By Martti Ahtisaari and - -
HELSINKI, Apr 7 2008 (IPS)

In November 2005, the UN Secretary-General, acting on the basis of the conclusions of the Security Council that the situation in Kosovo is no longer sustainable, asked me to lead the political process to determine Kosovo\’s future status, writes Martti Ahtisaari, ex-President of Finland and UN Secretary-General Special Envoy to Kosovo. In this article, the author writes that almost a year after he initially submitted his proposal, it became clear that the Security Council would not pass a new resolution. Therefore, since everybody, even the Russian Federation, agreed that the status quo in Kosovo was not sustainable, a solution outside of the Security Council needed to be found. The result we all know: many important countries, including the US and the majority of the EU, have recognized or committed themselves to recognize Kosovo\’s independence. Kosovo is primarily a European issue and the EU cannot afford to let Kosovo become just another \’frozen conflict\’. Doing nothing was not an option and my Settlement proposal provides an organized methodology for a UN exit and EU takeover. This requires a strong, consistent, and united European position in the coming months if we want Europe and Balkans to be stable.

I made my first trip to the region at the end of November 2005 and told the leadership in Belgrade that I interpreted the mentioned principle that Kosovo will not return to the pre-1999 situation as meaning that Kosovo will not return to Serbia. My hosts, particularly the Prime Minister, did not share this interpretation. Furthermore, during these initial visits to Belgrade and Pristina, it became apparent that the positions and perceptions on status were entrenched and so mutually opposed that any immediate attempt to narrow the differences would lead nowhere.

During the Contact Group ministerial meeting in London on 31 January 2006, it was suggested that the Contact Group members individually deliver private messages to the Kosovo Status Process parties. The key messages were that the unconstitutional abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989 and the ensuing tragic events resulting in the international administration of Kosovo have led to a situation in which a return of Kosovo to Belgrade’s rule was not a viable option.

All but the Russian Federation delivered private messages in the course of February and March 2006 to Belgrade, Pristina, and Kosovo Serbs. All members of the Contract Group, including the Russian Federation, agreed in the Ministerial Statement of 31 January 2006 that the settlement needs to be acceptable to the people of Kosovo.

My team and I therefore commenced work in early 2006 with an understanding that we should try to at least close the gap between Belgrade and Pristina on ‘technical aspects’ of status: rights of communities and their members; decentralization; religious and cultural heritage; economic provisions and property. Technical agreements or at least rapprochements were thought to then serve as building blocks for the resolution of status.

However, after a year of gruelling talks, on 10 March 2007 I chaired in Vienna a high-level meeting concluding the negotiations on the future status process for Kosovo, during which my team has engaged both parties in 17 rounds of direct talks and 26 expert missions to Belgrade and Pristina.

I had hoped, and very much preferred, that this process would lead to a negotiated agreement; however, after all efforts invested in the negotiation by my team and me, I felt that no amount of additional negotiations would change that. It was my firm conclusion that the potential of negotiations was exhausted. Bearing in mind the Guiding Principles of the Contact Group and the private messages, it was obvious that neither a return of Kosovo to Serbian rule, which the overwhelming majority of the people of Kosovo would not accept, nor a continuation of Kosovo’s current political and legal limbo under international administration, are viable options.

Therefore, I sent my settlement proposal, which is the best compromise as I see it, to the UN Secretary-General at the end of March 2007. I envisaged that the supervisory role of the international community will come to an end only once Kosovo has implemented the measures set forth in the proposal.

The UN Secretary-General endorsed my settlement proposal and forwarded it to the UN Security Council. The suggested solution enjoyed wide international support, not least within the EU. But this was not enough to produce a resolution that could be adopted by the Security Council. As a compromise solution, an agreement was reached that a Troika, comprised by representatives of the US, Russia, and the EU, was to be established by the Contact Group to lead an additional attempt to negotiate a settlement, with my office in Vienna continuing to be involved in the process and providing support as necessary. While the Troika managed to facilitate high-level, intense, and substantive discussions between Belgrade and Pristina on a wide range of options, the parties nevertheless were unable to reach an agreement on the final status of Kosovo. Neither party was willing to cede its position on the fundamental question of sovereignty over Kosovo, as I had expected.

