Image: Hiroshi-Mori-Stock / shutterstock.com and 内閣広報室 / Cabinet Public Affairs Office / Wiki Commons

By Ria Shibata
Mar 3 2026 (IPS)

 
Sanae Takaichi’s electoral victory in February marks a historic turning point in Japanese politics. As Japan’s first female prime minister and the leader of a commanding parliamentary majority, she represents change in both symbolic and strategic terms. Conventional wisdom long held that younger Japanese voters leaned progressive, were sceptical of assertive security policies, and disengaged from ideological nationalism. Yet a segment of digitally active youth rallied behind a politician associated with constitutional revision, expanded defence capabilities, and a more unapologetic articulation of national identity. This shift cannot be reduced to a simple conservative swing. Rather, Takaichi’s rise reflects a deeper transformation in how democratic politics is constructed in the digital age: the growing power of imagery, digital mobilisation, and algorithm-driven branding in shaping political choice—particularly among younger voters.

Takaichi’s approval ratings among voters aged 18–29 approached 90 per cent in some surveys, far surpassing those of her predecessors. Youth turnout also rose, suggesting that Japanese youth are not politically apathetic. On the contrary, they are paying attention—but the nature of that engagement has changed. Viral images, short video clips, hashtags, and aesthetic cues travelled faster and farther than policy briefings. For many younger voters, engagement began—and sometimes ended—with the visual and emotional appeal of the candidate. This pattern is not uniquely Japanese. However, the scale of its impact in this election suggests that political communication has entered a new phase in which digital imagery can shape electoral outcomes as much as—or more than—substantive debate.

A New Phase of Digital Politics in Japan

In the months leading up to the election, Takaichi’s image proliferated across social media platforms. Supporters circulated clips highlighting her confident demeanour and historic candidacy. A cultural trend sometimes described as ‘sanakatsu’ or ‘sanae-mania’ framed political support as a form of fandom participation. Hashtags multiplied. ‘Mic-drop’ moments went viral. Even personal accessories—her handbags and ballpoint pens—became symbolic conversation pieces.

Political enthusiasm has always contained emotional and symbolic elements. What is new is the speed and scale at which digital platforms amplify them. Algorithms reward content that provokes reaction—admiration, anger, excitement. A charismatic clip often outperforms a detailed explanation of fiscal reform. For younger voters raised in scroll-based media environments, political information increasingly arrives as curated snippets. Policy complexity competes with—and often loses to—aesthetic immediacy.

Post-election surveys and interviews suggested that many first-time voters struggled to articulate specific policy distinctions between parties. Instead, they cited impressions—strength, change, decisiveness, novelty—suggesting that digital engagement does not automatically translate into policy literacy. Political identity can form through repeated exposure to imagery and narrative rather than sustained examination of legislative proposals. When campaigns are optimized for shareability, they are incentivized to simplify. Nuance compresses poorly into short-form video.

The Politics of Strength in an Age of Uncertainty

Japan’s younger generation has grown up amid prolonged economic stagnation, regional insecurity, and global volatility. China’s rise, tensions over Taiwan, North Korean missile launches, and persistent wage stagnation form the backdrop of their political participation. For many, the future feels uncertain and structurally constrained.

In such an environment, Takaichi’s assertive rhetoric carried emotional resonance. Her emphasis on strengthening national defence, revisiting aspects of the postwar settlement, and making Japan “strong and rich” projected clarity rather than ambiguity. Where institutional politics can appear technocratic or slow, decisive messaging offered the voters psychological reassurance.

At the core of her appeal is a narrative of restoring a ‘strong’ Japan. Calls for constitutional revision and expanded defence capabilities are framed as steps toward recovering national self-confidence. For younger Japanese fatigued by protracted historical disputes and what some perceive as externally imposed guilt, language emphasising pride and sovereignty resonates more readily than complex historical debates. This may not signal a rejection of peace. Rather, it may reflect a generational reframing of peace itself—understood not solely as pacifism, but as deterrence, defence capability, and strategic autonomy. Messages stressing ‘sovereignty’, ‘strength’, and ‘normal country’ can circulate more effectively in shareable digital formats than nuanced and complex historical analysis.

A Global Pattern: Virtual Branding, a Democratic Crossroads

Japan’s experience mirrors a broader transformation in democratic politics: the rise of virtual branding as the central organizing principle of electoral strategy. In earlier eras, campaigns revolved around party platforms and televised debates. Today, strategy increasingly begins with platform optimization. Campaigns are designed not only to persuade, but to perform within algorithmic systems. The guiding question is no longer only “What policies do we stand for?” but “What content travels?”

The election of Donald Trump in the United States illustrated how virtual media strategy can reshape political competition. Memorable slogans and emotionally charged posts dominated attention cycles, often eclipsing policy detail. Scholars have described this as “attention economics in action”: the candidate who captures digital attention shapes political reality before formal debate even begins. More recently, figures such as Zohran Mamdani have demonstrated how youth-centered digital branding can mobilize support with remarkable speed. Campaigns became participatory; supporters did not merely consume messaging but actively distributed political identity.

