Image: The White House 29.9.25 / Wiki Commons

By Ramesh Thakur
Oct 6 2025 (IPS)

Back in January last year, my Toda Policy Brief 182 was published with the title “Israel and Gaza: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow”. On 29 September this year, President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a joint press conference to announce a peace plan for Gaza. The plan’s title could well have been “Gaza: Today, Tomorrow and the Day After”. Trump’s yearning for the Nobel Peace Prize is no secret, possibly out of Obama-envy. If the bold and audacious 20-point Gaza plan succeeds, he will surely deserve the award. For it entails the end of Hamas as a governing force in Gaza and a security threat to Israel, gives Arabs the stability they seek in the region, promises a terror-free future for Israel and keeps alive the dream of a Palestinian state. That said, however, potholes, there be a few on the pathway to Middle East peace.

First, the good news

Any viable peace plan must deliver on three core challenges: an immediate ceasefire that brings an end to the killings and a release of all Israeli hostages still in captivity, dead or alive (today); the removal of Hamas as a military, political and institutional force from Gaza and its replacement with a credible governance structure for the strip to oversee its reconstruction (the agenda for tomorrow); and appropriate provisions, backed by credible guarantees, to prevent the return of terror to Israel (the promise of the day after).

The plan calls for the withdrawal of Israeli forces to an agreed line, the immediate cessation of hostilities and freeze on battle lines once all parties have agreed to the plan; the return of all hostages to Israel within 72 hours of the latter’s acceptance of the agreement; the release of 2,000 Palestinian prisoners by Israel (points 3–5).

The second part (tomorrow) is covered in points 6–16. After the exchange of hostages and prisoners, Hamas members who give up their arms and surrender will be granted amnesty and, if they wish, be given safe passage to third countries. They will play no role in Gaza’s governance. Aid deliveries into Gaza will resume and distributed without interference from any party. Gaza will be governed by a transitional, technocratic and apolitical committee of qualified Palestinians and international experts. An international high-level Peace Board will “set the framework”, “handle the funding for the redevelopment of Gaza”, and “create modern and efficient governance” to the “best international standards”. Trump will draw up an economic development plan. No one will be forced to leave Gaza. Israel will neither occupy nor annex Gaza. Instead, its forces will withdraw to agreed lines and on a timetable tied to Hamas’s demilitarisation. The US, Arab countries and other international partners will provide a temporary International Stabilisation Force to deploy immediately in Gaza.

The third and final element is addressed in points 1, 9, 14, 19 and 20. They envision Gaza as “a deradicalised terror-free zone that does not pose a threat to its neighbours”; a guarantee from Arab regional partners that Hamas and its factions will comply with the provisions and New Gaza will not pose a threat to its people or to neighbours; and, possibly as the most critical trigger to a direct US involvement if the agreement is violated, the new “Board of Peace” to be set up “will be headed and chaired” by Trump himself. As Gaza redevelops and the Palestinian Authority implements the necessary reforms, a “credible pathway” to realise the aspirations of the Palestinians for self-determination and statehood will emerge. The US will establish a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians “for peaceful and prosperous co-existence”.

Now, the rest of the news

There are thus a lot of moving parts and the plan will work only if everything that can go right, does go right. Usually this is an overly optimistic basis for any peace plan.

To start with, Israel gets almost all its demands and conditions met on hostage release, Hamas disarmament and its removal as a military and political power, and a security buffer zone in Gaza. Its own withdrawal will be phased on Hamas’s compliance. Hamas, not so much. Hostages have been its most powerful leverage over Israel. Mass civilian casualties and humanitarian suffering have been its most potent weapon in the campaign of global delegitimisation of Israel. The few credible opinion polls show Hamas to be the runaway choice in the West Bank and, especially, Gaza. Trump has threatened to give Israel the green light to finish the job if Hamas rejects his plan. For an ideology that welcomes martyrdom for shahids, they might choose to die on their feet rather than survive on their knees on Israeli sufferance.

Conversely, the deal might be torpedoed by the more hawkish partners in Netanyahu’s governing coalition who demand a permanent security presence in Gaza, annexation of the West Bank, no release of the worst of the Palestinian prisoners and no amnesty for the killers of 7 October. Of course, it’s possible that opposition parties that want an end to the war could step in to keep Netanyahu afloat.

Third, both Hamas and Israel might feel compelled to accept the plan in order to escape the wrath of the infamously short-tempered US president. But both have a long history of sabotaging the implementation of agreements reached, arguing endlessly over the finer details and implementation implications of the agreement’s clauses, pointing fingers at each other, and so on. The region has never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity.

Fourth, to believe that the Palestinian Authority, with a president who is into the third decade of his four-year elected term, will quickly transform into a corruption-free model of competence and effective governance is a triumph of hope over experience.

Fifth, Arab governments were brought on board with Trump’s very public rejection of Israel’s agenda to annex the West Bank. When Israel attacked targets on its soil, Qatar discovered the limits of playing all sides in hosting the Hamas leadership and a big US military base while also acting as a mediator in the Israel-Palestine conflict. This helped concentrate its mind to seal the deal. But how long will the Arab regimes be able to resist their attachment to the Palestinian cause?

Finally, Tony Blair’s presence on the Peace Board as an eminence grise is a kick in the teeth of international idealism. He is thoroughly discredited for his role in the 2003 Iraq war. Putting “Tony Blair” and “Middle East peace” alongside each other in any plan for the region has as much chance of peaceful coexistence as Hamas and a Netanyahu government in Gaza and Israel. We can only conclude that Trump lacks awareness of just how globally toxic the Blair brand is.

