By Jon Elmer
RAMALLAH, Jan 19 2010 (IPS)

When Omar Abdel-Razeq was appointed finance minister following the election of Hamas in January 2006, the BBC characterised the post as the “least enviable job in the new Palestinian government.”

Omar Abdel-Razek Credit: Jon Elmer/IPS

The economics professor was one of 15 Palestinians elected to parliament from an Israeli prison cell; he was held without charge and released shortly after the election.

Long before he could tackle the massive budget deficit created by the crippling siege and boycott of the Hamas government, Abdel-Razeq was again arrested, in June 2006, along with 64 senior Hamas officials including several cabinet ministers and more than 40 elected members of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC). He spoke to IPS from his office in Ramallah.

Q: Israel linked your June 2006 arrest to the capture of an Israeli soldier in Gaza. A: At the time, yes. We were arrested because of that event. But they could not talk about that in the military court system. They accused us of being members of an election list, of participating in the PLC meetings and being a minister of a government “in the service of” Hamas. In my case at least, being the minister of finance is a professional, rather than a political job.

Q: Would it have been possible for Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s regime in the West Bank to take over without those arrests of PLC members? A: No. One of the goals of the Israeli government was to distort the election results. The Islamic movement won a majority, and they were supposed to run the territories for four years. So they interfered by imprisoning about 42 PLC members so that the majority was switched.

Q: In terms of the Palestinian security forces that have come under the auspices of Gen. Keith Dayton, are you still getting reports of mistreatment and torture from your people? A: Well, there is a problem with the definition of torture here. Starting in October there was a decree by the president preventing torture. Unfortunately the definition of torture is only severe physical pressure, beating or hanging people upside down, and so on.

There are still kinds of torture being practiced under the belief by the security forces that it is not torture. For example, they can tie your hands behind your back and have you sit on a chair for 12- 15 hours. They still can tie your hands and hang you up with your toes off the ground. There are also cases – especially during these days of cold weather – of confiscating blankets or mattresses, for days sometimes. They force people to stand for hours, or won’t allow someone to sleep for days – and they don’t consider that torture.

But, before, severe torture was the norm; now it is an exception. It is much better than two months ago, but it is still going on.

Q: And there are still attacks on the infrastructure of Hamas, what Israel is calling the Dawa Strategy? A: I don’t think there is any more infrastructure to attack. They finished the infrastructure of Hamas. Most of the cases now are to follow up on whoever is trying to rebuild the infrastructure. Of course, when we talk about the infrastructure we are talking about the societies and the cooperatives and the institutions that existed to help the poor and the orphans and the families of the prisoners and so on. Of course this affected that part of the civil society very severely.

Q: Has it worked? A: It has worked in the sense, as you said, that you cannot find anybody to speak on behalf of Hamas if you are a journalist. You cannot find a Hamas representative to speak at a seminar. It has succeeded in preventing all activities, for example, on university campuses. The charities have stopped. This has a wider affect on the movement itself. So they succeeded in that.

But if we talk about the movement – is Hamas finished? No.

Q: In some ways are they making the movement stronger by targeting it? A: I think it was a wise decision of the movement not to confront the Authority in the West Bank. It is not our goal to fight the Palestinian Authority.

What happened in Gaza has its preconditions, its own environment. Actually, it started on the other side – with the security forces led by Dahlan and Dayton. Nobody denies this anymore; they wanted to take over, to overthrow the civilian government. And Hamas was obliged to take action to restore order.

But in the West Bank there was no excuse, no justification. Nothing was done against the Authority or against Fatah by Hamas in the West Bank.

[People sympathise with Hamas] for two reasons: one is that the practices of the security forces are out of order, nobody believes in what they are doing. And the other is the complete failure of the so-called political process.

Q: Let’s talk about that political process. The Dayton security project is linked to an economic project that Tony Blair is unfolding called the “Jenin model.” The idea is to create alongside the security forces a kind of neo-liberal economic prosperity. Dayton’s crew cites four percent economic growth in the West Bank last year, the IMF has pegged this year’s growth at closer to seven percent. A: What is going on here is that the donors’ aid is being reflected in the statistics. Seven percent growth is because of the increase in some businesses and trade that is the beneficiary of the donor system. However, if you look at the marginal portions of society, most people will tell you that the poor became poorer during the last few years.

Public employment is now linked to security screening. People are being dismissed just because of how they voted, or how they are suspected to have voted. So on one side there is this increase, but it’s artificial in the sense that it is only coming from the donors’ money, and if this is stopped for any reason, as it was in 2006 after the results of the elections, then the economy will collapse.

Q: You see this aid as problematic? A: It is problematic in the sense that it has a political price. It has been conditional on what you do in the political process. They used this donor funding to pressure the government.

Q: Is the Jenin Model ever going to work? A: Is it going to bring a solution to the problem? No.

Q: That’s how the Israel and the U.S. see it, they call it the “political horizon.” A: You cannot deal with the political struggle with the Israelis through the economy. They are trying to buy calm. I believe the first intifada and the second intifada proved this is not the right way to do it.

Q: So are we on a track to a third intifada? A: Not because of the economic situation. Because of the Israeli policies in Jerusalem, maybe; or because of the Israeli policy regarding settlements. Or because of the failure of Fatah and PA to achieve any of the Palestinian national goals.

[President Mahmoud Abbas] is determined that the only track, the only alternative we have is negotiations. So he’s not allowing anyone to express other options. Even civilian resistance. I am not even talking about a military uprising. After the siege, after the practices of the Authority against the resistance movements, a military uprising is going to be very difficult. But even the civilian uprising is being prevented by the Authority. It is not being promoted.

Q: With the way they are setting up these security forces under Dayton, they will be on the frontlines of putting down that intifada. A: But if this happens, and as more people face security forces and there are more injuries, more casualties, the security forces will start retreating because they will be killing their cousins, their neighbours, their friends. In our country, the population centres are small enough that everybody knows everybody else.

Q: If there is reconciliation on the political level, is it possible that Hamas members would join the army that Dayton is establishing in order to make it more legitimate? A: In the West Bank we are not looking to join the security forces. We’re looking to have security forces protect the people, with the police and the court system and so on. And secondly, to quit the cooperation with the Israelis – to stop fighting the resistance.

We are under occupation. As long as occupation goes on, there is a right to resist. Now, whether you resist or not is something else, but there is a right to resist. We don’t believe any opposition to, or any fighting of, the resistance by Palestinians will help the Palestinian cause.

Q: What’s the next step? Can there be elections? A: Without reconciliation [between Fatah and Hamas], I don’t believe there would be any meaning to an election. Hamas is going to run in an election if it’s after the reconciliation. But in my personal view, this is not the solution.

We had an election. It was a very fair, just and transparent election. It was praised by everybody, but nobody accepted the results. We can have elections tomorrow, but it’s no good if the world is not going to accept the results. Unless of course the elections are designed to produce the results that are in line with what the United States, or the West wants.

Q: So what is the way out? Can Fayyad continue to rule with no legitimacy among the people, and no possibility for elections to gain such legitimacy? A: Does Fayyad have to rule? We believe Fayyad has to exit, unless he gets legitimacy in the proper manner. He only has two seats in the parliament. You are talking about the smallest party ruling the society. This is against all rules, all norms, all values of democracy.

The solution should start in the U.S. Unfortunately their foreign policy is built on the assumption that American interests are best served by Israel. There is no reason to believe that a Palestinian democracy is a threat to the American interests.

Have people live in peace; have them choose their leadership. Let Palestinians have their rights. There is a consensus among all Palestinian factions: we will accept a sovereign Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, the whole territory, with East Jerusalem as the capital.

The Israelis want the whole land. They want a Jewish state. It’s like saying let’s have a Christian state – a Catholic or a Protestant state; or a Shia or Sunni state. You give the state this religious description and it’s a recipe for disaster.

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By Jon Elmer
AMMAN, Nov 4 2009 (IPS)

Leila Khaled became an instant icon of the Palestinian struggle in 1969, when at 24 she was an operative in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacking of a Boeing 707, the first in a series of high-profile actions intended to put the Palestinians on the political map.

Leila Khaled Credit: Jon Elmer

She was in a group that hijacked a TWA flight from Rome to Athens in 1969. No one was injured in the hijacking, but the plane was blown up later. She was then involved in a hijack attempt of an El Al flight the following year, but was caught and handed over to the British police after the flight from Amsterdam to New York was diverted to London. She was released later in a prisoner exchange.

A “guerrilla heroine,” as Time magazine would call her in 1970, Khaled was driven from her home in Haifa during the creation of Israel. She has remained a prominent leader on the Palestinian left, and a determined spokesperson in the ongoing struggle for Palestinian rights. She spoke to IPS from her home in Amman.

IPS: Maybe we can begin with the Goldstone Report on the Gaza invasion and in particular the political fallout from (Palestinian Authority President) Mahmoud Abbas’s role in delaying debate on the report in Geneva. Leila Khaled: We have declared that it was a political mistake – a big one. It’s not just a tactical mistake.

We’ve asked for a full investigation. Who gave the orders to postpone the debate?

This is a United Nations report. It took months to finalise. It should be directly accepted by us, because it is denouncing the invasion and all the acts that resulted – to the extent that Israel should be taken to the International Criminal Court to charge the war criminals, whether on the political level or the military level.

IPS: What’s your reaction to the Gaza invasion in general? LK: It’s not new. This is not the first time. But now there is an opportunity for us to charge the war criminals.

IPS: In terms of the conflict between Fatah and Hamas, what’s your response to what happened in Gaza in 2007, but also to what has been going on since in the West Bank under (caretaker Prime Minister Salam) Fayyad and Abbas. LK: This is a very serious situation, because Palestinians are still under occupation. Our people are under siege in Gaza. In Ramallah, the Palestinian Authority doesn’t have (sovereignty), whether on the land or the borders. The Israelis are still confiscating lands, they demolish houses, they arrest people at any time and in any place.

To have division among Palestinians, politically speaking, it affects our ability to face all these challenges from the Israelis. We and others are calling for reconciliation between these two factions because it is not in the interests of our people. It has weakened the Palestinians (vis-à-vis) Israel, and also weakened solidarity with Palestinian human rights on the international level.

We see it as a catastrophe.

IPS: Do you think the election of Hamas in 2006 gave it legitimacy to rule that was being challenged in Gaza by Abbas and (senior Fatah official Muhammad) Dahlan and the Israeli project to overthrow them? Both sides accuse the other of a coup. How do you see it? LK: We don’t think Hamas has used its legitimacy in the right way. They got a majority in the elections, but they shouldn’t have gone to the extent of solving the contradictions between them and Fatah with the use of arms.

It didn’t bring anything better to the Palestinians. Gaza is still under siege. Meanwhile, they have left the Palestinian Authority to do what they wanted in the West Bank.

They could have used dialogue and more discussion about the different issues, negotiations. This will show the society that we are democratic people. In our history we always had different ideas and different visions, but we never (resorted) to arms.

The main contradiction is with occupation, not among us.

IPS: U.S. General Keith Dayton is training a Palestinian security force which is openly targeting Hamas, but it’s also targeting the Popular Front. How do you see the above contradictions in light of this? LK: The Dayton plan builds an apparatus not to defend our people, but to prevent our people from the resistance. Which means not only training, but also facing the resistance cells – all factions, not only Hamas. Meanwhile, every day Israel is entering any city, arresting people, assassinating them.

Instead, the Palestinian Authority (should) strengthen those that are ready for resistance. Unfortunately this is one of the main contradictions on the Palestinian level: the Palestinian Authority, whether in government, or the security apparatus or the police, are built in the Dayton vision, and not for the benefit of our people.

IPS: How then do you see the next intifadah shaping up? With the wall encircling Palestinian communities, with the security forces trained by Dayton, many people in the West Bank are seeing that any kind of resistance to Israel is buffered by this project. Is this setting up a paradigm where the next intifadah is against the Palestinian Authority? LK: Any intifadah should have its objective reasons. The situation is not ripe enough for a third intifadah, with all this pressure against our people, whether from the Palestinian side or from the Israeli side.

People have found that after the first and second intifadah, they sacrificed a lot, with their families, houses, children, whether they are martyrs or prisoners. We have now around 11,000 prisoners in Israeli jails. Behind them there are 11,000 families.

I think first of all, we have to end this division. It will give more power to our people. We have seen at the time of the invasion of Gaza, the (demonstrations) were stopped by the Palestinian police and not the Israeli police.

Still, I think an intifadah is not near.

IPS: Where is the Popular Front, specifically and the left in general, on the scene right now, particularly in the division with Hamas and Fatah? The left is clearly at one of its lowest points in the history of the national movement. LK: I think that the Oslo Accords was a turning point in the Palestinian struggle. A part of our people in Palestine supported negotiations with the Israelis. They thought it would bring them independence, it would bring them a national state. But after years (of achieving nothing), people realised it wasn’t for their good. That’s why the second intifadah broke out.

The left was affected by what happened, and it is weakened by its division. We’ve been trying for years to have the left as one front, not as one party but as a front with a (unified) political and resistance programme.

We feel that if we succeed it will create a third line. In the media, we only hear about Fatah and Hamas, but in fact it is not like that. This weakens the whole situation.

Specifically, the Popular Front has faced many challenges. Our general secretary, Abu Ali Mustafa, was assassinated. Ahmed Sa’adat is in prison. Many of our cadres have been arrested. Many have been killed by the Israelis. We have hundreds of our cadre and members in prison. This will weaken the Popular Front.

IPS: I spoke with general secretary Ahmed Sa’adat in 2003 about this question. He spoke about Israel using the intifadah to focus immediately on the PFLP, to break the organisation’s back with assassination and arrests. Both because it saw the PFLP as a historical threat, but also because it had been weakened so significantly by the political climate throughout the 1990s – both locally and globally. LK: Abu Ali Mustafa was assassinated because he immediately declared that (the PFLP) was here to resist and not to compromise our rights. This the Israelis understood very well. It was the first time the Israelis assassinated a personality on the political level like Abu Ali Mustafa.

Israel knew very well that the PFLP was in a position to resist. That it has its resistance programme which means they are not going to go for negotiations. They know that by either assassinating or putting the leadership in jail it will weaken the PFLP, and it did. But we could also go on rebuilding ourselves, and still we have a lot to do.

But the general situation is also not with the resistance – on the Palestinian level, (but especially) on the Arab level. This weakens the whole situation, not just the Popular Front.

IPS: I wonder if we can talk a bit about the trajectory of the Palestinian armed struggle: what are the possibilities and limits for armed struggle within the confines of the wall, and the new ghetto paradigm? LK: In general, people always find the means of resistance. After 1967, we were using hijackings. Then our people used stones to express their resistance, then what is called suicide bombers, which have stopped. Then the use of rockets from Gaza, because the Israelis left and there were (new spaces opened up), while in the West Bank it is silenced.

You have used the term ghettoes – yes, our cities are like ghettoes now. They are surrounded by settlements, the wall, at all the gates to the cities we have checkpoints.

But people will find the means of their resistance in ways that I myself cannot think of. Nobody thought of intifadah of the stones: that children would use them also. It caused a lot of criticism to Israel and more solidarity for the Palestinians.

So, by all means. Where there is occupation, there is always resistance. This resistance every time has its own shape and its own means. I think this situation (of calm) will not last. Our people have a very long experience in struggle and cannot accept that this situation will go on. One day it will break out again. In what way, I cannot say. But it will come.

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