By Greg Mills and - -
JOHANNESBURG, Nov 1 2003 (IPS)

As the date of its summit in Abuja, Nigeria, approaches (5-8 December), the Commonwealth finds itself polarised and apparently paralysed about what to do with Mugabe\’s Zimbabwe, writes Greg Nillas, National Director of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) and the author of \’\’Poverty to Prosperity: Globalisation, Good Governance and African Recovery\’\’. As a result of Robert Mugabe\’s misrule from Harare, half of Zimbabwe\’s 13 million citizens face starvation, and many live under constant physical threat from his government. This situation stands in dire contrast to the values set forth in the Harare Declaration, Mills writes in this article. Human rights issues now threaten to divide the Commonwealth between North and South, between the developed and developing world, between the largely white and the largely black member-states. In spite of the labelling of the Abuja meeting as \’\’Development and Democracy: Partnership for Peace and Prosperity\’\’, the agenda is likely to be dominated not only by Mugabe\’s Zimbabwe but also by the security situation in Iraq.

As the date of its summit in Abuja, Nigeria, approaches (5-8 December), the Commonwealth finds itself polarised and apparently paralysed about what to do with Mugabe’s Zimbabwe.

As a result of Robert Mugabe’s misrule from Harare, half of Zimbabwe’s thirteen million citizens face starvation, and many live under constant physical threat from his government.

This situation stands in dire contrast to the values set forth in the Harare Declaration which followed the 1991 summit, which stated the Commonwealth’s commitment to ”democracy, democratic processes and institutions which reflect national circumstances, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, just and honest government” and ”fundamental human rights, including equal rights and opportunities for all citizens regardless of race, colour, creed or political belief”.

At the postponed 2001 summit held in Australia, a decision was reached to suspend Zimbabwe’s membership. At the 12-month review of this decision, a troika comprising South Africa, as previous chairman, Australia, and Nigeria disagreed over the extension of the suspension. South Africa’s President Mbeki said this period had now lapsed; Prime Minister John Howard said it had not; and Nigeria’s president Olusegun Obasanjo leant towards South Africa’s view. In the end, Commonwealth secretary-general Don McKinnon, having canvassed opinion within the body, argued successfully for a review at the Abuja summit.

Comprising 54 countries with a combined population of 1.7 billion people, the Commonwealth ranges from the developed economies of Canada, Australia, Britain and New Zealand to micro-states in Polynesia. Over half of its member-states have populations under 1.5 million people, while its largest member, India, has around one billion. As Nelson Mandela has observed, the Commonwealth is ”a body straddling the North-South divide”.

During the apartheid years, South Africans’ views on the Commonwealth were shaped largely by the role it played as a leading critic of South Africa’s racial policies and as one of the chief proponents of sanctions. But whereas the white ruling National Party and its supporters viewed the association with hostility – as an irrelevant, unwarranted intrusion on sovereign matters – the South African opposition movements largely regarded its role as a positive contribution to the cause of liberation. As the ANC head Oliver Tambo said about his country’s readmission, “But the people of South Africa never left the Commonwealth”.

Human rights issues now threaten to divide the Commonwealth between North and South, between the developed and developing world, between the largely white and the largely black member-states. This should not come completely as a surprise, however. At the 1995 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting at Millbrook in New Zealand, then President Mandela raised South Africa’s head above the foreign policy parapet in soundly condemning Nigeria’s human rights record and calling for the suspension of the West African regime from the association. This event brought prominence not only to Pretoria’s role in international affairs but also, less positively, to how the absence of back-up from African states for Mandela’s principled stand illustrated the extent to which race and the ties between African leadership trumped human rights.

In the face of a threat of boycott from other members and also its ceremonial head Queen Elizabeth II, Obasanjo has told Mugabe to stay away from Abuja. But this is unlikely to remove Zimbabwe from the agenda given the report-back given by Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) members. Earlier this year Australia presented a report to CMAG chronicling recent human rights abuses, including cases of beatings with sticks wrapped in barbed wire, rape, and the existence of torture camps in Zimbabwe.

No doubt, too, in spite of the labelling of the Abuja meeting as ”Development and Democracy: Partnership for Peace and Prosperity”, the agenda is likely to be dominated not only by Mugabe’s Zimbabwe but also by the security situation in Iraq. This is unlikely to encourage a change in Tony Blair’s ambivalence thus far towards the Commonwealth as he and coalition ally John Howard come under scrutiny for their role in removing Saddam. Even though the meeting will also discuss the Commonwealth Plan of Action on Terrorism, progress in this regard is likely to be hamstrung by the absence also of President Pervez Musharraf, given Pakistan’s suspension since his 1999 coup.

Such debates run the risk of entirely obscuring the tangible benefits the association brings. Though its decisions are non-binding on its member-states, the Commonwealth provides, among many other things, a forum for sharing views on subjects as diverse as globalisation and global warming, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), access to the Commonwealth’s Private Investment Initiative, the provision of electoral and military-training assistance, access to the Commonwealth scholarship and fellowship plan, and benefits through the Commonwealth Science Council.

