The World Bank lists Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu as Pacific Small Islands Developing States (PSIDS). . Some listings also include the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau. In September 2019, these countries had a combined population of 2.3 million spread over hundreds of islands spread over an area roughly equivalent to 15% of the surface area of the earth. Of these, the most populated country – Fiji – has a population of 900,000. The World Bank’s World Development Indicators reveal that annual per capita GDP of these islands fell from $4,340 in 2018 to $3,768 in 2020. It has probably fallen further during the pandemic.

Raghbendra Jha

Almost all the PSIDS have been subjected to extreme weather shocks including hurricanes and other climate change related disasters, apart from earthquakes, volcanic eruption and the like. The PSIDS face a disproportionately large number of external shocks. It has been estimated that the cost of climate-induced disasters can be as high as 30% of GDP.[2] In some cases threats of climate change can be existential. For instance, climate change is particularly threatening for the long-term habitability of the island state of Tuvalu. This is because the average height of the islands is less than 2 metres above sea level, with the highest point of Niulakita being about 4.6 metres above sea level. Indeed the PSIDS have been classified as among the most vulnerable to risk areas in the world.

When risk and vulnerability are so high, it is natural to turn to insurance as an antidote. However, just as there are strong structural reasons why economic growth and poverty reduction cannot accelerate rapidly in the PSIDS there are compelling structural reasons why insurance cannot be widely used in the PSIDS. Most citizens of the PSIDS are part of the informal economy.

The incidence of informality of economic activity is around 60 to 85% in Melanesia and Micronesia countries and is increasing in Polynesian countries.[3] More than half the workers are in the informal sector. A majority of these are women and/or have low levels of education. Therefore, it would be difficult for them to negotiate complex insurance contracts. Further, most climate insurance disasters are quite debilitating so that there the longer the delay in executing the insurance obligations the higher is the loss to the individuals. This would lead to dis-saving on the part of individual to meet their consumption needs. This would then reduce the resources available for investment and growth. Therefore, even a single climate disaster can have effects well beyond its immediate effect on humans and property.

A measure to complement individual insurance is aggregation of risks with the insurance being taken out by higher level entities. For instance, a tripartite partnership among insurers, aid agencies and the government can be created so that a country-specific risk pool can be created. This requires that the payout triggers be well defined.

There are clear advantages to making comprehensive housing insurance to be made compulsory for all income groups. Policyholders could also be encouraged to aggregate risks through cooperatives, credit unions and the like. Finally, the insurance policy can be held by the government or other national or international agencies. Payouts can be used to accommodate government services and maintain post-disaster programs.

If these provisions were accepted, then it would follow that quite a bit of the premium for insurance would have to be paid for by international aid. Multilateral aid would be preferred to bilateral aid as many of the insuring agencies could well be located in donor countries creating complex problems of moral hazard. In contrast, the use of multilateral aid would be more hands off.[4]

The case for providing insurance rapidly remains strong. Keeping this in mind, the UNDP has designed a climate risk insurance product for six PSIDS.[5] However, much remains to be done. Clearly any long-term meaningful insurance policy should not be viewed in isolation but should be embedded in a broader policy of providing climate change relief for PSIDS.

Raghbendra Jha [1] is Professor of Economics and Executive Director, Australia South Asia Research Centre, Australian National University

[1] This article draws on my article co-authored with D. Jain, A. Chida, R.D. Pathak and S. Russell “Climate risk insurance in Pacific Small Island Developing States: Possibilities, challenges and vulnerabilities – a comprehensive review”. See https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11027-022-10002-z

[2] See https://www.cgdev.org/publication/are-pacific-islands-insurable-challenges-opportunities-disaster-risk-finance

[3] See https://info.undp.org/docs/pdc/Documents/PSC/PC%20%20Prodoc%20Final%2017%20Dec%20(signed%20copy).pdf

[4] This further supports the general case for an increase in multilateral aid. See https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2004.00596.x

[5] https://www.preventionweb.net/news/new-insurance-product-aid-fight-against-climate-change-pacific

By Raghbendra Jha
CANBERRA, Australia, Apr 29 2021 (IPS)

Edmund Burke called the press the fourth estate, the fourth pillar of democracy, with an oversight role on the remaining three pillars – the legislature, executive and the judiciary. In an ideal world, this fourth estate would have unimpeded access to the other three pillars so that the citizenry could be kept informed at all times. This freedom was conceived to be so sacrosanct that many countries have included it as a fundamental right, e.g., the US Constitution enshrined it as the very first amendment.

