By Mohamed ElBaradei and - -
VIENNA, Jul 1 2004 (IPS)

Since the discovery of Iraq\’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme in the early 1990s, the IAEA has sought creative methods to strengthen the nuclear safeguards regime; these methods have in many ways proved successful, writes Mohamed ElBaradei, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In this analysis, the author writes that \”our recent experiences in Iraq, Iran, and Libya have confirmed how effective IAEA verification can be, even under difficult conditions, provided that we are given adequate authority, aided by all available information, backed by a credible compliance mechanism, and supported by international consensus\”. A key aspect of IAEA authority is the so-called \’\’additional protocol\’\’, the supplement to a safeguards agreement with the IAEA that gives it broader rights of access to information and inspection sites. For the regime to be credible, the additional protocol should be accepted as the verification standard, but only 56 of the 184 non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT have ratified the protocol. Developing countries can play their part to enhance the credibility of the NPT regime and solidify their position on the \’\’moral high ground\’\’ by bringing this additional protocol into force.

Fifty years ago, world leaders were struggling to address a crisis unlike anything the world had seen before: a threat, they believed, to the very existence of the planet. The power of the atom, unleashed with horrifying results in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was becoming available to more countries.

The peaceful benefits of nuclear energy, which held out the potential for great advances in agriculture, health, and industry, were in a position to be overshadowed by the prospect of a world armed to the teeth with nuclear warheads.

It was into this troubling set of circumstances that the Atoms for Peace initiative was born and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) created. The vision was global, but the premise was simple: the way to halt the advance of nuclear weaponry and prevent eventual self-destruction would be to strike a bargain that served the interests of all involved.

That bargain, which took more than 15 years to complete, became the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This initiative had three parts: by signing the treaty, the non-nuclear-weapon states agreed to give up any nuclear-weapon ambitions. In exchange, the five nuclear-weapon states who signed the treaty agreed to proceed towards full nuclear disarmament. And the states possessing nuclear technology agreed to share with the other signatories the peaceful nuclear technology that could be of benefit.

Today, with the spotlight on the challenges of nuclear verification and on how to deal with countries that have developed clandestine nuclear programmes, or with the discovery of an extensive black market for components with nuclear applications, it is easy to lose sight of the other dimensions of Atoms for Peace.

It is gratifying to witness the increasing array of nuclear and isotopic techniques that have been used to address daunting challenges, particularly in the developing world, to generate crops with better yields in arid climates, to diagnose and treat diseases, to study child malnutrition, to manage drinking water supplies, to improve animal health and promote livestock production, to increase industrial productivity, to eradicate disease-bearing pests, and to solve many other problems related to hunger, poverty, and inadequate health care.

Through its technical cooperation programme, the IAEA works to understand the needs and priorities of each member state, and to develop a programme of nuclear applications tailored to those needs.

Developing countries also have a vital interest in the IAEA’s efforts to maintain a strong nuclear non-proliferation regime. Despite flaws in the system, implementation of the NPT continues to provide important security benefits by providing assurance to the world that, in the great majority of non-nuclear-weapon states, nuclear energy is not being misused for weapon purposes.

Although the NPT is sometimes perceived as a Western project, its benefits extend across any North/South or East/West geopolitical divide.

Developing countries have shown leadership in extending the influence and scope of the NPT regime by establishing nuclear- weapon-free zones. Four such zones have been successfully established in Latin America and the Caribbean, in the South Pacific, in Southeast Asia and in Africa to bolster and supplement, in a regional context, the non-proliferation commitments made under the NPT. Another such zone, in Central Asia, is currently being negotiated.

Since the discovery of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme in the early 1990s, the IAEA has also sought creative methods to strengthen the nuclear safeguards regime. These methods have in many ways proved successful: our recent experiences in Iraq, Iran, and Libya have confirmed how effective IAEA verification can be, even under difficult conditions, provided that we are given adequate authority, aided by all available information, backed by a credible compliance mechanism, and supported by international consensus.

But a key aspect of IAEA authority is the so-called ”additional protocol”, the supplement to a safeguards agreement with the IAEA that gives it broader rights of access to information and inspection sites. For the regime to be credible, the additional protocol should be accepted as the verification standard; the agency should have the right to conduct these broader inspections in all countries. However, to date, only 56 of the 184 non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT have ratified the protocol.

Developing countries can do their part to enhance the credibility of the NPT regime and solidify their position on the ”moral high ground” by bringing this additional protocol into force.

Fifty years ago, the international community set about to move towards a world in which nuclear weapons would no longer be needed or pursued, and in which peaceful nuclear technologies would provide enduring benefits to all peoples and cultures. The 21st century has brought new and critical challenges to this mission. The question remains: what legacy do we want to leave to our children? I call on all countries to do their part to make that legacy a nuclear-weapon-free world. (END/COPYRIGHT IPS)

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