The Commonwealth will survive the Zimbabwe and Iraqi crises if, simply put, its members see unique benefits in its existence. While the smaller states in particular see it as a means of promoting their otherwise-neglected interests on the world stage, the larger emerging nations — notably South Africa and India — may see the importance of its role diminishing in the face of their own attempts to establish co-operative relationships more directly concerned with trade issues. But in a divided world, the presence of a set of common interests and shared history give the Commonwealth today high value in international relations. (END/COPYRIGHT IPS)

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By Greg Mills and - -
BARCELONA, Jan 1 2003 (IPS)

Just when the leadership of France and Germany was commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Elysee Treaty, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, irritated with Paris and Berlin for their opposition to war against Iraq, lashed out at the Franco-German position as simply coming from the \’\’old Europe\’\’, writes Joaquin Roy, Jean Monnet professor and Director of European Union Centre at the University of Miami. In this article for IPS, Roy writes that to believe that Lithuania, Slovakia, or even Poland, because of their fast conversion from satellites of the Soviet Union are today the true representatives of Europe is preposterous. In the post-September 11th world, the \’\’old Europe\’\’ is the one formed around the nucleus forged by two nations tragically mangled by self-inflicted wars that ended in near suicide (Germany) and humiliation and occupation (France) in World War II. Their leaders concluded that the only way to end their tendency to bloody conflict was to place the means of war under the control of common institutions. The grave danger raised by Rumsfeld\’s remark is that the US might persist in considering the European doubts irrelevant. The risk is that the US will decide to carry out the war by itself and believes that others will follow. Only when the cards are down on the Security Council table or the first shots are fired over Iraq will we know the truth. Until now, fortunately, only words and pots of ink have been launched. It is an improvement, given past experience.

Just when the leadership of France and Germany was commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Elysee Treaty, signed in 1963 by Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, irritated with Paris and Berlin for their opposition to war against Iraq, lashed out at the Franco-German position as simply coming from the ”old Europe”.

The ”new Europe”, supposedly constituted by the new members of NATO (Rumsfeld and President Bush never mention the European Union), apparently fully understands the new world scene, knows how to identify its dangers, and accepts mutual interests with the United States.

Shouts of outrage still resound in the European parliaments, op-ed pieces still burn in the most influential papers, and dramatic announcements still echo from the desks of TV anchorpersons. It seems as if the European leaders were just waiting for a new excuse to vent their criticism of recent US policies, and Rumsfeld offered them this opportunity on a silver platter.

Although Europe is no longer partitioned between ”West” and ”East” as it was during the Cold War, Washington is now inscribing a new division. But, what is the ”old Europe”? How is it different from the ”new”?

In the post-September 11th world, the ”old Europe” is the one formed around the nucleus forged by two nations tragically mangled by self-inflicted wars that ended in near suicide (Germany) and humiliation and occupation (France) in World War II. At the end of the 1940s, having learned their lesson from this slaughter, their respective leaders concluded that the only way to end once and for all their tendency to bloody conflict was to place the means of war under the control of common institutions.

On May 9, 1950, Robert Schuman, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, inspired by Jean Monnet, the adviser for economic reconstruction, issued at the Quai d’Orsay his now famous Declaration (”of interdependency”, as EU scholars fondly call it). France proposed to pool the coal and steel ndustries –the two main sectors involved in making war– and place them under a common authority.

The EU was created not merely to market coal and steel but ”to make war unthinkable”, as the Declaration reads. Just in case, it will also make war ”materially impossible”. The offer was intended for Germany, internationally prostrate, its industrial territories occupied. It was also an offer to all European states qualified to join.

Modern European integration began with the European Community of Coal and Steel, later transformed into the European Economic Community, and recently into the European Union. Its common currency, the euro, adopted in January 2002, was one of very few components of national sovereignty not yet fully shared. Now only a common defense remains to be realised: the Eurocorps are already in place, a military multinational conglomerate around a Franco-German nucleus with its headquarters in Strasbourg, a city that has changed sovereignty several times in the last two centuries. The Eurocorps is destined to be the basis for the EU’s Rapid Reaction Force, commissioned for peace-making and peace missions.

De Gaulle, who had a different concept of cooperation between the two states, decided in 1963 that Franco-German reconciliation required a more solemn pact. He offered Adenauer a place in history with the Elysee Treaty.

Both agreements, complementary and irreplaceable, have proven to be among the most successful processes of European history. Europeans have insisted on this method to solve differences and preserve peace, renouncing the use of force. The EU economic shield provided a complement to NATO, sending the message that the temptations of the centralized Soviet-led economy led down the wrong path.

To believe that Lithuania, Slovakia, or even Poland, because of their fast conversion from satellites of the Soviet Union are today the true representatives of Europe is as preposterous as believing that in 1985, about a decade after their transition from dictatorship to democracy, Spain and Portugal became the backbone of the EU.

The grave danger raised by Rumsfeld’s remark is that the United States might persist in considering the European doubts irrelevant. The risk is that the US will decide to carry out the war by itself and believes that others will follow. Only when all the cards are on the Security Council table or the first shots are fired over Iraq will we know the truth. Until now, fortunately, only words and pots of ink have been launched. It is an improvement, given past experience. (END/COPYRIGHT IPS)

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