The Security Council remained divided and Russia blocked the passing of a new resolution that would de-facto give Kosovo independence. I find it regrettable that the Security Council could not reach agreement on this issue. In my view, if this body of the UN cannot make decisions on important issues, then it is likely that these issues will be resolved somewhere else. If such tendency were to become dominant, the relevance of the Security Council would be diminished, which in turn would change the system of international relations as we know it.

What happened with Kosovo proves this point. Almost a year after I initially submitted my proposal, it became clear that the Security Council would not pass a new resolution. Therefore, since everybody, even the Russian Federation, agreed that the status quo in Kosovo was not sustainable, a solution outside of the Security Council needed to be found. The result we all know: many important countries, including the US and the majority of the EU, have recognized or committed themselves to recognize Kosovo’s independence. In the given circumstances, independence was the only option that could lead to stability in the Balkans and signal the end of the era that saw one of the worst atrocities committed on European soil in recent times.

It should be remembered that Belgrade leadership knew already in early 2006 what would be the outcome of the negotiations. They could have chosen to make a real difference for Kosovo Serbs and meaningfully engage in the talks. Instead, they decided to promote a nationalistic cause pursued by Milosevic that had forced the International Community to intervene in 1999 in the first place. In the course of the negotiations Belgrade has not publicly acknowledged any wrongdoing in Kosovo in the recent past. Even now its leaders act as if nothing happened in 1998 and 1999, when terrible injustices were suffered by the Kosovo Albanian population. During the negotiations the Kosovo Albanian delegation presented facts about these years with little remorse or understanding demonstrated from Belgrade.

Let me say a few words about the position of the Russian Federation. It was aware of the outcome of the negotiating process all along. Russia accepted the CG Guiding Principles, adopted in 2005, which are heavily tilted towards independence. In early 2006, my understanding was that Moscow would not block the inevitable from happening, but since then there has obviously been a change of mind. The diverging positions of Russia on the one hand and the EU and US on the other have made the world question the authority of the UN Security Council. Who would need a body that is not able to make a decision? Can a dictator – like Milosevic – succeed and get away with no repercussions for the sovereignty of the country where terrible acts were committed? In other words, a dictator could use the worst forms of discrimination based on ethnic principles, yet those that were the targets of this discrimination should idly accept the status quo and pretend to live together peacefully ever after?

I feel proud that the international community ended this conflict by closing a chapter where history was manipulated and used to fuel violence and hatred. I firmly believe that Kosovo is primarily a European issue and that the EU cannot afford to let Kosovo become just another ‘frozen conflict’. Doing nothing was not an option and my Settlement proposal provides an organized methodology for a UN exit and EU takeover. This requires a strong, consistent, and united European position in the coming months. I am encouraged by the results of the Steering Group meeting in Vienna in late February. I hope the process will continue in the same fashion in the future. It has to if we want Europe and Balkans to be stable. (END/COPYRIGHT IPS)

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By Martti Ahtisaari
VENICE, Dec 10 2007 (IPS)

There is hardly a trouble-shooter in the world today more trusted than Martti Ahtisaari, Chairman of the Crisis Management Initiative. Kosovo, the disputed southern province of Serbia, is the latest challenge he has taken on.

He has done this as head of the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), an independent, non-profit organisation that works for “sustainable security” and “combines analysis, action and advocacy.” The Helsinki-based organisation was founded in 2000.

Ahtisaari was in Venice to attend a meeting on the role of communication in the alliance of civilisations, organised jointly by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the Province of Venice and IPS. Ahtisaari spoke at the meeting with Sanjay Suri from IPS.

IPS: How far has the EU-U.S.-Russia Troika progressed on Kosovo? Martti Ahtisaari: It doesn’t look like they have been able to make any headway. Of course the secretary-general has to report this to the Security Council, and then the Council has to start debating. What they have on the table is the report that I and my colleagues presented in March. We will see if there is a different reception to that report now.

I think everyone has known what outcome is going to come; I think this 120-day exercise was important because it should now hopefully unite the European Union in dealing with this.

IPS: Is the Kosovo issue a microcosm of attempts to bridge political differences within a nation? MA: No, I think it’s much more important what kind of leadership countries have. If you look around at the world, and you look at the past history of the world, and the greatest disasters, it always is around certain individuals, and others have very much followed.

Unfortunately Mr Milosevic behaved in a manner that can’t be ignored. I don’t think anyone, even in Serbia — there may be a few — but the majority of Serbs recognise that things went badly wrong. And I think that has to be the beginning, when you start looking for solutions. Because if you think you can start negotiating the status of Kosovo without any history at allà

There are democratic forces in power who beat Milosevic in elections, and sometimes they behave like there shouldn’t be any history, and we should start from a time before Mr Milosevic. But it doesn’t work that way, and I don’t think you can force the situation, otherwise over 90 percent of the population in Kosovo yearns for independence, after only what happened in the 1990s; you don’t need to go further than that.

IPS: But are there not irreconcilable differences now between peoples? MA: I think there has been a lot of work done on both sides. The political leadership in Kosovo at the moment, the Albanians, have actually been in touch, the Prime Minister has visited, the President has visited the Serb communities. The Serbian Orthodox Church has had a dialogue with Kosovo Albanians, and that has led to a different attitude in many places. I have some of the monasteries, for instance, and witnessed that personally.

But one of the problems is that when the status is not clear whether a country becomes independent or not, it actually prevents normal dialogue between people. And furthermore, when Kosovo Serbs have not participated in elections like the recent one because they have been ordered by Belgrade not to, and they have decided themselves that that’s the line they want to follow, it’s very difficult then if you want to exclude yourself in the political process, it’s very difficult to come to a normal situation, or at least somewhat normal situation where the dialogue could be pursued.

But there’s an enormous amount of work that lies ahead whatever status comes, because I think reconciliation is a long-term exercise.

IPS: What are the principles in conflict resolution that you have seen work? MA: Throughout my career I have dealt with groups that have been at one time or other been branded terrorists. Sometimes for political convenience more than anything else. And it’s interesting to see that the same groups, when they come to power in certain countries, or they share power in some others, they have become responsible actors in their societies. I don’t think you learn to become responsible if you don’t hold power.

And therefore to imagine if there has been a political process, a democratic political process through elections that are generally regarded as free and fair, to say that certain groups are excluded because their statements have been such that others and neighbours might find objectionable, I have experienced from many of these conflicts that people know, organisations know what is expected of them if they are part of a political process.

But it is I think unreasonable to believe that any of these groups would start a political process by declaring that yes, we accept this, this and that. It will come, but it’s part of a political process, and I think we are wasting our time if we believe that one can artificially push this sort of groups aside.

IPS: IPS set up a dialogue on alliance among civilisations. Can this help? MA: I think IPS is an important organisation in many ways because first of all its information concentrates on processes, not on personalities and events as media tends to. It analyses the situation, and therefore it is of vital importance. It also brings people together. This is one event, but we can draw conclusions out of this discussion as well.

IPS: We see conflicts in Turkey, elsewhere. Are there fundamental solutions? MA: Every conflict can be solved if we put our political will behind it, and we get all the necessary actors to support us, problems can be solved. In most conflicts we know very well what needs to be done. We are simply hesitating in not moving forward. And there, as we see different religions coming together, as we heard the reports here, is of vital importance. It’s the best preventive medicine I can think of.

IPS: Can war ever help? MA: We have seen that World War II ended the Nazism that was destroying Europe. Sometimes you need military intervention to stop genocide. I think more has been done wrong in the world by not interfering in time. We could have saved many lives. We know that in Africa at a number of locations the international community should actually have acted, but didn’t. But it is also very important that if we have to use military force to stop a conflict, that then reconciliation work starts.

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By Martti Ahtisaari and - -
HELSINKI, Apr 1 2004 (IPS)

Although the forthcoming enlargement of the European Union is the largest in EU history, it is important to realise that it still does not encompass the whole of Europe, writes Martti Ahtisaari, president of Finland in 1994-2000. In this article, the author writes that after the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 preparations should begin for the next enlargement round. The Union must make sure that it provides the South-East European countries a meaningful and concrete vision for their membership. The EU also needs to establish its relationships with a number of countries not expected to become members in the near future, such as Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova. The EU must be able to offer something between mere collaboration and full membership. The final objective for enlargement of the Union to the east is to consolidate peace and security on our continent. The former foreign minister of Poland, Bronislaw Geremek, has said \’\’the enlargement will bring history and geography in harmony with each other\’\’. This goal, which the member states and the applicant states have pursued for over a decade, is finally materialising.

Although the forthcoming enlargement of the European Union is the largest in EU history, it is important to realise that it still does not encompass the whole of Europe; a number of countries will remain outside. It is essential that the EU not stagnate. After the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, preparations should begin for the next enlargement round. The Union must make sure that it provides the South-East European countries a meaningful and concrete vision for their membership.

The EU also needs to establish its relationships with a number of countries not expected to become members in the near future, such as Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova. This is the new neighbourhood or the ”wider Europe”. As Romano Prodi said in an interview last spring, the ”EU needs a circle of friends around its borders”. He stressed that the EU must offer these not-soon-to-be-members a strategic partnership, where everything except the EU institutions will be shared with the circle of friends. The EU must be able to offer something between mere collaboration and full membership.

The Baltic Sea region has often been mentioned as a potential centre of economic growth in the European Union. That is not idle talk. The prospects for healthy economic growth in the area are real as is already shown in the investments that have been made around the Baltic Sea. More is needed in particular in infrastructure so that closer economic ties can be fully developed.

European institutions have several different programmes that can be helpful in building better networks for transport and communication. Some of the already existing institutions, such as the cooperation between the universities in the region, or port authorities in the region have to be enhanced. The history of European integration has proven clearly that the greater our interdependence, the more probable it is that we find solutions to our problems. Progress in one area of integration tends to make progress in other related areas more likely, and sometimes even unavoidable.

The EU membership of Finland and Sweden as well as the ongoing enlargement process has put the question of stability and security in the Baltic Sea region and Northern Europe on the agenda of the European Union. The Union has thus developed policies to address both its relationship with Russia and the northern region as a whole.

The Finnish Government launched the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership initiative in 1997 to address environmental problems in the north and in Russia especially. It was a new and challenging project, outside of the conventional agenda items of the European Union. It was to become an important policy area of the EU. The Northern Dimension as formulated by the EU is a realisation that mechanisms and assistance were needed to promote regional integration.

Increasing cooperation with Russia also opens up more opportunities for solving the daunting environmental problems that were bequeathed by the former Soviet Union to many northern land and sea areas. The consequences of environmental neglect require urgent action. On a local scale, air pollution in some areas has seriously impaired the quality of life. Careless treatment of nuclear waste poses a threat to people now living in the area and generations to come. The state of the Baltic Sea is tragic, and is a result of policies in all of the littoral states. These are problems that we can only solve by working together.

It has been said that the European Union is like a bicycle: you have to move forward to be able to ride it. It has its hands full managing everyday programmes and issues, internal and external. At the same time it faces major challenges, the outcome of which will have far-reaching consequences for our future.

The final objective for enlargement of the Union to the east is to consolidate peace and security on our continent. The former foreign minister of Poland, Bronislaw Geremek, has said, ”The enlargement will bring history and geography in harmony with each other.” This goal, which the member states and the applicant states have pursued for over a decade, is finally materialising. Whatever challenges lie ahead, this is a time for remembering the great achievements of the EU in widening the zone of stability and prosperity. (END/COPYRIGHT IPS)

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By Martti Ahtisaari and - -
HELSINKI, Jan 1 2004 (IPS)

Jumping from crisis to crisis is becoming unbearable for the people in the Horn of Africa, for the humanitarian community, and for donors as well, writes Martti Ahtisaari, the president of Finland in 1994-2000. As a result of failed rains in 2002, both Ethiopia and Eritrea face serious food shortages and the humanitarian consequences of increased destitution among the most vulnerable segments of society. Between six and ten million people will require food and other forms of assistance this year. We are entering a period in the Horn of Africa in which the underlying causes of these problems must be addressed urgently and properly, the author writes in this analysis. It is generally agreed that the time has come for the World Bank to take the leading role in the long-term development efforts and for the international donor community to concentrate its efforts in the Horn of Africa. It will be much more cost effective if we manage to shift the development towards increasing independence in the production and food security.

Jumping from crisis to crisis is becoming unbearable for the people in the Horn of Africa, for the humanitarian community, and for donors as well. Development in the region has to be steered to a more sustainable basis as the frequency of severe droughts seems to have increased.

As a result of failed rains in 2002, both Ethiopia and Eritrea still face serious food shortages and the humanitarian consequences of increased destitution among the most vulnerable segments of society.

Between six and ten million people currently require food and other forms of assistance in the Horn of Africa, yet a major emergency could be prevented this time as a result of the early warnings of impending crisis and prompt action by donors, local governments, and the humanitarian community.

In Ethiopia –a huge country of over 70 million people– a major disaster was indeed averted in 2003 through a remarkable collective effort. Still, significant humanitarian needs remain, especially in non-food sectors. It will be necessary to continue large-scale humanitarian efforts in 2004 and to maintain the current momentum of fund-raising.

Requirements remain substantial, especially in worst affected areas where malaria and a variety of infectious diseases are hitting the physically weak harder than usual.

There are also very difficult policy issues, like the question of land. The average size of a farm is one hectare, which can’t feed a family of five even in good years.

The government of Ethiopia is now implementing plans that relocate people to provide them with twice the amount of land. As the experiences of other countries have shown, making people move is always a controversial approach.

The state-owned land is not fully privatised but people are granted very long-term ownership rights, which they can transfer to their children. This makes the farmers much more committed to the land and more eager to make improvements.

The Ethiopian government is reluctant to implement full privatisation of the land because of the fear that people might sell their plots –their only asset– and place themselves totally at the mercy of outside help.

In Eritrea –a country of 3.6 million people– there are several worrying indicators. About two-thirds of the population now live below the poverty line, with at least half of these in extreme poverty. Child malnutrition is high, and up to 53 percent of households are headed by women.

With the increase in the frequency of severe droughts and humanitarian crisis, we are entering a period in the Horn of Africa in which the underlying causes of these problems must be addressed urgently and properly.

In the case of Eritrea, three central areas will require attention in order to achieve more long-term results: (1) meeting outstanding humanitarian funding requirements, which is instrumental in building the foundations for recovery and development, (2) improving the dialogue between the government and donors, and (3) finalising the demarcation process of the disputed border between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The government of Eritrea indicated that a sense of insecurity is preventing a more rapid demobilisation. Given the considerable impact that the general labour shortage and absence of farmers from their land is having on the humanitarian situation, it will be critical to have demarcation carried out on an urgent basis.

Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a bitter and disastrous war in 1998-2000 over the border line in Badme; this same section of the border is again being disputed.

It is generally agreed that the time has come for the World Bank to take the leading role in the long-term development efforts and for the international donor community to concentrate its efforts in the Horn of Africa.

It will be much more cost effective if we manage to shift development towards increasing independence in production and food security.

Once we have identified the programmes that are needed (this process is well underway) the international community must look into financing them in a slightly longer-term perspective –a five year period as a minimum– and commit itself to these targets in order to achieve real progress in the area. It will only become more difficult if we fail to act now. (END/COPYRIGHT IPS)

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