Heightened tensions with longtime foe Armenia over breakaway Nagorno Karabakh and mediator Russia’s Ukrainian adventure appear to be pushing Caspian-Sea energy power Azerbaijan ever more strongly toward a military strategy of self-reliance.

The strategy comes via two approaches: first, a build-up in Azerbaijani-made military equipment, including drones co-produced with Israel; and, second, a new defense troika with longtime strategic partners Turkey, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and neighbouring Georgia, a NATO-member-hopeful.

Nor is this a strategy just left to paper. On Sep. 11, Azerbaijani Defense Minister Yaver Jamalov announced to reporters that Azerbaijan plans to export 100 drones, co-produced at a local Azerbaijani-Israeli plant, to “one of the NATO countries.” The remarks headlined the country’s first international defense-industry show, ADEX-2014, held on Sep. 11-13 in the Azerbaijani capital, Baku.

Jamalov did not specify the country or the terms of the sale, but the prospect of the deal reinforces the fact, long clear in foreign policy, that Baku sees itself as a regional military force that need no longer pay heed to the likes or dislikes of Russia.

While Azerbaijan has spent “several billion dollars” over the last decade importing a range of Russian-made military equipment, politics now have become an issue, commented military expert Azad Isazade, a former Azerbaijani defense-ministry official.

As it looks on the plans for a trade union with Azerbaijani enemy Armenia, Baku increasingly feels that Moscow’s interests in resolving the 26-year-long Karabakh conflict are more closely aligned with those of Armenia, where Russia already has troops stationed.

By focusing its attention on its own military-production capabilities or on military partnerships with other countries, “the Azerbaijani government wanted to balance the pro-Armenian position of Moscow,” Isazade said.

Elhan Shahinoglu, head of the non-profit Atlas Research Center in Baku, agreed. “I think that after the last meeting of the Azerbaijani, Armenian and Russian presidents in Sochi [in August], [Azerbaijani President] Ilham Aliyev has lost any hope that Moscow is going to play a positive role in the Karabakh conflict’s resolution,” he commented.

The Kremlin’s support for pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine and intervention in the conflict there does little to reassure Baku on this point.

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has not specifically addressed such misgivings, but, in his opening remarks at ADEX-2014, commented that “in the current world, countries have to keep facing new security challenges, which make cooperation and the exchange of modern military technologies more important.”

Azerbaijan is due to receive 100 Russian-made T-90C tanks in early 2015, but the shipment is based on a 2010 contract, Trend news agency reported, citing an adviser to Russia’s state-owned weapons-export company, Rosobornexport. Azerbaijan has not announced any more such contracts.

Defense Minister Jamalov claims that Azerbaijan expects by the end of 2015 to be able to meet almost all of its own needs for ammunition and tank and artillery shells, formerly mostly supplied by Russia, Belarus and Ukraine.

Israel, which imports most of its natural gas from Azerbaijan, appears to play a leading role in Azerbaijan’s makeover into a materiel-manufacturer. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Yaalon visited Azerbaijan for the first time this month to meet President Aliyev and attend ADEX-2014.

At the exhibition, Azerbaijan presented models of two drones produced in conjunction with an unnamed Israeli company – one for reconnaissance ( “Aerostar”) and one for combat-missions ( “Orbiter 2M”).

Overall, 200 companies from 34 countries, including the United States and Russia, took part in the event, which featured products ranging from armored troop carriers to sniper guns.

Only one contract with an Azerbaijani company was signed during the show, however, an Azerbaijani defense-industry representative commented to EurasiaNet.org.

South Africa’s Paramount Group, a privately owned defense company which claims to be the largest in Africa, plans to create a joint venture with Azerbaijan’s private AirTechService to work on upgrades to military helicopters and some jets.

The defense industry representative, who asked not to be named, noted, however, that other countries expected to take an interest in Azerbaijani materiel include Arab Persian-Gulf states, and, in Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

NATO member states Estonia, Bulgaria, Lativa, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, all of which have indicated they will increase defense spending in response to the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, also feature among the sales-targets, the representative said.

But weapons manufacturing alone does not provide Azerbaijan with a sense of security.

Like other former Soviet republics, Azerbaijan, with one eye on the Karabakh flare-up and another on the Ukrainian civil war, is trying to find new ways to protect itself from Russian pressure, noted Shahinoglu.

On Aug. 19, Defense Minister Hasanov met with Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Alasania and Turkish Defense Minister Ismet Yilmaz in the exclave of Nakhchivan, President Aliyev’s ancestral home, to address the “military-political situation in the region,” as the government-friendly AzerNews put it.

After the meeting, Georgian Defense Minister Alasania, the most publicly talkative of the three, said the trio plans to defend collectively regional pipelines and railroads – strategic projects in which all three already cooperate – in case of military aggression in any of the three countries.

Joint military exercises also will be held, although the 30,000-troop exercises currently underway in Azerbaijan only include Azerbaijani forces.

While one Russian security analyst has questioned the pact’s significance since Turkey and Azerbaijan already are military allies, defense expert Isazade countered that Turkey’s presence will constrain Moscow in its treatment of Georgia and Azerbaijan, and reassure the international community that energy resources will be protected.

“If there would be just an alliance of Baku and Tbilisi, Moscow would not care,” he elaborated. “But Turkey, which is a NATO member and also has wide links and cooperation with Russia, is an important factor of stability for the region.”

So far, no official response has come from Moscow.

Originally published by EurasiaNet.org

Shahin Abbasov is a freelance correspondent based in Baku.    

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev chats with OSCE PA President Ranko Krivokapic, Jun. 28, 2014, in Baku. Credit: OSCE Parliamentary Assembly/CC-BY-2.0

By Shahin Abbasov
BAKU, Aug 10 2014 (EurasiaNet)

Azerbaijan in recent months has launched a clear assault against various civil society activists and non-governmental organisations. While rough treatment of critics is nothing new in this energy-rich South-Caucasus country, one question remains unanswered: Why pick up the pace now?

Some observers link this behavior to two causes: The February resignation of Ukraine’s ex-President Alexander Yanukovich in response to mass protests, and the Azerbaijani government’s keen desire for a protest-free 2015 European Games, a Summer Olympics for European countries that is a pet-project of President Ilham Aliyev.

And so, in the best of Soviet traditions, the cleanup has begun.

"Two months ago, the deputy head of the presidential administration, Novruz Mammadov, openly accused the U.S. of financing a revolution in Ukraine. Therefore, the authorities [here] want to deprive the local civil society of any foreign funding [...]." -- Emil Huseynov, director of the Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety
The tactics appear to fall into two categories – criminal prosecutions and scrutiny of financial resources. Since June, several leaders of local NGOs, critical bloggers and opposition activists have been arrested and sentenced to long prison terms on various criminal charges, including alleged tax-evasion, hooliganism and possession of illegal narcotics.

On Jul. 30, the crackdown accelerated with the filing of criminal charges, including treason, against outspoken human-rights activist Leyla Yunus. She is now in jail for three months awaiting trial. A former defense-ministry spokesperson actively engaged in citizen-diplomacy with neighbouring foe Armenia, Yunus and her husband, conflict-analyst Arif Yunus, have been under investigation since April.

Shortly before her detention, Yunus and a group of fellow activists publicly denounced the upcoming European Games as inappropriate for “authoritarian Azerbaijan, where human rights are violated.”A group led by Yunus has appealed to the European Olympic Committee (EOC) and the European Union’s EOC representative office to cancel the decision to hold the Games in Baku.

Yunus’ problems with the government, though, are not unique. The list of people sentenced to prison since June reads like a “Who’s Who” of Azerbaijani civil society.

Anar Mammadli, director of the Election Monitoring Center has been sentenced to 5.5 years on charges of tax evasion; his deputy, Bashir Suleymanly got five years. Hasan Huseynli,  head of the youth-education NGO Kamil Vetendash, or Intellectual Citizen, received six years for allegedly illegally carrying weapons and wounding a person with a knife.

Yadigar Sadigov an activist from the opposition Musavat Party is in for six years on charges of “hooliganism.” And three so-called “Facebook activists,” bloggers Elsever Mursalli, Abdulla Abilov and Omar Mammadov were sentenced to upwards of five years for carrying illegal drugs.

On Jul. 25, Baku police put another Musavat activist, Faradj Karimli, into pre-trial detention for allegedly “advertising psychotropic substances.” All of the accused deny the charges.

The prosecutions follow on the heels of legislative changes that now allow law-enforcement and tax agencies greater scope to audit and fine registered NGOs and ban outright unregistered NGOs’ ability to receive grants.

“Obviously, Baku is following the Russian way – to control the financial flows and, thus, to control the situation,” commented political analyst Elhan Shahinoglu, head of Baku’s Atlas Research Center.

“If the pressure will continue further, it will not be possible to talk about the normal activity of NGO’s in the country,” warned Elchin Abdullayev, a member of a network of NGO’s created to resist perceived intimidation-tactics.

The fact that these events are taking place during Azerbaijan’s six-month chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, the continent’s primary human-rights organ, seems to pose no contradiction for the government.

And the desire for control apparently extends to international groups as well. The Baku office of the Washington, DC-based National Democratic Institute was officially closed on Jul. 2 after the authorities accused it of financing “radical” opposition youth groups.

Like others, Emil Huseynov, director of the Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety, which also faces funding problems, traces that accusation to Baku’s fear of an Azerbaijani EuroMaidan.

“Two months ago, the deputy head of the presidential administration, Novruz Mammadov, openly accused the U.S. of financing a revolution in Ukraine. Therefore, the authorities want to deprive the local civil society of any foreign funding […],” Huseynov charged.

Gulnara Akhundova, a representative of the Danish-run International Media Support NGO, said that the government has refused to register any of the organisation’s grants to local NGO’s and individuals. “Most of our partners in Azerbaijan cannot work. The bank accounts of some of them are frozen,” Akhundova said. No reasons have been given.

According to the pro-opposition Turan news agency, the government also reportedly has expressed a desire to halt activities by the U.S. Peace Corps, which has operated in Azerbaijan since 2003.

President Aliyev, however, insists that Azerbaijan has no problem with civil rights. Last month, speaking at the Jun. 28 opening of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Parliamentary Assembly’s session in Baku, President Aliyev repeated that Azerbaijan is “a democratic country where freedoms of assembly, speech, media and Internet are guaranteed.”

Roughly a week later, speaking to Azerbaijani foreign-ministry officials, he claimed that he had never “heard any criticism of Azerbaijan’s domestic policy at meetings with European leaders.”

If so, it is not for lack of talking.

The OSCE has termed the number of journalists in prison in Azerbaijan “a dangerous trend,” while the European Union on Jul. 17 urged Baku to meet its obligations as “a Member of the Council of Europe.”

A difference in perspective poses an ongoing obstacle, however, noted U.S. Ambassador to Baku Richard Morningstar on Jul. 25, Turan reported.

“The major task of Azerbaijan is to keep stability. But we believe that if people would get more freedom, there will be more stability in Azerbaijan,” Morningstar said.

While Shahinoglu believes that the U.S. and European Union, for all their energy and security interests, will have to continue pressing Baku about its “poor human-rights record,” President Aliyev already has cautioned that the complaints will fall on deaf ears.

“Some people who called themselves opposition or human rights defenders believe that somebody would tell us something and we will obey,” he commented on Jul. 8. “They are naïve people.”

Editor’s note: This article originally appeared on EurasiaNet.org. Shahin Abbasov is a freelance correspondent based in Baku.

Shakhmarli is laid to rest the day after his suicide. Credit: Free LGBT

By Shahin Abbasov
BAKU, Feb 7 2014 (EurasiaNet)

The suicide of a gay rights activist in Azerbaijan is prompting the country’s LGBT community to become more assertive in fighting for civil rights.
Isa Shakhmarly, the head of the Free LGBT non-governmental organisation, died on Jan. 22, using a rainbow flag to hang himself in his Baku apartment. He was 20. In a suicide note, he faulted Azerbaijani society at large for pushing him to take his life. “This world… is not able to hold my colours,” the note stated.“Isa has died, but his fight for equality of all people in Azerbaijan will continue.” -- Javid Nabiyev

The LGBT community until now has kept a relatively low profile in socially conservative Azerbaijan. But Shakhmarly’s death catalysed Azerbaijani activists to take public action. On Jan. 27, over 20 activists held a news conference in Baku to announce plans for a signature drive for fresh legislation to protect sexual minorities, and for an outreach campaign and a hotline that could provide psychological counseling. They also designated Jan. 22 as a “Day of Pride in Azerbaijan’s LGBT Community.”

The Jan. 27 news conference marked the first such event held in Baku by LGBT activists, and took place without incident. A flash-mob event in downtown Baku area to memorialise Shakhmarly also did not experience any disturbances.

In planning their civil rights campaign, LGBT activists intend to capitalise on the fact that Azerbaijan will assume the chairmanship in May of the Council of Europe, one of the continent’s leading human-rights watchdog organisations.

“We will use this opportunity to demand further reforms in this area,” said Javid Nabiyev, a friend of Shakhmarly and the leader of Nefes (Breath), an LGBT non-profit organisation.

On Jan. 24, the Council of Europe’s rapporteur on LGBT rights, Robert Bedron, issued a statement of concern about Shakhmarly’s suicide.

The civil rights campaign in Azerbaijan is fraught with the potential for civil tension to spill over into confrontation, similar to that which occurred in neighbouring Georgia last May. Homosexuality has not been a criminal offence in Azerbaijan since 2000, and the constitution proclaims the “equality of all people.” But most Azerbaijanis are not accepting of public displays of same-sex relationships or identity. Gay clubs do not exist.

“We are not accepted by society — by parents, relatives, neighbours, classmates and so on,” Nabiyev declared at the news conference. “Some people avoid us, while others show open intolerance.”

Shakhmarly’s friends claim that the young man lived alone – an unusual status in this communal society – since his family did not accept his homosexuality. His suicide did not appear an impromptu decision; the day before his death, he reportedly paid off all of his debts.

A member of parliament who asked not to be named suggested that new legislation, as proposed by the LGBT activists, would do little in practice to gain LGBT Azerbaijanis a greater degree of mainstream social acceptance.  “The law cannot change people’s attitudes. Better educational work is needed,” the MP said.

Azerbaijan’s legislation already is in sync “with European [Council of Europe] standards for LGBT-rights’ protection,” asserted the MP, who works on social-welfare issues. “There is no need to approve a new law.”

Parliament will not discuss any bill on the topic, he predicted.

LGBT activists directed their public frustration more at society than at officials, but causes for concern about the government do exist. While several LGBT-rights groups exist in Azerbaijan, none have been registered officially as non-governmental organisations, including Shakhmarly’s Free LGBT group.

Although no official record of violence against sexual minorities exists, police do not always listen to complaints about prejudice or harassment, commented Free LGBT activist Gulnara Azimzade. She said going to the police was “often useless because the police attitude toward us is often humiliating.”

The government has not commented on Shakhmarly’s death or responded to the activists’ remarks contained in his suicide note.  Azerbaijani media reports about Shakhmarly’s suicide and subsequent events have tended to be either sympathetic or neutral. But the mood is different online, where many social-network and forum users, particularly those stressing their Islamic beliefs, have left aggressively homophobic denunciations of Shahkmarly and other members of the LGBT community.

Similar hostility was on display at Shakhmarly’s funeral in the strongly conservative Baku suburb of Bina. Some residents threw stones at Shakhmarly’s friends and their cars as a protest against burying a gay man in the local cemetery. The burial occurred only after a Bina mullah stated that a person’s past cannot prevent his interment.

For LGBT activist Nabiyev and others, thrown stones and name-calling won’t deter them from agitating for their rights. “Isa has died, but his fight for equality of all people in Azerbaijan will continue,” Nabiyev said.

Public anger is building in Azerbaijan over Russia’s rough treatment of an ethnic Azeri accused of murder. The incident likely will scuttle any chance, however remote, that Baku will join the Moscow-led Customs Union.

On Oct. 16, a 31-year-old Azerbaijani citizen, Orhan Zeynalov, was arrested in Moscow for the murder of Russian Egor Sherbakov after an alleged street altercation in the Russian capital’s Biryulevo District."Baku could use the hysteria over the Orhan Zeynalov case as a pretext not to enter the Customs Union." -- analyst Vafa Guluzade

Russian TV channels broadcast reports showing masked police officers beating and humiliating Zeynalov before dragging him, for unknown reasons, into the office of Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokotsev.

Anti-migrant protests followed the Oct. 10 murder, with a mob looting a mall in Moscow and a vegetable warehouse allegedly owned by ethnic Azeris and a place of employment for many labor-migrants. (According to some estimates, one million Azerbaijani migrants are now in Russia; firm numbers do not exist.)

As sensationalist coverage from Russian media outlets gained steam, and “hundreds” of arrests and deportations of Azerbaijani labour migrants began, anger in Azerbaijan reached a quick boil. Even MPs from the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party, usually not ones to criticise Russia, denounced Moscow’s “medieval methods.”

On social networks and in traditional media, some Azerbaijanis argue that, given what is perceived as an unwarranted insult to Azerbaijan’s dignity, the country now has no option but to ally itself more strongly with the West, if “we want ever to become a civilised nation,” as one commentator stated.

While steering clear of such declarations, Ali Hasanov, a longtime senior presidential political advisor who is often seen as the administration’s mood-ring, signaled that the government isn’t going to look the other way.

Terming the Russian police’s behaviour “inadequate” and charging that Russian media is “provoking hatred,” he warned on Oct. 17 that “these actions could have a boomerang effect and create negative conditions for Russian society,” the Turan news agency reported.

The upshot of this anger, whether coming from the Azerbaijani government or public, could have one direct consequence, analysts say – ending any chance for Baku to look favourably on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attempt to unite former Soviet republics into a so-called Eurasian Union. The initiative is widely seen as a Kremlin-branded alternative to the European Union.

“Russia itself created a serious obstacle for” Azerbaijan ever considering membership in the Customs Union, the Eurasian Union’s forerunner, said Baku-based political analyst Vafa Guluzade, a former senior diplomat and presidential foreign-policy advisor.
“Indeed, I think that Baku could use the hysteria over the Orhan Zeynalov case as a pretext not to enter the Customs Union,” said Guluzade, who himself favours closer ties with the European Union.

While Azerbaijan has never indicated publicly that it is considering joining the Russia-led Customs Union, some observers believe that Moscow will start a membership-rush on Baku in the run-up to the European Union’s summit next month in Vilnius, where three former Soviet republics (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) are expected to formalise closer ties with the EU.

In September, Azerbaijan’s western neighbour Armenia announced, after much Russian coercing, that it would join the Customs Union. The decision came despite earlier talks with the EU about an Association Agreement.

Energy-rich Azerbaijan does not have the same economic concerns as does Armenia. Nonetheless, some Azerbaijani media outlets believe that pressure is being brought to bear – including by influential presidential administration chief, Ramiz Mehdiyev. The campaign, the story goes, included stirring up tensions with the United States after Azerbaijan’s Oct. 9 presidential elections.

The government has not commented on these allegations.

Azerbaijan so far has no plans to move toward an Association Agreement with the EU. In Oct. 21 comments to journalists, Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov said that Baku would prefer “individual relations with the EU” rather than a relationship “based on some regional approach.”

Whether or not President Ilham Aliyev will participate in the Vilnius summit is not known, he added.

Many Azerbaijanis believe Moscow is on the lookout for diplomatic pressure points. Russian authorities may be acting under an assumption that, as is the case with labor migrants from Central Asian states, the deportation of guest workers is a political instrument that can exert pressure on Baku, some observers in the Azerbaijani capital suggest.

Yet analyst Zardusht Alizade contends that Azerbaijan’s state of relative economic health means that the deportations “will not become an efficient lever to force Baku to join the Customs Union.”

“It will not cause really serious problems for society in Azerbaijan,” he added.

What the deportations are doing is reinforcing a widely held notion throughout the South Caucasus: Russia looks at its relationships with its southern neighbours not as mutually equitable, but in more colonial terms.

Despite cases of ethnic Azeris murdered by Russians in Moscow, noted Azerbaijani Ambassador to Moscow Polad Bulbuloglu in an Oct. 16 interview with the Russian TV station Dozhd’ (Rain), “[W]e do not organise pogroms and hysteria” against ethnic Russians in Azerbaijan.

An estimated 120,000 ethnic Russians live in Azerbaijan, according to the Russian Community of Azerbaijan, a Diaspora organization.

If Moscow, as a consequence of the uproar over the Biryulevo murder, starts to consider imposing visa requirements on Azerbaijani citizens, Bulbuloglu continued, Baku “is ready to consider a visa regime with Russia.”

Baku is “not insulted” by Moscow, Bulbuloglu added, but it expects “the resolution” of the Sherbakov murder-case to take place “within the framework of the field of law.”

Editor’s note:  Shahin Abbasov is a freelance correspondent based in Baku. This story originally appeared on EurasiaNet.org.

A man who declined to campaign in the weeks before Azerbaijan’s presidential election on Wednesday is already gearing up for his inauguration ceremony.

President Ilham Aliyev. UN Photo/Rick Bajornas

That man, of course, is Ilham Aliyev, who, already after two terms and 10 years in power, is the longest-serving ruler in the South Caucasus. While there are 10 candidates contesting the Oct. 9 election, most voters know in advance that Aliyev is going to win – and it will not even be close.

Critics scoff that the lack of a genuine choice illustrates the country’s lack of democratisation progress. “Overall, the campaign took place under a predetermined result; i.e. the inevitability of Aliyev’s victory,” said political strategist and blogger Bakhtiyar Hajiyev.

Such jabs, however, do not appear to trouble top government officials: even before the polls open, preparations are well underway for Aliyev’s third presidential inauguration.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, an employee at one of Baku’s largest florists told EurasiaNet.org that the government prepaid for flowers for an inauguration ceremony at the Heydar Aliyev Center, a facility in downtown Baku named in honor of Ilham Aliyev’s father, the late President Heydar Aliyev, and not a venue likely to be the choice for any opposition candidate’s inauguration.

That officials are looking past the election is not really that surprising, given that representatives of the pro-presidential Yeni Azerbaijan Party (YAP) announced early on during the campaign cycle that Aliyev would not run a formal campaign because “he doesn’t need it.”

The 51-year-old Aliyev has not taken part in any televised debates (delegating the task instead to senior YAP members), has not traveled outside of Baku to meet with voters and has not held a single campaign rally. He has not even made a campaign promise.

Relying on a slogan, “Davam,” or “Continue” in English, Aliyev’s PR machine has stressed the economic boom that Azerbaijan has experienced during his decade in power. True to this motto, the president at an Oct. 7 cabinet meeting spoke about his administration’s regional development plans for 2014 as a fait accompli.

Elhan Shahinoglu, head of the Atlas Research Centre, a Baku think-tank, said that in a genuinely “democratic country, such behaviour would be considered disrespectful to voters, but, in Azerbaijan, it will go unnoticed.”

A random survey of 20 people in downtown Baku largely confirmed that perception; most expressed support for President Aliyev, who, in the words of a shoe-cleaner, Fuad, is seen as having “brought success to Azerbaijan.” Many others appeared afraid to talk, scurrying away when they saw a microphone.

Of Aliyev’s nine opponents, only two – historian Jamil Hasanli, a former MP backed by the coalition National Council of Democratic Forces, and Umid (Hope) Party parliamentarian Igbal Agazade – have criticised Aliyev’s administration.

Having stumped in the regions and staged three rallies in Baku, the 61-year-old Hasanli has run perhaps the most active campaign, built around the slogan “Enough.” He accuses Aliyev of “ruling the country like his personal business holding” and routinely violating human rights.

Some of those surveyed by EurasiaNet.org like Hasanli as “a different face.” And unlike the president, Hasanli has a long list of promises: the unconditional release of all political prisoners; measures to protect property rights and to guarantee independence of the courts; and promotion of freedom of religion, including the permission for observant Muslim women to wear hijab where desired.

He has made a few populist-sounding pitches, too: state subsidies for agriculture and the government payback of small-scale personal loans; a two-fold decrease in utility prices and a two- to three-fold increase in pensions and salaries for teachers and doctors.

But hindered by a brief, 22-day-long official campaign period and limited finances for opposition candidates, Hasanli’s message has not had the time or means to resonate widely. Turnout at Hasanli’s campaign events, sometimes hampered by police interference, has not been above several thousand people.

The only other candidate to run a relatively active campaign, Igbal Agazade, has been cautious in criticising the government and has never made a direct accusation against President Aliyev. Offering eight different programmes for people ranging from pensioners to the unemployed, he opted for the campaign slogan “Change Your Life.”

Voters increasingly do not appear to think that they can, in fact, change their lives by heading to the polls, commented Shahinoglu. “People’s belief in the possibility of changes via elections has seriously declined due to regular falsifications in the past,” he said. “Political apathy is widespread and people care [more] about their daily needs.”

While running an outspoken candidate, the National Council remains weak and handicapped by internal divisions over their choice of candidate and strategy, he added. “Therefore, even the so-called protest electorate is reluctant to support it.”

The remaining candidates either have praised the government and attacked Hasanli and the National Council (non-partisan MP Zahid Oruj; the United Azerbaijan Popular Front Party’s Gudrat Hasanguliyev; the National Revival Movement Party’s Faraj Guliyev; Social-Democrat Party leader Araz Alizade, and Modern Musavat Party chief Khafiz Hajiyev) or have been passive (the Justice Party’s Ilyas Ismayilov, Democrat Party Chairperson Sardar Mammadov).

Monitors from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights have criticised the overall campaign, which ended on Oct. 8, for “a lack of thorough debate” and campaign platforms, and for the state-controlled media’s heavy coverage of President Aliyev in comparison with other candidates.

Opposition activists and journalists have come in for a disproportionate share of police attention, ranging from the arrests and beatings of National Council activists to charges of alleged drug trafficking against one opposition journalist, Parviz Hashimli.

In addition, 10 activists from the opposition NIDA youth movement face criminal charges for allegedly preparing a coup and making Molotov cocktails. Meanwhile, a leading opposition figure, Ilgar Mammadov, remains in prison on charges of having allegedly incited popular unrest earlier this year.

YAP representatives assert that the government has created a “free atmosphere and all the necessary conditions for candidates’ campaign activities.”

But some voters who have already decided to stay away from the polls are not buying it. “They get elected by themselves,” scoffed Baku high-school math teacher Khafiz Mustafayev in reference to the government. “That’s it.”

Editor’s note:  Shahin Abbasov is a freelance correspondent based in Baku. This story originally appeared on EurasiaNet.org.

There are three weeks to go before energy-rich Azerbaijan’s presidential vote on Oct. 9, but a race is nowhere to be seen. No political ads adorn the capital, Baku, and no candidate spots are running on private TV channels. The incumbent strongman, 51-year-old Ilham Aliyev, is not even bothering to run an active campaign.

More than any previous election, Azerbaijanis see this vote as an exercise in futility: the foregone conclusion before anyone goes to the polls is that Aliyev, in office since 2003, is assured of a third, five-year term.

“Many people are dissatisfied with inequality in the distribution of oil revenues, a lack of justice and access to good education and healthcare, but the opposition has failed to turn that into a really massive protest movement,” commented Baku-based political analyst Togrul Juvarly.

At a Sep. 16 news conference in Baku, the main opposition candidate, Jamil Hasanli, a 61-year-old former MP and historian, focused more on the “unequal [campaign] conditions for candidates” and the likelihood of alleged “widespread vote- rigging in favour of Ilham Aliyev” than on his own policy positions. Hasanli receives backing from the National Council of Democratic Forces, a coalition of opposition parties and groups.

“Jamil Hasanli is a respected and decent person, but, unfortunately, the opposition has failed to prepare for the campaign well,” said analyst Elhan Shahinoglu, director of Baku’s Atlas Research Center.

The National Council’s original nominee was celebrity filmmaker Rustam Ibragimbekov. But his candidacy was rejected by election officials on the grounds that Ibragimbekov is a dual national of Russia and Azerbaijan. The prolonged struggle over whether Ibragimbekov could run or not cost the opposition valuable time, noted Juvarly.

The only real unanswered questions now concern the accuracy of the official election results, as well as turnout totals, drily observed Shahinoglu. Western election monitors, it is worth noting, have never evaluated an Azerbaijani election to be free-and-fair.

While the race “is almost invisible for the general public,” according to Anar Mammadli, director of the Baku-based Election Monitoring and Teaching Democracy Center, it is not without a few elements of drama. On Sept. 17, for example, wolves in eastern Azerbaijan ran off with 20 sheep belonging to a shepherd busy watching an election debate on public television, Vesti.az reported.

Ordinary residents of Baku do not appear to share the shepherd’s interest in politics. Only one out of 12 people interviewed recently at random by EurasiaNet.org had heard of any candidates other than President Aliyev.

Aside from Aliyev and Hasanli, the race includes five MPs: Igbal Agazade (Umid (Hope) Party), non-partisan Zahid Oruj, Ilyas Ismayilov (Adalat [Justice] Party), Gudrat Hasanguliyev (United Azerbaijan Popular Front Party) and Faraj Guliyev (National Revival Movement Party).

There are also two low-profile opposition figures vying for the presidency – Social-Democrat Party leader Araz Alizade and Democrat Party chairperson Sardar Mammadov. In addition, the pro-government Modern Musavat Party chief, Khafiz Hajiyev, has presidential aspirations.

Public indifference about the election appears to extend to regional centres that have experienced notable anti-government disturbances. In Guba, a city 180 kilometres to the north where a 2012 riot led to the dismissal of the local, presidentially-appointed government head, “no campaigning or any particular sign” of the presidential election exists, commented Ramin Mahmudov, a local freelance journalist.

The same studied calm prevails in Ismyaili, where similar protests this January led to a series of arrests, including of intended opposition presidential candidate, Ilgar Mammadov.

In both places, voters, appeased by changes in local officials, do not appear inclined to stick their necks out again to demand change.

That mood, however, “will not contribute to free and fair elections,” argued Mammadli, whose election watchdog is conducting long-term monitoring of 89 of Azerbaijan’s 125 constituencies, most outside Baku.

As in elections past, government officials appear to be making free use of huge administrative, financial and other resources, along with media, to tilt the political playing field heavily in favour of President Aliyev, said Juvarly, the analyst.

Representatives of Aliyev’s ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party have announced that the president will not run a full-fledged campaign because “he does not need it.” Nonetheless, he has visited over 10 regions in the last several weeks to meet with locals, as well as open new manufacturing plants, hospitals and schools. In addition, he has signed executive orders raising salaries for almost all government employees by roughly 10 percent and pensions by 15 percent.

The National Council, along with other opposition hopefuls, had intended to campaign actively in the regions, where socio-economic conditions are worse than in the capital. But as in the case in Baku, sites designated by election officials for campaign rallies have been restricted to the outskirts of regional population hubs.

A lack of campaign hoopla is conspicuously absent from television. Not a single privately run TV or radio station has registered with the Central Election Commission to broadcast paid campaign ads or talk shows and debates about the elections. On-air opportunities for candidates to express their views are limited to Public Television, which is obliged by law to provide each candidate with a total of 18 minutes of free advertising and the possibility to take part in several, hour-long debates. And unlike past elections, foreign journalists are nowhere to be seen in Baku.

Meanwhile, in sync with the start of the school year, discussions on Azerbaijan’s most popular social network, Facebook (with more than one million registered Azerbaijan-based users), tend to focus on education issues rather than on the upcoming presidential elections.

Editor’s note: Shahin Abbasov is a freelance correspondent based in Baku. This story originally appeared on EurasiaNet.org.

In Azerbaijan, opposition journalists have long been beaten, blackmailed and some even killed. But now, it appears a few are being bought.

When it comes to media freedom, President Ilham Aliyev’s administration has a dismal record. In recent years, the government has tended to resort to the stick to go after journalists who expose official misdeeds, or otherwise vex people in high places.

With a presidential election fast approaching in early October, however, authorities have evidently opted to offer a few carrots in the hopes of quelling critical news coverage

In late July, the government opened an apartment building with 155 one-, two- and three-bedroom units to be occupied exclusively by working journalists and their families. The 17-story structure, built at a cost of five million manats (6.37 million dollars), is located in the Baku suburb of Bibi Heybat.

Many of the takers are affiliated with pro-government media outlets and information entities. But a few new tenants work for opposition-oriented and independently owned outlets.

President Aliyev clearly hopes the apartment building’s opening will help soften his administration’s troubled democratisation image. The fact that “journalists of various media outlets and people with different political views have received apartments … shows the absence of any political discrimination in Azerbaijan,” Aliyev claimed.

Some journalists contend that the offer of free housing is a thinly disguised government bribe, designed to influence media coverage.

“Authorities have finally turned the fundamental right to freedom of speech into the right for freedom from paying rent for an apartment,” quipped former newspaper editor Shahveled Chobanoglu in a Contact.az op-ed.

Two employees of the government’s most outspoken media critic, the newspaper Azadliq (Freedom), a periodical associated with the opposition Popular Front Party of the Azerbaijani Republic, applied for and were given free apartments in the Bibi Heybat building. Several employees from other opposition newspapers, Yeni Musavat (linked to the Musavat Party) and Bizim Yol (Our Way), are also tenants.

Azadliq Editor-in-Chief Rahim Hajiyev told EurasiaNet.org that, despite his strong objections to the project, he did not refuse when two employees “really in need” informed him that they wanted to apply for the flats.

“They asked me and I just could not say no because the newspaper cannot fulfill their financial needs,” Hajiyev said. He underlined though, that he is not comfortable with their decision.

“I agree, it is a vicious practice to take grants and apartments from the government. I cannot say we are right,” he said. The paper also receives revenue from the government’s Media Support Fund.

“We are working in very tough conditions, deprived of any foreign donor support and advertising revenues and have to survive,” Hajiyev added.

Both Hajiyev and the opposition journalists who live in the building insisted that the acceptance of a government-funded apartment will not influence the way either the journalists in question, or the outlets they work for, carry out their watchdog functions.

The Turan news agency was the only privately owned, pro-opposition outlet that refused – despite several supposed invitations from the government – to seek any apartments for its employees.

One Turan reporter, Huquq Salmanov, suggested that the government seemed more interested in trying to compromise the journalistic integrity of opposition media outlets, than in helping any specific journalist in need.

When Salmanov, whose family faces acute economic hardship, applied for an apartment as an individual, officials told him he could “only get an apartment as a Turan correspondent”.

“They wanted to have Turan in the list of recipients,” Salmanov claimed. “I did not want to play these games, and refused.”

Media Support Fund Director Vugar Aliyev was not available for comment to EurasiaNet.org.

Salmanov is far from the only journalist struggling to make ends meet in Azerbaijan. On average, monthly salaries for broadcast, online or print journalists amount to just 450 manats (574 dollars), while the typical rent for a flat in central Baku can easily be double that, if not more. The comparatively high cost of living in Baku is what drove most, if not all the opposition journalists to apply for a place in the Bibi Heybat building.

“It is not possible to have a decent life with our salaries when you need to rent a place to live,” said one of the opposition journalists/ Bibi Heybat residents, a married father of two children. He spoke on condition of anonymity.

The opposition journalist saw no conflict of interest in his actions. “The building was not built with Ilham Aliyev’s personal money,” he reasoned. “I received the apartment from the state and, therefore, do not feel under an obligation” to the Aliyev administration.

In general, the scramble for apartments seemed to highlight a shortcoming in Azerbaijani journalists’ understanding of what constitutes a conflict of interest.

Another opposition journalist, Aygun Muradkhanly, a Yeni-Musavat correspondent, believes the government has an obligation to financially assist journalists. When Muradkhanly’s name was removed from the list of apartment recipients a few days before the building’s opening, she appealed to President Aliyev.

“I have 22 years of experience and have rented an apartment for the last 14 years,” she told to EurasiaNet.org. “I also deserved an apartment.”

Such sentiments harken back to the Soviet era, when the state provided apartments and other perks to members of the creative class who toed the government line. Rejected from the first media building, Muradkhanly expressed gratitude that the presidential administration subsequently promised her an apartment in the future.

Meanwhile, at least one recipient of a Bibi Heybat apartment has acknowledged owning another flat, a violation of the eligibility requirements. Rashad Majid, editor-in-chief of the privately owned 525-ci Gazet, admitted in an editorial that he has an apartment in Baku, but sees nothing wrong with getting a new one for free.

“I am in journalism for many years and deserved it. My son, who is also a journalist, will live in the new apartment,” Majid wrote. “I want the government to give me two more apartments for my two other sons.”

Such apartments will soon be on offer. In late July, President Aliyev allocated another five million manats for the construction of a second media residence, next to the first. Construction already has begun.

Editor’s note:  Shahin Abbasov is a freelance correspondent based in Baku. This story originally appeared on EurasiaNet.org.

Democratisation activists in Azerbaijan are increasingly pessimistic about what they describe as the West’s lack of support for reform and the protection of basic rights in the energy-rich South Caucasus country.

The soured mood follows a new wave of arrests of youth activists, the closure of the Western-funded Free Thought University, an alternative education centre, and a scandal over offshore companies reportedly linked to President Ilham Aliyev’s family."The understanding that changes have to come from the inside is growing." -- Baku-based blogger Ali Novruzov

Although the arrests and university closure have sparked statements of concern from international human rights activists and Western governments, the alleged offshore activities have not.

An October 2012 decision by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) not to adopt a resolution calling for the release of alleged Azerbaijani political prisoners, along with a report about Baku’s alleged use of “caviar diplomacy” to woo PACE deputies added to the unease.

Government critics charge that the lack of forceful responses from Western governments and organisations – including the United States, the European Union as well as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe, the continent’s top human-rights monitor — undermines their role as a catalyst for democratic change.

“It is clear that there is little, if any, support for the Azerbaijani pro-democracy movement in the West,” charged Murad Gassanly, director of the London-based Azerbaijan Democratic Association-UK, a pro-opposition pressure group. “The U.S. and Europe have considerable interest in preserving the status quo in Azerbaijan.”

Oil fields and gas pipelines to Europe explain that position in part, as do discussions about withdrawing North Atlantic Treaty Organisation troops from Afghanistan via Azerbaijan, he added.

“All this means that Western capitals are not keen to antagonise Aliyev in this presidential election year and perhaps even beyond that, in the 2015 parliamentary elections.”

One of the Aliyev administration’s most vocal critics, formerly jailed blogger Emin Milli, went a step further, recently claiming on Facebook that the “[s]ilence of [the] international community at this moment is a crime!”

An opposition leader, however, cautions that Azerbaijani activists’ “idealistic approach to politics” is a source of their disappointment in the West.

“It is naïve to expect that the international community will solve the democratisation problems of Azerbaijan,” commented Erkin Gadirli, a leader of the Republican Alternative (REAL) group. “Each country tries to satisfy its own interests, then the interests of its allies and only then, all remaining issues.”

During a Mar. 13-14 visit to Baku, the British Foreign Office’s permanent undersecretary, Simon Fraser, the senior policy advisor to British Foreign Minister William Hague, gave a sense of how the United Kingdom views this issue.

In comments at the Azerbaijani Diplomatic Academy, Fraser claimed that the British government has always supported human rights in Azerbaijan, but added that “the UK has also other joint interests with Azerbaijan, including the economy and energy sectors.”

Such a duality of interests should come as no surprise, underlined longtime opposition leader Ali Kerimli, head of the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan.

“I’ve said it many times … they [Western governments] have their own interests and follow their own policies,” Kerimli said. “Therefore, we should rely on our own resources … in order not to get disappointed later.”

Ironically, President Aliyev also recently called for self-reliance in political affairs. At an Apr. 14 cabinet meeting, Aliyev repeated the familiar theme that Azerbaijanis “know better how to rule our country.” and “do not want interference [by foreign powers].”

Where opposition to the government is concerned, Baku-based blogger Ali Novruzov, an activist for the OL youth group and former coordinator of the Free Thought University, believes that self-reliance already has begun.

Organisers of recent unsanctioned protests in Baku against the non-combat deaths of Azerbaijani soldiers, or the January crackdown on protesters in the regional town of Ismayilli targeted locals rather than the international community with their message, noted Novruzov, whose OL group was among the events’ participants. A Facebook-based campaign was organised to raise funds to pay the fines of those protesters detained, he added.

“It means that the understanding that changes have to come from the inside is growing,” Novruzov said.

Some political analysts reject the notion that the West isn’t responding to civil or human-rights crackdowns. An Apr. 17-18 visit to Baku by U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Melia “sent several important messages to the Azerbaijani government concerning democratisation issues,” noted political analyst Elkhan Shahinoglu, head of the Atlas research centre, a Baku-based think-tank.

Nonetheless, the investigation of the National Democratic Institute, a Washington, DC-based democratisation entity, and the loss of radio frequencies for the U.S.-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America signaled that Washington has “restricted levers with which to pressure Baku,” Shahinoglu added.

Disappointment with the West for its perceived passiveness toward alleged government abuses does not necessarily mean that reform activists are now looking elsewhere for inspiration.

“Most of the youth organisations and opposition parties aim for integration into Europe and the West,” Novruzov said. “The purpose is to achieve democratic change in Azerbaijan and it is not going to change.”

*This story originally appeared on EurasiaNet.org.

(EurasiaNet) – Democratisation activists in Azerbaijan are increasingly pessimistic about what they describe as the West’s lack of support for reform and the protection of basic rights in the energy-rich South Caucasus country.

The soured mood follows a new wave of arrests of youth activists, the closure of the Western-funded Free Thought University, an alternative education centre, and a scandal over offshore companies reportedly linked to President Ilham Aliyev’s family. Although the arrests and university closure have sparked statements of concern from international human rights activists and Western governments, the alleged offshore activities have not.

An October 2012 decision by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) not to adopt a resolution calling for the release of alleged Azerbaijani political prisoners, along with a report about Baku’s alleged use of “caviar diplomacy” to woo PACE deputies added to the unease.

Government critics charge that the lack of forceful responses from Western governments and organisations – including the United States, the European Union as well as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe, the continent’s top human-rights monitor — undermines their role as a catalyst for democratic change.

“It is clear that there is little, if any, support for the Azerbaijani pro-democracy movement in the West,” charged Murad Gassanly, director of the London-based Azerbaijan Democratic Association-UK, a pro-opposition pressure group. “The U.S. and Europe have considerable interest in preserving the status quo in Azerbaijan.”

Oil fields and gas pipelines to Europe explain that position in part, as do discussions about withdrawing North Atlantic Treaty Organisation troops from Afghanistan via Azerbaijan, he added. “All this means that Western capitals are not keen to antagonise Aliyev in this presidential election year and perhaps even beyond that, in the 2015 parliamentary elections.”

One of the Aliyev administration’s most vocal critics, formerly jailed blogger Emin Milli, went a step further, recently claiming on Facebook that the “[s]ilence of [the] international community at this moment is a crime!”

An opposition leader, however, cautions that Azerbaijani activists’ “idealistic approach to politics” is a source of their disappointment in the West. “It is naïve to expect that the international community will solve the democratisation problems of Azerbaijan,” commented Erkin Gadirli, a leader of the Republican Alternative (REAL) group. “Each country tries to satisfy its own interests, then the interests of its allies and only then, all remaining issues.”

During a Mar. 13-14 visit to Baku, the British Foreign Office’s permanent undersecretary, Simon Fraser, the senior policy advisor to British Foreign Minister William Hague, gave a sense of how the United Kingdom views this issue.

In comments at the Azerbaijani Diplomatic Academy, Fraser claimed that the British government has always supported human rights in Azerbaijan, but added that “the UK has also other joint interests with Azerbaijan, including the economy and energy sectors.” Such a duality of interests should come as no surprise, underlined longtime opposition leader Ali Kerimli, head of the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan.

“I’ve said it many times … they [Western governments] have their own interests and follow their own policies,” Kerimli said. “Therefore, we should rely on our own resources … in order not to get disappointed later.” Ironically, President Aliyev also recently called for self-reliance in political affairs. At an Apr. 14 cabinet meeting, Aliyev repeated the familiar theme that Azerbaijanis “know better how to rule our country.” and “do not want interference [by foreign powers].”

Where opposition to the government is concerned, Baku-based blogger Ali Novruzov, an activist for the OL youth group and former coordinator of the Free Thought University, believes that self-reliance already has begun.

Organisers of recent unsanctioned protests in Baku against the non-combat deaths of Azerbaijani soldiers, or the January crackdown on protesters in the regional town of Ismayilli targeted locals rather than the international community with their message, noted Novruzov, whose OL group was among the events’ participants. A Facebook-based campaign was organised to raise funds to pay the fines of those protesters detained, he added.

“It means that the understanding that changes have to come from the inside is growing,” Novruzov said.

Some political analysts reject the notion that the West isn’t responding to civil or human-rights crackdowns. An Apr. 17-18 visit to Baku by U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Melia “sent several important messages to the Azerbaijani government concerning democratisation issues,” noted political analyst Elkhan Shahinoglu, head of the Atlas research centre, a Baku-based think-tank.

Nonetheless, the investigation of the National Democratic Institute, a Washington, DC-based democratisation entity, and the loss of radio frequencies for the U.S.-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America signaled that Washington has “restricted levers with which to pressure Baku,” Shahinoglu added.

Disappointment with the West for its perceived passiveness toward alleged government abuses does not necessarily mean that reform activists are now looking elsewhere for inspiration. “Most of the youth organisations and opposition parties aim for integration into Europe and the West,” Novruzov said. “The purpose is to achieve democratic change in Azerbaijan and it is not going to change.”

*This story originally appeared on EurasiaNet.org.

Azerbaijan in late April crossed a self-imposed “red line” in its relations with southern neighbour Iran by dispatching Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov on a visit to Israel, Tehran’s arch-foe. Reasons for the timing of the move are not clear, but, so far, Tehran appears to be biding its time with a response.

While Israel and Azerbaijan – like Iran, a majority Shi’a Muslim country – have maintained strong diplomatic, economic and military ties for years, Mammadyarov’s Apr. 21-24 trip was the first time an Azerbaijani cabinet member had made such a high-profile visit to Tel Aviv.

With one eye seemingly on Iran, the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry avoided attaching the word “official” to the visit. Instead, it cast the ministerial mission as undertaken within the context of Azerbaijan’s status as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.

Even so, the trip had all the markings of an official visit. No documents were signed, but Mammadyarov met with Israeli President Shimon Peres, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defence Minister Moshe Yaalon, among other senior officials. A statement that Baku would consider opening an embassy in Israel concluded the mission.

“It is a matter of time,” Mammadyarov said at an Apr. 26 news conference in Baku.

A few days later, it was time to offer explanations to Iran.

On Apr. 29, Azerbaijani National Security Council Secretary Ramiz Mehdiyev, who doubles as President Ilham Aliyev’s influential administration chief, flew to Tehran to meet with Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad and other senior Iranian officials. Although the government did not specify the agenda, many Azerbaijanis believe the trip was taken to soothe an angry Tehran.

“Mehdiyev went to assure Iran that Baku is not going to host Israeli military bases or provide its territory for attacks on Iran” in connection with the international campaign to stop Iranian development of a nuclear weapon, commented Baku-based political analyst Zardusht Alizade, a Middle East specialist.

Reports in U.S. news media outlets in 2012 made just that assertion, though they could not be confirmed.

Relations between Iran and Azerbaijan have never been rosy, but Baku previously has been careful not to push its powerful neighbour’s patience to the breaking point.

At least since the administration of the late President Heydar Aliyev (1993-2003), for instance, Tehran’s enmity toward the Israeli government fostered an unofficial taboo on Azerbaijani officials visiting Israel. Against that backdrop, Vafa Guladze, a former presidential foreign-policy adviser, deemed Mammadyarov’s excursion “revolutionary”, the Turan news agency reported.

A reason why Baku would want to take a “revolutionary” step at this time remains unclear. Some speculate that an Iranian call for the annexation of Azerbaijan, once under Persian control, raised Baku’s ire.

Alizade, though, believes that the visit to Israel has been in the works for a long time. “Relations in economic, military and diplomatic areas are so broad and have reached such a high level that it is time for actions,” he said.

Azerbaijan supplies up to 40 percent of Israel’s oil needs, or about 21.7 million barrels, according to official data; foreign trade turnover between the two countries stands at four billion dollars.

The countries also are actively cooperating on weaponry and in other military-equipment areas. In 2012, Azerbaijan bought 1.6 billion dollars worth of Israeli arms. Israeli defence firms also are advising the Azerbaijani defence-industry ministry on an Azerbaijani-made weapon.

Conceivably with those activities in mind, Mammadyarov emphasised during his talks with Israeli President Peres that Baku has no interest in the use of Azerbaijani territory “for military actions against Iran”, The Jerusalem Post reported.

Baku also subsequently announced that, in conjunction with the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation, it will host in June an international donor conference for the Palestinian territories, whose statehood Iran aggressively supports.

Referring to Iran as “the greatest threat to the region,” Peres did not hide that the Islamic Republic had been among the topics on the table with Mammadyarov.

If Tehran had been looking for an opportunity to smack Azerbaijan down to size, it has not taken it yet: Iranian officials have not reacted publicly to Mammadyarov’s Israel trip.

How Mehdiyev described Mammadyarov’s trip to his Iranian hosts also is unknown, although Iran’s state-run IRNA news agency reported that Ahmadinejad blamed “Zionist and US intelligenc[e]” for “trying to weaken our relations.”

Playing to his Iranian audience, the Azerbaijani national security chief blamed the West for “taking some steps which violate peace and stability in Azerbaijan,” IRNA reported – an apparent reference to a series of unsanctioned anti-government protests earlier this year.

With the Azerbaijani courtesy call over, Baku analysts do not expect more to come from Tehran about Mammadyarov’s Israeli visit. Distracted by other concerns, Iran would gain little by pushing back against Azerbaijan, they believe.

“Relations between Baku and Tehran are already very bad. I do not think that visit to Israel will bring any real changes,” Rauf Mirkadirov, a political columnist for the Russian-language Zerkalo newspaper, commented to the Vesti.az news portal.

“They do not have any options,” agreed Alizade, in reference to Iran. “What can they do?”

*This story originally appeared on EurasiaNet.org.

Azerbaijani officials appear to buy into the idea that taxation policy can be an effective way of managing the environment.

While environmentalists are generally supportive of a government idea to introduce a “green tax” on companies, some experts voice concern that such a provision would be prone to manipulation.

Despite various clean-up efforts over the past decade, Azerbaijan wins few international accolades for the state of its environment. Problems range from pollution of the Caspian-Sea’s coastline to large-scale deforestation and inadequate wastewater treatment facilities.

Azerbaijani environmental specialists name the oil-and-gas sector, petrochemical factories, large-scale corporate farms, and cement and concrete plants as among the worst polluters.

The government, with international assistance, has addressed some of the damage. And now officials plan to do more via a “green tax” on companies that pollute.

“Taxes related to the environment are one of the most effective tools for economic and environmental policies,” wrote Akif Musayev, head of the Ministry of Taxes’ Department of Tax Policy and Strategic Research, in an August 2012 article in the ministry’s Vergiler (Taxes) newspaper.

The tax would be paid directly into the state budget rather than into the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources’ State Environmental Protection Fund. As yet, other details about the tax are not known. Musayev could not be reached for additional comment.

Azerbaijani environmental activists welcome the idea. With Azerbaijan’s industrial output regaining some muscle and gas production on the rise, they argue that it is time to do more to encourage Azerbaijani companies to use cleaner technologies and to develop a “green economy.”

Under current Azerbaijani regulations, each year companies pay fees of between 100 and 400 manats (about 127.39 to 509.55 dollars) per tonne of “allowable” atmospheric or water pollution into the Ministry of Environment’s off-budget State Environmental Protection Fund.

Fines for exceeding pollution quotas, based on annual inspections, can range from 75,000 to 100,000 manats (about 9,554 to 12,739 dollars).

In 2011, the Fund collected 1.16 million manats (1.478 million dollars) through such means, according to the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources. The monies are intended for various environmental-protection measures, ranging from water-purification stations along the Caspian Sea to woodland conservation.

No public monitoring exists for the fund, and its management structure has a reputation for being opaque. Data on particular fines paid by companies, for example, is not publicly known.

The State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR), one likely candidate, claims that in late 2011 its oil & gas production department was fined 21,420 manats (about 25,000 dollars) and its Absheron-peninsula drilling department paid 12,490 manats (about 15,000 dollars) for alleged excessive pollution.

Foreign energy companies have not been ignored, although they are fined at far lower rates. In 2011, the environmental ministry fined the foreign oil consortium Garasu about 9,550 dollars and the Lukoil-Azerbaijan joint stock company 1,116 dollars over their allegedly polluting practices.

One economist warns that, as with environmental regulations in Russia and in Kazakhstan, a “green tax” could be manipulated to defend government interests against foreign energy companies, or against other companies seen as threatening the interests of government-friendly corporations.

On Oct. 11, for the first time in public, President Ilham Aliyev criticised BP for missing badly on projected oil production targets; a miscalculation that cost state budgets eight billion dollars, according to the president. Aliyev indicated that “serious measures” would be taken in response to the shortfall. Whether or not such measures would include “green pressure” is impossible to tell.

A Ministry of Taxes official, who asked not to be named, told EurasiaNet.org that, for now, the “green taxes” are just an idea, and that changes to legislation are not expected soon.

Environmental expert Samir Isayev said the challenge for Azerbaijan’s environment goes beyond tougher taxes on pollution. The country requires a “complex fiscal policy” that would mean that companies that use environmental-friendly technologies “should be freed from customs duties and some taxes for the import of new, cleaner equipment,” he said. “This would really lead to both a better environment and more competitive industries; in other words, to economic growth.”

Farida Huseynova, chairperson of the Greens Movement, a Baku-based non-governmental group, agreed. “Those companies which comply with environmental standards and introduce more ‘green’ technologies should get tax benefits from the government,” Huseynova said.

For now, local observers can only wait and see how far Azerbaijan’s “green tax” will go, or whether it will ever materialise at all.

“(It) is too early to make assumptions,” said Baku-based economist Natik Jafarly.

*Editor’s note: Shahin Abbasov is a freelance reporter based in Baku.

This story was originally published on Eurasianet.org.

It may look like just a 27-year-old radar station in a remote stretch of northern Azerbaijan. But, in reality, Gabala is all about Baku’s desire to assert its own weight as a regional power – even against its onetime patron, Russia.

With less than five months to go before the Dec. 24 expiration of Russia’s lease on Gabala, capable of monitoring missile launches throughout the Middle East, Iran and Southeast Asia, Azerbaijan shows no sign of eagerness to have the Russian military stick around for another 10 years.

Talks about a new lease started last June, and Baku’s asking price has increased steadily ever since — first, from seven million dollars to 15 million per year; then, in early 2012, to 150 million and, most recently, to 300 million dollars per year.

Russian media reports about alleged Kremlin plans to take up an offer from Armenia to host a radar station have not caused Baku to budge. In late May, an anonymous source in the Russian government termed Azerbaijan’s approach “non-constructive”, the Russian news agency Interfax reported. For 300 million dollars per year, Moscow could just as easily build two new radar stations, the source added.

At a June briefing, presidential administration spokesperson Elnur Aslanov countered that Baku’s proposals for renewing the lease “reflect today’s realities”.

“One should not forget that, currently, Azerbaijan is the most developed country in the region,” Aslanov huffed.

With an estimated Gross Domestic Product per capita of 10,300 dollars, the hydrocarbon-rich country does, indeed, outrank neighbours Georgia and Armenia. Of late, as its energy wealth has grown, Baku has started to flex its foreign-policy muscles, pushing back against Iran, as well as Turkey, the United States and Russia.

With that status in mind, some Azerbaijani politicians look on Gabala as an historic relic. In a May 24 interview with News.az, pro-government MP Asim Mollazade, a member of parliament’s international relations committee, asserted that neither Russia nor Azerbaijan need the radar station, and that the facility should instead be turned into “the Dinosaur Museum of the Cold War”.

Ultimately, as Russia’s only military footprint in Azerbaijan, the base for Moscow carries more diplomatic than military value, commented independent parliamentarian Rasim Musabekov. A new radar station at Armavir, in the southern Russian region of Krasnodar, can perform the same functions as Gabala, he added.

Senior Russian military officials have said the same.

But if Moscow still wants Gabala as a link to the past, when Russian influence reigned supreme in the Caucasus, it’s going to have to pay, Azerbaijani analysts say. The Kremlin’s 49-year lease on an army base in Armenia, and its failure to use its influence with Yerevan to mediate a resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have left the Azerbaijani government in no mood to make nice with Moscow.

Meanwhile, rents for military bases in other parts of the former Soviet Union are far higher, and Baku has taken notice.

In Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan announced earlier in July that it would raise the rent on three of Russia’s four military bases when Moscow’s lease expires in 2014. A figure was not named, but Bishkek wants payment in cash and pegged to inflation.

The United States pays Kyrgyzstan 150 million dollars per year for the right to use the Manas airfield – a land plot much smaller than Gabala’s 2,500 hectares, noted economist Natik Jafarly.

Against that backdrop, asking 300 million dollars per year for Gabala is “fair”, he contended, describing the current annual rent of seven million as “very low”.

“Gabala region has recently turned into one of the most popular tourist destinations in Azerbaijan,” Jafarly said. “Land prices there have been constantly increasing (on average, 2,500 -3,000 dollars for a 10-x-10-square-metre plot), and it would be more profitable (for Azerbaijan) to develop tourist infrastructure to replace the radar station.”

Retired Col. Uzeir Jafarov, a onetime senior defence ministry official, believes Russia will never agree to pay 300 million dollars for Gabala.

“The station is out of date and is not worth such an amount,” said Jafarov, a military expert for the Milaz.info military news portal. “Baku setting such a condition (for lease renewal) shows that Azerbaijan does not want to prolong the lease.”

Already, the Kremlin appears to be preparing for withdrawal. Locals in Gabala confirmed to EurasiaNet.org a Jun. 18 report in the Russian daily Izvestia that an on-site Russian hospital, school and kindergarten have closed, and that soldiers’ families have moved out of the area.

*Editor’s note: Shahin Abbasov is a freelance reporter based in Baku.

This story originally appeared on EurasiaNet.org.

As the showdown over Iranian nuclear ambitions intensifies, political analysts in Azerbaijan are urging the government to deepen the country’s ties with Israeli and Western security structures.

Officials in Baku have not commented on how Azerbaijan intends to respond to the rising global tension connected to the Iranian nuclear issue. But a series of arrests suggests President Ilham Aliyev’s administration is cracking down on sources of perceived Iranian influence in Azerbaijan.

Long an anomaly in the Muslim world, Israeli-Azerbaijani ties run the gamut from telecommunications investments to sales of military technology and equipment and oil. On Feb. 11, those ties acquired a new public dimension with a Times of London article that claimed that Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, has a substantial presence in Azerbaijan to gather intelligence about Iran.

Tehran took matters a step further and claimed that Mossad operatives in Azerbaijan allegedly worked out plans to assassinate Iranian nuclear scientists – a claim Baku angrily denounced on Feb. 13 as “a lie, fabrication and libel”. Tehran seemed to raise the stakes on Feb. 21, when Baku announced that an Iranian helicopter had violated Azerbaijani airspace at the border town of Astara, the Turan news agency reported.

Such incidents should not intimidate Azerbaijan into backing away from Israel, said Vafa Guluzade, a former presidential foreign policy aide.

“Baku should cooperate with Western powers to reveal Iranian intelligence networks when their activity really harms Azerbaijan’s security,” asserted Guluzade, who worked during the early post-Soviet era for former presidents Ayaz Mütalibov, Abulfaz Elchibey and Heydar Aliyev.

Iran, a country with which Azerbaijan shares deep cultural and historical ties, is routinely suspected of attempting to stir up trouble in Baku – either via protests by the country’s practicing Shi’a Muslims, or through more violent steps such as an alleged recent assassination plot against Israeli Ambassador to Baku Michael Lotem.

Guluzade characterised Tehran’s uproar over the Times article as part of that same supposed trend, an alleged attempt “to pressure Baku and restrict its cooperation with Israel”.

One former deputy minister of national security echoed the call for closer ties with Western intelligence operations, arguing that Azerbaijani law-enforcement agencies are not capable on their own of thwarting suspected Iranian activities.

“I would welcome deeper cooperation (by Azerbaijani law enforcement) with their colleagues from the United States, Turkey and other countries,” said Sulhaddin Akper, director of the Baku-based Center for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation.

Alper conceded that “(o)f course, both Israeli and Iranian intelligence services are active in Azerbaijan,” and predicted that “this activity will increase further, taking into consideration the situation in the region.” At the same time, he scoffed that the notion that Azerbaijan would cooperate with Mossad to target Iranian nuclear scientists, saying such action would be “against our national interests”.

Elhan Shahinoglu, director of the Atlas research center, agreed, adding that, aside from intensifying alleged ongoing cooperation “with U.S., Turkish and Israeli intelligence agencies,” Baku should also increase its cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

On Feb. 15, a few days after the Iranian protest note, President Ilham Aliyev visited NATO headquarters in Brussels, where he expressed interest in making long-term financial contributions to the Afghan National Army Trust Fund, and emphasised Azerbaijan’s provision of over-flights, troops, cargo transit and mine-clearing for the alliance’s campaign in Afghanistan. Details about the size of any potential fund contributions were not released.

Meanwhile, Baku appears to be taking on its own what might be termed “preventive measures” against Iran.

In the suburban village of Nardaran, a Baku suburb known for its Islamic conservatism, police over the past four days have arrested more than 15 people, including Niazi Kerimov, brother of Natig Kerimov, a member of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan. Government officials have long alleged that the party, banned since 1996, receives Iranian funding. The group is the only political entity in Azerbaijan to have denounced Baku’s ties with Israel.

No reason has been given for the arrests, nor has the government body responsible for the arrests been identified, Turan reported. In a Feb. 20 statement, the Islamic Party called the arrests “politically motivated”.

Other high-profile arrests include a prominent theologian, Haji Akhund Ilham, the mullah of a mosque in Bina, outside Baku, and a scholar educated at an Iranian seminary, Turan reported. The Ministry of National Security declined to comment on Ilham’s Feb. 17 arrest.

Also on Feb. 17, Baku police detained Anar Bayramly, a local freelance correspondent for Iranian broadcast media, including the satellite news channel Sahar. Bayramly was charged him with heroin possession and resisting police.

Bayramly’s brother, Eldar, has denied the allegations of drug possession, and told Turan that his brother had been repeatedly summoned to a local police station over the past few weeks and questioned about his political views. Bayramly’s lawyer, Anar Gasimli, told EurasiaNet.org that he has not yet been able to meet with his client, or with state investigators. He added that he had no official information about the charges against the journalist.

The Iranian Embassy in Baku has denounced the arrest and warned that it could damage relations with Tehran. But Azerbaijan, wedged between Iran to the south, Russia to the north and a hostile Armenia to the west, long ago learned to play its diplomatic cards carefully.

While criticising Iran for its alleged “anti-Azerbaijani activity”, Parliamentary Speaker Ogtay Asadov on Feb. 14 underlined that Azerbaijan would never allow its territory to be used against Iran. The pledge, often made by President Aliyev as well, is a familiar one.

“There is no reason why this position should change,” said Shahinoglu, the political analyst.

*This story originally appeared on EurasiaNet.org.