Prime Minister Imran Khan recently invoked Franco-German peace to urge old rivals India and Pakistan to make peace too. But like so many of his ideas, this one is naïve given how that peace emerged. Using a noble anti-imperialism cry, Germany often attacked France and others. Fed up with wars in Europe, global powers finally imposed regime change and pacifism on it by occupying it for long.

Dr Niaz Murtaza

Let’s review other cases where foes became friends, especially split states with border disputes. Left holding at high cost only a few small towns surrounded by rebels, Sudan wisely — albeit surprisingly — let South Sudan split after a long war. But India is more in control in Kashmir. The split didn’t resolve the status of Abyei, an oil-rich area, leading to many skirmishes. South Sudan is now too beset by internal wars to press its claim. In terms of parallels, Pakistan is more beset by internal wars, though their scale is much lower.

Who would they see as Germany here?

Eritrea split from Ethiopia after a long war. There was initial amity, both being run by Tigrinya tribe ex-rebels which had separately fought a pro-Moscow Ethiopian regime. But ties later soured over a border town (Badme). After a bloody war, the UN brokered truce and then arbitration, giving Badme to Eritrea. But big brother Ethiopia rejected the ruling. Alert Pakistani minds may see parallels. The bigger state from which the smaller one split here rejects a UN ruling too. The UN didn’t award Kashmir to Pakistan, but ruled for a referendum which may lead to that outcome if held. Eritrea too pursued freedom based on claims of being a nation, despite being multi-ethnic and never having been a united free state ever. So the parallels increase.

The parallels may appear even more seductive for Pakistani minds given the rapid recent happy ending where the bigger state agreed to give Badme to Eritrea after a transformational leader Abiye Ali won power in Ethiopia. This talk of a wise leader making huge changes may feed perfectly into Imran’s naïve narratives about the power of such leaders (like him, in his view) to make history.

But having perhaps built up too much excitement, I must sadly deflate it now. Ethiopia’s generosity on Badame reflects mainly not the wisdom of one change leader, but its extended rapid growth. This catapulted a change leader to power as it can’t grow further with its old controlled sociopolitical system. With this rapid growth, fight on an obscure town distracted it from bigger goals. So the parallels end. Kashmir is not an obscure town but a strategic region. India has already seen prolonged rapid growth without it showing generosity on Kashmir but only on smaller, Badme-scale, tiffs with other neighbours. But China has made big compromises, though only tactical and not permanent ones, in pursuit of fast growth. With its split province Taiwan and other foes, it has ignored border issues and engages economically with them to strengthen itself.

Among other cases, Japan, Iraq and Serbia too were pacified only after defeats and regime changes effected by the West. The US and Moscow became less hostile, again only after a regime change in Moscow, forced in its case by economic and state collapse. Such collapse is unlikely here. But parallels-wise Pakistan faces more endemic economic woes. Jordan and Egypt made peace with Israel but under unelected regimes seeking US favours to survive. Again, it is Pakistan which has often had unelected regimes seeking US favours to survive but they too haven’t bent much on Kashmir.

So globally, it is not the wisdom of great leaders but forced regime change in one state which has mainly made foes become friends or at least less hostile. Other causes are economic growth, US alliance and internal conflict. But on most such factors, it is Pakistan which is weaker. Still, its relative weakness will not force it to eschew Kashmir. However, nor will India’s growing strength entice it to eschew it either, unlike Ethiopia. This creates a clear stalemate on a permanent solution. That leaves the China tactical model as the only one worth invoking, however alien and shocking the idea of ignoring territorial issues for economic progress may seem to fossilised hawkish minds. If both states demilitarise their conflict and reach an interim solution on Kashmir to focus on economic ties and growth, amity could reach South Asian shores too.

The writer is a Senior Fellow with UC Berkeley and heads INSPIRING Pakistan, a progressive policy unit.
murtazaniaz@yahoo.com

This story was originally published by Dawn, Pakistan

How do major messes get created? The genesis of some messes reflects the decisions of elites over a small period of time, eg, the Rwanda genocide. But other messes emerge gradually, with various elite groups adding different, mutually reinforcing, layers of the mess over time to produce an intractable situation.

Dr Niaz Murtaza

How did we get here and who added which layer of the mess? The path dependency idea suggests that a state’s initial inheritance limits its development trajectory for long. But external factors and how the nation deals with them and its inheritance via national will also matter. For a state divided horizontally (ethnicity, faith etc) and vertically (caste and class), one must also review internal struggles over the national will and whose will usually won.

Our inheritance included divisions, and low income, literacy and industrial levels. There was a tiny educated but elitist middle class. The nation lacked precious natural resources and its agrarian base was controlled by large landowners. It had to establish governance quickly to deal with the large inflow of refugees that gave it an initial welfare bias. The logic for freedom invoked faith, but didn’t clarify whether the aim was securing Muslim rights or having a faith-driven state. Many say this freedom rationale was the root cause of the current mess, but this view needs more analysis.

The will of elites and unelected forces has remained dominant.

Faced with big challenges and internal divides, the middle class in charge centralised power rather than mobilising and empowering all identity groups. The Kashmir issue was the first major external factor, which turned the welfare bias into a security one, heightened centralisation and empowered unelected forces. The Korean War provided a windfall. But it accrued to a tiny group of traders and made them into industrialists as the state marginalised farmers to benefit traders.

The Cold War alliance with the US exacerbated existing fault lines. Power shifted from elite politicians to bureaucrats and then to generals, the centralisation and elitist biases were strengthened and ethnic demands further marginalised. High-level corruption emerged. All this ultimately led to the ’71 division. But curiously, despite other issues, faith issues then were relatively muted, challenging the thesis that extremism today is the inevitable result of the faith-based freedom logic.

The ’71 tragedy nonetheless made us geographically and ethnically more cohesive and this and the marginalisation of unelected forces gave a fresh chance to build an egalitarian state. The PPP’s initial politics raised hope, but it was dashed as earlier biases re-emerged soon. The Gulf bonanza and the huge out-migration gave limited prosperity to the masses. But it also pushed us under the sway of the theocratic Saudi state, with its impact on state policies evident even under Bhutto.

These trends intensified under Zia, coupled with the Soviet Afghan invasion. The use of Saudi Salafist ideas by the state gave rise to faith-based politics. It is doubtful that sans the Saudi links, extremism would have become so embedded in Pakistan despite the faith-based freedom logic. Drugs, arms, mass corruption, sectarianism and ethnic conflicts reached new heights. Under the Musharraf era and a new US alliance, extremism crystallised into terrorism. Two fair polls invoked hope of democratic consolidation but governance remained abysmal and the dubious 2018 polls dashed hopes further. Thus, today, the burden of the initial inheritance remains largely intact. Furthermore, external factors coming our way have done more damage than good and have exacerbated the burden of the initial inheritance. The will of elites and unelected forces has remained dominant.

Generals, bureaucrats, landlords, industrialists and the middle class have all contributed to the mess, each ruling group blinded by their immediate interests. We share many of the same limitations of other larger Saarc states. But commitment to people’s welfare seems higher in Sri Lanka, India and Bangladesh.

The defining difference seems to be the presence in Pakistan of a deep state that is more immune to popular pressures than even corrupt politicians, that freely uses faith to strengthen its own hand and often has entered into harmful alliances with the US. Thus, while there are many offenders in the Pakistani story, the biggest external one has been the US and the biggest internal ones its client generals.

The writer is a Senior Fellow with UC Berkeley and heads INSPIRING Pakistan, a progressive policy unit.
murtazaniaz@yahoo.com
www.inspiring.pk

This story was originally published by Dawn, Pakistan

Many people say Pakistan`s problems today stem from the wilful failure of rulers to establish an Islamic system. These are not supporters of the militant Islamic State group but well-meaning individuals who abhor IS excesses. For them, this system is like turning on a water tap waiting to deliver unlimited sustenance.

But when asked for specifics, they can only express vague generalities and wishful desires for an egalitarian system. However, egalitarianism is a final outcome that cannot be reached directly but through effective policies which they struggle to identify. Their basic belief, sold widely by clerics, is that the human mind is weak and leads us astray, so we must follow religious injunctions even for small things by gleaning Islamic history for edicts which only clerics can decipher.

There are many issues with this view.

Firstly, what constitutes God`s word? Besides the Quran and hadith, even broad and often questionable interpretations by latter-day and present-day clerics and often even their unsupported opinions are termed God`s word.

The high disregard for human intellect also seems contrary to the message of the Quran which extols it. Human beings are called the best species only since they have high intellect. The Quran says things have been made easy to fathom and those who use their minds can f athom divine signs easily. It is unlikely that a faith which values human intellect so much would expect humans to constantly copy ancient eras with very different contexts for minor things.

There are many societies globally without any history of revealed religions or adherence to detailed religious dogma which have still built materially and morally advanced states, eg, Japan, which f ar excels all Muslim states on both counts today. The human mind has made amazing discoveries with no clerical input. Disparaging it makes little sense.