Related articles:
The return of the ugly American
Donald Trump: Self-proclaimed peacemaker lacking fortune and expertise
Donald Trump’s overwhelming force/surrender style of negotiation and governing

Ramesh Thakur, a former UN assistant secretary-general, is emeritus professor at the Australian National University and Fellow of the Australian Institute of International Affairs. He is a former Senior Research Fellow at the Toda Peace Institute and editor of The nuclear ban treaty: a transformational reframing of the global nuclear order.

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.

IPS UN Bureau

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

Credit: Berit Kessler/shutterstock.com

By Ramesh Thakur
Jan 14 2025 (IPS)

 
A regime built on terror, ruled by fear and sustained by foreign proxy forces crumbled in less than a fortnight. In the end, the foundations of the House of Assad (1970–2024) rested on the shifting sands of time. In the good ol’ days, despots could retire with their plundered loot into comfortable lifestyles in Europe’s pleasure haunts. No longer. The reverse damascene expulsion has seen the Assads scurry to safety to Moscow.

The beginning of the end of the Assad dynasty can be traced back to Hamas’s brutal attacks of 7 October 2023. Its objectives were to kill, rape, torture kidnap and subject to public humiliation on the streets of Gaza as many Israelis as possible.

Its political calculations sought to undermine Israelis’ confidence in their government’s ability to protect them; provoke retaliatory strikes on the densely populated Gaza strip that would kill large numbers of civilians held as involuntary human shields, and inflame the Arab street, enrage Muslims around the world and flood the streets of Western cities with massive crowds shouting pro-Palestinian/Hamas slogans; disrupt the process of normalisation of relations with Arab states; dismantle the Abraham Accords; and isolate Israel internationally.

It’s fair to say that Hamas has won the propaganda war. Israel has never before come under such sustained international censure in the UN Security Council, General Assembly, Human Rights Council, World Court and International Criminal Court. It’s also been heavily criticised in many previously supportive Western capitals, streets and campuses including Australia.

There are still some 100 hostages captive in Gaza. Israeli soldiers are still being killed and wounded. Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis retain residual capacity to launch rockets and drones into Israel.

Yet, Israel has achieved impressive military successes in fighting throughout Gaza followed by Lebanon. Hamas and Hezbollah have been decimated as fighting forces, with their military commanders and leaders decapitated with targeted assassinations and improvised explosive devices placed in pagers and walkie talkies. Iran has been humiliated, lost its aura of invincibility and seen the destruction of its entire strategy of trying to bleed Israel to death through a thousand cuts inflicted by proxies.

The military outcome thus is a complete reset of the local balance of power to Israel’s advantage. The reason for this is strategic miscalculations by Hamas. It launched the attacks of 10/7 unilaterally, hoping to draw fraternal groups into the war. Only Hezbollah half did so by firing rockets but without committing ground troops.

The second strategic miscalculation by Hamas was to underestimate Israel’s will and determination. This is Israel’s longest war. Israel stayed steadfast on destroying Hamas as a capable military force and governing power in Gaza; relegated the rescue of hostages to a highly desirable but subordinate goal; destroyed Hezbollah and ejected it from southern Lebanon; and checkmated Iran as the over-the-horizon military threat to Israel via its two powerful proxies in Gaza and Lebanon.

A further consequence was to remove the props holding up the Assad regime in Damascus and leave it exposed and vulnerable to overthrow by the well-armed and strongly motivated jihadist rebels. PM Benjamin Netanyahu is right to claim that Israel’s ‘blows inflicted on Iran and Hezbollah’ helped to topple Assad.

The new strategic balance sees the Israeli centre emerging much stronger amidst the ruins of the anti-Israel axis of resistance. The underlying reason for this is precisely the scale, surprise factor and depraved brutality of October 7. This broke beyond repair the endless loop of Hamas and Israeli policies of attack, retaliate, rinse and repeat when desired. Only a new balance of power could restore deterrence-based truce resting on certain Israeli retaliation and Israeli dominance at every level of escalation.

International calls for immediate and unconditional ceasefire and urgings not to go into Rafah proved counterproductive, I believe, for two reasons. For one, given the monstrous scale of 10/7, to Israelis they separated true from fair-weather friends. For another, Western youth and countries, under the impact of changing electoral demographics with mass influxes of radicalised Middle Eastern Muslims, were deserting Israel and softening on fighting antisemitism in their own populations. This drove home the realisation that time was against Israel. Hamas and Hezbollah had to be removed as security threats now or never.

However, post-Assad Syria is highly combustible. Syria is not a nation-state but a tattered patchwork quilt of different sects with a blood-soaked history of feuding. The rebels are diverse in tribe, race and religion and backed by different foreign actors with their own agendas. The chances are that après victory will come the deluge of warring factions and Syria descends once more into killing fields.

The dominant rebel group is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), whose roots go back to al Qaeda and the Islamic State. Its leader is Abu Mohammed al-Jolani who has had a US $10 million FBI bounty on his head since 2017 as a terrorist. The HTS’s base is the 75 percent Sunni population, with the remaining one-fourth split between Shiites, Kurds, Christians, Druze, Ismailis, Armenians and Alawites.

Israelis cannot assume that Syrians are immune to the Jew hatred that animates many Muslims in the region. Guided by its own precautionary principle, Israel has pre-emptively destroyed much of Syria’s weaponry, chemical weapons infrastructure and arms-production facilities and taken control of the demilitarised buffer zone in the Golan Heights.

The experiences of Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya after their humanitarian liberations into freedom and democracy in the 2001–11 decade should give Panglossian optimists on a ‘new Syria’ a reality check.

Ramesh Thakur, a former UN assistant secretary-general, is emeritus professor at the Australian National University and Fellow of the Australian Institute of International Affairs. He is a former Senior Research Fellow at the Toda Peace Institute and editor of The nuclear ban treaty: a transformational reframing of the global nuclear order.

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.

IPS UN Bureau

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau