Trump insists the West must unite on his terms against the Rest, particularly China and Iran. Europe, however, wants greater Trump support for Ukraine’s Zelensky regime to replace Putin’s leadership of Russia.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

After Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s Munich appeal for Western unity based on shared race, culture and imperial history, this appears to have been a European effort to strengthen its alliance with the US.

The unsubstantiated charge of Chinese military support to Russia against Ukraine, a claim never corroborated by Kyiv, is expected to worsen relations between Europe and China.

Portraying China as a strategic threat to Europe justifies greater belligerence against Beijing. It no longer seems to matter that China has never endorsed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

However, China retains strong ties with Kyiv, calling for a ceasefire and political settlement, while repeatedly offering to mediate between the warring neighbours.

The G7summit of the seven largest rich economies in late June followed the EU in trying to consolidate Western strategic solidarity against Russia, China and Iran.

With financial crises from 1997 threatening G7 legitimacy, then US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers initiated the G20. But the recently expanded G7 role marginalises the more inclusive but less amenable G20.

Nurina Malek

More Chinese goods have entered European markets, with prices and quality that most others cannot match. For years, Western leaders happily enabled this by liberalising trade, appreciating cheap Chinese imports, for keeping inflation low.

After decades of state-encouraged investment, China’s still growing industrial capacity now supplies the world, enabled by Western-drafted WTO rules.

Before Trump 2.0, Washington had imposed investment restrictions, Section 301 measures, sanctions, tariffs and more following Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’. Facing less US market access, more Chinese exports have gone elsewhere.

European industry can no longer compete, even where it once led. Instead of neoliberal WTO trade liberalisation, EU protectionism supposedly ‘levels the playing field’.

US advisers increasingly warn European officials that China’s industrial ‘overcapacity’ will soon scale up the ‘China shock’ in most industrially significant supply chains.

China now refines and processes most of the world’s ‘rare earth’ minerals, exercising near-monopsonistic leverage over suppliers by processing at scale at much lower cost.

With China successfully countering Trump’s trade policies, Western leaders worry Beijing will abuse its near-monopolistic control of rare earth elements, which downstream industries need.

Jeffrey Sachs argues that New York and London rare earth market reactions indicate major institutional investors view recent developments as significant.

G7 vs China
Protecting European industry, labour and economic sovereignty is now constrained by the rules Western leaders put in place over decades, often coordinated by the OECD.

Splits inside the EU soon extended beyond commercial faultlines to ostensible strategic interests defined by the fluid geopolitics after the first Cold War.

German car exports to China have been superseded by Chancellor Metz’s military Keynesianism, in line with Trump’s demand for NATO allies to spend much more on the military to greatly strengthen Western military power and global dominance.

French President Emmanuel Macron’s earlier push for unaligned European ‘strategic autonomy’ has given way to a NATO+ strategic view embracing Western imperialism.

Meanwhile, smaller EU member states remain cautious, fearing the collateral effects of new Western ambitions, such as Chinese restrictions on imports that Europe depends on.

Great power rivalry
With the Iran war refusing to fade from daily headlines despite Trump’s on-off-on ceasefire, other myths are also evaporating. Few still believe Israel will accept a ‘two-state solution’ or that peace will prevail between trading partners.

NATO, OECD, G7, EU and other such arrangements have become variable links in the hegemonic US-led bloc. Such coalitions – including Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan – were never seamless together or fully fit-for-purpose.

Trump expects unilateral US aggression against Washington’s chosen enemies must be fully supported and subsidised by NATO allies, with reluctance deemed disloyal, even antagonistic.

Countries not aligned with the major poles may be alternatively courted and coerced by rival poles, especially by the affluent West. Cooperation among others may be seen and portrayed as proof of the existence of an antagonistic bloc.

Multiple poles are likely to coalesce into the West versus the Rest, competing for support and influence, as those courted try to gain from their suitors.

With reduced government engagement and less sustained inter-state cooperation and order, disruptions in an increasingly anarchic world economy have required governments to prioritise resilience as businesses, consumers and labour face rising costs.

As the US and its allies weaponise economic rules and arrangements to discipline both friends and foes, the world economy is slowing unevenly as prices rise sporadically.

The US-Israel war on Iran underscores how current conflicts can develop in unpredictable ways as states and other significant non-state ‘actors’ innovate strategically in unexpected conditions.

IPS UN Bureau

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

Leadership of the Global South has gradually declined since the 1980s. Many hope BRICS+ will fill the vacuum, but its purpose and membership suggest such hopes may be misplaced. A repurposed Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) offers the best way forward.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

In 1964, developing countries formed the G77 caucus and created the UN Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) within the UN system.

In 1974, the UN General Assembly called for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) after President Nixon ended the 1944 Bretton Woods international monetary system in 1971.

In 1979, the US Fed responded to Western stagflation by sharply raising interest rates. This triggered fiscal and sovereign debt crises in Latin America and Africa, forcing many to seek IMF emergency funds to cope.

Meanwhile, the Thatcher-Reagan-inspired counter-revolution against Keynesian and development economics led to ‘neoliberal’ Washington Consensus policy reforms, deepening economic contraction.

At New York’s Plaza Hotel, the US got its G7 caucus of the world’s 7 largest allied economies to address its overvalued dollar by requiring the currencies of Japan and Germany to appreciate sharply.

Nurina Malek

With its legitimacy at stake following the East Asian, Russian, and other financial crises of 1997-99, G7 finance ministers agreed in 1999 to create a more inclusive G20 grouping of finance ministers of the world’s 20 largest economies.

Soon after the 2008 global (actually Western) financial crisis began, the first G20 leaders’ summit convened in the White House in November 2008.

Making BRICS
‘BRICs’ was coined in late 2001 by then-Goldman Sachs Global Economic Research head Jim O’Neill, referring to Brazil, Russia, India, and China.

Ostensibly to include Africa, the BRICs invited South Africa to join, creating BRICS as a coalition of the five more independent large ‘emerging market’ economies.

Also serving as a caucus within the G20, BRICS has tried to improve international monetary and financial relations. It has since admitted more nations into an expanded BRICS+ with two tiers of affiliation.

To be sure, neither BRICS nor BRICS+ was ever intended to represent the even more diverse interests of the entire Global South. Understandably, it serves its ‘financially significant’ developing economy members.

BRICS and the South
The BRICS promise a world less dominated by the rich and powerful nations of the Global North, mainly in the West.

The world has been dominated by the US since the end of WW2, and especially after the first Cold War. Despite occasional dissent, the US’s European NATO allies seem happy playing second fiddle.

Many developing countries have long felt that existing arrangements do not serve their best interests. The BRICS seem to offer some ‘voice’ and alternative bases for international economic cooperation.

BRICS has undoubtedly strengthened the Global South’s voice and developed new arrangements to support developing country interests, especially to finance development.

The BRICS have also advocated on specific international issues for the Global South. All five BRICS countries have also led developing-country groupings on specific issues with varying degrees of success.

Unsurprisingly, many developing countries appreciate the BRICS role in such matters, with some choosing to publicly align with and even affiliate with it.

However, the BRICS expansion into BRICS+ is unlikely to resolve many problems faced by developing nations due to international power asymmetries and imbalances.

Potential and problems
The diversity of the Global South complicates any grouping’s claim to represent it.

BRICS+ brings together countries with very different political and economic systems, priorities and aspirations, including development goals and interests.

This diversity enhances BRICS’ broad appeal but also makes it difficult to ensure it becomes an effective platform consistently advocating all developing nations’ interests.

This challenge becomes more apparent when the interests and ambitions of weaker developing countries are compared with those of the major BRICS+ powers.

Many vulnerable nations are preoccupied with food security, structural change, deindustrialisation, environmental sustainability, planetary heating, and financialization.

Meanwhile, BRICS members seek to pursue their own strategic interests, garner finance and investments, boost their exports and increase their influence internationally.

Such objectives are not inherently contradictory, but rarely fully aligned. This makes it more difficult to pursue shared interests, advocate collectively, and sustain cooperation.

BRICS+ membership by invitation also limits its effective accountability to the Global South. It is unrealistic to expect BRICS+ to consistently advocate for the full range of concerns of all developing countries, especially the poorest and least influential.

The Global South should undoubtedly try to benefit from the economic weight and voice of BRICS+. But it can best advance its shared interests with its own voice and organised strength via a revived NAM, repurposed for peace, development and justice.

