Credit: United Nations

By Izumi Nakamitsu
UNITED NATIONS, Apr 9 2020 (IPS)

Humanity has faced no challenge greater than COVID-19 since the Second World War. As this rapidly developing global health emergency places unprecedented strain on our medical, economic and social systems, we must work hard to prevent new risks for instability, unrest and conflict.

The pandemic arrived as our frameworks to prevent catastrophic confrontation are crumbling. Countries are building faster and more accurate nuclear arms, developing new weapon technologies with unpredictable implications and pouring more resources into militaries than at any point in decades.

In the 75-year history of the United Nations, the folly of seeking security in vast destructive arsenals has never been clearer.Nor has the need to finally put the brakes on this deadly addiction.

Recognizing this, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) remains fully active and committed to the important work of disarmament. We are adapting our working methods and substantive activities to continue operations during the COVID-19 crisis.

Our staff strives to be nimble and flexible, and we are carrying on work around the world to help people in all States apply every tool of disarmament to build a more peaceful and secure future.

I will explain how the pandemic is affecting each area of our Office’s work. I will also share some of the changes we are making to continue fulfilling our mandates and advancing the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament.

Working to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction

Our Office is working tirelessly with the States Parties of relevant treaties, instruments and bodies, as well as civil society and other actors, to continue pursuing a world free of all nuclear weapons and secure against threats from biological or chemical weapons.

The largest immediate impact of COVID-19 has been the postponement of the 2020 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which would have been an opportunity to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty’s entry into force and the twenty-fifth year since its indefinite extension.

It is important to remember, however, that the Review Conference will take place as soon as circumstances permit, fulfilling its tasks so critical to our collective security. We are working with the president-designate and bureau to make sure this happens.

Likewise, we are working with States and our colleagues across the Secretariat and the United Nations system to explore all options—from virtual meetings to online exercises—to help prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors; support instruments and processes from the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction; enhance the preparedness of the existing Secretary-General’s Mechanism for the investigation of the use of chemical, biological and toxin weapons; and assist the Security Council in efforts to hold the perpetrators of chemical weapons use accountable.

Izumi Nakamitsu. Credit: United Nations

Tackling threats from conventional weapons

As Member States review plans to hold the Seventh Biennial Meeting of States on the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons from 15 to 19 June, the Office for Disarmament Affairs is continuing to support the entire process for the meeting, including an elaboration of the Secretary-General’s report on small arms and light weapons.

With regard to the Group of Governmental Experts on “Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus”, we are facilitating arrangements to hold discussions from 20 to 24 April, as scheduled, in a virtual, informal format. Our staff also continues to support the Chair in bilateral consultations with Experts during the intersessional period.

While the COVID-19 pandemic has delayed some of our practical support for conventional arms-focused projects in beneficiary countries, our Office continues to carry out essential preparatory work to guarantee their successful full implementation when the situation allows.

These temporary impacts extend to our European Union-funded project on Gender and Small Arms and Light Weapons, which we are continuing through the development of online training and desk research.

The global health emergency is similarly affecting our Office’s support for the African Union’s “Silencing the Guns” initiative through the Africa Amnesty Month Project, but we are carrying on consultations and coordination with national counterparts and key project partners, desk research, and preparation of workshop and sensitization material.

With our new funding mechanism, the Saving Lives Entity (SALIENT), the Office for Disarmament Affairs is collaborating with the United Nations Development Programme and the Peacebuilding Support Office to finalize administrative project documentation and compile terms of reference for field assessment missions in the beneficiary countries.

Our Office will also continue to service and update, as appropriate, the databases for our transparency mechanisms, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures. Meanwhile, the United Nations SaferGuard Technical Review Board continues to actively engage through an online platform to review the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines. This review is expected to be finalized by the end of 2020, as scheduled.

Addressing emerging weapon technologies

Despite the postponement of the Disarmament Commission’s annual session, my Office continues to work closely with the Office for Outer Space Affairs and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research to facilitate the next steps in multilateral deliberations to address the disarmament aspects of outer space.

These steps will include implementing and further developing transparency and confidence-building measures as well as elaborating effective measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We will also continue to engage on these issues within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament and the General Assembly First Committee.

With regard to the Open-ended Working Group and the Group of Governmental Experts on information and telecommunications in the context of international security, I am committed to working with the Chair of each process to assess the need to change its meeting schedule.

To date, the Chair of the Open-ended Working Group has had to cancel a round of intersessional consultations scheduled for 30 and 31 March on the pre-draft of the Group’s report, requesting written contributions from delegations instead. Possible impacts on the other meetings of the two processes will be reviewed on an ongoing basis.

Ensuring continuity in Geneva-based disarmament processes

In Geneva, where the core business is to support meetings of disarmament conventions and bodies, COVID-19 is likely to impact meeting plans throughout the year.

So far, the Conference on Disarmament could not hold plenary meetings from 16 to 27 March as planned. With its session scheduled to resume on 25 May, our Office is supporting the current President in holding virtual consultations with the other Presidents of the 2020 session as well as regional coordinators.

The pandemic is also affecting planned consultations of other Geneva-based disarmament conventions. Our staff in Geneva is undertaking extensive consultations with office holders, States Parties and stakeholders to identify options ranging from cancellation to postponement to virtual alternatives.

We are also continuing our substantive support to these disarmament processes to the fullest extent possible.

Our Office is also pushing ahead in efforts to strengthen the financial sustainability of Geneva-based conventions. We are working closely with States to promote tools and platforms to address structural challenges across Conventions, while also increasing accountability, ownership and transparency.

Our projects in support of the Biological Weapons Convention and a prospective fissile material cut-off treaty are largely ongoing. We are also preparing strategic communications to mark the forty-fifth anniversary of the Biological Weapons Convention entering into force and the fortieth anniversary of the adoption of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.

Advancing disarmament education

In Vienna, the Office for Disarmament Affairs is continuing preparations to implement the online portion of the joint project on disarmament education it is undertaking with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Recently, this programme finished selecting 150 participants from a competitive field of more than 1,000 candidates. While the project’s eight-week online portion will commence on 6 April as planned, both organizations have agreed to postpone its in-person segment in Vienna.

We are also working with our partners to explore further development of our online disarmament education materials.

Promoting women’s empowerment & equal representation in disarmament

In a year that held much promise for celebrating and further accelerating progress and partnerships for gender equality and women’s empowerment, including in disarmament processes and forums, the COVID-19 crisis creates added uncertainty around the ability to advance this agenda amidst the competing priorities of Governments.

Our Office remains committed to promoting women’s leadership and full, equal and meaningful participation in all disarmament processes, including in meetings held in a virtual format, and to strengthening analysis and approaches that take into account the gendered impact of different weapons.

Promoting disarmament at the regional level

The three regional centres of the Office for Disarmament Affairs continue to operate and maintain regular contact with donors and beneficiary States. Although the pandemic has forced the postponement of in-person programmatic activities in Africa, in Latin America and the Caribbean, and in Asia and the Pacific, the centres continue to undertake related efforts that do not entail travel and operations on the ground.

In this regard, they are elaborating substantive notes, supporting the drafting of national action plans and carrying out other, similar functions.

Meanwhile, ongoing preparations for meetings and workshops by our Office will allow the centres to rapidly resume their full operations at the soonest opportunity. In addition, the regional centres continue to engage with donors on new projects.

Communicating with stakeholders

Our Office remains committed to providing Member States, the diplomatic community, non-governmental organizations and the public at large with unbiased, up-to-date and relevant information on multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control through our website and social media channels.

We are also continuing our work on upcoming publications, including the forty-fourth annual edition of the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook.

As States continue to finalize arrangements for upcoming meetings, we will keep interested stakeholders informed of their status regarding cancellations, postponements or virtual arrangements.

Our Office is also continuing its efforts to engage, educate and empower young people through online resources, including e-newsletters and the development of a dedicated youth website.

Looking ahead

The COVID-19 pandemic will test us all, and like World War II, it will transform our world in ways that are unforeseeable.

But let’s remember, unlike the trials of that horrific world war, we all face this crisis together.

This pandemic has the potential to unite societies, institutions and individuals, just as the hard lessons of the Second World War laid the foundation for deeper international cooperation and stronger institutions to support our common security.

The Office for Disarmament Affairs will remain a steady partner in our collective effort to prevent this global health emergency from breeding conflict.

And I sincerely hope that in our solidarity through this crisis, we will realize we can transcend our entrenched divisions to pursue our highest collective aspirations.

These include ensuring healthy lives, promoting the well-being of every citizen across the planet, and striving to build a peaceful and secure world for all.

Let us put humanity at the centre of our security.

Excerpt:

Credit: UN peacekeeping

By Izumi Nakamitsu
STOCKHOLM, Oct 10 2019 (IPS)

Throughout history, technology has transformed armed conflict. The carnage of First World War battlefields is a stark example of what happens when advances in weaponry outpace the normative frameworks around its use.

Today, we are experiencing a technological revolution that holds incredible promise for human development and welfare. From genome editing to quantum computing and artificial intelligence, emerging technologies offer us powerful new ways to achieve our shared commitments, including the Sustainable Development Goals.

Our networked society is promoting a “democratization” of technological dissemination. Ease of understanding and using technology is greater than ever before. Yet these benefits also bring with them clear risks for international peace and security.

Before I address the trends and consequences of the current technological context, I want to add my usual caveat: it is important not to be alarmist about the ramifications of technology, but at the same time not dismissive either.

With that, let me share with you some of the major trends in conflict risk as I see them and the implications they carry for international peace and security.

First, the application of technology to new means and methods of warfare is aggravating an arms-racing dynamic in both conventional and nuclear weapons. This dynamic is evident in the eye-watering amounts of money spent on weapons – some 1.8 trillion dollars last year, according to SIPRI – and the nuclear modernization campaigns that are, in effect, a qualitative nuclear arms race.

This is both exacerbated by, and in turn exacerbates, the absence of transparency and confidence in international relations. As States strive to develop newer and better weapons, it threatens to undermine stability and increase the prospects for unintended and potentially uncontrollable escalation.

This dynamic is not limited to States with advanced technological bases. The democratic characteristics of technological innovation provide for creative asymmetric responses – the digital IEDs, if you will.

The second trend I want to highlight is how technology is opening new potential domains for the conduct of hostilities.

Military operations using emerging technologies and in new domains can involve actions that are not easily classifiable or fall below traditional thresholds for an armed attack or an act of aggression.

This creates challenges for international peace and stability, as even non- permanent means of disrupting or disabling a military capability can prompt a conventional armed response.

Take, for example, what is commonly referred to as “cyber warfare”.

The frequency of malicious cyber incidents is growing, along with their severity. Such acts are contributing to diminishing trust and confidence among States and encouraging them to adopt offensive postures for the hostile use of these technologies.

The difficulty of attributing responsibility for cyber-attacks could result in unwarranted armed responses and escalation. Constraints agr the case of cyberattacks that do not cause physical damage and are not lethal.

New domains and methods of warfare will also change the impact on civilians in ways that are less kinetic but equally damaging. For example, “casualties” in a cyber conflict could include millions of people who have had their bank accounts wiped out by an offensive cyberattack.

Put differently, some of these new technologies could not only change the size and speed of destruction in conflict, but also the character and nature of destruction in war.

A third and related trend is how certain new technologies, in particular armed uncrewed aerial vehicles, are undermining civilian protections. Lower risks to armed forces and comparatively lower levels of physical violence risk lowering the threshold on the use of armed force in situations where it would not otherwise have been contemplated.

Such actions not only endanger civilians, but risk escalating conflict.

The fourth and final trend I want to draw attention to is the emerging nature of warfare enabled by networked militaries, autonomy, uncrewed vehicles, advanced sensors, and weapons that can attack at hypersonic speeds.

This form of warfare is not yet fully realized, but technological innovation, coupled with evolving military thinking, is trending the world in this direction with several significant risks.

So-called “hypersonic weapons” pose particular concerns because they could both reduce decision-making times while also adding ambiguities related to the nature of their targets and their own payloads, whether conventional or nuclear.

Increased adoption of Artificial Intelligence (AI) may lead to decision-making processes faster than human cognition and concern has been expressed about the potential for unpredictable and non-transparent behaviour by AI in armed conflict.

Increasing autonomy in the critical functions of weapons systems raises serious ethical and legal questions for existing frameworks and how to ensure human accountability for the use of force. The growing use of UAVs and increased autonomy could lead to perceptions of casualty-free warfare.

The possibility of third parties with malicious intent interfering in control systems to incite conflict cannot be discounted.

The potential for such advances to exacerbate political divisions and global tensions would be alarming even in the most benign of international environments.

However, we are currently mired in a geostrategic context defined by distrust, the militarization of international relations and a dearth of dialogue. Relations between the so- called “great powers” are eroding as the rules-based international order – including the disarmament and non-proliferation regime – is being challenged.

Other global issues – climate change, mass migration and social unrest – will also continue to affect the nature and conduct of armed conflict.

In this unsettling environment, where brakes on warfare are being removed, the utmost caution should be exercised in the deployment of technological innovations with disruptive ramifications.

Having said this, it is easy to list risks and challenges. It is a much harder task to elaborate solutions.

I would like to suggest today what might be some of the key elements, from the United Nations’ perspective, for our joint work ahead to elaborate possible solutions. Some of them relate to substance, others to the process and partnerships we must forge.

First, a few points related to the development of norms and their operationalization or implementation.

One of the most prominent debates in the governance of emerging technologies has been whether international frameworks can adequately contain new risks and concerns. There is divergence over whether existing law is sufficient or whether new legal instruments are required.

Some new technologies, such as armed drones, have prompted concerns about how they can tempt some to reinterpret international law.

What we need is an honest debate about how international law applies to any possible use of emerging technologies as weapons, how any such uses are constrained or prohibited by existing international law and where new approaches, including new law, is needed to mitigate foreseeable risks.

Increased transparency and accountability in the use of new technologies could help increase confidence in adherence to international law. When it comes to the weaponization of new technologies, broadened use and transparency of weapons reviews – those required under article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions – would build confidence about the legality of those weapons systems.

Regardless of where States sit on this debate, protecting civilians from the effects of armed conflict must continue to be a central concern when addressing the means and methods of warfare.

This is a tenet that we cannot lose sight of as States rush to utilize technological innovations in armed conflict.

We must reinforce mechanisms for the protection of civilians, including respect for and compliance at all times with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.

While Member States will continue to have primary responsibility in matters of international peace and security, twenty-first century norm-making cannot be just straightforward treaty negotiations between States.

Much of the technology we have been discussing today is either dual-use or even enabling. Its creators need to be brought into the fold.

The importance of developing effective multi-stakeholder platforms that can bring together experts from Member States, industry, academia and civil society should be a priority.

This is important not only to ensure that intergovernmental deliberations are adequately informed, but also that technical communities are aware of the context and possible consequences of their work.

Modern norm-making should consider a broad spectrum of responses, from self-regulation such as code of conducts, to political initiatives such as transparency and confidence-building measures, to comprehensive and multifaceted efforts in the traditional intergovernmental negotiations.

Secondly, while each of these technologies will have a disruptive individual impact, it is at their convergence where the real challenges lie.

We need to generate a better understanding of the combined effects, especially of enabling technologies such as cyber and AI that will impact everything, not least each other. What, for example, will be the impact of autonomous malware?

I am particularly worried about how the combined use of technological innovations could upend strategic stability and lower the barriers to the use of a nuclear weapon.

Concepts such as “left of launch” missile defence – the disabling of nuclear command and control structures by cyber means – could create “use it or lose it” mentalities for first strikes.

Experts have raised the possibility of AI deep fakes to spoof command and control or early warning systems, as well the prospect of so-called “data poisoning”, the deliberate alteration of the data on which AI runs to produce unintended outcomes.

Because of such risks, Cold War concepts, including classical deterrence models, should be re-evaluated for the digital age where terms such as “cyber deterrence” could have dangerous escalatory consequences. In this era, instead of deterring conflict we need to better focus on preventing it.

In the UN context, we have made good progress to address some of the challenges posed by innovations in technology.

On autonomous weapons, States considering this issue within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons have produced three consensus reports. My office stands ready to support Member States to build on the commonalities identified in those reports, including by elaborating measures to ensure that humans remain in control of the use of force.

Five UN Group of Governmental Experts have agreed that international law applies to the use of ICTs and that the UN Charter applies in its entirety. In 2015, the GGE was able to forge 11 voluntary non-binding norms to reduce risks to international peace, security and stability. That work continues now in two forums – an Open-Ended Working Group that met earlier this month, and another GGE that will convene later this year.

To help facilitate responses to their potential risks, my office, together with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, published a study on hypersonic weapons. The study makes the case for multilateral discussion of these weapons, the development of which cannot be seen in isolation from the current deterioration in strategic arms control. We have now convened two track 1.5 meetings to inform and explore its findings.

Member States have taken practical steps to preserve peace and security by developing and commencing the implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities.

Later this year, the First and Fourth Committees of the General Assembly will convene a third ad hoc meeting on possible challenges to space security and sustainability.

A GGE on the prevention of an arms race in outer space also met earlier this year. Unfortunately, it was unable to agree on a substantive report, but nevertheless had the most substantive dialogue since the item was introduced to the Conference on Disarmament in 1985.

As you can see, there have been good discussions taking place in various individual areas of new technology. It is important to start now in understanding what might be the possible combined impact of these technologies in today’s international security environment. This leads me to my third and final key issue.

The disruptive nature of technological innovations and the convergence between them has prompted calls for new thinking in disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation.

As the Secretary-General said in February this year: “We need a new vision for arms control in the complex international security environment of today.”

Any new vision would need to preserve the indispensable benefits of the existing frameworks but could address many of the issues I have already mentioned. It should encompass all kinds of nuclear weapons and their qualitative developments.

It could consider particularly destabilizing categories of weapons such as hypersonic weapons. It could take into account new developments in technology and the potential vulnerabilities these have exposed, as well as the convergences between them, and new models of governance.

It should preserve and further develop or strengthen measures for protection of civilians in any type of conflict. And it should enable the use of these technologies for our collective benefit, in conflict prevention and peace-building mechanisms, and also arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.

The UN has the convening power to create different types of platforms and discussion mechanisms. It is uniquely situated to be an impartial convener and bring in non-government actors so that multiple stakeholders can learn from each other and develop creative, mutually beneficial solutions.

I believe that the UN system, due to its broad expertise, is also well-placed to act as a catalyst for innovative thinking. I believe the UN has to play a central role in bringing together the security and humanitarian discourses in a new vision for arms control and disarmament.

And I believe the UN should contribute creative ideas to maximize the benefits and minimize the challenges of disruptive technology.

The use of technology in warfare in ways that undermines our collective security is not a forgone conclusion. Through dialogue, transparency, negotiation and cooperation, we can build the normative framework that prevents the direst of scenarios from taking place. I look forward to working together to secure our common future.

*In an address to the fourth annual Stockholm Security Conference at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

Excerpt:

By Izumi Nakamitsu
UNITED NATIONS, May 8 2018 (IPS)

Every day, hundreds of lives are lost due to gun violence worldwide. Guns are responsible for about half of all violent deaths – nearly a quarter million each year.

But the dire consequences of gun violence are not limited to those slain by guns. For every person killed by a gun, many more are injured, maimed, and forced to flee their home and community. Still many more live under constant threats of gun violence.

UN Under Secretary-General Izumi Nakamitsu. Credit: UN

If we were to achieve the ambitious goals set out in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – which explicitly links sustainable development and security-, we need to tackle this scourge of gun violence head-on.

The pandemic of gun violence has many roots. These range from legal, political, to socioeconomic, to cultural factors. Lack of adequate legislation and regulation on gun control, insufficient resource and capacity to enforce such legislation, lack of employment and alternative livelihood for youths, ex-gangs and ex-combatants, and a culture that glorifies violence and equates guns with masculinity – all exacerbates gun violence.

Such complex, multi-faceted problems require equally multi-faceted, sustainable solutions that address root causes. Governments, while primarily responsible for controlling guns, cannot do it alone.

To end the crisis of gun violence, we must work together. The Global Week of Action Against Gun Violence is a conduit for fostering cooperation on this critical issue among all stakeholders – government, international, regional and sub-regional organizations, research institutes, private companies, and civil society organizations-, to come together and pool our experience, strength and expertise.

And we must address the human factor behind the gun violence. It is essential that we recognize that gun violence affects women, men, girls and boys differently and that we need to seek different strategies to address all dimensions of gun violence.

Next month, States will gather at the United Nations in New York for the Third Review Conference on the Programme of Action on small arms – the key global instrument that has guided international efforts in the fight against the illicit trade in small arms over the past two decades.

The Conference will provide an important opportunity for the international community to renew its commitment to silence the guns that affect so many innocent lives, and to continue its work towards achieving our common goal of peace, security and development for all.”

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