Bangladesh is rightly praised for saving lives during cyclones and floods. Early warning systems, cyclone shelters and community mobilisation have turned once-catastrophic disasters into emergencies in which evacuation is often possible. But behind that success lies a quieter national failure: millions of people are being uprooted inside the country, often more than once, without a clear path back to secure homes, land or livelihoods.

Dr Mohammad Zaman

In Bangladesh, this distinction is not academic. A Rohingya family that fled Myanmar into Cox’s Bazar is rightly understood as part of a refugee crisis. A Bangladeshi family forced from a riverbank in Kazipur-Sirajganj, a cyclone-hit village in Barguna or Patuakhali, or a landslide-prone hillside in Chattogram is internally displaced. The first case draws international refugee law and a global humanitarian apparatus. The second is too often dismissed as local misfortune, seasonal migration or urban poverty—even when the displacement is forced, repeated and long-term.

The drivers are unmistakable. Monsoon floods, cyclones, storm surges and landslides trigger large annual movements. Slower disasters—riverbank erosion, salinity intrusion and coastal land loss—make return impossible for many families. Conflict and violence produce smaller annual movements, but protracted displacement in the Chittagong Hill Tracts remains unresolved. Development projects, urban evictions and infrastructure expansion can also uproot communities when resettlement and compensation fall short.

The numbers show why Bangladesh can no longer treat internal displacement as a temporary humanitarian footnote. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre reported about 2.4 million disaster-related displacements in Bangladesh in 2024, up from about 1.8 million in 2023. Monsoon floods alone triggered around 1.3 million movements, including an estimated 723,000 in Sylhet division in June. Cyclone Remal added roughly 1.1 million displacements, many of them pre-emptive evacuations that saved lives but still disrupted homes, schools, work and local economies. Conflict and violence accounted for about 2,800 displacements.

New national evidence makes the picture starker. The International Organization for Migration’s Displacement Tracking Matrix estimated 5 million disaster-induced IDPs in Bangladesh in its 2025 nationwide assessment. Nearly two-thirds had been displaced before April 2020, meaning many have lived with displacement for years, not weeks. One quarter were concentrated in just four districts—Chattogram, Sirajganj, Bhola and Noakhali—while Chattogram and Dhaka divisions together hosted about 40 per cent of the estimated displaced population.

These figures expose an unequal geography of risk. Coastal households face cyclones, storm surges, saline water and embankment failures. Riverine communities in the north and centre lose land to erosion. City slums absorb families who arrive after disasters, only to place them in flood-prone, insecure and poorly serviced neighbourhoods. Women, children, older people and persons with disabilities face particular barriers in evacuation, shelter access, documentation, employment and safe housing. Displacement is not simply movement from one place to another; it can strip people of assets, identity, social networks, education and political voice.

Bangladesh’s IDP crisis is best understood as a development crisis with humanitarian symptoms. The country is comparatively strong at emergency response: it can warn people, open shelters and move communities away from immediate danger. The harder work begins after the water recedes—restoring land, rebuilding homes, returning children to school, replacing fishing gear or livestock, securing tenure in safer locations, and preventing displaced families from being pushed into exploitative labour or unsafe housing. Without durable solutions—safe return, local integration or planned relocation—each disaster deepens the last.

Bangladesh has a policy foundation, including its National Strategy on Internal Displacement Management. What it lacks is implementation at the scale demanded by climate reality. Internal displacement must be built into land-use planning, social protection, climate adaptation, urban housing, education, health care and local government finance. Data systems should distinguish short-term evacuations from protracted displacement. Relief, relocation and resettlement must be transparent, participatory and centred on livelihoods—not merely a transfer from one unsafe place to another.

Ashrayan, Bangladesh’s flagship housing program for landless and homeless families, offers both a useful model and a warning. Since 1997, it has given many poor households a legal roof, a small plot and access to basic services. For families living for years on embankments, khas land, riverbanks or in insecure urban settlements, secure shelter can be life-changing. But Ashrayan also shows why housing cannot be mistaken for rehabilitation. A house in the wrong place—without work nearby, transport, drainage, schools, health care or local accountability—can become another form of confinement. The real test is not how many units are handed over, but whether families can rebuild livelihoods and belong to the communities that receive them.

The recurring failures are practical and political. Too many Ashrayan-style resettlement sites are chosen because public or khas land is available, not because the location offers a realistic route out of poverty. Weak construction, poor drainage, inadequate sanitation, limited maintenance and exposure to floods or erosion can undermine relocation itself. Governance failures—unclear beneficiary selection, local influence, informal payments, land disputes and weak grievance systems—can be just as damaging. When these problems occur, families may gain a roof while losing the social networks, markets and informal economies that kept them afloat. Some commute long distances; some rent out or abandon the unit; some move again. That is not a failure of the displaced. It is a warning about policy design.

The future will be harsher if policy remains reactive. Climate change will intensify the hazards that already uproot families—heavier rainfall, stronger storm surges, sea-level rise, salinity and river erosion—while urbanisation will keep pulling displaced people into already strained cities such as Dhaka, Chattogram and secondary urban centres. Bangladesh has proved through cyclone preparedness that public policy can save lives. Its next test is whether those who survive disaster can also recover dignity, income and security afterward.

That begins with treating IDPs as rights-holders, not as casualties of bad weather. Bangladesh must move beyond emergency shelter toward secure housing, restored livelihoods and accountable national systems backed by climate finance. Resettlement must be written into land policy, local budgets, urban planning, social protection and climate adaptation before the next flood or cyclone arrives. The choice is stark: displacement can remain a conveyor belt into poverty, or it can become a national commitment to safety, citizenship and a future people can rebuild.

Dr. Mohammad Zaman is an internationally recognized scholar and practitioner in resettlement and development projects across Asia and Africa. His work brings together academic scholarship, field-based practice, social safeguards, and policy engagement, with a particular focus on how affected communities experience, negotiate, and reshape development interventions. Dr. Zaman’s most recent book is Anatomy of Resettlement: Ethnographic Accounts and Stories in Retrospect (Bloomsbury Academic, 2025).

IPS UN Bureau

Char residents crossing the Jamuna River by boat (Stock photo, 2016).

By Mohammad Zaman
DHAKA, Bangladesh, Aug 31 2026 (IPS)

Bangladesh’s riverine and coastal chars have always been landscapes of movement, but climate change is making that movement more violent, frequent, and unequal. The shifting islands of the Jamuna, Brahmaputra, Padma, and other rivers now reveal how climate stress multiplies deprivation, weakens citizenship, and forces char dwellers to absorb the costs of a crisis they did little to create.

After years of researching and writing about Bangladesh’s chars, I see them not as marginal landscapes, but as frontline climate geographies. They show how river erosion becomes repeated displacement, flooding brings livelihood collapse, and administrative neglect heightens vulnerability. Char people rebuild, migrate, and diversify under extreme uncertainty, but their resilience should not be romanticized. It is being stretched by intensifying hazards and institutions still designed for fixed land, fixed addresses, and orderly poverty. This is why the issue should be framed not simply as adaptation to hazards, but as a question of rights. The central problem is not that char dwellers fail to cope with a moving river; it is that institutions repeatedly ask them to cope without secure recognition, services, or protection.

Mohammad Zaman

Chars are marginal because state planning treats them as temporary spaces for poor and landless people. Some estimates suggest that chars cover roughly 8% of Bangladesh’s land area and are home to 15 to 20 million people. For char communities, migration is not a rupture in char life; it is a recurring way of organizing and rebuilding, often annually. But climate change is turning mobility from strategy into necessity. For many char dwellers, migration may begin as seasonal labour, become repeated relocation, and finally harden into permanent detachment from land, kinship, and legal security.

In 2024, according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre’s Bangladesh country profile, monsoon floods triggered 1.3 million movements, while its disaster displacement risk reporting records more than 21 million disaster displacements in Bangladesh between 2008 and 2024. Among char people, climate change is felt through household decisions made under pressure: whether to rebuild on the same island, move to another char, keep children in school, or migrate to Dhaka for work. These choices are rational and strategic, but the field of options is narrowing under climate stress, vulnerability, and social exclusion.

Migration from char areas also reflects intelligence and aspiration: young people leave for wages, education, electricity, phones, clinics, and futures beyond subsistence and uncertainty. The tragedy is that climate-stressed households often move without skills, savings, documents, safe housing, or labour protection. The river follows them into the garment line, the rickshaw garage, the brick kiln, the domestic workplace, and the rented slum room.

How should these heightened risks from flooding and displacement be addressed? Adaptation is necessary, but it is not enough. Raised plinths, early warnings, flood-resistant crops and community preparedness may save lives, yet adaptation without land rights, education, healthcare, social protection and safe migration routes becomes a way of managing dispossession. Climate change deepens vulnerability because it strikes people who already lack secure tenure, dependable services and political recognition.

In Bangladesh, climate policy should stop treating char dwellers as humanitarian exceptions and start treating them as political subjects. Public services must be redesigned for moving landscapes through boat schools, mobile clinics, digital civil registration, portable social protection, and weather-responsive transport. Land administration must recognize erosion and accretion, while migration should be planned as adaptation through skills training, safe housing, labour rights, and social insurance. Gender must be central to this agenda. Women and girls often carry these risks most directly, through interrupted schooling, unsafe travel for work or services, increased care burdens during floods, and reduced voice in decisions about land, migration, and relief. Policies that imagine the household as a single male-headed unit misread both vulnerability and agency.

The politics of the char is the politics of who counts in a warming world. Fixed maps assume that citizenship has a stable address and that development follows roads. Char life challenges those assumptions. It shows that climate vulnerability is produced not only by hazards, but by institutions unable or unwilling to recognize lives shaped by unstable land.

Bangladesh can praise char people for endurance, or it can confront the uncomfortable truth: the river will keep moving; that is its nature. But if the rights of char people move more slowly than the river, the failure is political. Their future will not be secured by teaching them to adapt endlessly to disappearance, but by ensuring that no citizen has to prove belonging on land that may not be there tomorrow.

The experience of Bangladesh’s char dwellers shows that climate change is not only an environmental crisis, but also a crisis of rights, recognition, and governance. River erosion, floods, and displacement become devastating because they intersect with insecure land tenure, weak services, gendered risks, and limited political voice. A just response must therefore go beyond short-term adaptation and treat char communities as full citizens whose mobility, livelihoods, and claims to belonging deserve protection in a warming and increasingly unstable world.

Dr. Mohammad Zaman has lived and conducted extensive field research in the Kazipur-Sirajganj chars and has written widely on char land tenure, livelihoods, and social organization. He is the lead editor, with Mustafa Alam as co-editor, of Living on the Edge: Char Dwellers in Bangladesh (Springer, 2021). He can be reached at mqzaman.bc@gmail.com.

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Downpours flood the streets of Dhaka. Credit: Farid Ahmed/ IPS

By Mohammad Zaman
DHAKA, Bangladesh, Aug 13 2026 (IPS)

Dhaka’s recent and recurrent flooding is often treated as a natural disaster, but rain is only the trigger. The deeper causes are political, planning and ecological failure: wetland loss, canal encroachment, unplanned growth, weak enforcement, fragmented institutions and short-term engineering fixes. Dhaka is not drowning because it rains; it is drowning because it has been built as if water had nowhere to go.

Historically, Dhaka was part of a watery landscape of rivers, canals, ponds, floodplains and low-lying retention areas. These were not vacant lands; they were essential drainage infrastructure that stored rainwater, slowed runoff and carried excess water toward surrounding rivers. As the city expanded, this blue-green network was filled, narrowed or severed, leaving drains unable to cope even with moderate rainfall.

Mohammad Zaman

Drains and canals have also deteriorated. Many are clogged with waste, narrowed by illegal structures or disconnected from smaller drains. Box culverts, often promoted as modernisation, have in some places buried waterways rather than restoring them as living drainage corridors. Drainage fails not only because pipes are small, but because the wider hydrological system has been cut apart.

Climate change adds pressure through shorter, heavier and less predictable rainfall, but it should not excuse bad planning. World Bank work on urban flooding in Greater Dhaka has warned that the city already has an adaptation deficit. The real problem is that Dhaka has reduced its own capacity to absorb shocks, treating flooding as a pipe-sizing seasonal issue rather than a citywide water-management challenge.

The consequences appear first in transport paralysis. When major roads in Mirpur, Dhanmondi, Green Road, Motijheel, Shantinagar, Old Dhaka and other areas go underwater, commuters lose hours, public transport stalls and businesses suffer. The cost includes damaged vehicles and inventories, delayed logistics, lost productivity and the daily stress of moving through a city that cannot function after rain.

Flooding also deepens inequality. Low-income residents in informal and low-lying settlements face contaminated water entering their homes, loss of daily income, damaged belongings and higher disease risk. Floodwater mixed with sewage, waste and pollutants increases infections and waterborne illness. The poor pay twice: through greater exposure and weaker access to healthcare, savings and political voice.

The scale of impact shows this is not a seasonal inconvenience. A 2023 GIS and remote-sensing study found that almost 35 percent of Dhaka falls within high or very high waterlogging-vulnerability zones, with slum households disproportionately concentrated there. Recent rainfall confirms the risk: Dhaka recorded 130 millimetres of rain in six hours on 12 July 2024, while another episode brought 196 millimetres in 24 hours in 2025, submerging major roads despite large drainage investments.

Infrastructure spending has not produced resilience. The two Dhaka city corporations reportedly invested more than Tk 262 crore over four years up to 2024 to build 334.19 kilometres of drains, box culverts and related infrastructure, yet large areas still flooded. Planning data show that Dhaka lost 3,440 acres out of 9,556 acres of designated flood-flow zones, retention areas and waterbodies since the 1995 Detailed Area Plan, while central-city waterbodies reportedly fell from 20.57 percent in 1995 to 2.9 percent in 2023. The city is paying to drain water while allowing the systems that make drainage possible to disappear.

This failure is reinforced by institutional fragmentation. Responsibility is divided among Dhaka WASA, the two city corporations, RAJUK, the Bangladesh Water Development Board and others. Each controls part of the problem, but no single body manages the full catchment: drains, canals, retention areas, pumps, river outfalls and land-use control. The result is scattered action followed by renewed flooding.

Weak enforcement makes plans meaningless. Master plans and Detailed Area Plans have identified flood-flow zones, retention ponds and wetlands, yet these areas continue to disappear under housing, roads and commercial development. Encroachment survives because it is profitable, politically protected or administratively tolerated.

Accountability is also weak. Spending is reported, but outcomes are rarely evaluated. Dhaka does not need another narrow drainage project; it needs the political courage to enforce existing plans, recover waterways and protect the remaining wetlands.

The city must treat canals, wetlands, ponds and flood-flow zones as critical public infrastructure. Remaining wetlands should be protected, encroached canals demarcated and recovered, and major waterways restored as open drainage corridors connected to surrounding rivers. Dhaka also needs an integrated flood-management platform with clear authority over land-use approvals, canal recovery, drainage investment, pump operation, solid-waste control and emergency response.

Future planning must also centre vulnerable communities. Informal settlements, low-income neighbourhoods, street vendors, schoolchildren and daily-wage workers face the harshest effects but are rarely treated as planning partners. Community reporting of blocked drains, health warnings, emergency transport plans and compensation for repeated losses should be part of resilience policy. A flood-safe Dhaka requires ecological restoration, institutional discipline and social justice.

Dhaka’s flooding is a warning about planning against nature. The city has tried to engineer its way out of a crisis created by land conversion, institutional weakness and ecological neglect. Until it restores and governs its blue-green network as essential infrastructure, each monsoon will bring the same result: a megacity halted by rain it once knew how to live with. The choice is no longer between development and drainage; it is between protecting people and flooding them in the name of progress.

Dr. Mohammad Zaman is an international development consultant whose work across Asia and Africa focuses on social safeguards, displacement, resettlement and inclusive development. He lives in Vancouver, Canada, and can be reached at: mqzaman.bc@gmail.com

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Rohingya refugees cross the Naf River on a makeshift raft while fleeing violence in Myanmar, on their way to Bangladesh. Credit: UNICEF/Mackenzie Knowles-Coursin

By Mohammad Zaman
VANCOUVER B.C., Canada, Aug 3 2026 (IPS)

The Rohingya crisis remains one of the most enduring humanitarian and political failures in South and Southeast Asia. Since the 2017 mass expulsion from Myanmar’s Rakhine State, Bangladesh has hosted more than one million refugees in Cox’s Bazar and Bhasan Char, while Myanmar has failed to create conditions for safe return. What began as an emergency response has hardened into protracted displacement marked by statelessness, insecurity, aid dependency, and diplomatic fatigue. Repatriation is repeatedly presented as the preferred durable solution, yet every major attempt has failed because the core political question remains unresolved: the Rohingya cannot safely return to a state that denies them citizenship, protection, and equal belonging.

In 2017, only months after the largest influx, Bangladesh and Myanmar signed a bilateral Memorandum of Arrangement. It promised a time-bound repatriation process, but it was non-binding, weakly enforced, and silent on the guarantees most essential to return: citizenship, freedom of movement, property restitution, and independent monitoring inside Rakhine. Bangladesh, facing demographic, environmental, and political pressure, needed a pathway to reduce the burden of hosting refugees. Myanmar, by contrast, had incentives to delay, control, and symbolically manage the process without addressing the legal and security conditions that caused the exodus.

Three major repatriation efforts since 2017 reveal the same pattern. Attempts in 2018 and 2019 collapsed because refugees refused to return without credible guarantees of safety, citizenship, and dignity. A China-facilitated initiative in 2023 proposed a pilot return of several thousand people and arranged verification visits by Rohingya representatives to Rakhine. It also stalled. Cyclone damage, renewed fighting, and widening armed conflict made even limited returns impractical. More importantly, refugees remained unconvinced. Their reluctance was not resistance to return; it was a rational response to risk. Returning to fenced villages, transit camps, or controlled areas without rights would merely convert exile in Bangladesh into containment in Myanmar.

Dr Mohammad Zaman

The political problem is both domestic and regional. Domestically, Myanmar’s state-building project has excluded the Rohingya by portraying them as outsiders rather than citizens. Without recognition of Rohingya identity and legal status, administrative repatriation will remain cosmetic. Regionally, the crisis is shaped by strategic interests. China has mediated because stability in Myanmar affects its investments and influence, but its diplomacy has emphasized state-to-state negotiation more than rights-based accountability. India has balanced humanitarian concern with security and geopolitical interests, while ASEAN has struggled to move beyond cautious consensus and non-interference. Western governments have condemned atrocities and supported accountability efforts, but sanctions and legal cases have not changed conditions on the ground. The result is a fragmented diplomatic landscape in which no actor has combined sufficient leverage, consistency, and political will to compel Myanmar toward a rights-based solution.

Bangladesh’s position is increasingly difficult. Its initial humanitarian generosity has become a long-term national burden. The camps place pressure on land, forests, water, public services, and local labour markets. Security concerns have grown as trafficking, armed activity, and criminal networks exploit a population with limited mobility, education, and livelihood opportunities. Declining humanitarian funding has deepened frustration: reduced food rations, health services, and education increase despair and encourage dangerous onward movement by sea to Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, where conditions are often insecure. Yet Bangladesh’s legitimate burden cannot justify premature repatriation. Any return must be voluntary, safe, rights-based, and dignified.

A critical analysis must also recognize the limits of humanitarianism. Aid keeps people alive, but it cannot resolve statelessness or political exclusion. The international response has often separated relief, justice, and diplomacy into disconnected tracks: humanitarian agencies sustain survival in Bangladesh; lawyers pursue accountability; diplomats negotiate repatriation frameworks; and development actors support host communities. Each track is necessary, but together they have not formed a coherent strategy. The Rohingya have too often been treated as beneficiaries rather than political stakeholders. A durable solution requires their participation in defining return conditions, monitoring mechanisms, citizenship pathways, education policy, and community security arrangements. The newly formed Rohingya Repatriation Committee has to address all of the above in finding a sustainable solution.

The road ahead must be realistic rather than rhetorical. Repatriation should remain the long-term objective, but only when it is safe, voluntary, dignified, and sustainable. This requires verifiable changes inside Rakhine: citizenship or a credible pathway to citizenship, freedom of movement, access to services, restoration or compensation for property, and protection from military, police, and armed-group abuse. Any future framework must include independent international monitoring with meaningful access to return areas. Diplomacy must also adapt to Myanmar’s altered conflict map by engaging relevant actors without legitimizing abuses or abandoning principles. Bangladesh will need pragmatic but principled engagement with the junta, the Arakan Army, regional powers, and international organizations.

Meanwhile, the camps in Bangladesh cannot remain waiting rooms for an indefinitely delayed return. Refugees need education, skills training, legal protection, and limited livelihood opportunities to prevent social deterioration and prepare for eventual reconstruction in Rakhine. These measures should not be framed as local integration against Bangladesh’s wishes, but as human-capital preservation and crisis management. International burden-sharing must become concrete: donors should sustain aid, expand resettlement for vulnerable cases, support host communities, and coordinate pressure on Myanmar. Accountability mechanisms should continue because impunity is one reason repatriation remains unsafe.

Ultimately, the Rohingya repatriation crisis is not a logistical failure but a political one. Buses, refugee lists, reception centres, and pilot projects cannot substitute for rights, security, and recognition. Bangladesh seeks relief, Myanmar seeks control, regional powers seek stability, and donors seek a manageable humanitarian file. The Rohingya seek what repatriation is supposed to mean: return to their homeland as citizens with dignity. Until diplomacy is anchored in that principle, repatriation attempts will continue to produce announcements without arrivals, agreements without trust, and roadmaps without roads. The way forward requires pressure, patience, and a shift from counting potential returnees to building the conditions under which return becomes a restoration of justice rather than an act of desperation.

Dr. Mohammad Zaman is an internationally recognized expert in resettlement and development. He has contributed many op-eds on the Rohingya crisis. Dr. Zaman’s recent edited book (co-editors Robert Anderson and Kawser Ahmed) is titled Rohingya Stories: History and Geopolitics in a Multipolar World (Springer, 2025).

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Amir Ali, a Rohingya violinist who was a member of a wedding band of the northern Rakhine State of Myanmar, attends a weekly prayer event to play the violin at the Kutupalong refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar, March 7, 2019. PHOTO: REUTERS/MOHAMMAD PONIR HOSSAIN

By Mohammad Zaman
May 21 2019 (IPS-Partners)

There are over a million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, including the latest batch of 800,000 that came after August 25, 2017 and the 250,000 that arrived since the first exodus of mid-1990s. As Myanmar nationals, the Rohingya Muslims have historically faced ethnic and religious persecutions, culminating in 2017 in a fierce, protracted genocidal campaign by the Myanmar army against its own people. The military launched a violent crackdown leading to arbitrary killings of Rohingyas, including children and the elderly, gang rapes of women, inhuman torture, and razing of village after village that forced all those people to seek shelter in Bangladesh, unleashing a humanitarian crisis unprecedented in recent history.

In the last two years, there have been many twists and turns concerning the repatriation of the Rohingya refugees to their homeland. For instance, first, the agreement signed in November 2017 for repatriation did not work due to the unwillingness of the Myanmar government to recognise the rights and citizenship of the Rohingya Muslims. Second, Myanmar imposed an unfair screening and verification process to eliminate the so-called illegal Bengali Rohingyas from the list of returnees. Third, in November 2018, a much-publicised repatriation bid for some 2,000 families was stalled after the refugees refused to return for fear of fresh persecutions and confinement in the newly-built camps across the border in Rakhine State. The repatriation bid was later abandoned and rescheduled for 2019. Fourth, the planned relocation of 100,000 Rohingyas to Bhasan Char appears to have met with scepticism as there are no voluntary takers among the refugees for such a remote home on an island char. Finally, according to an UN official, the repatriation plan is now at a “total standstill.”

With no plausible solution to the refugee crisis in sight, there are growing concerns in Dhaka and among the host communities in Cox’s Bazar, who have been severely impacted by the presence of such a large number of outsiders in their neighbourhoods. There is an equally increasing disquiet among government officials at different levels about the future of the refugee situation. The challenge is to find the right balance between the official rhetoric calling for a speedy return of the Rohingyas and any long-term plans for them in Cox’s Bazar camps, supported largely by external aid and assistance. The ongoing initiatives for more durable houses, improved roads, solar street lamps, training and employment for women, markets/shops within the camps, and finally provisions for schools for the kids are all indications of a much longer—or even permanent—stay. Given the continued military atrocities against the Rohingyas inside Myanmar, the refugees in Cox’s Bazar are not going back to Myanmar any time soon. Aid workers, diplomats and humanitarian agencies working on long-term plans for improving camp conditions would not, however, publicly state this for fear of contradicting the official position.

At this point, despite constant diplomatic efforts by the government, there seems to be no hope for an immediate repatriation. Indeed, the Myanmar government seems least interested in the resolution of the crisis. The “clearance operation” is already done; the Myanmar military is sticking to their lies and deceptions, unwilling to give in to any demands of the international community. Even the strategy to send back the refugees to so-called designated “safe zones” inside Myanmar is not getting any ground; but if it does happen, which is unlikely, it will be tantamount to sending them to concentration camps and robbing them of their future rights and citizenships—which are their primary demands. There cannot be any safe zones in Myanmar unless the perpetrators of the Rohingya crisis, including the military generals, who committed crimes against humanity and genocide, are brought to justice.

The current scenario does not provide any sense of hope or relief for any returnees in Myanmar nor those stranded in camps in Bangladesh. The refugees are not allowed to work (although many sneak out to work); they can’t leave the camp, open a bank account, and have a mobile phone (due to security reasons, although many have bought phones from local Bengalis who can have multiple phones); and children can’t attend any Bengali school, which may lead, it is believed, to social and cultural integration. The present dense living conditions, poor quality of water and inadequate vaccination have left Rohingya refugees prone to many contagious diseases. As a result, both the refugees and the host communities in Cox’s Bazar are reportedly vulnerable to serious health risks.

Meanwhile, the host communities are also becoming apprehensive of the long-term presence of the refugees and thus slowly turning hostile towards them. The concern is equally evident in Dhaka. At a recent meeting, leading economists and policy analysts have rejected the idea of providing the refugees with access to the local labour market; instead, they recommended their quick repatriation to ease pressures on Bangladesh because their presence has already posed serious threats to the local environment and population. Thus, any plan for a long-term stay or opening the door for resettlement and integration would lead to conflicts with local communities and raise a range of security issues for Bangladesh. A Rohingya diaspora in Bangladesh also means a second-class status of the Rohingyas and extinction of their cultures. Many refugees don’t want this to happen. They want to return to their homes and re-establish their life on their ancestral lands with dignity and full rights as Myanmar nationals.

The Rohingya crisis has not run its course yet. Bangladesh government should continue to pursue voluntary, safe, and dignified repatriation of the Rohingyas to Myanmar. Since the UN finds the situation to be at a “total standstill”, Bangladesh should look elsewhere and closely work with India and China for an acceptable resolution. India has not been friendly to the Rohingyas and never supported Bangladesh in any international forum to solve the protracted Rohingya crisis. Myanmar seems more important to India than Bangladesh due to India’s economic and geopolitical interests. China has a strong grip on Myanmar at various levels, including the government and the military establishments. Bangladesh must seriously engage both China and India to find a resolution for a dignified return of the refugees. Until this happens, the crisis will continue and bring miseries to the refugee population as well as the host communities.

Mohammad Zaman is an international development/resettlement specialist and advisory professor at the National Research Centre for Resettlement (NRCR), Hohai University, Nanjing, China.

This story was originally published by The Daily Star, Bangladesh

A partial view of camp settlements where Rohingya refugees have sought shelter. PHOTO: FOOD SECURITY CLUSTER

By Mohammad Zaman
Jan 19 2019 (The Daily Star, Bangladesh)

To date, much has been written and said about the Rohingya crisis. The regime in Naypyidaw has literally flouted all international laws and evaded pressures from the international community. Myanmar is now accusing Bangladesh for the delay in repatriation and at the same time plotting more atrocities against Rohingyas in Rakhine state. Last week, the Rakhine state government issued notice further blocking the United Nations and other aid agencies from travelling to five townships affected by the conflict. Sadly, many believed that the agreement for repatriation signed back in November 2017 will take care of this human tragedy.

We must not forget that the Rohingya crisis is trapped into many strands of regional and international politics. The new foreign minister AK Abdul Momen, in his debut statement on the Rohingya crisis, said that the “much-talked-about Rohingya issue will not be solved easily.” The foreign minister referred to this international tangle, and remarked that “interest of everybody including India and China will be hampered,” if the Rohingya crisis continues. The foreign minister further urged the international community “to step forward for a logical solution to this crisis.” The foreign minister also directed to conduct a study to understand the impacts of Rohingyas on Bangladesh economy, society and security systems.

The Rohingya crisis as it is unfolding gradually has many faces that should be of concern to the Bangladeshi people and the government. In July 2017, prior to influx of the Rohingya refugees, the combined estimated population of Teknaf and Ukhiya was slightly over four lakh. The sudden gush of an additional eight lakh Myanmar refugees by December 2017 was overwhelming. The numbers keep rising even today. The presence of this massive number of refugees has impacted on everyday carrying capacity of the region; today, this is felt on all aspects of life and cultures—both for the hosts and refugees themselves.

An immediate impact was on land and local resources—for instance, the massive loss of forests and changes in land use from forest/agriculture to housing and camp sites for resettlement of the refugees. In addition, many reported on the growing social, economic, environmental and health impacts of Rohingya refugee resettlement. The unplanned and makeshift settlements at the early stage of the surge on hill slopes and forestlands led to vulnerabilities for landslides and other forms of risks and disasters for all.

By July 2018, when I made a short visit to the camp sites, a more orderly system of settlement and camp administration was already established jointly by the Bangladesh government and United Nations High Commission for Refugees through registration, re-grouping and relocation in formally constituted 34 camps, with internal roads, markets, mosques, relief distribution centres, and clinics. Close to 100 national and international NGOs—for instance, Medecins San Frontieres, World Vision, BRAC, Gono Shahthaya Kendro, and others—work as service providers in various fields. In addition, there are literally thousands of aid workers assisting the operations.

The Rohingya crisis, without any doubt, has put a huge pressure on Bangladesh’s economy and society. Thanks to the government and international aid agencies supporting the operations, the initial stage of crisis management—for instance, provision for shelter, food, medicine, etc.—helped to cope with the immediate needs. During a meeting in Cox’s Bazar, an international refugee resettlement expert—who previously worked in South Sudan, Syria and Jordan—told me that unlike other refugee camps in countries with unstable or weak governments, the Cox’s Bazar refugee camps provide “good practice” examples for refugee support and administration” due to a stable system of government and administration in Bangladesh.

Having said this, the flip side of the Rohingya refugee issue is that the repatriation remains elusive at this point, because the environment is not right for repatriation. The Rakhine State has been rocked by successive rounds of violence and extensive military crackdown, following the attacks by Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), the group demanding greater autonomy for Rakhine State. Instead of implementing the repatriation agreement and addressing the root causes of the crisis (e.g., citizenship, freedom of movement, livelihoods), the Myanmar Army has once more escalated their genocidal activities in recent months. On top of this, the Myanmar army now claims presence of ARSA training base inside Bangladesh, which was strongly refuted by the Bangladesh government. The activities of the Myanmar Army, including mobilisation of troops to Rakhine border with Bangladesh, raises a host of security issues and concerns. It appears from reports in Myanmar that the regime will force out the last Rohingya in their fight against terrorism.

Thus, the Rohingya issue has raised many external stakes. The Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) reportedly deployed additional force to patrol the country’s 54 km border with Myanmar fearing intrusion through the Naf River and other border areas. The situation seems tense. Amid this, there are also internal security issues such as recent passport forgery cases by some Rohingyas, who were deported by Saudi Arabia. In Cox’s Bazar, it is almost common knowledge that many Rohingyas left for Malaysia in the 1990s with Bangladesh passports availed to them through the network of local dalals or agents in collusion with passport officials. Finally, there are also reported cases of Myanmar agents in Cox’s Bazar camps and in the country for collecting intelligence data.

Aside from the security issues, there are social dimensions of the emerging issues—for instance, tension between the host communities and the refugee population regarding benefits and livelihood issues due to loss of land and access to forests. The government has taken some measures to quell this, but those may not be enough, because the Rohingya refugees are going to stay longer than initially anticipated. Given zero progress with repatriation and the current attitude of the Myanmar government, Bangladesh should work with the international community to find viable and just solutions to this crisis.

Since an acceptable solution may take many more years, the government in the meantime should undertake a long-term plan for support and sustenance of the refugees and host communities through economic and social development programmes using the resources received from the various development partners and agencies such as the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank and other bilateral organisations. The impact study commissioned by the foreign minister should look into all of the socio-economic and security aspects holistically and help make a long-term plan for refugee resettlement and repatriation options as well.

Mohammad Zaman is an international development consultant and advisory professor, National Research Centre for Resettlement, Hohai University, Nanjing, China. Email: mqzaman.bc@gmail.com

This story was originally published by The Daily Star, Bangladesh