IPS UN Bureau

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

US President Trump’s policies are supposed to make America great again (MAGA), which means different things to various parties. Some of its consequences are inadvertent, including undermining dollar dominance and inducing stagflation worldwide.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

The US held 70% of the world’s gold reserves at the time, with gold priced at $35 per ounce. Other central banks bought and held US Treasury bonds and similar dollar assets as liquidity reserves.

This effectively made the US dollar the primary means of payment in the post-war international monetary system. The exchange rates of other national currencies were all set against the dollar.

As other economies recovered post-war, the US current account and trade surplus declined. Until 1971, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) occasionally adjusted fixed exchange rates for ‘structural’ balance-of-payments deficits or surpluses.

Exorbitant privilege
This dollar-based international monetary system gave the US what France’s Gaullist leadership called an ‘exorbitant [economic] privilege’.

Under the Bretton Woods arrangements, the US would never face balance-of-payments problems, as it paid for imports with its own currency, which it could print at will.

Nurina Malek

Foreign central banks soon became accustomed to holding US Treasury bonds as official reserves, effectively funding the large and growing federal debt.

Such foreign central bank demand kept the dollar strong in foreign exchange markets. Persistent capital inflows into the US have kept the dollar overvalued.

The strong dollar has boosted domestic consumption of imports, depressed exports, widened trade deficits, and kept consumer price inflation in check.

In 1960, Robert Triffin warned the US Congress about the inevitable problems that arise when a national currency is also used as an international reserve currency.

He urged the US Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) to consider the dollar’s international role when making domestic monetary policy.

In August 1971, President Richard Nixon unilaterally ended the US Bretton Woods commitment to redeem dollars with gold. Thus, the dollar clearly became a fiat currency, with exchange rates shaped by market confidence.

Protection through diversification
After the 2009 Great Recession, Western central banks kept nominal interest rates low for over a decade through coordinated ‘quantitative easing’ (QE).

Low interest rates were maintained for over a decade through the 2020-21 Covid-19 recession before the Fed raised interest rates from 2022, ostensibly to address inflationary pressures.

Borrowers worldwide were thus induced to take on more debt. Governments, corporations, and households borrowed more, increasing accumulated debt.

International payment obligations are increasingly being settled by other means. Gradually, dollar-based arrangements are co-existing with euro- and renminbi-based arrangements and BRICS-initiated alternatives.

Thus, US indebtedness and stagnation have been growing with inflationary pressures. Unsurprisingly, other monetary authorities’ previous preference for holding US Treasury bills as official reserves has declined.

Instead, official reserves have been increasingly diversified to include more gold holdings ostensibly to help hedge against inflation and currency debasement.

About 36,200 tonnes, a fifth of all gold holdings, are now held by central banks, up from 15% at the end of 2023. By 2025, non-US central bank gold holdings exceeded their US Treasury bonds for the first time this century!

Trump 2.0
Criticism of the dollar system has resurfaced from time to time, especially as Washington weaponises more financial instruments and arrangements.

The second Trump administration has threatened major US federal government creditors, including China and longtime allies such as Japan and the Gulf monarchies.

As loyal allies are bullied, many are quietly moving away from prevailing dollar-based international monetary and financial arrangements, which have long been preferred for convenience.

After bombing ten nations in the first year of Trump 2.0, US military spending has been rising rapidly, especially with the Iran war and many of its consequences likely to be protracted despite the promise of a ceasefire.

With international confidence in the US consistently undermined by unexpected unilateral White House initiatives, governments are trying to reduce their vulnerabilities, especially by diversifying their reserve assets.

But unlike early in his first term, Trump now welcomes a weaker dollar as “great”. His ongoing efforts to lower Fed interest rates also reflect successive US presidents’ refusal to address ever-larger federal fiscal deficits over the decades.

With inflation rising, market premiums over Fed interest rates are pushing up commercial rates. These hurt the real economy, employment, and banks, many struggling with rising defaults.

All this exacerbates financial ‘market corrections’ in the US and beyond. Trump-induced international disruptions are worsening instability and slowing economies worldwide.

Trump’s policies have slowed the world economy, including the US. With efforts to address the Hormuz crisis undermined by Israel, his legacy will now surely include having induced the first major stagflation in almost half a century.

IPS UN Bureau

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

The Federal Reserve Bank’s turn to ‘reserve management’ exposes the limited policy options still available as the US seeks to protect itself against international stagflation stemming from President Trump’s policies.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Reserve management
Successive US administrations have long refused to address the roots of the worsening fiscal and debt problems.

