When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, US President George H. W. Bush and Secretary of State James Baker promised Moscow that Nato would not be moved closer to Russia’s new borders. That promise was broken some years later by the Bill Clinton administration when the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were incorporated into Nato, followed soon after by Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, previously part of the Soviet Union itself.

Munir Akram

The Russians did react, as Kennan predicted, after Vladimir Putin had consolidated power. When the attempt was made to bring Georgia into Nato, Moscow sliced off two statelets from Georgia. When the pro-Russian president of Ukraine was ousted in a ‘political coup’, Putin took over Crimea and supported the ethnic Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine.

Today, Russia is again a first-rate military power. Its actions in Georgia and Ukraine will not be reversed. Moscow’s forces robustly patrol its western land, air and sea frontiers. The forthcoming large military manoeuvres across Belarus will illustrate Nato’s vulnerability. Russia has also reasserted its political, military and diplomatic role in the world’s ‘hot spots’.

The cerebral president Barack Obama displayed surprising strategic naiveté by simultaneously provoking Russia and announcing his vaunted ‘pivot to Asia’ to contain a rising China.

Despite America’s formidable naval power in the Pacific and its alliances with Japan, India and Australia, the US will be unable to oblige China to relinquish any of the territories or islands it claims unless it resorts to a full-blown war. China’s growing military and economic power also implies that the US will be unable to build reliable alliances to encircle China or block its sea routes.

In the new Cold War, America is pitted against two great powers which, between them, are likely to control the Eurasian ‘heartland’ and thus, if Halford McKinder’s thesis is right, also ‘control the world’. The US, meanwhile, is mired in the self-created quagmires of Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.

Although Donald Trump is a geopolitical novice, realisation of his desire to normalise relations with Russia (whatever his personal motives) would have reduced America’s great power adversaries from two to one. The US Congress has scuttled this option by imposing the new sanctions against Russia.

Trump’s effort to secure China’s cooperation on North Korea was also sensible. The attempt proved infructuous because the US demand that China apply extreme pressure on Pyongyang to unilaterally give up its nuclear and missile capabilities was exorbitant and unrealistic. Trump’s tweeted rants against China after the latest North Korean missile tests, US weapons sales to Taiwan, and renewed ‘freedom of navigation’ forays in the South China Sea have soured the prospects of Sino-US cooperation.

The early years of the first Cold War, when the US and the Soviet Union sought to consolidate their respective spheres of influence and resorted to brinkmanship, were the most dangerous. It was only after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis that both awoke to the danger of a nuclear Armageddon and instituted measures to regulate their competition, including nuclear arms control. Thereafter, the Cold War was fought either in the shadowy world of espionage and sabotage or through proxies.

The second cold war is in an early and dangerous phase and will be difficult to ‘manage’.

First, unlike the first Cold War, it is a trilateral, not bilateral, power struggle. Crisis management will become even more complicated once other militarily significant states align themselves with or against the major powers. Indeed, as at the outbreak of the First World War, international peace and security could be disrupted by the actions of any one of several state and non-state actors.

Second, the US appears to be seriously overestimating its power. Although the US is no longer the global hegemon, it continues to behave as if it is. Coercion and force seem to be Washington’s preferred option to address almost every challenge it confronts. Unless such belligerence is moderated, a great power conflict could erupt in Eastern Europe or the South China Sea; and the US could end up in shooting wars with North Korea and Iran. Some have even advocated US counterterrorist intervention in Pakistan without calculating the consequences.

Third, the potential for catastrophe has been magnified because, unlike the 1950s, now there are not two but nine nuclear weapon states. A conventional conflict in Korea or South Asia could rapidly escalate to the nuclear level.

Fourth, today’s conflicts are mostly ‘hybrid’ wars, encompassing special operations, sabotage and cyber warfare. As Afghanistan, Iraq, Ukraine, Syria, Libya and Yemen have illustrated, it is easy to start such ‘complex’ wars but extremely difficult to prevent their escalation and expansion.

The most tragic consequence of the new cold war will be the erosion of the collective efforts required to address the emerging existential and global threats: poverty and hunger, climate change, nuclear war, mass migration, communicable diseases. Nor will it be possible to collectively exploit the vast opportunities for human progress and wellbeing that technology and innovation now promise.

In the article mentioned, George Kennan added that what bothered him was “how superficial and ill informed the whole US Senate debate was’ (on Nato expansion). The same can be said about recent debates in the US Congress on Russia, Iran, North Korea, Afghanistan, Pakistan and a host of other issues.

The world’s destiny cannot be left to be determined by militarists, political pygmies, or partisan interests. It is imperative that political leaders who possess a global vision of a shared human future forge a new ‘Westphalian’ consensus to circumvent a second cold war, effectively prohibit the resort to force, control armaments and promote active international cooperation to address the common challenges that confront mankind.

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.

This story was originally published by Dawn, Pakistan

The widely circulated picture of Indian Prime Minister Modi clinging to a visibly uncomfortable Donald Trump`s breast illustrates the nature of the emerging relationship between India and the US.

Munir Akram

The Indo-US alliance has grave security implications for Pakistan. It will exacerbate the military imbalance and make India even more intransigent on Kashmir and belligerent towards Pakistan.

Indeed, to deflect attention from its failed oppression of the popular Kashmiri revolt, Modi may feel sufficiently emboldened to actually attempt a cross-LoC `surgical strike` against Pakistan, provoking a war which is unlikely to remain limited.

However, the alliance with America will involve challenges and costs for India which Modi appears to have discounted.

The US and India are unequal powers. As the practitioner of the Art of the Deal, Trump will not be shy to exercise the leverage which the US will progressively acquire over India, eg, to open India`s restrictive trade regime or curtail its traditional ties with Russia and Iran. To sustain the `partnership`, India will have to learn to bend, often, to America`s will, compromising the `independence` of its foreign policy.

As Pakistan discovered, defence ties with the US can be a mixed blessing. The arms and technology tap can be turned on and off by Washington to secure desired behaviour from its allies and partners. When Lockheed`s F-16 production is relocated to India, will the US, as it did with Pakistan, implant software to neutralise the aircraft`s operational capabilities in a crisis? New Delhi will never be sure that any equipment it acquires from the US, or Israel, will not be `compromised` if India attempts to use this for purposes other than those endorsed by the US.

While the US will wish to use India to strategi-cally harass China, it may be more reluctant to support all India`s aims against Pakistan and other smaller neighbours. As a `global` power, the US will want to retain direct influence over Pakistan and other South Asian states rather than delegate this to India.

Undeterred by such considerations, Modi seems to have embarked already on his assigned mission to contain China. India is the only major country to reject China`s Belt and Road initiative. It provoked China by inviting the Dalai Lama to disputed Arunachal Pradesh/south Tibet. And, it has blocl(ed Chinese road construction on Chinese territory along the Bhutan-China border. Beijing has demanded the withdrawal of Indian troops `as soon as possible` and reminded India of the lessons of history, ie India`s 1962 defeat.

In his book, Implosion: India`s Tryst with Reality, John Eliot argues that India is not well placed to confront China. Although India`s GDP is growing annually at seven per cent and China at 6.5pc, the gap is widening since the Chinese economy is more than four times the size of India`s.

Given that India has been unable to bully Pakistan, it is hardly in a position to confront China simultaneously. Even the smaller South Asian states are entering into economic and defence relationships with China. The Bangladesh government, although deeply beholden to India, is buying Chinese submarines and will exploit its major Bay of Bengal gas field with a Chinese rather than an Indian partner.

China`s Global Times asked: `With GDP several times higher than that of India, military capabilities that can reach the Indian Ocean and having good relations with India`s peripheral nations, coupled with the fact that India`s turbulent northern states border China, will Beijing lose to New Delhi?` India`s vulnerabilities are extensive. Kashmir remains India`s Achilles heel (where, so far, China has urged Pakistan to exercise restraint). India is fighting 17 `active` insurgencies in 119 districts (according to former prime minister Manmohan Singh), including the Naxalite, Naga and Mizo rebellions, the latter two in areas adjacent to China. With millions of Muslims and `lower` casteHindus alienated by BJP-RSS inspired discrimination and violence, India is also fertile ground for civil chaos.

Despite the grave implications of the Indo-US alliance, Pakistan should exercise strategic patience. India is on the wrong side of history. It is building alliances with distant powers, the US and Israel, both of which are disliked by the people if not all Muslim regimes. Pakistan has the opportunity of building strong ties not only with China but also Russia, Iran, and others across Eurasia who will be part of the Belt and Road initiative, which is likely to have a more profound impact on regional peace and prosperity than the US military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, etc.

Faced with India`s growing militarisation, Pakistan`s primary objective is to ensure `full spectrum deterrence` against India. The successful test of the short-range Nasr missile is an important step.

Islamabad desperately needs a clear, active, national Kashmir strategy to support and sustain the indigenous Kashmiri freedom movement.

There is no longer any downside to raising the Kashmir dispute formally in the UN Security Council and other international forums, including the International Court of Justice.

Despite its imbalanced posture, there is no point in a confrontation with the US. In the immediate future, Pakistan may need to reach tactical `accommodations` with the US on Afghanistan in exchange for its active support to end Indian-inspired terrorism in Pakistan.

Over time, the `correlation of forces` in the region will change. India`s friendship with Russia and Iran will erode. (Ayatollah Khamanei mentioned Kashmir twice of late). India may blunder into a conflict with China. Its alliance with the US may erode if India proves reluctant to actually confront China, loosen its links to Iran and Russia or to open its market to US trade and investment.

Meanwhile, Pakistan should continue to ask Washington: would not US interests in Asia be better served by cooperation rather than confrontation with China? Do you really want to step into the Thucydides Trap?

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN

This story was originally published by Dawn, Pakistan

On his first foreign foray, President Donald Trump, apart from asking the 50-odd Muslim leaders assembled in Riyadh to act against `Islamist terrorism`, proposed a new alliance between the US, Arab-Muslim states and Israel to oppose Iran`s hegemonic expansion and support for `terrorism` while simultaneously promising a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.

Munir Akram

Trump`s new plan reflects a radical turnaround from his expressed hostility to Islam and condemnation of Saudi Arabia and `radical Islamic terrorism` during the presidential campaign. However, despite the fanfare in Riyadh and Jerusalem, there are good reasons to be scepucal about this plan`s success.

Trump`s intensified opposition to Iran is in itself not surprising. Two main sources of his support base the Republican right and Israel were strongly opposed to Barack Obama`s engagement with Iran. They wanted the complete dismantling of Iran`s nuclear programme rather than the agreement negotiated to ensure that Iran does not have the capability to develop nuclear weapons for at least a decade.

Obama`s apparent assumption was that in the wake of the nuclear bargain, Iran would use its considerable influence to help in stabilising Iraq and Syria and the region. For its part, Iran expected the US, under Obama`s Democratic successor (Hillary Clinton), not only to legally abrogate the nuclear sanctions but also work to eliminate the unilateral US sanctions imposed on Tehran in the context of terrorism and missile testing. Trump`s victory upended these assumptions.

Under Trump, Iran is doubtful that the nuclear sanctions will be cancelled by the US Congress and rightly fears that other US sanctions may be intensified, as threatened by Trump and his advisers and members of the US Congress. Consequently, while continuing to fight the militant Islamic State (IS) group and Al Qaeda in the region, Tehran has held back its cooperation with the US and enhanced its military role in all of the region`s conflicts.While Trump has not renounced the nuclear deal, his administration is embarked on finding ways to intensify pressure on Iran. The aim, at the minimum, is to secure a halt to Iran`s missile testing, a more accommodative stance on Iraq, Syria and Lebanon and termination of support to Hezbollah and Hamas. To challenge Iran, Washington has now aligned itself completely with Israel and Saudi Arabia.