Takaichi’s recent victory reflects the evolving mechanics of digital democracy. Her leadership will ultimately be judged not by imagery but by governance — by whether her policies deliver economic stability, regional security, and social cohesion. The broader question, however, transcends any single administration. It means political decisions have migrated into digital environments optimised for speed and visual communication. In an age where images travel faster than ideas, democratic choice risks being guided more by what is seen than by what is discussed. In such an environment, political campaigns will be forced to adapt, and produce content that performs well within these algorithmic constraints. Over time, this may reshape voter expectations and politics will begin to resemble influencer culture. Campaigns that fail to master digital branding risk will appear outdated. Those that succeed can mobilize youth at scale.

Democracy has always balanced emotion and reason. The challenge today is ensuring that emotion does not eclipse reason entirely. The future of informed citizenship may depend on restoring that balance. This does not suggest that previous eras were immune to personality politics. What has changed is the proportion. The digital environment magnifies symbolic cues and compresses policy discussion. If democracies wish to maintain robust deliberation, they must consciously rebalance image and substance. This requires civic education focused on media literacy, virtual platform incentives that elevate substantive debate and political leadership willing to engage in depth, not just virality. And the responsibility is collective—voters, educators, media institutions, and candidates alike. The question facing democracies is whether this transformation can coexist with substantive deliberation or whether branding will increasingly overtake it.

Related articles:
Japan Stumbles: The Taiwan Fiasco
The New Takaichi Administration: Confronting Harsh Realities on the International Stage
Middle Powers After Davos

Ria Shibata is currently a Senior Research Fellow at the New Zealand Centre for Global Studies, and the Toda Peace Institute in Japan. She also serves as a Visiting Scholar at the University of Auckland. Her research focuses on identity-driven conflicts, reconciliation, nationalism and the role of historical memory in shaping interstate relations and regional stability in Northeast Asia.

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.

IPS UN Bureau

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

Sound has been travelling faster than light in China, Japan and Taiwan lately, as political, religious, and economic leaders use a lingering conflict for their own domestic political interests.

The presenting problem is a longstanding territorial dispute over who has sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The Chinese believe the islands were unlawfully seized by Japan as “war booty” in 1895. Japan argues that possession is nine-tenths of the law and that there can be no dispute since they have occupied the Senkakus for the past 117 years. For the past 40 years Japan has managed to avoid overt conflict over the islands by not raising questions of sovereignty and not engaging in any economic development. For their part, China and Taiwan fully expected that the islands would be returned to them in 1972 when the United States gave up its occupation of the Okinawan chain.

The Japanese illusion that “no territorial dispute exists” was undermined in mid-September when Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda pre-empted Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara’s desire to purchase the islands by buying them for Japan.

This offended China and immediately sparked violent protests. More than 60,000 Chinese citizens staged anti-Japan rallies in at least 24 cities to protest the purchase of the islands. The Noda decision and the Chinese response mean that Japan can no longer adhere to the view that the islands are not in dispute.

The challenge facing both countries is what to do about this. In the early stages, moderate Japanese public opinion did not raise its voice for fear of giving support to violent Chinese protests. As the conflict escalated, the Japan Business Federation, or Keidanren, and more moderate opinions urged a de-escalation of the rhetoric and maritime confrontation. They have requested negotiated solutions to the dispute. The questions now are whether or not both countries are hostage to extreme nationalist agendas and what conditions will be conducive to successful bilateral negotiations.

What needs to happen for both countries to de-escalate and resolve the dispute?

In the first place there has to be an acknowledgement of a divisive territorial dispute. By buying the islands the Japanese government opened Pandora’s box and acknowledged that the islands were contested. Both countries now need to decide between a negotiated or confrontational solution.

Secondly, because Japan triggered the dispute it should think of some suitable conciliatory gestures that might create ripe conditions for both countries to come to the negotiating table.

Thirdly, political leaders on both sides should start costing the negative economic, social and political impacts of continuing this conflict. Both countries have 340 billion dollars of annual bilateral trade and China accounts for 21 percent of Japanese exports and 20 percent of its imports. The conflict is already resulting in declining tourism and trade between both countries; it makes no economic or political sense to allow the dispute to continue.

Fourth, if there is no inclination or mood to have bilateral talks, both China and Japan should initiate talks about whether it would be better to have mediated or arbitrated negotiations. These could be under the auspices of the United Nations secretary general or his special representative; or, more formally, the case could be taken to the International Court of Justice for arbitration.

This case also highlights the need for some permanent North-east Asian regional security mechanism capable of managing disputes between the countries of North-east Asia.

Fifth, for the conflict to be adequately resolved in the long term, both China and Japan, but particularly Japan, need to devise processes for coming to terms with their common history and memories of war.

The Chinese believe that Japan has not yet admitted its responsibility for the Second World War. The current generation of Japanese decision makers feel diminished responsibility for events such as the Nanking Massacre, sanitised Japanese history textbooks and legal responsibility for the comfort women.

These traumatic memories are reactivated every time a Japanese head of state visits the controversial Yasukuni Shrine where class-A war criminals are enshrined as “war heroes” or when disputes like the Senkaku/Diaoyu occur. Without paying attention to traumatic history and the humiliating consequences of military defeat, territorial issues such as this will continue to undermine a positive and peaceful relationship between Japan and China in North-east Asia. (END/COPYRIGHT IPS)

* Kevin Clements is professor and director of the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (NCPACS) at the University of Otago and Ria Shibata is research assistant at NCPACS.