Thus, this view seems designed to empower clerics by making them the custodian of divine knowledge while disempowering the masses as incapable of discovering the right way without clerics` help. But this is contrary to Quranic edicts that everyone can understand Islam directly without clerics` help. In reality, especially whenit comes to statecraf t, Islam expects people to use their intellect to identify policies relevant to their times. So, even the most important issue in governance, ie, how rulers should attain power, is left to people to decide as both the Quran and hadith appear silent on such matters. Thus, it stretches credulity to claim that Islam expects the divine word to be followed strictly for lesser decisions when even the most key decision has been delegated to people.

Similarly, while the debate on edicts vis-à-vis present-day governance, eg monetary, fiscal, industrial policies, continues, they are questions about their applicability to the challenges of the current times. Islam seemingly expects policies in all such areas to be developed by people. But many things that clerics present as divine injunction and mandatory policies to be adopted by states are either irrelevant or even harmful to the establishment of an egalitarian society today.

So, while we may think that establishing an Islamic system is like turning on a water tap, the obstacles in doing so are far more structural than unwilling rulers.

The Medina system was heavily reliant on the presence of people of very high morals, the likes of whom are absent today.

Even if such people could be assembled, the next challenge would be for them to find an easy and peaceful way of attaining power.

But if honest people could attain power, they could perform wonders even within a secular social democratic system.

So the next challenge would be to demon-strate that they have a vision and concrete policies based on Islam which can outperform secular systems, ie, deliver the strengths of Western democracies while avoiding their weaknesses. Even so, the next challenge would be to overcome the vehement opposition of clerics since this new vision will likelybe very different from the clerics` brand of Islam and will marginalise them. Finally, they will have to win the trust of people who, weary of decades of misuse of religion`s name in politics, largely shun religious politics in Pakistan.

Despite being a firm believer in secular democracy, I still believe if someone builds on Islam`s progressive elements, like egalitarianism, rights for women and minorities, etc., they should be able to develop such a vision. I am a firm believer in secular democracy not because I don`t believe in Islam`s progressive elements, but because I see the faith hijacked by retrogressive forces and little inclination within the majority to challenge their hold and develop a progressive Islamic vision. In such a situation, secular democracy seems the best available option. The writer heads INSPIRING Pakistan, a progressive policy unit, and is a senior fellow with UC Berkeley.

www.inspiring.pk
murtazaniaz@yahoo.com

This story was originally published by Dawn, Pakistan

Pakistan has had its fair share of street protests, some of them even toppling rulers. Decades before the Arab Spring, Pakistan had its own ‘spring’ in March 1969 when protests toppled Ayub’s regime. Street protests also toppled Bhutto and weakened Zia and Musharraf.

Dr Niaz Murtaza

Nevertheless, the experience of established democracies shows that street protests are a legitimate tool of democratic struggle if carried out within certain bounds. But when does the street protest negate democratic norms and become an illegitimate avenue by a minority to impose its will?

The question is not academic as 2017 may see more street protests depending on the outcome of the Panama leaks case. The court may rule that it found evidence of neither wrongdoing nor rightdoing. This would mean that while the opposition could not produce evidence of specific criminal activity by the PM or even his family, the Sharifs also could not prove the Mayfair flats were purchased legally. This half-judgement may not be enough to disqualify the Sharifs but will cripple them morally. This in turn may encourage Imran to launch another round of street protests.

Street protests should be based on influence, not force.

Under unelected regimes, the answer is easy. Since such regimes lack legality and democratic legitimacy, street protests (and even armed struggles as a last resort, as long as they do not target civilians) are a legitimate way to overthrow them. Thus, revolutions to topple unelected regimes, as in Russia, China and Iran were certainly legitimate though even they only ousted autocrats and did not improve governance immediately and significantly. However, the question is more complicated when it comes to street protests where there is a legitimately elected regime. Given that even so-called million man marches bring out a tiny fraction of the electorate, what rights does this small minority have against the will of the majority?

Democratic processes, in contrast with autocratic ones, rely on influence and persuasion rather than force. Thus, democratic protests too should largely rely on influence rather than force. Force-based protests involve blocking critical economic or political locations indefinitely through mass protests. They aim at inflicting such a heavy political or economic cost on the regime that it wilts.

On the other hand, influence-based protests involve using protests as a way of gaining attention and shaping larger public opinion as a way to exert pressure on the government. Here, the cost for the latter is not immediate, uncontrollable chaos but reduced future electoral prospects. Influence-based protests limit themselves either temporally or geographically. If they paralyse the whole capital (unlimited geography), they would limit themselves temporally by holding the protest only for 1-2 days at a time as during the anti-Iraq war protests or the current ones in Seoul. Or if they plan indefinite protests, they would limit the geography to specific non-critical locations as during the US Occupy movement.

Much also depends on what the protest is all about. If the protests are against specific government policies rather than its very existence, the focus should be obviously on influence-based protests aimed against the policy. Protests aiming to topple elected regimes must have a very solid justification, eg irrefutable proof of major electoral or financial rigging. The PTI lacked that in 2014 but still tried to hold protests limited neither temporally nor geographically. Thus, those protests were clearly beyond the realm of democratic protests as were its November 2016 lockdown plans even before the courts had given a verdict.

But the PTI will have much stronger protest rationale if the court gives even a half-judgement. Even then, the protests should remain influence-based. This would mean increasing the frequency of temporally or geographically limited protests without engaging in protests unlimited temporally or geographically.

Finally, neither influence-based nor force-based protests will immediately and significantly improve governance. Thus, arguments justifying extra-legal means to overthrow corrupt regimes based on ‘ends justify means’ logic carry neither legal, moral nor utilitarian weight. Improved governance will only come gradually once the educated middle-classes recognise the value of democracy and invest in building it at the grass-roots level by participating in legal social movements.

The writer heads INSPIRING Pakistan, a progressive policy unit.
murtazaniaz@yahoo.com
www.inspiring.pk
Published in Dawn, January 3rd, 2017

Both Islamists and Islamophobes find Islam and democracy incongruent. Some cite a verse that deprecates majority views. To call Islam anti-democracy by citing a brief verse non-contextually is odd. Even in democracy, small ruling groups usually make decisions. Majority only decides who rules. The mode of this decision is the key contrast between democracy and other rules. We must view Islamic stands on such key democracy traits to gauge congruence.

The writer is a political economist and a senior fellow with UC Berkeley.

The Prophet (PBUH) had two roles: Prophet and, after migration, Madina ruler. The basis for the first was divine edict. The second came from not edict, dynasty or force but a request by Madina’s people. The majority Muslim view is that Islam didn’t mandate his successor or even a mode of succession. Again, the decision was found best left to the people despite their huge faith in divine and prophetic wisdom. And the people chose the first caliph through consensus. The first caliph chose the second. The third caliph was chosen by consensus. Multiple candidates were vetted and questioned, a bit like now. Tumult led to his death.

Yet, rebels or generals didn’t seize power, so sacrosanct was people’s will. People still chose the fourth caliph. There were no monarchies nor did generals depose people-chosen caliphs by force. Thus, early Muslim practice was not anti-democracy but anti-autocracy. One rarely finds such democratic selection in the early history of other faiths.

Early Muslim practice was anti-autocracy.

The next key democracy trait is that rulers govern with egalitarianism, accountability and participation. There are many verses and hadiths extolling these values among rulers, which Madina rulers practised. Rulers sat on floors with people and consulted them. Judges and people could question their views. All this was rare in the pre-modern era. Clearly, modern and pre-modern era standards differ. Even in the West a mere 100-plus years ago, after modern democracy’s dawn, one finds exclusion of women, colonies and low castes; slavery and massacres of aliens. But Madina rule, like Greece, represents a good example of pre-modern democracy. So democracy is not a Western import but a core part of Muslim history.

The third issue is the source of law, it incongruently being fully secular in ideal democracy but partially divine in religions. Secularism supports laws enhancing people’s welfare and only bans acts which clearly harm people. Religions usually support the first goal but ban some things which secularism terms benign (pork, beef, etc.). Is Islam inherently incongruent with secularism here, unlike other faiths? Muslims exhibit multiple practices here.

In the minority view found in brief jihadi ‘caliphates’, all public life is harshly governed by their odd views on Islam. The second view exists in autocratic Saudi Arabia and hybrid Iran (around 10pc of the Muslim world together) where clerics dictate detailed Islamic laws based on Quran, hadith and the views of imams. A last minority view exists in states like Niger that are secular.

The majority view exists in mostly democratic states like Pakistan, Indonesia etc. where clerics have at most advice roles. A small number of edicts, only those seen as timeless Quranic ones (e.g., ban on liquor etc.), become law there through the religion-inspired voting of elected officials. But bans based on the religious views of legislators exist to a lesser extent elsewhere too, eg, Indian beef bans, abortion bans in Catholic states, gay bans in Chris¬tian Africa and a US Congress majority against gay union and abortion even today.

Around 30 states have Christianity and 22 Islam as state religions. So, the difference is relative. Overall, Islam seems more congruent on two democracy traits and less on only one.

The chasm between secularism and religion is mainly due to latter-day clerics. Religions earlier were the main source of gains for weaker groups like women. Thinking minds saw the gains as tactical first steps by religions given the limited change capacities of any society and advocated for more steps once those changes got entrenched. But unthinking clerics saw them as the last word forever and religious thought on social progress froze.

Thinking minds then had to make secular fronts to push for more change. Thus, today, secular practice is far ahead of religions on social issues despite the latter’s big head start. A revival is needed in religions, including Islam, under thinking minds to restore their role as leaders on social progress.

The writer is a political economist and a senior fellow with UC Berkeley.
murtazaniaz@yahoo.com
Published in Dawn, August 2nd, 2016

This story was originally published by Dawn, Pakistan

The middle class is viewed as a positive force for progress given its higher education, mobility and wealth. But this view is based on its role in developed states in fostering egalitarian progress, democracy and the rule of law by initiating social movements.

In lower-income states like Pakistan, the middle classes usually eschew this role. They become passive agents under unfair systems or even their partial supporters. Why is this so? As a social scientist, I believe in structural explanations. Structural approaches view widespread negative traits not as coincidentally rampant individual moral failings but the result of broader structural factors which shape societal behaviour potently.

Western middle classes played positive roles within rapidly growing and transforming post-Second World War economies. Such change reduced the conflict between middle-class personal progress and broader egalitarian national progress. Thus, they easily adopted liberal outlooks and supported egalitarian struggles. In contrast, middle classes in places like Pakistan face anemic economies. As such, their personal progress can often only be achieved under unfair national systems which marginalise the masses.

Sections of the middle classes in such situations often become conservative. In fact, as Western economies have stagnated, their middle classes too have done so.

The Pakistani middle class, though small proportionately, totals tens of millions of people because of our large size. This and the lack of concrete data make sweeping generalisations hazardous. But though my daily interactions do not yield a random sample, I come across some conservative traits so frequently that I feel they afflict large sections of middle-class people because of the structural factors that have been mentioned.

The first trait is skewed knowledge of economic and political development issues among many. This has two sides. Firstly, many largely define development in narrow physical terms such as big malls, sleek motorways etc. or narrow economic measures like GDP growth rather than egalitarian, propoor and sustainable development.

Secondly, they view the drivers of development simplistically in terms of single causes like the presence of an honest leader, especially a military one. There is often insufficient appreciation of the multiple, complex causes of development encompassing historical and current, national and global, social, economic and political factors.

Obviously, people from other fields cannot have such deep knowledge. However, even when such information is presented in simple terms, many show little interest in absorbing it, subconsciously knowing it runs counter to their class economic interests. The second issue related to their analytical skills. Social science analysis on complex phenomena like national development involves painstakingly identifying multiple causes and their interrelationships, collecting data about how they have co-evolved in the past in similar contexts and then making tentative predictions and recommendations for effecting gradual future change.

But a large section of the middle class seemingly believes that huge changes can happen instantaneously and the future has little to do with the past. Within such a historical views, there is a firm belief that immediate glory is waiting just around the corner for Pakistan if we could do some simple tasks like electoral reforms or punishing Panama leaks villains under a non-elected regime.

The third trait is illiberal values. Many educated people claim Pakistan`s problems can only be solved by the danda and killing thou-sands of people.

There is widespread support for crude tools like the death penalty, public hangings and military courts. Anyone challenging them on human rights basis is dismissed as impractical.

The final issue isattitudes that can be seen as arrogant, passive and elitist. Despite incomplete knowledge on development and governance issues, there are many among the middle classes that are loath to admit that they could be wrong, and resent being asked for logic and proof. This reveals a faulty view that every-day analysis need not be based on evidence but unsupported opinions.

Even though the corruption scandals of upper-class politicians are a source of great outrage for them, this will still not drive the majority to join social movements. They expect generals and judges will deliver them a clean system in the comfort of their homes.

Finally, they look down upon the masses as lazy, untrustworthy and part of the problem.

Fortunately, some change is evident and one at least sees some desire among a growing number of middle-class people to support progressive causes benefiting the masses.

But even so, those interested in progressive change can only expect at best partial support from the middle class immediately.

Turning them into steadfast allies will require a huge awareness-raising exercise to neutralise the impact of structural causes making them conservative.

The writer heads INSPIRING Pakistan, an economic and political change initiative. murtazaniaz@yahoo.com

This story was originally published by Dawn, Pakistan