The Russo-Ukrainian war, which began in February 2014, shows no signs of ending. Credit: UNOCHA/Dmytro Filipskyy

By Nickolay Kapitonenko
KYIV, Ukraine, Mar 19 2026 (IPS)

It is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the tension, violence and uncertainty in the world in recent years. The number of wars is growing, more and more money is being spent on weapons, and the rhetoric of major powers is becoming increasingly decisive.

The latest escalation in the Middle East has reignited the debate about the start of World War III. The consequences of the Israeli and US strikes on Iran are being felt to varying degrees far beyond the region, at least by those who follow oil prices.

The interests of numerous great powers are at stake, and third parties are considering their next moves and making political statements. Opinions range widely, from the belief that there can be no Third World War because of the existence of nuclear weapons, to the conviction that it has already begun. So, what is really going on?

A journalistic and academic concept

When historians talk about world wars, they mean two unique events in the past. Their scale, the involvement of a wide range of states, the level of violence and the nature of the consequences put them in a league of their own.

To understand how these wars differed from any others, one need only glance at the diagram of human casualties, defence spending, or destruction in various armed conflicts of the 20th century.

However, historians also have different opinions. One of them, better known in his political capacity, Winston Churchill, once described the Seven Years’ War as a world war. This protracted 18th-century conflict drew most of the major powers of the time into direct combat; it spanned numerous battlefields in Europe, North America, the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean; and it had serious geopolitical consequences. How was this not a world war?

By the fact that it was not a total war between industrialised states, the scale of the clashes was rather limited, as were the number of armies; and the consequences, although serious, were not systemic — this may be the response of more conservative historians than the British Prime Minister.

The number of armed conflicts in the world has been growing over the past few years: 2024 has been a record year since World War II.

‘World War’ is both a journalistic and academic concept. To enhance the effect, attract attention or draw conditional analogies, it can be used to describe more events than just the First and Second World Wars. For example, the Thirty Years’ War of the 17th century, the Napoleonic Wars of the 19th century or even the Cold War are sometimes referred to as world wars.

Within this logic, individual elements of a world war can be seen even today. The number of armed conflicts in the world has been growing over the past few years: 2024 has been a record year since World War II. According to some estimates, 61 armed conflicts in 36 countries were recorded this year, which is significantly higher than the average for the previous three decades.

Global military spending is also on the rise: today it has reached 2.5 per cent of the global economy, the highest figure since 2011 and an upward trend since 2021. This is still significantly less than during the Cold War, when a range of 3 to 6 per cent was the norm. Analysing these figures, it is clear that global security has deteriorated in recent years, but how critically?

A more academic approach would be to define a world war as one in which most of the major powers are involved; which has global reach and is total in nature; leads to enormous loss and destruction; and significantly changes the world upon its conclusion. Direct and large-scale armed conflict between major powers is a mandatory criterion.

And this is the main argument against the idea that World War III has already begun. No matter how high the level of destabilisation in the modern world, no matter how far large-scale regional conflicts have escalated, and no matter how much money states spend on armaments, this is not enough for a world war. Large-scale military operations involving major powers are needed.

All just fears?

This has not happened in the world for a long time. The interval between the Second and Third World Wars turned out to be much longer than between the First and Second. Nuclear weapons played a central role in this, raising the price of war so high that major powers began to avoid it by any means possible. This safeguard has been in place for over 80 years and looks set to continue.

Peace, or rather the absence of war between major powers, remains one of the central elements of the current international order. International institutions and regimes may collapse or weaken, regional wars may break out, but the likelihood of war between major powers remains extremely low.

Proponents of the Third World War theory sometimes point out that even in the absence of full-scale war between major powers, other manifestations occur: hybrid wars, cyberattacks, or proxy wars. This is true, but all these outbreaks of conflict are several levels below a world war in terms of their destructive potential and are not total in nature.

Throughout history, states have fought through proxies or resorted to information, trade or religious wars, but we do not consider these wars to be world wars — except in a symbolic sense.

A systemic war does not necessarily have to be a world war

Unlike the 2003 war in Iraq, the strikes on Iran are taking place in a world where, instead of US hegemony, there is complex competition between at least two centres of power. This adds nuances and forces other states to respond, directly or indirectly, for example, by supplying weapons or intelligence data, supporting one side or the other.

But this does not make the war global. Arms supplies, for example, are a common practice found in most regional conflicts, as is diplomatic or financial support from allies or partners. Even if American troops use the technology or expertise of partners – such as Ukrainian drones – this does not mean that Ukraine is being drawn into the war. Just as American arms supplies to Ukraine during the Russian-Ukrainian war did not mean US involvement in the war.

For a world war, the key ingredient is still missing: direct confrontation between major powers. In addition to world wars, there are also systemic wars. In these conflicts, it is not so much the scale that is important as the change in the international order to which they lead.

The Thirty Years’ War, the Napoleonic Wars, and the First and Second World Wars mentioned above were systemic wars: after their completion, the rules of international politics were rewritten and new ones were adopted at peace conferences and congresses. A systemic war does not necessarily have to be a world war.

Moments of hegemonic crisis and the beginning of the struggle for hegemony always carry with them the danger of new wars, arms races and escalations.

The current destabilisation and growth of various risks are largely linked to the struggle for the future of the international order. The United States and China have almost fallen into the ‘Thucydides trap’ — a strategic logic similar to that which led to the Peloponnesian War in the 5th century BC. At that time, the narrowing of the power gap between the hegemon and the challenger forced the Spartans to start a preventive war.

Today, there are well-founded fears that the decline of American hegemony, the rise of China and the approach of a bipolar world will sharply increase the likelihood of direct armed conflict between the superpowers.

The decisive, to put it mildly, steps taken by the US administration can also be considered preventive actions aimed at strategically weakening China’s position while Washington still has the upper hand. Such moments of hegemonic crisis and the beginning of the struggle for hegemony always carry with them the danger of new wars, arms races and escalations.

We are in the midst of such a crisis. It is systemic in the sense that it is not just a collection of regional conflicts in different parts of the world, which have become more numerous, but a manifestation of a large-scale redistribution of influence and power on a global scale. This redistribution will entail changes in the international order, because the rules of the game are linked to the balance of power.

If, at some point, the leaders of major states decide that it is worth taking the risk of war and paying the price, the systemic crisis will turn into a world war. But this, as the Spartans themselves said, is ‘if’.

Nickolay Kapitonenko is an associate professor at the Institute of International Relations at Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv and director of the Centre for International Relations Studies.

Source: International Politics and Society, Brussels

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UN Secretary-General António Guterres at a press encounter with the President of Ukraine in Kyiv, 28 April '22. Credit: United Nations

By Nickolay Kapitonenko
KYIV, Ukraine, May 5 2022 (IPS)

Before the war, Ukraine’s dream to become part of the EU was exactly that – a dream. But the new political reality could make it come true.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine changed and to some extent even destroyed the familiar international political reality. Up until 24 February, Russia had been integrated into the global economy, had excellent growth prospects, and the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline was almost finished.

Moreover, NATO had no intention of expanding in any direction and Ukraine joining the EU seemed to be a very long way off given the usual plethora of domestic problems the country was facing.

The Kremlin has chosen a calculated gamble to play to its own advantages, at great cost to many. Russia’s war against Ukraine is a profound crisis capable of dramatically changing how things pan out in the future, making certain developments highly probable which just two months ago seemed utterly implausible.

One such scenario relates to Ukraine’s EU membership. On 28 February in the besieged capital of Kyiv, the fate of which at that point was entirely unclear, President Zelenskyy signed a formal request to accede to the European Union along with a joint declaration with the prime minister and head of the Ukrainian parliament.

At that point, Kyiv had already been clinging on for four days, and the first doubts regarding Russia’s ability to wage a quick and successful campaign were beginning to plunge Europe into a state of strategic uncertainty.

Nickolay Kapitonenko

In March 2014, a similar sense of symbolism and hope for the future accompanied the signing of the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement, less than a week after the Crimean status referendum and at the height of the complex and volatile revolutionary events in Kyiv.

This step made a crucial contribution to the consolidation of Ukrainian statehood, to the country’s vision for the future and to its fundamental system of values. Stripped of the hope of rapid accession to the EU – the fact that the Association Agreement never provided for membership is often called to mind in Europe – Ukraine could at least focus on realising the potential of the most extensive association agreement in history.

In 2022, the context of the negotiations regarding EU–Ukraine relations changed dramatically. From an ever-moving prospect, Ukraine’s integration into the EU became one of very few elements capable of making some form of progress when it came to resolving the conflict.

NATO is not an option

It is all about security guarantees. The Russian invasion forced Ukraine to prepare for the next war. No promises — whether written or verbal — would be enough. From now on, when it came to relations with Russia, any Ukrainian government would have to proceed on the basis of a worst-case scenario regarding the course of events.

The only way of preventing renewed aggression from Russia is either to rely on direct security guarantees, or to invest a significant share of resources in constructing and supporting effective, modern armed forces. Membership in NATO could also be an effective mechanism to guarantee security but this does not seem realistic and Russia has declared it a threat to its security.

The rationale that prevailed before the war continues to apply here: a high risk of direct conflict with Russia makes Ukraine’s aim of NATO accession more difficult. In light of this, there are ongoing discussions about security guarantees on the individual country level and even on a multilateral basis outside NATO.

This is a complex debate. Firstly, few are in a position to give such guarantees, especially when we are talking about a potential conflict with Russia. The US is probably the only country that could provide effective and credible guarantees. It is the only country with the capacity to project its military power to an extent that would deter Russia.

Secondly, there are not many countries that would be willing to provide security guarantees carrying such high future risks. That said, the West cannot afford to refuse a dialogue on the issue of security guarantees because a continuation of the conflict in its current state presents Europe with serious problems.

Membership of the European Union, on the other hand, does not seem to antagonise Russia in the same way. In its pre-war rhetoric, Moscow never raised the issue of EU expansion and never accused the EU of being a threat to its security. This creates a certain amount of scope to pursue other possibilities.

Of course, EU membership cannot be seen as providing a complete security guarantee. However, it is capable of increasing the costs of aggression for Russia and providing the prospect of recovery for Ukraine’s frail economy. Such recovery would be a precondition for Ukraine to be able to sustain effective defence capabilities.

An open door for European membership

Obviously, it is not as simple as this. At the conceptual level, and this is something many European officials have already pointed out, it is impossible to force EU membership, even with the ‘accelerated procedure’. It is a lengthy and complex process requiring coordination of a myriad aspects, from legislation to technical standards.

Even the most optimistic assessments of Ukrainian politicians and diplomats suggest that the process could take several years. Austria, Sweden, and Finland joined in record speed, and the process still took around four years. Since then, the situation has not got any easier, indeed it has arguably become more complex as the number of legal norms and standards within the EU has increased significantly.

Moreover, there is already a ‘queue’ of five other countries waiting to join. These are all undeniably relevant obstacles, given the strong impact of EU bureaucracy and procedures even in these exceptional circumstances.

At the political level, there must be a consensus among all the member states of the EU. The overall situation in Europe has changed so much that rather than the purely symbolic support provided before the war in the form of declarations signed by a number of European states, today there is a broad social consensus when it comes to Ukraine’s European future.

This consensus was already manifested in the official statements from heads of various Eastern European countries asserting that Ukraine deserved to be provided the immediate prospect of membership.

Public opinion throughout Europe is gradually leaning towards supporting this idea – this is also evident in the reactions of national parliaments to the addresses given by the Ukrainian president.

Today, there are very few European politicians who would formally object to the very idea of Ukraine having a future in Europe. Of course, the task will not necessarily be easy. The sympathy and empathy expressed by Europeans towards Ukraine now needs to be translated into political results.

Mobilising the support of the most influential EU member states – Germany and France – will be of critical importance. What is required here is extremely delicate diplomacy and a thorough understanding of Berlin’s and Paris’ interests.

This includes restoring European security. Furthermore, taking this path would require putting an end to old disagreements or, at the very least, map out the prospects of this being achieved.

A question of European security

Yet all the key arguments pertain to security matters. It is not just about Ukraine protecting Europe from Russian revisionism at the cost of so many lives — and how EU membership could serve as a gesture of recognition of the importance of the country’s contribution to European security.

The issue is also that this European security is unlikely to be possible if Ukraine, as before the war, continues to remain in Europe’s ‘grey zone’, without allies, guarantees or a certain future. The threats for Ukraine may not be the same threats as for Europe – however, since Russia’s invasion, everything has fundamentally changed.

In the two months since the start of the conflict, Ukraine is no better prepared for EU membership than before the war. For Europeans, Ukraine joining the EU will be associated with certain risks and problems. But something else has changed as well – the overall situation when it comes to European security.

A continuation of the war will cost Europe far more. The EU can no longer stand by and wait, it, too needs to find a way out of the war being waged by Russia.

If Ukraine is granted the candidate country status in June, this will be an encouraging signal for everyone. That which up until 24 February seemed an impossibility, would become a subject of discussion and an entirely realistic, albeit somewhat remote prospect.

Nickolay Kapitonenko is an associate professor at the Institute of International Relations at Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv and director of the Centre for International Relations Studies.

Source: International Politics and Society (IPS)-Journal published by the International Political Analysis Unit of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Hiroshimastrasse 28, D-10785 Berlin

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