer. Statistics from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs show that over 80% of domestic consumption relies on imports, reaching more than 100 million metric tons in 2021. The imported soybeans are GM and are mainly processed to produce cooking oil and the meal used in animal feed. Locally produced soybeans are non-GM and are primarily used for direct human consumption.

However, China’s reliance on foreign soybeans was viewed as a concern during the Trump-era trade war. China is likely to reduce its reliance on soybean imports by increasing domestic production to encourage self-sufficiency. In December 2021, Premier Li said that significant efforts must be undertaken to stabilise grain acreage and increase the production of soybeans and other oil crops. Following this, last month the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs announced China’s new 14th Five-Year Plan on crop farming. As part of this plan, by the end of 2025 China wants to have produced approximately 23 million tonnes of soybeans, up 40% from current output levels.

B) Corn
Although China is the world’s largest grower of corn by area, its total production falls short of its needs. In 2021, the country had to import more than 28 million tons of corn in 2021, up 152% from an annual record of 11.3 million tonnes in 2020. Most corn imports came from the US, Argentina, Brazil, and Ukraine.

Nonetheless, Beijing may continue to diversify its import sources of corn and encourage domestic production, where possible, to ensure a stable supply. Having launched the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, China’s interest in diversifying corn imports has grown. Before the launch of the BRI, the United States of America (US) was China’s biggest supplier of corn and accounted for almost all Chinese imports of corn. Nonetheless, this had changed by 2019 when Ukraine became China’s biggest supplier of corn, making up over 80% of corn imports in China for that year.

The implications of a Ukraine-Russia conflict
An external factor to consider is the current tensions between Ukraine and Russia. Much of Ukraine’s most fertile agricultural land is in its eastern regions, which are also vulnerable to a potential Russian attack. In the case of a Russian incursion or land grab, the flow of goods from Ukraine would likely be impacted, including Ukraine’s agricultural exports. As a major grain exporter (e.g. corn, wheat, and rye), Ukraine plays a crucial role in feeding populations worldwide. The implications of a Russian attack may well extend into the countries and regions that depend on Ukraine for food, exacerbating social and political instability as well as leading to food insecurity.

Genetically modified crops – game-changers?
Although China was the first country to grow GM crops commercially, commercialisation has not gone ahead, partly due to significant public opposition to GM food. However, recent moves from the Chinese government suggest that China will, at some stage, approve new regulations to allow the planting of GM seeds to boost the domestic production of these crops.

Announcements from China’s Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs suggest that China is preparing to allow greater use of GM technology in agriculture and also support domestic biotech companies. Recently, the ministry published draft rules outlying registration requirements for herbicides used on GM crops, announced plans to approve the safety of more GM corn varieties produced by domestic companies, and announced plans to approve the safety of more GM corn varieties produced by domestic companies.

Gene-edited plants – another gamechanger?
China is also interested in gene-edited plants. In January this year, the Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Affairs China published trial rules for the approval of gene-edited plants, paving the way for faster improvements to crops. Taking into account some of the many pressures China and other countries face, including water quality and quantity issues and climate change impacts alongside urbanisation and shifting demographics, China may also encourage the development of “climate-smart” seeds to help increase domestic production.

At present, the full socio-economic and environmental implications of China’s push to strengthen domestic production, of soybeans and corn, remain unclear. Questions may be asked about China’s climate change commitments, green agenda, and food security. How much water and energy are needed for Chinese farmers to meet these targets? With President Xi having promised that the country will reach peak carbon emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060, how could this impact China’s ambitions of increased domestic soybean and corn productions, while simultaneously trying to satisfy China’s food demand and ensuring that the country’s agricultural systems are environmentally efficient?

Genevieve Donnellon-May is a research assistant with the Institute of Water Policy (IWP) at the National University of Singapore. Her research interests include China, Africa, transboundary governance, and the food-energy-water nexus. Genevieve’s work has been published by The Diplomat and the Wilson Center’s China Environment Forum.

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

For the first time since 1990, China has (re)opened an embassy in Managua, Nicaragua, less than a month after Nicaragua cut ties with Taiwan. The (re)opening of the embassy on January 1, 2022 comes amidst the backdrop of US-China tensions, particularly over trade and Taiwan, as well as worsening Cross-Straits relations.

Genevieve Donnellon-May

In response, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) responded by stating that Taiwan “deeply regrets” that President Daniel Ortega has disregarded the long-standing friendship between the two countries. MOFA noted that it has worked with the Central American country for many years to promote cooperation that “is beneficial to the people’s livelihood and assists the overall development of the country,” according to a MOFA press release. MOFA also reiterated that “Taiwan is not a part of the People’s Republic of China, and that the PRC has never governed Taiwan. The Taiwanese people will not bow to pressure from China.”

Days after the (re)establishment of China-Nicaragua relations, China sent 200,000 doses of Sinopharm vaccines to Nicaragua as part of its vaccine diplomacy. The 2000,000 doses, which were the first of 1 million, were accompanied by a Nicaraguan delegation led by President Ortega’s son, Laureano Ortega Murillo. The Nicaraguan foreign minister, Denis Moncada, thanked China for its vaccine donation and noted that was an “ideological affinity” between the two countries.

China and Nicaragua originally established formal relations almost forty years ago. In 1985, Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega established relations with China. After he lost the election in 1990, the president Violeta Chamorro recognised Taiwan. In 2007, however, Ortega returned to power and was re-elected in November 2021 for a fourth term. A month after his re-election, Nicaragua cut ties with Taiwan, following months of worsening relations between Ortega and U.S. President Biden’s administration.

In addition, Nicaragua’s decision to establish formal relations with Beijing means that the number of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies has decreased to 14, down from 22 when President Tsai Ing-wen took office in 2016. Previously, China and Taiwan had observed a so-called “diplomatic truce” in place during the previous Ma Ying-jeou administration and the Kuomintang (KMT) wherein China did not diplomatic overtures to Taiwan’s diplomatic partners.

As a result of the change in recognition and China’s inroads in Central America, Taiwan appears to be increasingly isolated on the international stage. Most countries switched to Beijing by the end of the 1970s, after Taiwan (as the Republic of China or ROC) lost its seat in the United Nations in 1971 to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Aside from Nicaragua, recent transfers of recognition from Taipei to Beijing have been undertaken by the following countries: Solomon Islands (2019), Kiribati (2019), El Salvador (2018), Dominican Republic (2018), Panama (2017), Gambia (2016), and Sao Tome and Principe (2016).

After Nicaragua, many eyes are now on Honduras, a small Central American country, and its newly elected president, Xiomara Castro. In November 2021, the outgoing Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez began a three-day surprise visit to Taiwan. The visit came amidst concerns from Taiwanese officials in Honduras that the next Honduran president may sever ties with Taipei and establish formal diplomatic ties with Beijing.

Establishing ties with Beijing was one of the pledges made by Castro during her presidential campaign in 2021. A switch in relations from Taipei to Beijing, she declared, would give Honduras access to economic opportunities as well as Chinese-made Covid-19 vaccines and low-cost medicine. Although Castro will not be sworn in as president until later this month, her pledge may put Honduras in the middle of an intensifying diplomatic tug-of-war between Taiwan and China and becoming the new front against intensifying global showdown between the two superpowers. These geopolitical tensions combined with the financial needs of Central American governments, the resurgence of populist leaders in the region, and China’s growing economic importance, combined with China’s vaccine diplomacy and the absence of a truce between Taipei and Beijing, all influence Central America’s relations with both the U.S. and China. And currently, they are the driving factors in pushing Central American countries “away from the US and towards China”, as noted by Evan Ellis, a professor at the US Army War College who researches Latin America’s relationships with China.

At the same time, a move to establishing diplomatic relations with China could be partly motivated by a desire to counter American hegemony in the country and the region. Washington has long dominated Central America both economically and politically, viewing it as its strategic backyard. Before the presidential election, China accused the US of “arm-twisting and bullying behaviour” after Washington reiterated that it wanted Honduras to maintain its longstanding diplomatic relations with Taiwan. However, the U.S. holds considerable sway over Honduras. In particular, remittances, mainly from people living in the U.S., make up more than 20% of Honduras’ gross domestic product, according to the Brookings Institute. This economic reality, combined with significant U.S. aid to Honduras, also means that Washington does have influence over local politics.

However, in recent years, Honduras has seen rapid increases in inequality, corruption, violence, and poverty have further driven migration to the US. Unemployment has risen above 10% while major hurricanes devastated northern Honduras in 2020. Honduras is now the third poorest country in the Americas: over 66% of the population live in poverty. According to the World Bank, the pandemic considerably impacted the country’s economy, with the national GDP expected to have contracted by 9% in 2020.

Nonetheless, China’s influence in Honduras continues to grow. In 2020, Chinese state-owned companies finished the construction of 105MW hydropower dam in the country. Also, more external debt is owed to China than to the U.S. According to World Bank data, 4% of Honduras’ outstanding external debt is owed to China, while only 0.01% to the US. Further, China already accounting for as much as a fifth of Honduran imports. In this way, any potential financial benefits, such as loans and investments from establishing formal ties with China, or even playing Washington and Beijing off each other, may be considered too important to ignore.

Genevieve Donnellon-May is a research assistant with the Institute of Water Policy (IWP) at the National University of Singapore. Her research interests include China, Africa, transboundary governance, and the food-energy-water nexus. Genevieve’s work has been published by The Diplomat and the Wilson Center’s China Environment Forum.

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

The new Yangtze River Protection Law (YRPL), which came into effect on March 1, 2021, is China’s first legislation on a specific river basin. The Yangtze River is China’s longest and largest river system, stretching over 6,300 kilometres and has over 700 tributaries. With a drainage basin covering more than 1.8 million square kilometres, approximately one-fifth of China’s total land area, the river basin is home to over 40% of the country’s population.

Genevieve Donnellon-May

Why is the YRPL necessary?

The YRPL is necessary for four main reasons:

1) To protect China’s mother river: Both Yellow and Yangtze rivers are often referred to in Chinese as the “mother rivers”. As “cradles of Chinese civilisation” of Chinese civilization, both rivers have played significant roles in China’s history, demonstrating their cultural and historical value to China and Chinese people.

2) To safeguard China’s driving economic force: the Yangtze River holds great socio-economic value for China. Notably, the river forms an integral part of the Yangtze River Economic Belt which plays a key role to national energy and food security as well as global supply chains. Covering 21% of China’s total land area, the Yangtze River Economic Belt is made up of nine provinces (Anhui, Guizhou, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Zhejiang), two municipalities (Chongqing and Shanghai), and many of China’s free trade zones. The region is believed to account for 45% of the national gross domestic product (GDP), making it one of China’s economic centre, and a major agricultural region, making the area one of the most intensive farming regions in the world and an integral part of China’s ability to safeguard food security. The area plays an important role in China’s rapid development as well as in the national green development push, agricultural green development, and various other development policies.



Mark Wang

3) To protect China’s resource basket: the Yangtze River basin is rich in mineral and water resources, and as an important national ecological asset, it is also rich in biodiversity, providing habitat to over 400 species of fish. As the main source of drinking water for over 400 million people living near the Yangtze River basin, the Yangtze River provides drinking water for more than 35% of the country’s population or more than 5% of the world’s total population. The Yangtze River also forms an integral part of China’s hydropower accounting for 73% of China’s total hydro-capacity.

In addition, the Yangtze River plays an enormous role in the South-North Water Transfer Project. The South-North Water Transfer Project diverts water from southern China to secure water supply to Beijing and other major cities in the North China Plain for drinking and non-drinking purposes. Along with the Hai River, Yellow River, and Huai River, the four rivers form the so-called ‘four horizontal and three vertical’ “sanzhong siheng” (三纵四横) water security network in China.

4) To maintain sustainable development: the development of the Yangtze River Economic Belt has come at the cost of serious impact on the sustainable development of both the economy and society. Consequences include severe pollution, overfishing, and industrialisation as well as sand dredging and dam-building which harm the river’s water quality and biodiversity, as well as environmental and human health. This consequently affects more than 580 million people who live along the 2 million square-kilometre land area of the YREB.

The consequences of lax environmental standards have resulted in the main drinking water supply source of around 400 million people, or a third of China’s population, being threatened. The dangerous levels of heavy metals (e.g., arsenic and lead), linked to the development and smelting of mineral resources, and which threaten the environment and ecology as well as human health, food security, and food safety. The river’s high rates of pollution have been further linked to China’s “cancer villages” (癌症村).

Although the central Chinese government has acknowledged these concerns in reports and environmental policies (e.g., “ecological red lines” policy to balance environmental and ecological protection and economic growth) and regulations (e.g., fishing ban), they are generally subject to poor coordination, application, and enforcement. In 2016, Chinese president Xi Jinping highlighted the necessity of protecting the Yangtze River as a key long-term task through basin-wide coordination at the Yangtze River Economic Belt Development Forum, where he called for “joint effort to protect, not develop”. President Xi additionally emphasised that the economic belt’s future development should prioritise “green development” and ecology as per China’s national “ecological civilisation” (生态文明).

The YRPL offers many opportunities. Aiming to addressing water resources management and the sustainable development of the Yangtze River basin by cutting across, the YRPL can strengthen China’s “ecological civilisation” and green development policies. However, the YRPL presents many challenges. How can the Chinese central government implement and enforce the YRPL at a local level? What kind of legal infrastructure or mechanisms are necessary to create a supporting environment to ensure the law’s success? In addition, will local interests try to overpower the basin-wide protection law? Many of the factories accused of polluting the Yangtze River contribute significant amounts of money to the gross domestic products (GDPs) of provinces. Will this, combined with socio-economic disparity between provinces, influence the YRPL’s implementation and effectiveness? Nonetheless, if successful, the YRPL may lead to the universal implementation of similar protection laws for other rivers in China.

Genevieve Donnellon-May is a research assistant with the Institute of Water Policy (IWP) at the National University of Singapore. Her research interests include China, Africa, transboundary governance, and the food-energy-water nexus. Genevieve’s work has been published by The Diplomat and the Wilson Center’s China Environment Forum.

Mark Wang is a human geographer specializing in development and environmental issues in China. He is a professor in School of Geography, Earth and Atmospheric Sciences and also the director of the Centre for Contemporary Chinese Studies at the University of Melbourne.

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

While the COVID-19 impact has been predominantly negative, the pandemic appears to have sparked increased interest in developing agricultural technology (agtech) to improve the efficiency of food systems, from input supplies through farming and processing to delivery and retail.

Paul S. Teng

During the pandemic, the international media highlighted phenomena like farmers dumping milk and feeding quality produce to cattle, vegetables rotting in fields due to lack of labour to harvest, increased food waste in urban environments, delays in supply of inputs for growing crops or feeding fish, and supermarkets with empty shelves. The pandemic has highlighted the need to produce more food locally and to use techniques which both minimize the use of labour and avoid a high carbon footprint. Governments have responded to some of these through policies and action. The private sector has responded even quicker, having detected investment opportunities to support solutions to these problems. Venture Capital funds like AgFunder and Yield Lab have set up their Asian bases in Singapore to support initiatives throughout the Asia-Pacific.

Some of the exciting new agtech developments deal with ensuring new sources of inputs for farming crops and fish. This is exemplified by waste valorization to extract valuable elements from water and biowaste that can be used to grow plants. Many new ventures use the Black Soldier Fly, a ubiquitous insect that feeds on food waste, to harvest larval protein directly or indirectly for use as feed supplements for fish and chicken. Countries like Singapore and Malaysia, which import almost all their agricultural inputs, have provided incentives to spur these activities so that they have more resilience in their supply of fertilizers and animal feed.

Genevieve Donnellon-May

There are also exciting developments to help farmers make better use of increasingly scarce or expensive inputs like water and fertilizer. Precision technologies, such as drip-irrigation which are supported by the monitoring of soil moisture and plant water status, are now available in several countries. One company has even developed technology to supply chilled, oxygen-enriched water to stimulate plants growth in the tropics.

In land-strapped countries like Singapore, the number of high tech vegetable and fish farms using vertical farming technology with multiple stacks of vegetables or fish tanks, and supported by digital tools to monitor the growing environment, and plant and fish growth, has increased dramatically during the pandemic. The Singapore government in fact enacted a “30 by 30” strategy to produce 30% of its nutrition needs (vegetables, fish and eggs) by 2030 and incentivized an accelerated research and development programme (called the Singapore Food Story) with some Singapore $144 Million to create new technologies that enable high-density farming. This follows on achievements in other Asian countries, notably Japan, China and South Korea, to increase their share of controlled-environment farming using indoor plant factories, a form of “Smart farming”. Moving forward, these indoor plant factories will also allow countries to address weather patterns attributable to climate change.

One of the significant set of activities precipitated by the pandemic has been on e-commerce – using telecommunications and the internet to link farmers to retailers, manufacturers to traders and food and beverage outlets to consumers at home. The growth of this sector has been spectacular in Asia as movement control measures to reduce the spread of the virus encouraged households to use the internet to order raw and cooked food. It is likely that this practice will continue even after the pandemic has become an endemic.

Apart from agtech, there has been similar growth in fintech and foodtech. Using digital technology and the widespread use of mobile phones and other portable personal devices, even giants like MastercardTM have entered this space of providing financial services to small farmers. Others have linked financial services to marketplace information. Likewise, foodtech is providing food processors and ultimately consumers with many new offerings, such as extending the shelf-life of vegetables and fruits with environment-friendly sealants and packaging are now in use. Precision fermentation technology has also seen an upsurge to produce more diverse plant-based protein, and in the near future, also cellular meat. Concern for the negative effects of producing animal protein on the environment and climate have spurred innumerable startup companies to venture into the “Alternative Protein” space. Furthermore, nutrition-enhanced food, such as with vitamin and essential minerals, is also likely to see an increase in the marketplace.

It can be argued that all the above would have happened even without the stimulus provided by the pandemic. But the pandemic has convincingly increased awareness on food security worldwide, and coupled with the COP26 climate summit urgings, has led to this increase in activity to use modern agtech, fintech and foodtech in sustaining our food systems.

Paul S. Teng is Adjunct Senior Fellow, Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies at Nanyang Technological University Singapore and concurrently Managing Director of NIE International Pte. Ltd. Singapore. He has worked in the Asia Pacific region on agri-food issues for over thirty years, with international organizations, academia and the private sector.

Genevieve Donnellon-May is a research assistant with the Institute of Water Policy (IWP) at the National University of Singapore. She is also a master’s student in Water Science, Policy and Management at the University of Oxford. Genevieve’s research interests include China, Africa, transboundary governance, and the food-energy-water nexus.

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau