Credit: US Department of Defense / Wiki Commons

By Herbert Wulf
Apr 6 2026 (IPS)

 
Donald Trump ran on a platform of ending wars. After his success in Venezuela, he is intoxicated by his military achievements and is banking on regime change in several countries.

In a swift and decisive move, US forces abducted Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and his wife to the United States. The current government in Caracas has little choice but to largely submit to Washington’s dictates. Trump’s motives for the war against Iran remain unclear, partly because the US president has cited various reasons: to finally destroy the Iranian nuclear program, to end the Iranian threat to the Middle East, to support the Iranian people, and to overthrow the terrible regime in Tehran. He remains vague about his reasoning and seems to make off the cuff suggestions for regime change. Trump had a lofty idea at how he envisions the end of this war. He has suggested “unconditional surrender,” followed by his personal involvement in the selection of a successor: I must be involved in picking Iran’s next leader.

The swift victory against Iran failed to materialize, an end to the war is not in sight, and a new leader has been chosen without Trump’s involvement. The structures of the mullah regime appear so entrenched that the anticipated regime change following the rapid decapitation of the leadership did not occur. Yet Donald Trump had proclaimed: “What we did in Venezuela is, in my opinion, the perfect, the perfect scenario.” The Atlantic calls this attitude a “hostile corporate takeover of an entire country”. Now the US government expects Cuba to surrender. “I think I could do anything I want” with Cuba, Trump declared, now that the island is virtually cut off from energy supplies and its economy is in ruins. He is demanding the removal of Cuban President Diaz-Canel.

In the business world hostile corporate takeovers sometimes work, sometimes they fail. Similarly with Trump’s idea of swift government surrenders. In the case of Iran, he was misguided by the Wall Street playbook. Irresponsibly, he called on Iranians to overthrow the government before the bombing campaign started. Regime change in Iran has now been forgotten and Trump is agnostic about democracy. He is interested to get the oil price down and the stock market up.

Lessons from the past

The concept of regime change—replacing the top of the government to install one more agreeable to the US—is not new to US foreign policy. Proponents of regime change usually point to Japan and Germany as positive examples of successful democratization. Often, however, the goal is not, or at least not primarily, democratization, but rather the installation of a government that is ideologically close to the US or amenable to them. But the “Trump Corollary”, as explicitly stated in the National Security Strategy to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, is not new either. In reality, it was already the Kennedy, Nixon, Reagan, and Bush doctrine.

Both Trump’s idea of regime change and his rigorously pursued territorial ambitions (Canada, Greenland, the Panama Canal) are reminiscent of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, particularly the version of this doctrine expanded by President Roosevelt in 1904. This doctrine legitimized American interventions in Latin America. At the beginning of the 20th century, the US intervened in numerous Latin American countries in ‘its backyard’, using military and intelligence means: in Colombia, to support Panamanian separatists in controlling the Panama Canal; repeatedly in the Dominican Republic; they occupied Cuba from 1906 to 1909 and intervened there repeatedly afterward; in Nicaragua during the so-called ‘Banana War’, to protect the interests of the US company United Fruit; in Mexico, as well as in Haiti and Honduras.

The New York Times recently suggested that Trump’s current enthusiasm for regime change is most comparable to that of Dwight D. Eisenhower. During his two terms in office from 1953 to 1961, the once coldly calculating general allowed himself to be seduced into a downward spiral from one coup to the next. In 1953, the US succeeded in overthrowing the elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh with Operation Ajax. Mossadegh wanted to nationalize the British-owned oil industry. The coup succeeded with CIA support. The US installed the Shah as its puppet. He ruled with absolute power until the so-called Iranian Revolution and the dictatorship of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. After the successful overthrow of the government in Iran, Eisenhower decided to intervene in Guatemala. The elected president, Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán, who initiated far-reaching land reform laws, was overthrown in a coup d’état in 1954 and replaced by the pro-American colonel, Castillo Armas.

During this period, the US government also formulated the so-called domino theory, which aimed to prevent governments, particularly in Asia, from aligning themselves with the Soviet Union. The assumption was that if one domino fell, others would follow. It was during this time that the costly war in Korea ended in an armistice. Therefore, countries like Vietnam, Laos, Burma, Indonesia, and others were on Eisenhower’s domino list. However, the destabilization campaigns carried out by the CIA sometimes had the opposite effect. Governments in Indonesia and Syria emerged strengthened from the interventions. Eisenhower left Kennedy with the loss of American influence in Cuba. The failed Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, intended to overthrow Fidel Castro, was the starting point for the decades-long blockade of Cuba, which Trump is determined to end now through regime change.

The most dramatic example of failed regime change in recent history is undoubtedly the Iraq War, which began in 2003 under President George W. Bush. The stated goal was to remove Saddam Hussein from power and destroy his weapons of mass destruction. The war led to the overthrow of the regime. The United Nations and US teams found no weapons of mass destruction despite intensive on-site investigations. Attempts to establish an orderly state in Iraq failed. These experiences, and especially the disastrous outcome of two decades of military intervention in Afghanistan, discredited the concept of regime change.

What are the implications?

The most important lesson taught by efforts to affect externally forced regime change is that interventions often lead to crises that were ostensibly meant to be prevented or solved. The temptation was too great for Trump to miss the opportunity to depose the despised Maduro government.

Scholarly studies of the numerous attempted regime changes and democratization efforts reveal three key findings. First, simply removing the government from power (whether through assassination, as in the case of Saddam Hussein in Iraq or now in Iran, or through kidnapping as in Venezuela) is insufficient, as such actions often lead to chaos, state collapse, or even civil war. Thus, it will be interesting to watch further developments in Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran.

A second lesson from empirical studies of regime change is that democratization is more likely to succeed if democratic experience already existed in the country. However, this is often not the case.

Finally, if the real goal is democratization (and not just to secure spheres of influence or oil supplies etc.), it is far more promising not only to hold elections (as in Afghanistan, for example), but to renounce violence and initiate a long-term program with development aid and support for civil society.

Whether the US government will be impressed by these findings, or even acknowledge them, is doubtful. Currently, the American president is euphoric, despite the strong reaction from the Iranian government which he, surprisingly, did not expect. His promises to end the senseless wars and not start any new ones, however, seem to have been forgotten.

Related articles:
The US: Good at Starting but Bad at Ending Wars
Failure of US–Iran Talks Was All Too Predictable — But Turning to Military Strikes Creates Dangerous Unknowns
The ‘Donroe Doctrine’
The Return of the Ugly American

Herbert Wulf is a Professor of International Relations and former Director of the Bonn International Center for Conflict Studies (BICC). He is presently a Senior Fellow at BICC, an Adjunct Senior Researcher at the Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg/Essen, Germany, and a Research Affiliate at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, New Zealand. He serves on the Scientific Council of SIPRI.

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.

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Credit: Masson/shutterstock.com

By Herbert Wulf
DUISBURG, Germany, Dec 19 2024 (IPS)

Donald Trump, president-elect of the USA, wants to end the Ukraine war within a day, as he has emphasized several times, but without saying how. Despite the brutal clashes on the ground in Ukraine, do negotiations now have a chance? Are we near to a “ripe moment” for negotiations?

The war continues unabated. There is no end in sight. Can we hope that Donald Trump will find a personal connection to Vladimir Putin to end this war? The phone call on 15 November between German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Putin – the first telephone contact in two years – was sobering because Putin only reaffirmed his already known positions: He is ready for negotiations, but only on his terms. In other words, recognition of the “new territorial realities” and “consideration of Russian security interests”. In concrete terms, this would mean the handover of the four regions in eastern Ukraine, parts of which are occupied by Russia, and Crimea. Scholz called for negotiations with the aim of a “just and lasting peace”, which is primarily aimed at the withdrawal of Russian troops.

The Russian attack and Ukrainian defence have turned into a war of exhaustion, with current military advantages for Russia. The Russian strategy can be described as an escalation with the hope of a military victory. So far, Ukraine and its supporters have reacted with intense resistance. Western support has escalated with the delivery of more effective weapons and belief that victory is still possible. But increasingly a certain fatigue can be felt among them and Trump has made it clear that the massive support will no longer come from the USA.

What is the consequence for the Ukraine war, and what is the alternative to this battle with more and more deaths? Negotiations now? Is there a chance for peace without military victory? But neither side is ready yet for serious negotiations. Ukrainian President Volodymir Zelensky was not happy about Scholz’s initiative and spoke of a policy of appeasement, also because the call counteracts Putin’s international isolation.

The American political scientist William Zartman speaks of the necessary “ripeness” of a conflict as a prerequisite for the success of negotiations. The concept of “ripe moments” centres, according to Zartman, on the adversaries’ perceptions of “hurting stalemates”. The willingness to negotiate increases when both sides realize that a military victory is not possible and that the military potential, i.e. soldiers and weapons, is no longer sufficient. The depressing conclusion is that today, even after almost 1,000 days of war, this situation does not exist in Russia or Ukraine. But the increasing logistical bottlenecks on both sides, the irreplaceable, irrecoverable and permanent losses are perhaps an indication that the conflict is in a process of maturing for negotiations. Even Russia, with its present territorial advances, seems not able to replace its casualties. The arrival of about 10,000 North Korean troops in Russia raises the question of whether the Kremlin can make up for its enormous losses.

Different scenarios

Four scenarios are conceivable, all of which are far from an ideal solution.

First, it is not inconceivable that the war, which has now lasted almost three years, with all its destruction and loss of life, will continue for another few years without an end in sight.

Second, Donald Trump could actually strike a deal with Vladimir Putin, presumably at the expense of Ukraine. Trump believes in deals. Russia would receive the parts of Ukraine it occupies, a demilitarized zone would be established along this border within Ukraine, Ukraine would receive security guarantees (from NATO, the United Nations, or a grouping of neutral states), and a peace treaty would be postponed until later. And “later” could mean decades without a peace treaty.

Third, one side could win militarily. Unlikely, but not completely out of the question. The Kremlin firmly believes in this possibility and is assured by its territorial gains in recent weeks. At the same time, the Russian leadership underestimated Ukraine’s will to resist at the beginning of the full invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and then had to significantly limit its war goals, the overthrow of the government in Kyiv and the integration of Ukraine into the Russian Federation.

The fourth scenario, a ceasefire and a frozen conflict. There are a number of conflicts that are in this state of having no real solution. In recent years, the situation in Korea has been referred to several times in order to consider a similar solution to the Ukraine war. This scenario is perhaps the most likely.

Ceasefire and a frozen conflict: The Korean solution

Of course, every conflict is different, and the respective conditions also differ. Nevertheless, there might be both conflict patterns and patterns of conflict resolution that could provide clues to Ukraine’s future. Sergey Radchenko, a historian at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in the US, pointed out parallels to the Korean War in an op-ed in the New York Times after a year of the Ukraine war. More than 70 years ago, in July 1953, an armistice agreement and the establishment of a demilitarized zone led to the freezing of this war and the division of Korea into two separate states.

Recently, Joseph S. Nye, one of the most influential political scientists in the USA, pointed to a “Korean solution” in an article entitled “What Would Victory in Ukraine Look Like?”. He writes: “If Ukraine defines victory as the return of all land that Russia has occupied since 2014, victory is not in sight. But if it aims to maintain its independence as a prosperous democracy linked to Europe, while reserving its right to the ultimate return of its territory, victory remains possible.” The Korean War also swayed back and forth from 1950 to 1953. Like what is happening now in Ukraine, neither the north nor the south, nor their respective supporters, were prepared to end the war quickly because of hopes of a military victory. The Korean armistice agreement of July 1953 stipulated the status quo ante with the division of the country at the 38th parallel. Korea is still a divided country, and the conflict is a frozen one. A peace treaty was never concluded and the so-called demilitarized zone along the border between the two states is one of the most militarized borders in the world. A permanent ceasefire was reached without a peace agreement.

Proponents of a “Korean solution” point out that the destruction and loss of life has ended, and that South Korea has now become a resilient democracy and emerging economic power. Democratic development and integration in Western Europe could then follow in the same way in Ukraine.

Critics of such a solution describe the Korean ceasefire as a “non-solution”. The Swiss historian Roland Popp, who researches at the Military Academy of the University ETH Zurich, writes that this Korean solution “also covers four decades of one of the most brutal dictatorships in the world, massacres of tens of thousands of civilians … or the assassination of the president by the director of the South Korean CIA in 1979.” And he points to the immense costs and uncertainties for Western Europe.

In 1953, a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was set up in Korea. In the more than seven decades of the existence of the armistice agreement there have been numerous military skirmishes on the border. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is a threat, just as the North calls the South Korean military with its ally the United States a threat. Precisely for this reason, is it remarkable that this agreement has prevented a new war with heavy losses for more than seven decades. The consequences of a Korean solution for the situation in Europe would probably also mean, as in the case of the Korean peninsula, arms races as during the early days of the Cold War

Neutral states could also play an important role in ending the Ukraine war: for example, India, South Africa, Brazil or Switzerland. If neither side makes significant gains in Ukraine, a ceasefire would not be impossible. Presumably, the Ukrainians would not regain all the territories occupied by Russia. Russia could interpret the abandonment of its actual goal as a partial victory in order to save face. The conflict would be frozen. Not a nice result, but still the end of the war. A frozen conflict is better than a hot war. But the history of frozen wars shows that they can turn into hot wars again at any time. In the case of Ukraine, the imposition of an unfair solution could possibly result in Ukrainian partisan resistance.

A possible fifth scenario, a peace agreement that is binding under international law, with an agreement between Russia and Ukraine, currently seems to be completely out of the question.

Related articles by this author:
– Agonizing over Europe’s Defence: Some Narratives are Getting Ahead of the Facts
– Boots on the ground
– Ten Take-Aways on Russia’s War and Five Ideas for the Future of Ukraine and Beyond

Herbert Wulf is a Professor of International Relations and former Director of the Bonn International Center for Conflict Studies (BICC). He is presently a Senior Fellow at BICC, an Adjunct Senior Researcher at the Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg/Essen, Germany, and a Research Affiliate at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, New Zealand. He serves on the Scientific Council of SIPRI.

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.

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2022 Year in Review: As conflicts rage, international dialogue remains ‘the only hope’ for peace. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine creating global upheaval, and war, conflict, and unrest blighting all parts of the world in 2022. The UN stressed the importance of international dialogue, and announced plans for a new peace agenda. Credit United Nations

By Herbert Wulf
DUISBURG, Germany, Jan 11 2023 (IPS)

If our societies are to become resilient and sustainable, our priorities must change towards de-escalation, including in diplomacy and economy.

Putin’s war against Ukraine has not only damaged the international cooperative security architecture, it has permanently destroyed it. The Helsinki Act of 1975, the Charter of Paris of 1990 and the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 created a basis for security cooperation in Europe – even ‘a new era of democracy, peace and unity’, as the Charter of Paris was euphorically titled. At least, that is how the heads of state saw it in the decade after the end of the Cold War.

Today, the war in Ukraine casts a long shadow over European and global security. Cooperation and collaboration have been replaced by military confrontation. Economic cooperation has been shattered, fear of dependency in the energy sector has led to a turning point and the concept of the positive effect of economic interdependence (‘change through trade’) has proven to be a misperception not only in the case of Russia but also with respect to the relationship of the USA and its Asian and European allies against China.

On the contrary, the turn towards confrontational, essentially military-based defence policies can be felt all over the world. Global military spending is at an all-time high of over two trillion US dollars.

Given the budget announcements for the next few years, this sum will continue to rise rapidly in the future. Nuclear weapons have come back into focus. After Russia’s surprising attack, which was hardly considered possible, it is understandable that now – as a first reflex – arms are being upgraded, that economic dependencies are being reduced and, of course, there are concerns about critical infrastructure.

It is not only about traditional military threats. The boundaries between war and peace have become blurred. Hybrid warfare, the use of mercenaries, cyber warfare, destruction of critical infrastructure, undermining social cohesion with disinformation campaigns and election interference, sanctions and other measures of economic warfare have become the standard of international conflict.

De-escalation on three levels

Is there a way out of the constant political, economic and above all military escalation? Despite the apparent hopelessness of an end to the power struggle with Putin, despite the escalated situation in East Asia, despite the many now less noticed wars and conflicts – be it Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan or Mali – it is necessary to think about the possible end of these wars. This should happen in parallel on three levels: security, diplomacy and economy.

With all understanding for the hectic procurement of new weapons now being commissioned in the sign of the turn of the times, it should be noted that security policy is more than defence with weapons. Even if there is currently no path in sight for a negotiated solution to the Ukraine war, such a solution should still be considered.

Ultimately, this war can only be ended through agreements at the negotiating table. Even though Russia started the war in Ukraine in violation of international law and is obviously committing war crimes, in the long term there can be no peace in Europe without Russia and certainly not against Russia.

Respect for Russian security interests, however difficult this may be because of Russian aggression and Putin’s fantasy ideas of Russia, is a prerequisite for de-escalation and serious negotiations.

Geopolitics that maximises only one’s own advantages leads to a dangerous dead end: the clash is pre-programmed.

Many countries rely on a militarily supported geostrategic foreign policy. China’s assertive military, foreign and economic policies are rightly viewed with concern. But the EU also wants to become militarily autonomous.

The US is trying to find partners for its policy conducted in competition with China. Other powers such as Australia, Japan or India are also positioning themselves in rivalry to China.

Instead of focusing on geopolitics, it is necessary to focus on values (democracy, human rights) and binding rules (international law), even if Putin is blatantly violating international law and ‘democracy’ is a foreign word in China. It is necessary to change the narrative significantly.

‘The West’, which demands rule of law and democracy with rigour, has all too often emphasised these values and principles in a know-it-all manner – ‘the West against the rest’. Often enough, double standards were applied and these values were not observed by ‘the West’ itself, such as in the so-called war on terror and the war in Iraq.

If these principles and projects for democracy and against autocracy are to be convincing, then one must completely abandon the concept of ‘the West’ and try to cultivate partnership-based – and not Euro-centric (or ‘Westro-centric’) – relations with democratic countries. In short, geopolitics that maximises only one’s own advantages leads to a dangerous dead end: the clash is pre-programmed.

Is the sole answer of ‘the West’ to keep the upper hand in the geopolitical competition by military means? Economically, it makes sense to reduce dependencies and diversify supply chains. This cannot be done through radical decoupling, but must be done gradually.

Obviously, the shock of the pandemic, but above all Russia’s possibilities to blackmail by stopping energy deliveries, have changed the priorities a little. But by no means all priorities. At no time since the early 1990s has the military burden on global income been as high as it is today: well over two per cent with a trend towards further increases.

The need for timely disarmament

Should the new era (Zeitenwende) consist only of a return to old-fashioned patterns of the military-supported use of force? Arms control is not taking place at the moment. The United Nations and other arms control forums have been pushed to the side. But arms control and de-escalation must already now be considered, even if the Kremlin is still opposed to them and the Chinese leadership is hardly responsive to them at present.

The continuation of the current course leads globally to a situation that is becoming more dangerous than the confrontation in the heyday of the Cold War, since the world is now also seriously endangered by the climate crisis.

Almost all arms exports are accounted for by the G20 and 98 per cent of nuclear warheads are stored in their arsenals.

Although the risks of climate change and armament are well known, there is currently no reversal of this trend in sight. The two crises are heading towards a seemingly unavoidable catastrophe. After the old-world order – with a halfway functioning multilateralism, compromises and give-and-take – was replaced by nationalist aspirations, which then led to a breach of international law in the case of Russia, by an emphasis on nuclear weapons and by the pursuit of supposed self-interest, the goals of the climate agreements are being missed and arms control treaties are being ground down.

Geopolitically ambitious powers such as China, India, Turkey, Brazil, South Africa or Saudi Arabia must be integrated into arms control efforts. Almost ‘naturally’, the G20 summits offer themselves as a forum for this.

The G20 initially focused their talks primarily on macroeconomic issues, but have since also negotiated on sustainable development, energy, the environment and climate change – but not seriously on global security policy.

However, the G20 member countries are responsible for 82 per cent of global military spending. Almost all arms exports are accounted for by the G20 and 98 per cent of nuclear warheads are stored in their arsenals. Today’s military-based arms efforts are concentrated in the G20.

Since the members of this exclusive G20 club are also the main perpetrators of climate change, they bear the main responsibility for the two current catastrophic trends.

Moreover, there are links between climate and arms policy that are most clearly reflected in the wars and violent conflicts of the last decades, the movements of refugees, migrant flows and corresponding counter-reactions.

If our societies are to become more resilient and more ecologically sustainable, then priorities must be changed, and then such a large share of resources cannot be permanently poured into the military – without any prospect of de-escalation. Our current shift must therefore contain more than the present rearmament.

Since the members of this exclusive G20 club are also the main perpetrators of climate change, they bear the main responsibility for the two current catastrophic trends. So, it is time to remind them of their responsibility and urge them to turn back. Perhaps the fact that India is chairing the G20 this year can be used to put security policy prominently on the forum’s agenda.

After all, India has refused to adopt Western sanctions against Russia, citing its own interests. In doing so, the government in Delhi – similar to some other countries in the G20 group (Brazil, South Africa and Turkey) – has kept an open door for potential talks. In order to enable a turning point towards a global security order and cooperation in the climate crisis, more is needed than the current clear military positioning of ‘the West’ in confrontation with Russia.

It is to be hoped that the leading powers of the Global South will strive for a rules-based, multilateral world order within the framework of the G20 talks. That there are possibilities for a security order that looks beyond Europe, as hinted at by Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar, when he confidently stated: ‘Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s.’

Herbert Wulf, Director of the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) from its foundation in 1994 until 2001, is currently a Senior Fellow at BICC and an Adjunct Senior Researcher at the Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg/Essen where he was previously a Deputy Director.

Source: Source: International Politics and Society (IPS)-Journal published by the International Political Analysis Unit of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Hiroshimastrasse 28, D-10785 Berlin

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For a long time – and too long for the North Korean government – the issue of North Korea and its nuclear programme has been pushed into the background on the international stage. With the swearing-in of Joe Biden as president, however, it will be on the agenda sooner or later. Credit: UN photo

By Herbert Wulf
DUISBURG, Germany, Feb 10 2021 (IPS)

How long can Kim Jong-un wait patiently? After a euphoric start, the Trump administration ultimately proved to be a bitter disappointment for the North Korean regime.

During the meetings between Trump and Kim Jong-un, there was grandiose talk of an imminent deal to de-nuclearize the Korean peninsula. In the negotiations that followed, it quickly became apparent that the two heads of state had simply brushed over the practical problems and fundamental differences of the American-North Korean rapprochement.

For at least two years since then, there has been radio silence. After four years of erratic policy, Pyongyang is waiting to see what the Biden government’s position will be on North Korea. But it cannot expect to receive a quick answer from Washington.

While Biden has years of foreign policy experience, his administration’s first priorities are domestic: dealing with the coronavirus pandemic, the devastating economic slump, deep social divisions, the fight against racism and the consequences of the Capitol riot on 6 January.

It is therefore not unlikely that North Korea – in a manner we’ve seen in the past – will provocatively launch missiles and test nuclear warheads, continue to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, spark conflict at the inner-Korean border and insult politicians in Seoul and Washington.

With such actions teetering at the brink, the North Korean government has often tried to attract international attention – with the aim of overcoming the economically damaging isolation of the country and easing the sanctions that have been imposed.

Three approaches to North Korea

For a long time – and too long for the North Korean government – the issue of North Korea and its nuclear programme has been pushed into the background on the international stage. With the swearing-in of Joe Biden as president, however, it will be on the agenda sooner or later.

Herbert Wulf

First, the denuclearization paradigm: its advocates argue that North Korea must make preliminary efforts – that is, scale back or at least freeze parts of its nuclear and missile programme – before negotiations can be conducted and sanctions can be eased or lifted.

In the long term, the goal is complete nuclear disarmament. Maintaining pressure and coercive measures, then, is absolutely necessary to persuade the North Korean government to adopt such a policy.

At the same time, this thinking also emphasises military cooperation with American allies South Korea and Japan. In the past, however, maximalist positions have not been able to divert North Korea from its course – not least because China and Russia in particular have only half-heartedly supported the isolation of North Korea.

In North Korea, unrest and impatience are on the rise. The Kim regime no longer wants to be treated as an international pariah.

The second approach provides for gradual nuclear disarmament with a simultaneous easing of economic sanctions. This paradigm reflects that the North Korean regime views its nuclear programme as life insurance and is unwilling to take preliminary steps in arms control or disarmament.

It acknowledges, but does not accept, that North Korea makes policy by means of nuclear weapons. At the heart of this second strategy are reciprocity and simultaneity. Measures would need to be taken to freeze certain nuclear facilities in North Korea while providing humanitarian or economic assistance from the US and other countries, as envisioned in the June 2018 meeting between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un in Singapore and the February 2019 meeting in Hanoi.

As we know, the second summit in Hanoi was broken off prematurely because of irreconcilable differences. But that does not mean that such a strategy is doomed to fail from the outset.

According to its proponents, a process that is gradually set in motion would be mutually beneficial and would initiate a process of détente step by step. If appropriate confidence-building measures take effect, the tricky situation in Korea could be resolved, as was the case between the East and West in Europe in the 1980s.

The third possible variant is based on maintaining strategic stability – being patient in the name of stability and not to tamper with existing conditions. To put it in a less positive way: ‘Wait and see while doing nothing.’

This was the policy followed by the Obama administration. At the same time, the US attempted to build up international pressure. However, during the eight years of Obama, North Korea succeeded in expanding and modernizing its missile and nuclear programme.

The risks of Biden’s ‘wait and see’ approach

It is not unlikely that the Biden government will again adopt this paradigm. As Vice President, Biden supported this North Korea policy. For the new administration, this would have the advantage of not having to decide on a new policy model – at least initially, as the policy of waiting and doing nothing has implicitly continued for the past two years.

No serious negotiations have since taken place. An additional advantage for Biden would be that he would not have to immediately act in all of the crucial political areas at the same time, and this would allow him to pursue his domestic political priorities.

The big disadvantage, however – as past experience shows – is that the North Korean government will presumably not stand by idly. In all likelihood, it will push forward its missile and nuclear programme with all available means. Relying on its own military means –nuclear weapons first and foremost – is a high priority for the regime.

In North Korea, unrest and impatience are on the rise. The Kim regime no longer wants to be treated as an international pariah. It has only now publicly acknowledged the need for economic reform.

Effective reforms will require an end to isolation and at least an easing of sanctions. Negotiating on an equal footing with Donald Trump was an important symbolic act for Kim Jong-un at the time. It was celebrated accordingly in Pyongyang, even if it ultimately did not lead to the desired change in foreign policy relations.

There is reason to fear that for now, North Korea will not be a top priority in Washington’s foreign policy, nor will negotiations that pursue a strategy of gradual disarmament and rapprochement. Meanwhile, Pyongyang may begin to lose patience. But further missile launches and nuclear tests would spoil the chances for a long-term North Korean policy for the US.

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