Raghbendra Jha

While this is the ideal state of affairs, even under the best of circumstances press freedoms have faced considerable challenges. The traditional newspaper is threatened by shrinking readership and concentration of ownership and control which implies that profitable markets will be served first, viz. global or at best national audiences.. There has been a considerable void in news reporting, particularly on issues affecting local populations. Other forms of media are unable to fill the gap. Television combines news with entertainment – infotainment- and traditional radio has been swamped by satellite radios. Local issues areneglected and many local media outlets including newspapers and television and radio stations are facing dire conditions. There has been a steady rise in media concentration in the past few decades https://theconversation.com/factcheck-is-australias-level-of-media-ownership-concentration-one-of-the-highest-in-the-world-68437

At the same time, the emergence and now overwhelming dominance of the social media and the Internet have given rise to a sharp proliferation of media outlets. Many of these are driven by the pure short-term profit motive and are difficult to regulate. All these forms of media are facilitated by the frictionless distribution enabled by the Internet and the disruptive effects of digital transformation. There is no dearth of people active on social and regular media, including some who should know better, who will, when forming an opinion about an issue, first come to their preferred conclusion and then work their way back to selectively choose evidence to support their conclusion. The world still awaits a business model that pays for accurate content at competitive rates. The overburdening with information makes it difficult for people to use discretion in the absorption of news so that the primary objective of press freedom, i.e., keeping the citizenry informed at all times, is belied. Nevertheless, in many countries with very distorted ownership patterns of traditional media social media outlets have provided a breath of fresh air and independence, especially when elements of the traditional media are themselves accused of improper conduct and reporting.

This point brings us to the issue of pressing challenges facing journalism and press freedoms. https://orca.cf.ac.uk/94201/1/DG_FoJ-Risks%20Threats%20and%20Opportunities_JJ.pdf

The first one is personalized news feeds. Facebook and Twitter have created cultures of maximal tribalism and infinite personalization. Users can silo themselves in self-made realities while taking part in collective expression of tribal outrage that often seem bewilder outsiders. The fact that such personalization can mould the opinions of large numbers of people is particularly worrisome. Second, the 24-hour news cycle forces reporters to publish articles without proper fact-checking. Even allegedly responsible media houses have had to retract stories because of the lack of proper checking. This leads to a deeper concern. Whereas the privilege of helping the citizenry to form opinions about key public issues lies with journalists, there is an implied responsibility that the information and analysis provided by the journalist is accurate and verifiable. This does not always seem to be the case. Indeed, some journalists have been accused of spreading “fake news” by pursuing their own agendas when pursuing their vocation. There have been well-known instances of both traditional and social media outlets pursuing political advocacy. The distinction between “news” and “views” has broken down in many cases and the citizenry is often ill equipped to discern the difference.

During the on-going pandemic another very serious issue has disrupted. Violence towards journalists is an old issue but the promulgation of long lockdowns has led to explosion of serious domestic violence and mental ill-health concerns. This has been described as a pandemic within a pandemic https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2024046

Under ordinary circumstances, the explosion of these domestic issues would be an important news story. However, lockdown orders have meant that many such instances all over the world get unreported. Clearly, women are the worst victims here. In particular, it has become increasingly difficult for women journalists to report on such issues. It is ironical that although women journalists are most suited to report on occurrences of domestic and sexual violence, they are the ones with minimal access to the victims of such abuse.

Even before the pandemic journalists- particularly women journalists – have been subjected to harassment and abuse.of several types: https://www.iwmf.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/IWMF-Global-Report.pdf

On World Press Freedom Day (May 3) there is need to ponder on these and many other issues relating to the role of the fourth estate. Freedom of the Press is invaluable in society. However, as with any other freedom, constant vigil and action are the price of this freedom. If we want a robust press this price will need to be paid.

Raghbendra Jha, Professor of Economics and Executive Director, Australia South Asia Research Centre, Australian National University.

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Excerpt:

The COVID-19 pandemic (henceforth pandemic) has women particularly hard. In almost all countries, women constitute the bulk of the labour force in the service sector, which was hardest hit by the pandemic. Furthermore, they also represent a disproportionate share of the work force in particularly vulnerable sectors such as health care. Women also have disproportionate if not sole responsibility for home work including taking care of children.

Raghbendra Jha

Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that during the pandemic, casualization of the work force has increased substantially. Because of their filial responsibilities, women are disproportionately represented in the causal work force. This has meant a further loss in incomes for many women.

When analysing women’s attainments it is helpful to view it as a sequence of two steps. First, one could look at indicators of human development followed by women’s actual attainments in terms of wages, salaries and representation in key positions.

Indicators of human development disaggregated by gender is available in the Gender Development Index (GDI) computed and published annually by the UNDP as part of its Human Development Report.
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-development-index-gdi

The GDI views disparities women and men in three different dimensions of human development: health, schooling and measures of living standards. The GDI first calculates Human Development Indicators using these three measures for both women and men separately and then takes the ratio of the index for women to the value of the index for men. The closer this ratio is to 1, the more equal is society for both genders.

Every year the UNDP computes this index for 167 countries which are classified into five groups based on the absolute deviation from gender parity in HDI values. This means that grouping takes equally into consideration gender gaps favoring males, as well as those favoring females.

The latest GDI for the world as whole is 0.943, with HDI value of 0.714 for females and 0.757 for males. Women marginally outperform men in the area of life expectancy; they have equal attainment as men in expected years of schooling but fall behind men in key areas of mean level of schooling and gross national income per capita by gender.

Although the GDI is a useful measure, of how much women are lagging behind their male counterparts and how much women need to catch up within each dimension of human development, there are a number of areas in which they are unable to capture key underlying trends. For instance, in the area of nutrition within the family standard measures assume that there is equal access for males and females within the household. Recent literature emphasizes that this may not be the case. Indeed, female children may be discriminated against in comparison to their male counterparts.
https://academic.oup.com/wbro/article/10/1/1/1684910?login=true

Moreover, in some countries although enrolment of females in primary is quite robust, secondary female enrolment in school drops off. See chapter 8 of
http://www.springer.com/gp/book/9781349953417

In many countries female students are under-represented in key disciplines of study such as science and mathematics and over-represented in less remunerative areas of study.

When we analyse the second step – women’s actual economic attainment – the conclusions are even less sanguine. For example, in the case of Australia (a country with a GDI of 0.976) women are underrepresented in almost all leadership and management positions.
https://www.wgea.gov.au/women-in-leadership

According to the latest data, women hold only 32.5 % of key management positions, 28.1 % of directorships, 18.3 % of CEOs, and 14.6 % of board chairs.

An international comparison of women’s attainments in some key countries is available in:
https://www.catalyst.org/research/women-in-management/

Such trends have caused many observers to feel that women face a broken rung in the ladder for leadership in organisations.
https://pragmaticthinking.com/blog/women-in-leadership-statistics/

As if such results were not enough, there is compelling evidence to suggest that men are paid more than women (gender gap)
https://www.epi.org/publication/what-is-the-gender-pay-gap-and-is-it-real/

In recent years, although the gender pay gap has narrowed this progress has now stalled.
https://www.epi.org/publication/what-is-the-gender-pay-gap-and-is-it-real/

With this as background, one comes to the conclusion that women are economically worse off than men largely because women’s work is not fully priced in the marketplace. From the family to the frontiers in science, technology, politics and the armed forces women provide absolutely critical services, but these services are not always valued adequately.

The primary reason why such gaps have persisted for so long is attitudinal. From the household to the board room women face attitudes that are inimical to their interests. So, along with legislative and other measures to ensure equality for women all sections of all societies must work on their attitudes towards women.

The author is Professor of Economics and Executive Director, Australia South Asia Research Centre, Australian National University

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By Raghbendra Jha
CANBERRA, Australia, Dec 14 2020 (IPS)

Economic growth is the time-tested method of raising living standards and, if not accompanied by large increases in inequality, lowering poverty. Since World War II, economic growth has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, including in South Asia.

Raghbendra Jha

One of the surest ways of improving productivity growth is through Research and Development (R&D expenditure). The above table contrasts the 2018 experience of two major Asian countries in this regard: India and South Korea. Both countries had comparable per capita incomes in 1950. Now South Korea has attained high-income country status whereas India is a low middle-income country.

One of the reasons for this is the difference in the R&D expenditure of the two countries. As the above table shows, Korea spends more than 6 times India on R&D as percentage of individual GDPs. The absolute value of R&D expenditure is higher in Korea and this country has many more researchers per million population. Also interesting is the pattern of R&D expenditure in the two countries. The bulk of R&D expenditure in Korea is carried out by businesses whereas in India more than half of R&D expenditure is by government, through tax receipts.

This implies that when government finances are tight, as they will be during the current pandemic, R&D expenditure will be reduced. Also, government administered funds may not be as efficiently allocated as those in private business enterprises. Thus, in low-income countries there is a need to raise tax revenues for the purpose of subsidising R&D.

Also, agricultural productivity is not keeping pace with the speed of urbanization and growth in food demand and the demand for food is highly skewed making for an inordinate amount of food going for non-human consumption and wastage.

By 2050 more than two-thirds of the world’ population will be living in metropolitan centres. Concurrently, the population of the world is expected to rise from 7.7 billion in 2019–20 to around 9.8 billion in 2050. This growth is expected to be largely concentrated in Africa and Asia with stagnant, even declining, populations in many OECD countries.

Source: http://uis.unesco.org/apps/visualisations/research-and-development-spending/

Global urban population has grown by a staggering 411 per cent between 1960 and 2018—much higher than the growth of the total population. In Sub-Saharan Africa and the least developed countries urban population has grown more than ten-fold.

At the global level, cereal yield per hectare has grown by 285 per cent over the period 1961 to 2017 with much smaller increases in less well-off regions.

In many developing countries the total population has grown at a much faster rate than agricultural yield. These are some of the very countries that will experience the fastest pace of urbanization. Hence, there are genuine concerns for prospects for food security in these countries.

Although cereal yield has gone up, there is a substantial diversion of cereals for purposes other than human consumption, e.g. livestock. In the US, in 2015, 36 percent of corn was being used for feeding animals and 75 percent of global soya output was used to feed animals. Almost one third of the world’s arable land is being used to grow crops to feed animals.

In 2015, 70 billion farm animals were raised for the purposes of food. Over time, as world incomes grow, there is likely to be a further shift towards the consumption of meat and other animal products.

Trend rate of agricultural productivity growth is about 1.5 percent per annum whereas the rate of growth required to ensure food security for all by 2050 is about 1.75 percent. This significant gap needs to be closed. It is, therefore, imperative to boost agricultural R&D across the world, particularly in developing countries.

The diversion of grain to feed farm animals should be curtailed significantly. The consumption of crops by farm animals is creating an externality, i.e., reducing access to food for several millions. The market is unable to price this externality. A consumption tax on meat would serve this purpose. This is a market-based solution.

The diversion of crops to the production of biomass, ethanol and other products should be restricted by taxing such products. The revenue raised from both these taxes could be used for subsidising R&D in general and agriculture in particular to stimulate economic and food growth.

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Excerpt:

Remittances are an essential part of economic activity in low and middle-income countries (LMIC), including those in South Asia. Because of the pandemic remittances to LMIC are expected to drop from $548 billion on 2019 to $508 billion in 2020 and $470 billion in 2021. The implied growth rates for 2020 and 2021 are -7.2% and -7.5%. For South Asia the drop will be from $140 billion in 2019 to $135 billion in 2020 and $ 120 billion in 2021 with implied growth rates of -3.6% and -10.9%.
https://www.knomad.org/publication/migration-and-development-brief-33

Raghbendra Jha

Even for India, remittances have accounted for nearly 3% of GDP in recent times. Remittances thus serve the triple purpose of augmenting resources available to households to which these transfers are made, increasing funds for investment to the extent that remittances finance investment and support the current account balances of these countries. There are large deficits in the balance of trade of most South Asian countries.

In the absence of remittances and other invisible flows, the deficits would continue to be very large, thus threatening a perpetuation of macroeconomic imbalances in these countries. The drop in remittances would thus disadvantage these economies in all these areas. At the same time, FDI flows to South Asia have dropped significantly during the first half of 2020. Short-term economic prospects do not appear sanguine for the region.

The reasons for the drop in remittances are rather straightforward. For one, economic growth has been negative for most economies (both developed and developing). The earlier optimism about a V-shaped economic recovery has all but dissipated. This has sharply increased unemployment (with no end in sight) in most of the countries that have traditionally hosted migrants. Secondly, the drop in oil prices has led to a sharp reduction in economic activity in the Gulf and other Middle-east countries where many workers from South Asia traditionally work. Accompanying this is a pandemic induced shift in labour demand in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council countries towards domestic workers since employment opportunities have sharply fallen. Even in OECD countries (e.g. Australia) net migration has become negative. Third, some exchange rate movements (e.g. the depreciation of the rouble against the US dollar) have led to a drop in the dollar value of remittances from Russia. These factors will be ameliorated only gradually and, even when economic activity picks up, jobs will continue to be offered first and foremost to domestic workers in most of the host countries.

The pandemic induced downturn has led to a large return of migrants to their own countries. This has caused severe disruption in the lives of these people as well as those of the families they had held behind. The World Economic Forum and other agencies have warned that this revers migration and spinoff effects have the potential of increasing poverty, under-nutrition and deprivation in most of these countries.
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/08/4-critical-steps-for-fighting-a-historic-remittance-decline-in-south-asia/

Thus, human development indicators will be badly affected in these countries.

The corona pandemic presents a complex challenge wherein the economic and public health effects of the crisis interact with each other to worsen both economic and public health outcomes. The public health crisis worsens economic outcomes, which, in turn, reduce the resources to combat the public health challenge. Addressing the challenges thrown up with respect to remittances must, therefore, wait until the incidence of the economic and public health challenges has been restrained. Once this has happened policy can intervene to improve the return flow of workers to former host countries. This can happen if migration policy and remittance policy are integrated to some extent. First, all migrants must have dual registration in the domicile and host countries. For policy purposes, a continuous record of in-migration and outward remittances should be maintained. An insurance policy to protect such workers from unscrupulous migration agents and dodgy avenues for transferring remittances should be enacted. Following from these costs of sending money through remittances should be lowered.

Although the Sustainable Development Goal (Indicator 10.c.1) is that average cost of sending $200 through remittances should be 3.8% the average cost in Q3 2020 was 6.8%. Costs are low in high traffic areas such as Middle-east to India but very high in low traffic areas such as Pakistan to Afghanistan. Furthermore, costs of sending remittances vary considerably across regions and the means used to make these transfers with bank transfers being the most expensive. Steps should be taken to harmonise these methods of transfers and to reduce the costs, if necessary by making compensating transfers to the bank accounts of intended recipients.

Raghbendra Jha, Professor of Economics and Executive Director, Australia South Asia Research Centre, Australian National University

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By Raghbendra Jha
CANBERRA, Australia, Aug 26 2020 (IPS)

On July 25 2020 the Japanese bulk carrier MV Wakashio with 3,894 tonnes of fuel aboard ran aground off the cost of Mauritius. By 9 August over 1000 tonnes of oil had seeped into the pristine waters off the coast of this beautiful island haven. This spill was so large that it was even visible from space https://www.livescience.com/mauritius-oil-spill-from-space.html

Raghbendra Jha

https://www.ipsnews.net/2020/08/mauritius-oil-spill-puts-spotlight-ship-pollution/ There is the additional complication that Mauritius lies on a very busy shipping lane – particularly for fuel. Although cleaning up of waters is part of the Sustainable Development Goals (Goal 14) there is little clarity on the institutional and legal mechanism to support a clean-up after an oil spill, particularly near small island nations. In this particular case, some help has been forthcoming from the Japanese but the clean-up is far from complete and there is the risk that the ship may break up.

In a historical context two facts about oil spills stand out https://www.itopf.org/knowledge-resources/data-statistics/statistics/ First, reflecting better technology and improvement in practices, over the period 1970-2019 the number of large oil spills (>700 tonnes) has come down quite significantly. The decline in medium term spills (7-700 tonnes) has also been quite spectacular. The number of medium (large) spills was 543 (245) in the 1970s, 360 (94) in the 1980s, 281 (77) in the 1990s, 149 (32) in the 2000s, and 44(18) in the 2010s, even though the volume of fuel transported has increased very sharply over this period. Second, at the individual times of occurrence spectacular large spills near major ports have received more policy and media attention. By way of comparison with the spill near Mauritius the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil tanker accident in Alaska spilled 37,000 tons of crude and, of course, garnered considerably more media and policy attention. Although the Mauritius oil spill counts as a large oil spill the fact that it has not occurred near a major port and has occurred against the backdrop of the corona pandemic makes it less likely that it will stimulate long-term policy action.

Since international waters, including the waters off the coast of Mauritius, are a public good, it is ordinarily difficult to price the consequence of a mishap occurring in such waters. In the case of the Mauritius oil spill the Japan P&I which provided insurance cover to the ship’s owner, Nagasaki Shipping Company, has attested that it will carry out all its insurance obligations to the ship’s owner. This would include removal of the broken ship and the clean-up. However, the Mauritius government would need to depend on the local courts to recoup the environmental losses. Whether these courts have the wherewithal and the resources to adjudicate such cases involving large and powerful shipping companies and insurers is another matter.

It is at this point that the importance of the development of international norms for deciding on the environmental costs becomes evident. It is clear that when the damage is caused by multinational shipping companies backed by large insurers the adjudicating authority should have the backing of some sort of international law for fixing liabilities. Local courts in Mauritius cannot be expected to seek adequate compensation from powerful international actors. A clear set of guidelines on fixing damages should be agreed on by all nations. Although this will require an enormous amount of goodwill and effort from various nations it has the potential of generating other beneficial spinoffs, e.g., the scope of fixing liabilities for oil spills could be expanded to include other environmental damages inflicted on international waters including the dumping of waste into the seas and the consequences of ship breakups in the high seas. Currently, as reported by UNCTAD not all countries agree on norms for fixing such damages. This needs to be sorted out at the earliest. In the absence of such agreement future oil spills, especially those near the coast line of small island states, will continue to wreck considerable economic and environmental damage.

Excerpt:

By Raghbendra Jha
CANBERRA, Australia, Jul 6 2020 (IPS)

The onset of the coronavirus pandemic in early 2020 set off a series of health and economic crises that feed upon each other. The health crisis exacerbates the economic crisis by disrupting supply chains, throwing large number of people (particularly those working in the informal sector) out of work and closing down large numbers of enterprises – particularly micro, small and medium enterprises (MSME).

Raghbendra Jha

This essay analyses some of the short-run and medium-terms impacts of the corona crisis in South Asia, particularly on the women and children of the region.¹ As unemployment rose sharply in the wake of the onset of the crisis the household budget was thrown off-gear, particularly because a large proportion of workers in the region are in the informal sector.. Preliminary estimates indicate that job losses for this category of workers ranged from 25 % to 56%. . Even in the formal sector, there was substantial job loss as long lockdowns and social distancing norms took their toll. Consequently, large numbers of migrant workers left their places of work to return to their villages of origin. At this point, two good shock absorbers were introduced in India. First, the allocation to the National Rural Employment Guarantee Program was enhanced by ₹ 400 billion over budgeted amounts in order to boost employment opportunities in the villages. Furthermore, the Prime Minister announced an allocation of ₹ 500 billion for the specific purpose of providing employment to returning migrant workers.²

Another safety net in operation in India was free allocation of food for the poor. Even under normal conditions within household allocation of food in the region sometimes discriminate against women and (particularly female) children.³ Against this background the government of India extended free rations of basic grains for the poor until end November 2020.⁴ It is fortuitous that the winter (rabi) crop in India was abundant and the summer (kharif) crops is likely also to be good across the region. Thus, widespread hunger should not be an issue, at least in India.

There is evidence to suggest that in Bangladesh and Pakistan women are less likely to receive information about COVID-19 than men.⁵ This is particularly worrying because traditionally women have had primary responsibility for household hygiene and care for family members. In addition, women in Bangladesh and Pakistan are less likely to be covered by health insurance. This problem is likely to be less acute in India because of the PM-JAY health insurance scheme.⁶ Although women have a genetic advantage in immunity from COVID⁷ their emotional health may be adversely affected as compared to men for the above reasons.

It has been observed, however, that with the lockdown men and children are helping more with the housework than before. This should alleviate some pressures on women, although women continue to provide most of the services at home.

However, over the longer term there are some deep concerns. First, if the pandemic induced economic crisis becomes long drawn out there might be a substantial rise in poverty, particularly chronic poverty. The efforts of many decades of poverty reduction through economic growth and supportive measures may be wiped off. Government budgets are already under considerable stress because of various fiscal stimuli in the countries. The possibilities of enhanced economic aid are also remote since most developed countries are running huge budget deficits. If the increased poverty spells get protracted there will be serious consequences for households, particularly women and children in these households.

Also, the education of children in South Asia is facing considerable challenge in the COVID era. Sources note that even before the COVID crisis more than 95 million children were out of school in South Asia and it is likely that some more of the total of 430 million children in South Asia may face difficulties in continuing their education.⁸ Although the well known digital divide between rural and urban sectors has been bridged somewhat with rural India having more internet users than urban India speed and reliability of internet connections are still a concern. Whether existing internet platforms can provide enough opportunities for on line education of all children and adults is still an open question at best and more likely a serious challenge.

To conclude, while the short-term impacts of the corona crisis are still playing out, there is apprehension that a long drawn out crisis may exacerbate poverty, health and education challenges in South Asia. History suggests that women and children will be particularly vulnerable in such situations.

¹ https://www.unicef.org/rosa/stories/gender-equality-during-covid-19
² https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/pm-modi-to-launch-rs-50000-cr-job-guarantee-scheme-for-migrant-workers/articleshow/76447151.cms?from=mdr
³ https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mcn.12739
⁴ https://indianexpress.com/article/india/pm-modi-coronavirus-lockdown-free-ration-scheme-6483474/
⁵ https://data.unwomen.org/resources/surveys-show-covid-19-has-gendered-effects-asia-and-pacific
⁶ https://pmjay.gov.in/about/pmjay
⁷ https://www.mysciencework.com/omniscience/covid-19-women-genetic-advantage
⁸ https://thelogicalindian.com/news/internet-usage-rural-urban-india-20946

Excerpt:

Prior to the onset of the coronavirus crisis South Asian women participated only sparingly in the labor market. Even though South Asia was and still has the potential to become one of the fastest growing regions in the world (post COVID19) female labor force participation rates were low at 23.6% compared to 80% for men (World Bank figures).

Raghbendra Jha

Many of these constraints are being eased. But there is quite a way to go. Some economists argue that globally female employment has a U-shape in the employment income per capita space. When family income is low women have to work because they need to augment the family resources. At high levels of income women work in elite professions. At intermediate levels of income female employment is low.³ If this is true then the drop in female employment is actually a reflection of rising income. It should increase when incomes have risen sufficiently. However, female employment is needed for the sake of gender equity and because women bring in a different set of skills and also because working mothers are good managers of their households.

The onset of the COVID-19 crisis has seriously shaken up this state of affairs. Men and women particularly in the services, manufacturing and non-formal sectors will have experienced serious job separation issues. Many of these women and men have returned to their villages where agriculture is already quite feminized.⁴ How this reverse migration affects incomes and employment will depend on the ensuing recovery. If the slowdown is protracted these workers – both male and female – will have to be accommodated in the non-formal or rural sectors. This means that alternative sources of job opportunities will need to be created on a large scale.

The government of India has pumped in an extra ₹400 million into the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Program for fiscal year 2021 in addition to the amount already budgeted.⁵ Similar initiatives have been taken in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Non-agricultural rural employment would need to grow fast if the downturn is drawn out. It is likely that in some of these occupations (e.g. handicrafts, khadi and other work involving some amount of processing) women will find employment whereas men will be take in for more onerous work. But, it is hard to see total employment rise for women because of these activities. However, some states in India (e.g. Uttar Pradesh) have begun skill mapping of returning migrants so that they can be employed locally and do not have to go back to cities and large towns.⁶ Since women will rarely migrate back to cities and towns without men folk they will have to make do with whatever work is available at the local level, if they work at all.

Whenever full economic activity resumes and these workers and their families return to towns and cities their employment will depend on the speed of the recovery. On balance, it is difficult to imagine that most men or women will get back to positions similar to those they had prior to the onset of COVID. In the case of India generous loans for entrepreneurial activities have been made available and some families may get involved in these. So, one can foresee a strong move toward self-employment in the post COVID era. Ironically, this may see an improvement in women’s employment as many of them will be involved in family enterprises.

All told, next few months will be a testing period for workers in South Asia. Women workers have been adversely affected more than men and face an uncertain future whether they remain in the cities or have reverse migrated to their homes. This period of adjustment will test many of these workers. If the pace of recovery is rapid and geared towards low value-added, low skill intensive jobs or involve considerable self-employment the labor market will recover soon. However, if the recovery is slow prospects for female employment will remain weak.

¹ https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.FE.ZS Accessed 12th June 2020
² https://www.iza.org/publications/dp/12956/analyzing-female-employment-trends-in-south-asia Accessed 12th June 2020
³ https://www.ideasforindia.in/topics/social-identity/what-explains-the-decline-in-female-labour-force-participation-in-india.html Accessed 12th June 2020.
⁴ The concept of feminization of agriculture refers to a phenomenon when men go to work in towns and cities and women stay to work on the farm. See https://wle.cgiar.org/thrive/big-questions/what-truth/feminization-agriculture Accessed 12th June 2020
⁵ https://indianexpress.com/article/business/centre-to-pump-rs-40000-crore-more-into-mgnrega-for-fy21-6414887/ Accessed 12th June 2020.
⁶ https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/uttar-pradesh-launches-skill-mapping-of-returning-workers-to-provide-jobs-within-state/article31767273.ece Accessed 12th June 2020.

The author is Professor of Economics, Australian National University and Executive Director Australia South Asia Research Centre

By Raghbendra Jha
CANBERRA, Australia, May 21 2020 (IPS)

As of 11 AM (AEST) on 20th May 2020 the incidence of COVID-19 virus (henceforth virus) on the Pacific Islands was limited. Active cases (deaths) in some of the Pacific Islands were Australia 7,072 (100), New Zealand 1,503 (21), PNG 8(0), Guam 154 (5), Fiji 18 (0), Timor-Leste 24 (0), French Polynesia 60(0), and New Caledonia 18(0).¹ Standards of comparison are not uniform across the region since testing capacities of the various countries differ widely. The low number of cases in the smaller Pacific Islands compared to their larger neighbours, i.e., Australia and New Zealand, reflect both variations in testing standards as well as their smaller population size. The smaller Pacific Islands were also not subject to some of the aberrations experienced by the larger countries, e.g., large number of arrivals from foreign countries in planes and cruise ships.

Raghbendra Jha

The pandemic has led to concurrent health and economic crises, the latter because economic activity has come to a halt for long periods in many of these countries. The solution to the economic crisis is to restart economic activity which would necessarily involve the interaction of large numbers of people, which could then aggravate the health crisis. As the wait grows longer the capacity of the state even in large affluent countries to address the crises is reduced. Large budget deficits abound all around and many countries could experience a paucity of medical staff and equipment.

This dilemma is particularly acute for the smaller Pacific island nations. Given their small populations and widely dispersed island structures these countries require considerable economic assistance in the best of times. These take the form of international aid and humanitarian assistance at time of natural disasters like cyclones, not to speak of the existential threat that some of these countries are facing from rising sea levels. The capacity of Australia and New Zealand to deliver aid will be curtailed as a result of the steep rise in their budget deficits. Furthermore, many of the small Pacific islands are dependent on tourism dollars to supplement their resources. With international travel ruled out for the foreseeable future this paucity of resources will only get aggravated. So, the small Pacific islands face a severe and persistent resource crunch as a result of the systemic impact of the virus, even though the immediate impact on the health of their citizens is relatively mild.

The above analysis is cast in gender neutral terms, as if both males and females are equally affected by the health and economic crises. But this is far from the case. In an important article² Sharon Lewin and Thomas Rasmussen show that although the incidence of the virus is the same across both genders. Although more men are dying from the virus as compared to women (because of inherent immunological differences) women are more vulnerable because they constitute a larger share of health workers who are more exposed to the virus.

Furthermore, the economic crisis that the virus has engendered a severe employment crunch for women. In most of the Pacific countries sectors like hospitality, tourism and transport have been decimated by the virus. Women constituted a large proportion of workers in these sectors. Many of them are now unemployed. Many casual workers (again mostly women) have also lost their jobs. It is too early to anticipate what shape or form these sectors will return to in a post COVID world. Hence, not only are women disproportionately unemployed as a result of the virus, but also their employment and income prospects are uncertain at best.

Moreover, during the virus inspired lockdown and unemployment many women are facing a sharp increase in household duties.³ There is also the fear of increase in domestic violence during the lockdown.⁴ One media report has characterised this rise in domestic violence as “shocking”.

In conclusion, the impact of the twin health and economic crises has been manifold all over the world and the Pacific Islands are no exceptions to this rule. However, there are some particular characteristics of the Pacific Islands that make these impacts even more challenging. These relate to the dependence of these islands on external resources and the logistical and infrastructural challenges of managing so many widely dispersed islands that are subject to a high incidence of natural disasters even in the best of times. The burdens of coping with the crises and the resultant adjustment are also likely to fall asymmetrically on women. At the same time, although macroeconomic stabilisation and debt control have vocal political advocates, the same is not true for the new issues that women are facing. Policy should take cognizance of this.

¹ See https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html (Accessed 20 May 2020)
² See https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S0140-6736%2820%2930526-2 (Accessed 20 May 2020).
³ See https://www.wgea.gov.au/topics/gendered-impact-of-covid-19 (Accessed 20 May 2020)
⁴ See https://7news.com.au/sunrise/on-the-show/coronavirus-australia-the-shocking-rise-in-domestic-violence-reports-during-lockdown-c-1013619 (Accessed 20 May 2020).

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