For Riyadh, the return of its prodigal patron is heaven-sent. Angered by Obama`s `betrayal`, and fearful of Iran`s rising power, Saudi Arabia had hastily announced the formation of a 41-nation `Islamic alliance` last year. Given Iran`s explicit exclusion, the response to the `alliance` was lukewarm from most Muslim countries. The most notable development was the appointment of Pakistan`s respected ex-army chief to head the military alliance.

With the revival of the traditional US-Saudi alliance, as illustrated in the $110 billion in arms deals and $350bn in business contracts signed during Trump`s trip, the Saudis have less need now for the `Islamic Alliance` against Iran although it would be a useful appendage to the renewed partnership with the US.

It is safe to presume that tensions in the Levant and the Gulf are likely to escalate in the wake of the new `co-relation of forces` unleashed during Trump`s trip. However, it will not be easy, even for the powerful coalition that is being formed, to reverse Iran`s dominant position in the region.

Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi`s government in Baghdad depends on the Iranian-trained Shia militias to do most of the fighting against IS, and restrain the Sunni tribes and Kurdish ambitions. Similarly, Syria`s Assad could not survive without the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Shia militias.

In Yemen, the Iran-backed Houthis have proved resilient. Hezbollah, despite its preoccupation with fighting for Assad, possesses the missile capabilities to do serious damage to Israel from southern Lebanon and Syria. Iran also retains influence with Hamas, the only credible Palestinian resistance to Israel.

Finally, Iran`s capacity for retaliation under pressure cannot be underestimated. It can, among other things: foment trouble in the Gulf, especiallyBahrain, destabilise Afghanistan and provoke sectarian strife in Pakistan.

Trump himself affirmed in Jerusalem that Arab cooperation in an anti-Iran coalition will be available only if a political settlement can be achieved between Israel and the Palestinians. The 2002 Saudi peace plan was mentioned as a basis for a settlement. This appears highly unlikely, given Israel`s virtual foreclosure of a two-state solution.

Trump has raised expectations which are unlikely to be fulfilled.

Those Arab and Muslim states which were invited to Riyadh for the Arab Islamic American summit would do well to carefully review the pros and cons of joining the anti-Iran coalition.

As has been noted critically in the Pakistani press, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was not able to speak at the Riyadh summit, nor to meet President Trump, while the leaders of lesser countries were accorded that privilege. This may represent a deliberate snub, probably administered by the Americans rather than the Saudis, or merely an organisational mishap. In any case, this diplomatic snub or snafu may be a blessing in disguise since it provides Pakistan with even greater justification to review its position on the anti-Iran coalition.

Since the early days, Pakistan has taken the consistent position that it will not take sides or participate in conflicts between Muslim states. Thus, it adopted a neutral stance during the Iran-Iraq war and participated in a six-nation Islamic heads of state committee to end the war. Such neutrality did not detract from Pakistan`s traditional commitment to the security of Saudi Arabia and the holy places.

This practised paradigm provides a sound guide for Pakistan`s policy in the current context.

Of course, Pakistan`s neutrality should be reciprocated by Iran in the context of Pakistan`s challenges with Afghanistan and India.

Finally, Pakistan should expect to be pressed by the US to fall in line with its regional strategy not only in the Gulf but especially in Afghanistan and South Asia. This is another reason for Pakistan to determine its policies after due consideration of the entire spectrum of its strategic interests. The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.

This story was originally published by Dawn, Pakistan.

When China`s former vice premier, Qian Qichen, was asked 20 years ago about the future of Sino-US relations, he reportedly responded: `They [Sino-US relations] will never be as good as they should be; and never be as bad as they can be.` This prognosis holds true today for the world`s `most important bilateral relationship`.

Munir Akram

In its final years, the Obama administration seemed to be rushing towards the Thucydides Trap. Obama`s `pivot to Asia` consisted of: an ef fort to build a string of US alliances around China`s periphery from Japan to India; the deployment of two-thirds of US naval power to the Pacific; a challenge to China`s maritime claims in the South China Sea; and China`s exclusion from the Trans Pacinc(trade)Partnership.

Prospects for Sino-US relations worsened with Donald Trump`s campaign rhetoric against China and threats to slap punitive tariffs on its exports and declare it a `currency manipulator`. In justifying his unprecedented call with Taiwan`s leader, Trump threatened to discard the One China policy unless China agreed to trade concessions.

Tensions were further heightened when the incoming US secretary of state asserted that the US could deny China access to its claims in the South China Sea.

Since then, the Trump administration has walked back, slowly, from its most extreme positions. US Defence Secretary Mattis assured that the South China Sea disputes would have to be resolved through negotiations. In a carefully choreographed call with the Chinese president, Trump af firmed continued US adherence to the One China policy.

The recent Trump-Xi summit in Mar-a-Lago was expected to determine the direction of US-China relations. Although the summit was overshadowedby the US missile strikes against Syria, there was no acrimony, and agreement was reached on a highlevel security dialogue and a 100-day plan to address trade.

However, uncertainty persists due to Trump`s unpredictability. He will not declare China a `currency manipulator`. But Trump has now linked the trade talks to China`s help on North Korea.

In his tweets, President Trump has repeatedly urged China to resolve the threat f rom North Korea `or the US will`. The US deployment of a US carrier group towards the Korean Peninsula has escalated tensions. But the US is unlikely to conduct a pre-emptive or punitive strike against North Korea (à la Syria) given Pyongyang`s capacity for a devastating response. And, the `window` for such a strike is likely to close shortly if, as expected, the leftwing candidate wins the South Korean presidency and rules out the use of force.

China shares the US aim of denuclearising North Korea, and is deeply angered by Kim Jong-un`s provocative nuclear and missile tests and indifference to China`s wider interests. China is likely to support intensified Security Council sanctions against North Korea, including an embargo on oil sales, if it continues its tests. Yet, China is unlikely to intensify pressure to the extent of triggering the collapse of the North Korean economy or the Pyongyang regime. This could lead to war, massive refugee flows into China and possible absorption of North Korea by the South, bringing US troops to China`s border.

Under the circumstances, the best option may be a resumption of the five plus one (US, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea plus North Korea) dialogue; a de facto `acceptance` of North Korea`s nuclear capabilities; and a f reeze on its nuclear and missile development in exchange for economic aid and assurances of regime survival. Even this outcome will be dif ficult to negotiate.

Given the Korean crisis, it is fortunate that, at least so f ar, the US has not revived the provocative challenge to China in the South China Sea. Absent US intervention, China will probably display flexibility and offer economic cooperation to its Southeast Asian neighbours to resolve maritime disputes. The peaceful resolution of the SouthChina Sea disputes would remove a major source of potential Sino-US friction and confrontation.

Apart from Korea, trade is the other headline issue for Trump in dealing with China. For its part, Beijing wants a more balanced trade relationship with the US, and a reduction of the $300 billion bilateral trade surplus, through trade expansion rather than restriction. To this end, it appears willing to facilitate US agricultural, services and other exports and to stimulate domestic demand in China. But it will also urge the US to lif t the wideranging restrictions on the sale of advanced technological goods and services to China as one way of correcting the trade imbalance.

Xi`s economic trump card may be an offer of Chinese participation in Trump`s plan to restore and modernise America`s aging infrastructure.

China has the finance, expertise and recent experience to make a significant contribution. If Trump`s plans for tax breaks are stalled, he may welcome China`s contribution.

Such cooperation on infrastructure may open the door to US participation in China`s path-breaking One Belt, One Road initiative which its media has dubbed as `Globalisation 2.0`. China has invited US participation in the project. It could be extremely lucrative for US corporations and industry.

A first step in this direction may be active US participation in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor endeavour. The Asian Development Bank and the World Bank are already financing some CPEC-related projects in Pakistan. American companies are also involved as equipment suppliers for power plants and financial, technical and legal consultants in various projects.

Ever since it arranged Henry Kissinger`s clandestine trip to China in 1971, Pakistan has had a significant stake in the preservation of positive Sino-US relations. Today, if a great power consensus can be achieved on a strategy for stability in Afghanistan and counterterrorism, Pakistan can become the geographical locus for economic and strategic cooperation between the world`s two primary powers. The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.

This story was originally published by Dawn, Pakistan