At a time when the traditional transatlantic relationship is more strained than ever—largely due to the almost compulsive stance of the current occupant of the White House and his circle—it is imperative for Europe to establish or strengthen strategic alliances in all domains, including in trade. Credit: EEAS

By Manuel Manonelles
BARCELONA, Spain, Mar 20 2026 (IPS)

“Europe can no longer be a custodian for the old-world order, for a world that has gone and will not return (…) we need a more realistic and interest-driven foreign policy.” These were some of the words pronounced one week ago by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, at the EU Ambassadors’ Conference in Brussels. A speech that sparked considerable controversy: an almost immediate rebuttal from the President of the Council, Antonio Costa; rumours of a motion of censure against Von der Leyen in the European Parliament; more or less public reproaches from several European leaders; and a swift and complete retraction by the President herself.

The question, however, remains: was this a miscalculation by a President known for always trying to swim with the current? Or do her words reflect a deeper alignment with the mindset of a new (dis)order defined by Trumpian chaos and the authoritarian impulses emanating from Beijing and Moscow, among others?

Multilateralism is not only a matter of principles; it is also a matter of responsibility, and indeed of efficiency and effectiveness. Or does Europe truly believe it can tackle the major challenges it faces—from climate change and migration flows to global public health and the impact of AI—on its own?

In the former case, despite its seriousness, the mistake would still be forgivable. In the latter, we would be facing a far more significant—and particularly dangerous—problem.

In Brussels, some interpret it as a clearly failed attempt by Von der Leyen to steer the Union’s position towards the theses defended at that time by the German Chancellor Merz—her compatriot and party colleague—on the need to adopt policies more aligned with Trump.

Position that Merz himself has changed in the last few years, taking into account his particularly weak position, with approval ratings plummeting to just 26% less than a year after taking office—figures as low as Trump’s.

Returning to the President of the Commission, it was indeed troubling to observe that -in a Europe already deeply divided over the major geopolitical challenges of our time (the war in Iran and across the Middle East, the war in Ukraine, the situation in Venezuela)- it was precisely the individual recognised globally as the face of the European Union who delivered a speech so starkly at odds with the Union’s founding principles.

For the European project, with all its strengths—and its shortcomings—was built precisely on the ashes of the Second World War, on the traumatic experience of the totalitarian regimes of the 1920s and 1930s, and in opposition to the Stalinist totalitarianism that developed beyond the Iron Curtain.

It was founded on the principles of humanism, on respect for and the promotion of human rights, and on the idea of shared social rights and values. It was also grounded in the need for a rules-based international order which, despite its many imperfections, remains the only real mechanism capable of steering us away from the chaos and the law of the jungle to which some of the world’s major powers seek to drag us.

Are the United Nations in crisis? Undoubtedly, and no one seriously disputes it. Is multilateralism in retreat, and is respect for international law at a low point? Another undeniable tragedy. However, does this mean that the response to such a bleak context should be—as I have suggested—to adopt the very mindset of those responsible for this deterioration? Put differently: have we lost all sense of reason?

We are living in turbulent times. Europe must indeed strive for greater strategic autonomy—but this autonomy cannot be confined solely to defence. It must also—and urgently—extend to genuine autonomy in the realm of technological goods and services, where dependence on the United States places Europe in a position bordering on vassalage.

Moreover, at a time when the traditional transatlantic relationship is more strained than ever—largely due to the almost compulsive stance of the current occupant of the White House and his circle—it is imperative for Europe to establish or strengthen strategic alliances in all domains, including in trade. This is already happening with India, and should be finalised as soon as possible with Mercosur.

However, to suggest that Europe’s future—or, in other words, the future of the Europe that truly matters—could lie in a further weakening of the international order and the system of international organisations is, I say this unequivocally, simply irresponsible.

For multilateralism is not only a matter of principles; it is also a matter of responsibility, and indeed of efficiency and effectiveness. Or does Europe truly believe it can tackle the major challenges it faces—from climate change and migration flows to global public health and the impact of AI—on its own?

Europe needs multilateralism, among other reasons, to remain being Europe. And for that reason, it must commit to it now more than ever—without naïveté, with realism, but fully aware of the interdependence between the future of the European project and the existence of a minimum level of order and cooperation among nations, including the major powers.

This requires defending and promoting—against the alternative of chaos—the very spaces and institutions that make such cooperation possible, rather than ignoring or sidelining them.

Manuel Manonelles is Associate Professor of International Relations at Blanquerna-Ramon Llull University in Spain

Panoramic view of the colorful village of Kulusuk in eastern Greenland – Kulusuk, Greenland – Melting iceberg releasing water into the sea. Credit: Shutterstock.

By Manuel Manonelles
BARCELONA, Spain, Apr 1 2025 (IPS)

“…I am convinced that Greenland’s importance to U.S. interests will grow. Thanks to geography, historical ties (…), the United States has the inside track when competing for influence in Greenland (even as the Chinese have now started making regular visits)…” This quote from a diplomatic cable sent by the U.S. embassy in Copenhagen to Washington might seem recent, perhaps just before President Trump’s abrupt announcement of his intentions to “buy” or “annex” Greenland from Denmark, but that is not the case.

This message is actually seventeen years old, dating back to May 16, 2008. It is one of several Greenland-related cables that came to light with WikiLeaks, highlighting the fact that U.S. interest in Greenland is nothing new. It has been a consistent theme in U.S. foreign policy for at least the last 150 years.

The first documented discussion within the U.S. Government about acquiring Greenland dates back to 1867, the same year the U.S. purchased Alaska from the Russian Empire for $7.7M.

After so many failed attempts by the U.S. to purchase Greenland over the past 150 years, what makes Trump believe that he will succeed? Is the current White House policy—so aggressive and public—really the best way for the U.S. to regain influence, or even secure a new role in Greenland?

Around that time, internal consultations took place in the U.S. Federal Government regarding the possibility of buying Greenland (along with Iceland) for around $5.5M. In fact, the State Department even published a report on the matter in 1868. However, as we know, this proposal never materialized.

More fruitless discussions followed in 1910, and then, suddenly, another purchase occurred in 1916. This time, the U.S. government bought not Greenland but the Danish West Indies in the Caribbean (now known as the U.S. Virgin Islands) from Denmark for $25M.

The relevance of this purchase in the Greenland case is substantive because one provision in the international treaty that formalized the deal—known as the Treaty of the Danish West Indies—stated that the U.S. Government “will not object to the Danish Government extending their political and economic interests to the whole of Greenland.”

Because in 1916 Denmark controlled significant portions of Greenland but not the entire island. However, following the West Indies deal with the U.S., and with Washington’s consent, Denmark began a series of diplomatic movements that eventually allowed it to declare full sovereignty over all of Greenland. Only Norway contested this claim but lost in the International Court of Justice in 1933.

In April 1940, Nazi Germany occupied Denmark, and following that, the U.S. occupied Greenland, in order to prevent its seizure by Germany or eventually by Canada or even by the UK.

After WWII, the Danish government expected the U.S. to withdraw its troops. However, to their surprise, in 1946, the U.S. made a new proposal to purchase Greenland, this time offering $100M. Once again, the deal did not go through, and despite Copenhagen’s diplomatic efforts, the U.S. military stayed.

With the creation of NATO—and Denmark being one of its founding members—Copenhagen changed its policy, accepting the status quo. In 1951, Denmark signed an agreement allowing the U.S. to continue its military and defense activities in Greenland. In 1955, new serious discussions within the U.S. government about another potential offer emerged, and there is evidence that Vice President Nelson Rockefeller was behind another unsuccessful attempt in 1970.

With the end of the Cold War, U.S. interest in Greenland dramatically decreased, and most U.S. military bases on the island were dismantled, except for the one in Pituffik (then known by the Danish name of Thule).

With the start of the new millennium, the increasing effects of climate change and the escalation of geostrategic interest in the Arctic region, Washington reactivated its interest in the largest island on the planet.

However, this time rather than proposing another purchase to Denmark—after so many failed attempts—the U.S. opted for a more subtle policy, indirectly supporting Greenland’s pro-independence movement. The idea was that a newly independent and potentially weak Greenland could be more easily influenced by the U.S.

The surprise came in 2019 when President Trump reignited public debate on the issue and even cancelled an official trip to Copenhagen at the last minute after the Danish Prime Minister publicly rejected the possibility of selling Greenland.

With Biden in office, the issue was largely forgotten—until recently, when Trump brought it back, adopting an even more aggressive approach. It is no coincidence, then, that the U.S. opened a Consulate in Nuuk, Greenland’s capital, in 2020, despite the country’s small population of around 50,000 people and a negligible number of U.S. residents, aside from the few U.S. military personnel stationed at Pituffik.

The key questions here are: after so many failed attempts by the U.S. to purchase Greenland over the past 150 years, what makes Trump believe that he will succeed? Is the current White House policy—so aggressive and public—really the best way for the U.S. to regain influence, or even secure a new role in Greenland? Could this approach, in fact, jeopardize U.S. interests in the region in the long term? And last but not least, beyond the Danish Government, the Greenlanders may have something to say, and judging by the results of the recent elections, it seems they are not really in the mood to accept Trump’s expansionism.

Manuel Manonelles is Associate Professor of International Relations at Blanquerna-Ramon Llull University in Spain

Map of the 1858 trans-Atlantic cable route. Credit: Wikipedia.

By Manuel Manonelles
BARCELONA, Nov 9 2022 (IPS)

The recent incidents of sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipeline in the depths of the Baltic Sea, the authorship of which still raises doubts today, have reminded us that some of the key infrastructures that condition geopolitics, and our daily lives, are largely located deep under the sea.

One of these strategic infrastructures, the importance of which is inversely proportional to their public awareness, also lies in the underwater environment. It is about submarine cables, generally of fiber optic, through which more than 95% of internet traffic circulates. A thick and growing network of undersea cables that connect the world and through which the lifeblood of the new economy, data, circulates.

More than 95% of what we see daily on our mobiles, computers, tablets and social networks, of what we upload or download from our clouds or watch through platforms —and thus millions of people, institutions and companies of all over the world— go through this submarine cable system

The history of submarine cables is not new. The first submarine cables were installed around 1850 and the first intercontinental cable, 4,000 kilometers long, was put into operation in 1858, connecting Ireland and Newfoundland (Canada).

It was at that time a telegraph cable, and while the first telegram—sent by Queen Victoria to then US President James Buchanan—took seventeen hours to get from one point to the next, it was considered a technological feat. From here, the network grew unstoppably and communications in the world changed.

Telephone cables followed, and in 1956 the first intercontinental telephone cable was put into operation, again connecting Europe and America with thirty-six telephone lines that would soon be insufficient. Thirty years later, the first fiber optic cable —replacing copper— was activated in 1988 and in recent decades the submarine cable network has dramatically increased, driven by the exponential growth in demand generated by the new digital economy and society.

It is surprising, then, that an infrastructure as critical and relevant as this goes so unnoticed, considering that it is the backbone of a society increasingly dependent on its digital dimension. This is what experts call the “paradox of invisibility”.

Because, again, more than 95% of what we see daily on our mobiles, computers, tablets and social networks, of what we upload or download from our clouds or watch through platforms —and thus millions of people, institutions and companies of all over the world— go through this submarine cable system.

The financial transactions transmitted by this network are approximately of 10 trillion dollars a day; and the global market for fiber optic submarine cables was around 13.3 billion dollars per year in 2020, expected to reach 30.8 billion in 2026, with an annual growth of 14%.

A system, however, that suffers from a significant governance deficit and, at the same time, is subject to substantial changes in its configuration and, above all, in the nature of its operators and owners. Moreover, traditionally the main operators of these networks were the telecom companies or, above all, consortiums of several companies in this sector.

Many of these companies were owned or had a close relationship with the governments of their country of origin —and, therefore, were linked in one way or another to some sort of national or regional legislation— and they generated a model focused on the interests and the interconnectivity of its clients.

In recent years, however, the growing need for hyper-connectivity of the large digital conglomerates (Google, Meta/Facebook, Microsoft, etc.) and their cloud computing provider data centers has resulted in that these have gone from being simple consumers of submarine cabling to becoming the main users (currently using 66% of the capacity of the entire current network). Even more, from users they have become the new dominant promoters of this type of infrastructure, which results in the reinforcement of their almost omnipotent power, and not only in the digital environment.

This can induce movements – albeit barely perceptible but equally relevant – in the complex balance of global power, by concentrating one of the strategic components of the global critical infrastructure into the hands of the technological giants.

All this with the absence of a global governance mechanism addressing this question, since the International Convention for the Protection of Submarine Cables of 1884 is more than outdated. As it is the case for the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) –in which the abovementioned convention is currently framed- whose challenges are more than evident, with the obvious conclusion about the urgent need for the international community to provide an answer to this pressing question.

A response that not only has to be at a global level, but also at a regional one, for example at the level of the European Union, especially if digital sovereignty is to be ensured, a vital element in the current present and even more in the future.

Proof of this is that in the last weeks there have been several incidents in relation to submarine cables both on the British, French and Spanish coasts that several analysts have linked to the Ukraine war.

In the case of the United Kingdom, there were cuts in the cables that connect Great Britain with the Shetland and Faroe Islands, while in France two of the main cables that land through the submarine cable hub that is Marseille were also cut. Even if some of these cases have been proven the result of fortuitous accidents, in others there is still doubt about what really happened.

Some experts have pointed to Russia, recalling the naval maneuvers that this country carried out just before the invasion of Ukraine in front of the territorial waters of Ireland, precisely in one of the areas with the highest concentration of intercontinental cables in the world.

In this context, perhaps it is not surprising that the Spanish Navy has recently reported that it monitors the activity of Russian ships near the main cables that lie in sovereign Spanish waters, indicating that in recent months more than three possible prospecting actions carried by vessels flying the Russian flag had been detected and deterred. One more proof of the growing value of these infrastructures that, despite being almost invisible, are strategic.

Manuel Manonelles is Associate Professor of International Relations, Blanquerna/University Ramon Llull, Barcelona

By Manuel Manonelles
BARCELONA, Jun 5 2020 (IPS)

Six months after the outbreak, the new global scenario resulting from the impact of COVID-19 is gradually becoming much more defined. From the very beginning, we sensed that little good could result from a situation so surprising and unexpected. Now it is becoming increasingly clear that we are entering times of extreme volatility in the international sphere. Times of uncertainty and incandescence as we have not seen for years.

The unrest in the United States and Brazil are clear signs in this direction. It is not by coincidence that they are occurring in the two countries with the highest numbers of COVID-19 cases in the world. The US in its way to the two million cases and with more than 100,000 deaths; and Brazil has exceeded half a million cases and more than thirty thousand dead, without taking into account the underreporting in both cases.

The destabilizing potential of COVID-19 in some of the world's major powers, and in parallel with the relations among them, is substantive; as is the resulting uncertainty

While it is true that the origin of the worst riots in decades in the United States is the death at the hands of the Minneapolis Police of an African-American citizen, it is obvious that the resulting anger has been fuelled by the accumulated frustration of recent months.  A time when structural racism in the United States has been overwhelmingly confirmed by the percentage of coronavirus deaths in the African American population, much higher than in the white one. The result is forty cities in the US with curfews, the deployment of the National Guard and Military Police in various States, and the militarization of the capital, Washington DC; quite serious.

The point, however, is that these are not two isolated situations, and that the destabilizing potential of COVID-19 in some of the world’s major powers, and in parallel with the relations among them, is substantive; as is the resulting uncertainty.

Keeping with the case of the United States, the confrontation between President Trump and several Governors –almost leading to a constitutional crisis -, the attacks on the WHO or the progressive and dangerous escalation of tension with China, always in the context of the coronavirus crisis, do not predict anything good.

And all this in the context of an electoral year in the US, with an epidemiological curve that is resisting to significantly decline, with 40 extra millions of unemployed … and one of the most controversial presidents in history who is running for re-election. Territory paid for by uncertainty.

Moreover, the references from the White House to the “Chinese virus” have had no real effect on Beijing, and rather have helped consolidate the evolution towards a more aggressive foreign policy such as that promoted by president Xi Jinping. In fact, the comparison of how the United States is facing the pandemic with respect to China, with all its shadows and doubts, does not burden Washington.

And after Hong Kong comes Taiwan. Very few days separate the announcement of the new legislation on Hong Kong, with its implications, the Beijing government withdrew the word “peaceful” from its annual call for reunification with this island. In a matter of few weeks, these two events added up to the seventh incident -so far this year – between the Chinese and Taiwanese air forces; new skirmishes between Chinese and Indian troops in the disputed border area in the Himalayas (and the consequent sending of reinforcements to both sides of the border). To this, we have to add the sinking of a Vietnamese fishing boat by the Chinese Coast Guard in waters also under discussion; or reports of incidents with Chinese ships around a Malaysian-managed oil rig.

Nor can we ignore the situation in the Russian Federation. After 400,000 cases of COVID-19, and a growing case curve, Putin is experiencing its lowest popularity in a long time, while the follow-up on social media of its main opponents rises like foam. Even more, this is pending on a referendum on July 1 to approve the constitutional reform that must perpetuate him in power. Referendum that will do little to contain the pandemic.

In this context, the images of a few months ago in which Russia sent cargo planes full of masks to the United States or deployed military support in the fight against coronavirus in northern Italy are far away. Nor has Russia been able to avoid tensions with China, with mutual reproaches over the closure of land borders or the importation of new cases from one country to another.

Latin America is a growing area of concern which, along with the United States, is the new epicentre of the pandemic, bringing over 3 million cases over the 2.3 million in Europe. The paradigmatic case is the aforementioned Brazil, with a “denialist” president, a faithful follower of the Trump doctrine, despite already being the second country in the world in number of COVID-19 cases.

We will see how countries like Chile react now that they have surpassed 100,000 cases, dragging a season of instability with a strongly contested government on the street (which it should be recalled that was forced to move the COP25 Climate Summit from Santiago de Chile to Madrid). Another case is Peru, which, despite having taken stricter measures, is already approaching 180,000 cases. The coronavirus is also growing in the Persian Gulf and India, where the world’s largest confinement is being lifted, affecting approximately 1.3 million people.

It is in a context like this, where there are few countries in the world – and less among the great powers- that can really show off for their management of the pandemic, that incentives and the temptation to find internal or external scapegoats to divert attention or redirect public anger are particularly high. If we add controversial or autocratic leadership, pre-existing tensions or the worrisome short-term forecasts in the economic field, the scenario we face is unpromising, and above all uncertain.

While in Europe the storm (or its first wave) calms down, in the rest of the world the pandemic grows, together with its resulting instability and volatility.

Excerpt:

Wuhan City. Credit: UNESCO

By Manuel Manonelles
BARCELONA, Apr 10 2020 (IPS)

We have long speculated on the moment when the shift of global leadership from the United States to China would take place. From Washington to Beijing for the political power, from New York to Shanghai for the economic one. It seems that we are witnessing it now.

Some saw the Beijing Olympics (2008) and especially its opening ceremony as an attempt by China to display this new reality. Others saw it later, with the creation of the Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank (2015), as opposed to the Bretton Woods system (IMF and World Bank) that for decades has been a fundamental pillar of North American hegemony.

A certain truce came with Obama and Xi Jinping, with some sort of a de facto confirmation of a new bipolar global regime. A regime that, even if temporary, could punctually have some positive effects for global governance, such as the two leaders’ pact on climate change that made the Paris Agreement feasible, also in 2015.

However, with the arrival of Trump and his “Make America Great Again”, the escalation of this quarrel for global leadership increased in both speed and visibility. The most relevant examples, so far, are the trade war between the two countries -with the World Trade Organization as a hostage-; or the open battle over the control of 5G, with the Huawei controversy at its the core.

Manuel Manonelles.

Others examples are less obvious to general opinion, but a matter of debate in specialised settings. An example is the full-fledged offensive that China has made to increase its presence and influence in the multilateral system. Obtaining important first-level positions, but also second level postings key to influence these institutions, in the face of the neglect of the early years of the Trump administration.

One case is that of Geneva, where the US administration has vacated for more than three years the position of ambassador of this key place, the city with most diplomatic activity in the world. Three long years has taken to the State Department to realize the space that China and other powers were gaining by taking advantage of the US “empty seat” policy.

They did so by appointing a new high political-profile ambassador in November last year. However, the positions of the battles for the future of the WTO or the leadership of the International Telecommunication Union (key in the management of satellite orbits, the management of radio space or digital world governance) were already well advanced at that time.

History is capricious, and again the unexpected ends up precipitating Copernican changes. No one expected the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914 with the chain of fatalities that would follow.

Nor could be expected that a clumsy press conference on the afternoon of November 9, 1989 would lead to the Berlin Wall immediate collapse; something that none of the Western intelligence agencies had anticipated.

Then, between November and the beginning of last December something happened in the Huanan market, in the city of Wuhan. It seems that the first case occurred on November 17. But it was not until December 31 that an “outbreak of an unknown pneumonia” in this city was reported to the World Health Organisation.

The Huanan market was closed down on January 1. The following day the new virus was confirmed, with the technical name of SARS-CoV-2. On January 16, Japan reported the first case, on the 17th, Thailand did.

The 21st was Taiwan and the United States. On the 24th, France reported the first three cases within the EU, the number of countries increased as the first border closures took place, especially in countries bordering China.

On January 30 the WHO declared an International Public Health Emergency, the same day that Italy reported its first case; the next day it was Spain at the same time that the virus was already spread in India, Russia, the Philippines or Australia. On March 11 the WHO declared the global pandemic and, while the world trembles, global leadership transits.

On March 20, while the White House or Downing Street were still flirting with denialism in relation to COVID-19, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced a plan to support 82 countries in their fight against this virus.

Two weeks later, as the virus wreaked havoc on hospitals on both coasts in the United States, and the British Prime Minister was admitted to the ICU, 18 countries in central and western Africa had already received hundreds of tons of Chinese donations of medical supplies, and 17 more were waiting to receive them in a matter of days. Pakistan, South Korea, Spain or Italy are other countries that have received help. In the latter, this help was not only of material, but accompanied by experts and medical staff.

Putin’s Russia also took advantage of the pandemic in the first weeks to project its role as international power; by sending military personnel to Italy – in a context of astonishing silence and blockage of the European institutions- or aid in health supplies to his “friend” Trump.

And even as COVID-19 spreads through Moscow and other cities and regions of the Federation these rather symbolic activities continue. Turkey also tried, by responding to Spain’s NATO urgency request, but soon changed its policy once they realised how the situation was deteriorating in Ankara and Istanbul.

It is too early to evaluate the full scope of COVID-19. In fact, no one can really assert at this point what the evolution and global impact of the pandemic will be, neither in terms of public health, nor in its humanitarian, social or economic dimensions.

The outlook is not good, and particularly worrisome is the uncertain effect that this pandemic will have in less developed countries, considering how it is affecting higher-income ones.

However, it is quite clear that this will be a turning point in terms of global governance and hegemony. Once again, the arbitrariness of history precipitates change. The strategists, the intelligence agencies, the think tanks that for years have debated and conspired from Langley through Georgetown, Xijuan or Gouguan had not foreseen what would end up igniting in a provincial market in Wuhan.

But what does seems plausible is that, in the midst of such drama, we are witnessing the hanging over of global hegemony.

Excerpt:

Picture taken after the signature of the armistice in the Forest of Compiègne. Credit: Public Domain

By Manuel Manonelles
GENEVA, Nov 11 2018 (IPS)

What is the link between the current civil war in Syria, the austerity policy imposed by Germany during the last economic crisis or the Arab-Israeli conflict? Its origin, which lies in the world that was born a hundred years ago, inside a wagon in the middle of the Forest of Compiègne, northeast of Paris.

Indeed, it was on November 11, 1914 that the signature of the Armistice between the Allied powers and the German Empire took place, in the above-mentioned wagon. This event marked de facto the end of World War I (1914-18), a conflict that changed the world and still today projects its shadows.

The Armistice was followed by the Paris Peace Conference and, as a consequence, the Treaty of Versailles, that of Sèvres and many others. The birth of the League of Nations, the policy of “reparations” or the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian, German and Ottoman empires, and in part the Russian one, were other outputs of the end of the Great War. The consequences of some of these historical events are still present today in the international agenda and determine the lives of millions of people, one century later.

The Middle East, Kurdistan and Syria

The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, through the Treaty of Sèvres of August 1920, opened a Pandora’s Box that we still strive to close today. Three examples: the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the civil war in Syria and the case of the Kurdistan.

Let us start with the last one, with Kurdistan. Sèvres foresaw the holding of a referendum to decide its future, a referendum that never took place. The uprising of Kemal Atatürk in Turkey, the subsequent war and the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) were the main causes, but the disunity between the Kurds we could call “pragmatic” and the supporters of a greater Kurdistan also influenced. Similarly, the fact that Sèvres planned to include the oil rich province of Mosul within the territory of an eventual free Kurdistan (which the British were coveting) helped to tip the balance in favor of Turkish interests.

Another unfortunate legacy is, in part too, the current civil war in Syria. It is widely known that the origin of this conflict is related to the emergence of the Arab Spring, the resilience of the al-Assad regime, the infiltration of radical jihadist groups, and the interests of many regional and global powers.

However, part of the current war’s cruelty is intimately related to a State, Syria, resulting from the end of the WWI, with their borders designed to satisfy, exclusively, the French and British colonial interests. A division based on a Franco-British secret agreement taken before the end war, the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, that unscrupulously mixed and divided diverse ethnic and religious groups.

Even more, we cannot ignore the icing on the cake of all conflicts, the Arab-Israeli conflict. Its origin is linked to the Balfour declaration (1917) before the end of the Great War. This declaration was assumed by the San Remo Conference (1920) -also linked to the Paris Peace Conference- within the framework of the complex maneuvers of the great powers, and other influential groups of interests, during the reshaping of borders of the post-Ottoman Levant.

Inheritances in financial policy

In another vein, one of the main elements that also defined the treaties resulting from the Paris Peace Conference, and especially the Treaty of Versailles, was the policy of “reparations”. This policy mainly entailed that the countries that lost WWI had to face the payment of enormous sums to compensate the Allies.

This policy, so aggressive, led to the resignation of a young economist from the British delegation at the Peace Conference, called Keynes, who warned of the destabilizing effects in the economic and financial field that this could have. Indeed, this was one of the main causes of the German hyper-inflationary crisis of the years 1920-23, in which a loaf of bread reached the cost of billions of German marks. The influence of this crisis on the discrediting of the Weimar Republic and the consequent rise of Nazism is well known.

This sequence of events is at the base of the almost pathological animosity of the German economists to inflation. Since the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany, German official economic and financial policy has been always conditioned by a strict control of inflation: perceived as the mother of all possible and imaginable evils. This was the policy that Chancellor Merkel imposed, not only in Germany but also in the rest of Europe, during the last economic and financial crisis; a restrictive policy that would avoid the supposed danger of inflation. With the consequent austerity policies and their consequences…

All of this and more, a hundred years ago, started in a wagon inside the Forest of Compiègne, northeast of Paris.

Manuel Manonelles is the Delegate of the Government of Catalonia in Switzerland, as well as Visiting Professor at the University Ramon Llull – Blanquerna (Barcelona)

By Manuel Manonelles and - -
BARCELONA, Nov 29 2011 (IPS)

Coffee aficionados say that one of the finest cafes in the world is Rome’s Sant’Eustachio, located in the city’s historic centre. Since 1938 it has been the site of coffee pilgrimages and a must for the most ardent espresso devotees. The line often stretches far outside the shop.

Numerous legends have sprung up over the years regarding the secret behind this coffee’s perfection of taste and extraordinary aroma. It is commonly known that the beans are roasted over a wood fire, but this feature does not go far enough to answer the question. Some argue that the unique qualities of the espresso derive from the water used in brewing, which is extremely pure and comes from an ancient aqueduct that is still in operation. This is well within the realm of possibility, given that numerous buildings in the ancient Roman quarter still get their water in this manner.

Others hold that the secret has to do with how the coffee is brewed, a notion supported by the fact that the two espresso machines used by the cafe are positioned in such a way that customers cannot see how the famous coffees are prepared.

But what no visitor to this Mecca of caffeine addicts expects to find out is that all of the coffee served there, thousands and thousands every week, is fair trade coffee obtained through the Italian organisation Altromercato, a long-time pioneer in the fair trade movement. It is through this group that Sant’Eustachio obtains the very best beans produced in Brazil, Ethiopia, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, the Galapagos islands, or Saint Helena.

Thus every bean used by Sant’Eustachio is produced in keeping with the norms of fair trade and organic farming. As the owners of the cafe recognise, buying a free trade item produced in solidarity with the growers and harvesters means paying a fair price that is higher than the usual market price and building long-term trade relationships that guarantee the financing of local projects for environmental and social development. In addition, in this case buying a free trade product established a direct relationship between the roasters and the farmers, which leads both to seek out quality product.

The example of this prestigious cafe -it would be impossible to list the number of famous clients that have frequented it- overturns certain misconceptions and serves as a paradigm and a model. It shows without a doubt that in contrast to what the various “market” gurus proclaim night and day, quality, commercial success, and social justice are not only entirely compatible; together they can produce results of the very highest order, including commercial.

We live in times of economic and financial turbulence rife with worry and uncertainty about the future. Whether because of a lack of awareness or a dangerous inertia, we respond by blindly applying the same formulas that lead us to this crisis in the first place.

A walk through historic Rome and a visit -metaphorical or not- to the Sant’Eustachio coffee bar show us that there are completely viable alternatives to the dominant economic and entrepreneurial model that make the human element a priority and indeed an added value. We should think about this, and hope to be able to change our behaviour before it is too late. (END/COPYRIGHT IPS)

(*) Manuel Manonelles is the director of the Foundation for the Culture of Peace, Barcelona.

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By Manuel Manonelles
BARCELONA, Dec 22 2009 (IPS)

Little by little, it is being confirmed that the melting of the polar ice caps, whether in Antarctica or the Arctic, is happening significantly faster than initially predicted. The consequences of this for peace, one of the main victims of climate change, are enormous.

Glaciers and areas of high-altitude mountains that were previously considered zones of perpetual snow are now melting. A paradigmatic case is that of the alpine border between Switzerland and Italy where during a recent routine verification, certain sections of ice or perennial snow that had been on the map since 1861 were found to be missing. In this case, the two countries have enjoyed long periods of peaceful coexistence and are approaching the problem in a logical and cordial fashion, forming a commission to find a technical solution.

However, the possible implications of cases like this in other geographical areas are very worrisome. The destabilising potential of a similar development on the India-Pakistan border would be enormous, particularly in the zone of Kashmir or the Siachen glacier, where more than 3000 soldiers of both countries have died since 1984. The same is true of the tense China-India border, or the deeply problematic border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which will grow increasingly porous with melting, contributing to a rise in destabilisation in what are already two of the most unstable countries on the earth.

Another major effect of global warming is the gradual opening of major global shipping lanes in areas that had previously been impassable because of ice. The Northeast Passage along the north of Russia, used recently for the first time in history, shortens travel between the ports of China, Japan, and Korea and Hamburg, Rotterdam, and South Hampton by 4,000 kilometres. With the Northwest Passage along northern Canada, travel between the China and the ports of the eastern United States is similarly shortened. The opening of these new routes will completely change the dynamics of intercontinental trade and might render irrelevant places that until now were considered geostrategically essential, such as the Panama and the Suez Canal.

Add to this the draw of massive reserves of raw materials expected to be present in the Arctic, ever more accessible as the ice recedes, which is provoking a race for control of the area -including an arms race- and is stoking tensions particularly between Russia, Norway, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. The Russian news agency TASS has calculated oil reserves in the area at over 10 billion tonnes. Last year Canada approved an extraordinary 6.9 billion dollar arms bill to strengthen its military presence in its arctic zone, while Russia has resumed tactical flights of nuclear bombers in its polar region, triggering the protests of numerous countries.

This also explains, in part, the speed with which the European Union is processing the application for EU membership of bankrupt Iceland, which would place the body in the best possible position for future negotiations and territorial claims in the area with regard to future access to the “Arctic banquet”.

The melting of the ice caps is also the major cause of rising sea levels, which have other irreversible territorial, social, and economic consequences, such as the physical disappearance -partial or total- of certain small island states of the Pacific likely to occur within a few years -the Maldives, Samoa, Kiribati, among others. Obviously the implications are vast, including -in addition to the personal, environmental, cultural, and national trauma- the political and legal status of future states that have no territory. The principal components of the global infrastructure, from ports and refineries to airports and nuclear plants, are also seriously at risk, and will find themselves near or at or even below sea level.

It is important to note in this context that the majority of the global population lives in areas close to the sea, starting with megacities like Mumbai, London, New York, Shanghai, Tokyo, and Buenos Aires, and densely-populated areas like the Ganges delta in Bangladesh, where rising sea levels are already wreaking havoc in the form of water pollution and related effects. Recent studies indicate the possibility of some 200 million new environmental refugees in coming years -refugees who would only increase the already considerable humanitarian pressures and tensions in these areas and exacerbate existing or latent conflict.

The Global Humanitarian Fund issued a report this year that shows unequivocally that climate change today is responsible for some 300,000 deaths per year. Numbers for the medium and long-term are even higher. In this context, the urgency of fighting climate is a pre-condition for a peaceful future. Therefore, the international community has no other option, specially after the fiasco in Copenhagen, to spring into action as soon as possible. It is about climate, but also about peace and human lives.(END/COPYRIGHT IPS)

(*) Manuel Manonelles is director of the Foundation for a Culture of Peace.

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