As the US Treasury borrows ever more to continue funding federal government spending with less tax revenue, the accumulated public debt of $39 trillion now costs over a trillion dollars a year to service, even more than 2025 defence spending!

Total Fed losses since 2022 exceed $245 billion! But how does a central bank, that literally creates its own money, lose money?

The losses are blamed on the Fed paying banks over 4% interest on reserves after 2008. However, most Treasury bonds the Fed bought to fund the COVID crisis response yield only 1–2%!

This massive ‘negative carry trade’ is booked as a ‘deferred asset’. Such creative accounting implies the US is technically insolvent. But this is not a problem as long as Wall Street shapes its own narrative.

Nurina Malek

After over a decade of ‘quantitative easing’ (QE), which created money on a large scale, the Fed claimed it was reducing its balance sheet from 2022 to 2025 to curb inflation.

Risk diversification
Finance ministries and central banks worldwide increasingly worry about their vulnerability.

The US decision to freeze about $300 billion of Russian assets held in Western financial institutions is supported by its Western allies. Such actions have triggered broader concerns.

Threatened by the prospect of a softening bond market, the Fed turn to reserve management, which implies it has exhausted other options, including printing money.

Increasingly weaponised in recent years, the dollar is no longer trusted as a neutral reserve asset. Hence, central banks have been diversifying their heavily dollar-denominated reserve assets to reduce vulnerability.

Physical gold has been quietly acquired to change reserve portfolios. Over the past three years, non-US central banks have bought over 1,000 tons of gold annually.

Horns of dilemma
New Fed Chair Kevin Warsh has announced that reducing interest rates and shrinking the Fed’s balance sheet are his policy priorities. Both seem responsible and sensible.

Lowering rates benefits borrowers. But a smaller balance sheet implies less market intervention, requiring greater fiscal discipline and monetary credibility, both of which are desired by markets.

But Warsh’s two goals cannot be realised together in today’s US economy. Over $10 trillion in bonds are maturing and need refinancing over the coming year, as the Treasury borrows ever more to finance its faster-growing fiscal deficit.

The Fed balance sheet cannot be reduced while keeping rates low. The new Fed Chair will also have to choose between printing money and letting the bond market collapse. All his predecessors have chosen to print money.

In 2012, Jerome Powell was sceptical of QE, arguing it would never be enough. But by 2020, Fed chair Powell printed more dollars than ever before.

The Fed has long been expected to buy up Treasury bonds that private interests did not purchase. Increasing the money supply has kept the banking system liquid and depreciated the dollar, as desired by Trump 2.0.

As private investors and foreign central banks lose interest in US Treasury bonds, demand is at its weakest in decades.

Who will buy new US debt if the Fed does not buy Treasury bonds while rates remain low? Outgoing Fed chair Powell came to the rescue.

As ‘reserve management’ requires less market demand, he has given the dollar system an unexpected new lease of life without lowering interest rates, as Trump demanded.

However, the policy change will do little to reverse contractionary and inflationary pressures on the world economy, worsened by Trump’s various policies.

Oil accelerant
The Hormuz oil shock could accelerate this otherwise gradual transition. The slow energy transition away from fossil fuels has increased vulnerability.

In the last half-century, oil price hikes have raised energy costs, exacerbating inflation worldwide. In 1973, the OPEC embargo quadrupled petroleum prices overnight.

Over the following year, the gold price almost doubled. The 1979 Iranian revolution more than doubled crude oil prices, which in turn pushed gold prices even higher.

The conventional central bank response of raising rates to fight inflation could worsen stagflation, as inflation rises while economic growth slows.

Raising interest rates may check some sources of inflation, while increasing borrowing costs, squeezing investment and consumption, and hiking the costs of Treasury debt.

Interest payments on accumulated federal debt will exceed a trillion in 2026. As old debt issued during QE is refinanced at higher rates, fiscal and debt problems will accelerate.

Therefore, the Fed’s turn to reserve management is not merely a minor technical change in balance-sheet bookkeeping. It is trying to address worsening public finances as policy options run out.

IPS UN Bureau

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

The January 2026 US National Defense Strategy (NDS) departs significantly from those preceding it, including from Trump’s first term. Is it deliberately misleading? Or is actual policy, including war, being driven by other considerations?

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Much like the latest National Security Strategy (NSS), released by Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Marco Rubio in December 2025, the NDS claims to be about putting ‘America First’.

Both documents promise ‘no more business as usual’. They claim to change decades of strategy, supposedly in the national interest. Unlike earlier US military blueprints, the NDS is filled with vague rhetoric and eschews interventions abroad.

But in Trump 2.0’s first year alone, the US bombed ten countries, threatening at least four more, all in the Americas. Despite scant mention in both documents, the US-Israel war on Iran resumed on 28 February!

Europe
The NDS claims the US is reducing its direct military role in Europe but still wants to be influential.

It pledges to remain central to NATO “even as we calibrate US force posture and activities in the European theater” to meet US priorities.

Nurina Malek

The NDS blows hot and cold on Europe’s aggressive support for Ukraine’s Zelensky, envisaging a reduced troop presence on NATO’s borders with Ukraine.

Many European allies complain the Trump administration has created a ‘security vacuum’ by leaving Europe to confront Russia with uncertain US support.

They also complain about Secretary Pete Hegseth’s insistence on “credible options to guarantee US military and commercial access to key terrain”. The NDS insists on more than access to Greenland and the Panama Canal.

Issued days after Trump claimed he had a “framework of a future deal” on Arctic security with NATO chief Mark Rutte, he insisted it ensured the US “total access” to Greenland, long a territory of NATO ally, Denmark.

However, Danish officials insisted formal negotiations had not yet begun. Trump also threatened European nations opposing his Greenland plan with tariffs.

Western Hemisphere
The NDS supports the NSS and Trump’s ‘Donroe doctrine’ focus on the Western Hemisphere, envisaging the Americas as the US backyard.

In his January Davos speech, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney noted that recent US actions are disrupting established international norms.

The NDS was issued three days later, after a week of tensions between the White House and its Western allies. Cooperation with the Americas, including Canada, is conditional, to “ensure that they respect and do their part to defend our shared interests”.

It warns the US will “actively and fearlessly defend America’s interests throughout the Western Hemisphere. And where they do not, we will stand ready to take focused, decisive action that concretely advances US interests.”

Trump had declared the US should retake Panama and its Canal, accusing the government of ceding control to China. Later, however, Trump was more ambiguous about ‘taking back’ both the country and the canal.

Many also doubt Trump’s intentions in kidnapping Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, ostensibly for trial on drug charges in the US.

Asia-Pacific
The previous NDS, issued in 2022 under then-President Joe Biden, had deemed China the US’s principal threat. Biden also embraced Trump 1.0’s Indo-Pacific alliance to encircle China.

In contrast, the new NDS describes China as an established power in the Indo-Pacific region that only needs to be discouraged from dominating the US and its allies.

The goal “is not to dominate China; nor is it to strangle or humiliate them… This does not require regime change or some other existential struggle…President Trump seeks a stable peace, fair trade, and respectful relations with China”.

The NDS even proposes “a wider range of military-to-military communications” with Chinese counterparts! The U-turn followed the administration’s retreat from its threatened tit-for-tat tariff escalation after China’s successful retaliation.

Biden’s 2022 NDS promised the US would “support Taiwan’s asymmetric self-defense”. The new NDS offers no such assurances to the self-governing island province of China, which Beijing warns it will take by force if necessary.

The NDS also calls for “a sharp shift – in approach, focus, and tone”, insisting US allies must take more responsibility for countering adversaries such as China, Russia and North Korea.

It insists, “South Korea is capable of taking primary responsibility for deterring North Korea with critical but more limited US support”.

Cutting costs of empire
Like Trump, the new NDS wants allies to pay much more for US ‘protection’.

It echoes his frequent criticisms of allies for taking advantage of previous administrations to subsidise their defence and being ungrateful for US protection.

But the terms of such subordination remain ambiguous and arbitrary, even extortionate and corrupt. Gulf monarchies may now regret their generous donations to the president, apparently to little avail so far.

Trump’s treatment of allies, the Netanyahu-led war on Iran, and continuing US-led efforts to ‘contain’ China suggest both documents offer poor guidance to knowing and understanding, let alone anticipating, US policies abroad.

Nurina Malek is an economics graduate of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, currently working on policy research at the Khazanah Research Institute.

IPS UN Bureau

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau