A nuclear test is carried out on an island in French Polynesia in 1971. Credit: CTBTO

By Tariq Rauf
VIENNA, Austria, Aug 7 2025 (IPS)

On 16th July this year I was at the University of Chicago, attending a Nobel Laureate Assembly, and visited the site where at 15:25 PM local time on 2 December 1942, the nuclear physicist Enrico Fermi achieved the first self-sustaining atomic fission chain reaction.

Three years later, at precisely 5:30 PM on 16 July 1945, the nuclear age began with the detonation of the “Trinity” nuclear explosive device over the New Mexico desert.

At approximately 8:15 AM Hiroshima time on 6 August 1945, the US Air Force unleashed the “Little Boy”, a 9,700-pound uranium gun-type bomb, over the city. While no one will ever know for certain how many died as a result of the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima, it is estimated at least 70,000 people perished as a result of initial blast, heat and radiation effects.

Three days later, on 9 August 1945, at 11:02 AM, the US Air Force at an altitude of 1,650 feet detonated the plutonium device “Fat Man”, with an estimated explosive yield of 21,000 tonnes (kilotons), about 40 percent greater than that of the Hiroshima bomb. It is estimated that about 40,000 people perished initially, with 60,000 more injured.

By January 1946, the number of deaths in both Hiroshima and Nagasaki exceeded more than 150,000, with perhaps ultimately twice that number dead within the ensuing five years.

Between 16 July 1945 and 3 December 2017, it is estimated that 2,121 nuclear test detonations involving 2,476 nuclear explosive devices have been carried out by ten States – in chronological order: USA, USSR, UK, France, China, India, Israel/South Africa, Pakistan and North Korea.

Though the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibits all nuclear test detonations, in all environments, and has been signed to date by 187 States and ratified by 178, it still languishes having not entered into force.

In particular, entry-into-force depends on 44 named States to have ratified. Nine such States are holding up entry into force: alphabetically, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, and USA. Indonesia was the latest among this group of 44 States to have ratified in February 2012 – since then not a single State among the remaining nine has taken any steps to sign and/or ratify the CTBT, placing its future in doubt.

While the CTBT prohibits all nuclear testing once in force, nevertheless it has created a powerful global norm against further nuclear test detonations. On the other hand, all nine current nuclear-armed States are modernizing their nuclear explosive devices (warheads), in one way or another, and their nuclear weapon engineers and scientists direly would like to resume some limited explosive testing to validate new designs and certify older existing ones.

Only the CTBT stands in their way. Were any one of the nine nuclear-armed States to resume nuclear test detonations, it is quite probable that others would follow. Though not confirmed, it is speculated that pressure to test nuclear devices likely is strongest in India, followed by Russia, China, North Korea, Pakistan and the United States.

The United States and Russia both have advanced technical programmes utilizing quantum computing for advanced simulation and testing to non-explosively certify existing nuclear warheads for safety and reliability, and validate new designs. Nonetheless, nuclear warhead designers ideally would like to detonate new designs for certification, safety and reliability.

In conclusion, the moratorium on nuclear test detonations is hanging by a slender thread in these troubled times of exacerbated tensions between the United States versus China and Russia, India versus China and Pakistan, and North Korea in the Korean Peninsula. Were there to be “friendly” nuclear proliferation by States such as Germany, Poland, or South Korea; or new nuclear States to emerge such as Iran and Taiwan (China), the spectre of nuclear explosive testing once again could arise.

We are living in lawless times internationally, of might over right; it remains a perilous challenge to sustain existing global nuclear arms control and disarmament norms including those against nuclear test detonations.

The views expressed in this article are personal comments by Tariq Rauf, former Head of Verification and Security Policy at the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

IPS UN Bureau

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September 26th marks the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. Credit: International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN)Darren Ornitz

By Tariq Rauf
VIENNA, Austria, Oct 8 2024 (IPS)

In recent years, the rhetoric, strategy and practice of nuclear deterrence has grown riskier, more urgent, more dangerous, less stable, and increasingly in the hands of deficient leaders and policymakers.

Playing Nuclear Games

The ten States that have manufactured and test detonated nuclear weapons since 1945, each have received and/or provided assistance to other States – no existing nuclear weapon development and acquisition programme is truly indigenous or independent.

Furthermore, all ten nuclear-armed States have in place policies to use their nuclear weapons in circumstances assessed by them as threatening their vital security interests, sovereignty and territorial integrity; and in this context, all of them at one time or another have made implicit or explicit threats to use nuclear weapons.

On 26th September this year, at the commencement of the United Nations General Assembly’s annual high-level commemoration of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Secretary-General António Guterres warned that, “We are heading in the wrong direction entirely. Not since the worst days of the cold war has the spectre of nuclear weapons cast such a dark shadow”. He noted that nuclear-armed States “must stop gambling with humanity’s future” and must honour their commitments and obligations for nuclear disarmament.

The President of the General Assembly, Philémon Yang (Cameroon), also warned that, “This is a time when nuclear blackmail has emerged, and some are recklessly threatening to unleash a nuclear catastrophe. This simply cannot continue. We must step back from the nuclear precipice, and we must act now”.

In this regard, let’s take a brief detour back into the early history of the nuclear age. Following the Trinity nuclear test detonation of 16th July 1945, nuclear scientist Leó Szilárd observed that, “Almost without exception, all the creative physicists had misgivings about the use of the bomb” and further that “Truman did not understand at all what was involved regarding nuclear weapons”.

Last year, the movie Oppenheimer had been the rage based on a noteworthy biography of Robert Oppenheimer entitled American Prometheus written by historians Kai Bird and Martin Sherwin. Though the movie spared its viewers the horrors of the atomic bombing of Japan, it did reflect the warnings of the early nuclear weapon scientists about the long-term or permanent dangers of a nuclear arms race and associated risks of further nuclear weapons use.

On the other hand, the film overlooked other historical works including A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and its Legacies also by Martin Sherwin, that disputes and negates the US government’s narrative about the necessity of using nuclear weapons twice over civilian targets in Japan and suggests that the decisions were driven mainly by geostrategic and prestige considerations – criteria still in operation today to justify continuing retention of nuclear weapons.

Leó Szilárd’s observation that I have cited above that President Truman did not understand at all what was involved regarding nuclear weapons, unfortunately still rings true nearly 80 years on when it comes to the leaders of today’s nuclear-weapon possessor States as well as of most of their diplomats and those of 30-plus countries in military defence and security arrangements underpinned by nuclear weapons.

Now, why do I say this? In addition to nuclear doctrines based on nuclear weapons use, the UN nuclear disarmament system is in disarray. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the single multilateral arms control negotiating forum, has been stymied since 1996, unable to agree on a sustained programme of work on any of its “decalogue” of agenda items.

The Disarmament Commission as the specialized, deliberative subsidiary body of the General Assembly that allows for in-depth deliberations on specific disarmament issues, inter alia “Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons”, also has been deadlocked.

The First Committee of the General Assembly deals with disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace that affect the international community and seeks out solutions to the challenges in the international security regime. Every year it adopts more than 60 resolutions on various aspects of disarmament, but with no practical results in recent years.

The 2015 and 2022 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conferences failed to agree on any measures to reduce the risks of nuclear weapons and their elimination. As did the 2023 and 2024 preparatory sessions for the 2026 NPT review conference.

The UN Summit of the Future, held on 22-23 September this year, agreed on a Pact for the Future that regrettably was a big disappointment as it lacked any concrete actions, even though it paid lip service to the call that the “The time for the total elimination of nuclear weapons is now”. The document failed to reaffirm commitments to existing global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, or to call for new ones to be negotiated.

Notably the late UN Secretary General Kofi Annan had referred to this state of affairs as “mutually assured paralysis”, and that the “disarmament machinery is rusting”.

It is unfortunate that the above-referenced developments and the current nuclear rhetoric demonstrates that knowledge of nuclear history is waning thin and diplomats, academics and the mainstream media pundits are caught up with the emotions, pressures and even confusion of challenging technological advances in weapons, an ongoing territorial war in the heart of Europe, a genocidal war against Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank and Lebanon, along with tensions in Northeast Asia and South Asia.

In effect, those in control of nuclear weapons today, along with the echo chambers in allied States in defence arrangements underpinned by nuclear deterrence, are playing games tickling the tail of the Promethean nuclear fire dragon.

Tickling the Tail of the Promethean Nuclear Fire Dragon

All nuclear-armed States today have in place policies and doctrines to use their nuclear weapons. In order to constrain the further proliferation of nuclear-armed States, the five NPT recognized “nuclear-weapon States” each have advanced negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT and to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, on the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

China is the only nuclear-weapon State to assert that it would not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State. The other four nuclear-weapon States – France, Russia, UK and US – each have attached conditions to their negative security assurances to the effect that such an assurance would not be honoured were it to be attacked by a non-nuclear-weapon State in collaboration or with the assistance of another nuclear-weapon State.

The nuclear weapons employment policy of the United States clearly posits that “using nuclear weapons could create conditions for decisive results and the restoration of strategic stability”. For its part, Russian military doctrine envisions the threat of nuclear escalation or even first use of nuclear weapons to “de-escalate” a conflict on terms favourable to Russia.

China’s evolving nuclear doctrine envisions a “strong military dream” based on military-civil-fusion to achieve by 2049 full spectrum power projection. In South Asia, both India and Pakistan have nuclear doctrines positing use of nuclear weapons including pre-emptive nuclear strikes.

In the current heated and volatile atmosphere in central Europe in the context of the Ukraine war, it is reported that Russia is re-asserting the conditions it has traditionally laid down in its negative security assurances to States parties to the NPT and to nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ), which essentially are similar to that of the US, to the effect that: Russia will not attack or threaten to attack a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT or NWFZ treaty with nuclear weapons, unless that non-nuclear-weapon State attacks Russia in collaboration with another nuclear-weapon State.

Now, since we’re in a proxy war involving France, UK and US (all three are nuclear-weapon States) that are considering material assistance to Ukraine to attack military sites inside the territorial borders of Russia; it is not surprising that Russia has retaliated by warning Ukraine and its NATO backers that long range fires against Russia targeting its strategic military bases could trigger a nuclear response by Russia.

Strategic nuclear bases are those housing strategic nuclear delivery systems (long- and medium-range bombers, road and rail mobile ballistic missiles), command and control centres, early warning radars, naval bases for submarines, etc.

It is never a good idea for a non-nuclear-weapon State to threaten to target or to target strategic military sites in a nuclear-weapon State and it would be foolhardy to set such a precedent or to carry out military strikes that could provoke a nuclear response.

Were Ukraine to strike strategic military sites inside Russia proper, that would be the first time that a non-nuclear-weapon State would strike the continental homeland of a nuclear-armed State; though one might add that Iran’s recent missile strikes against nuclear-armed Israel fall into the same category.

Should the US/NATO allow long range fires against strategic military sites in Russia from Ukraine, that would further compound the already unacceptably high risk of a central strategic war involving four nuclear-weapon States and thus would be highly irresponsible and indefensible.

Departing NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg made comments in Washington to the effect that long range fires from Ukraine into Russian territory is the only one way to hit military targets behind the Russian lines, on Russian territory.

And that NATO should not be deterred by Russia’s “nuclear threats and rhetoric”; this in a way is questioning the credibility of Russian nuclear doctrine which is tantamount to “tickling the tail of the nuclear dragon” and could result in a Promethean nuclear fire of a central strategic war.

The new NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte also has claimed that “targeting Russian fighter jets and missiles before they can be used against Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure can help save lives”.

A just and equitable peace arrangement must be sought urgently under UN auspices to end the Ukraine war with the restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territory; and all sides must strive to avoid any further escalatory moves that could trigger a central strategic war.

Seek Peace, Not War!

It is highly reprehensible that these days the voices of war are prevalent over the voices seeking peace. The UN disarmament machinery has failed as has the Summit of the Future to curb nuclear risks. The architecture of nuclear disarmament and arms control is steadily crumbing with our eyes wide shut!

Unless we can mend our ways, it might be too late to avert a Promethean nuclear fire that consumes us all. We urgently must rethink how we manage nuclear risks; security based on nuclear deterrence is inherently flawed and risky and cannot continue on a long term basis.

A new international security system must be envisaged on the basic design principle that the effects of system failure cannot result to fundamentally disrupt or end civilization. We urgently need a new international security paradigm that can prevent an existential global nuclear catastrophe and keep the Promethean nuclear fire dragon firmly bottled up.

The views expressed in this article are personal comments by Tariq Rauf, former Head of Verification and Security Policy at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

IPS UN Bureau

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By Tariq Rauf
VIENNA, Mar 12 2020 (IPS)

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and coincidentally the tenth quinquennial (five yearly) review conference is scheduled to be held at the United Nations in New York from 27 April to 22 May.

With 191 States parties, the NPT is the cornerstone of the global regime for nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

An unexpected complication is that of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) and its impact on the NPT review conference – thus far, there is an inexplicable thundering silence from the UN regarding the postponement of the conference.

COVID-19

Yesterday, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the COVID-19 to be a global pandemic affecting more than 114 countries with 118,000 people infected, 4,291 fatalities and many thousands more fighting for their lives in hospitals.

The WHO stated that this is the first pandemic caused by a coronavirus and that never before has there been a pandemic that can be controlled.

In the United States, according to the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the total number of cases as of 11 March is 938, total deaths 29, in 38 states and the District of Columbia). The New York State Department of Health is reporting 52 cases in New York City and 164 in the State.

Thus, it is clear that New York City is affected by COVID-19 and there is a high risk of the further spread of the virus. Add to this, the expected arrival of more than 400 delegates from all parts of the world, to attend the NPT conference, including obviously from countries and regions already afflicted with the corononavirus.

Should this transpire, it would not take a virologist or a rocket scientist to predict a rapid transmission of the virus to many of the delegates all concentrated in the UN General Assembly chamber for several days and in other large meeting rooms for another three weeks.

Furthermore, the US may restrict entry to delegates coming from countries afflicted with coronavirus and either deny visas or place them under quarantine for two weeks or more? In fact, President Donald Trump already has suspended all travel from mainland Europe for 30 days starting on Friday.

So, why has not the UN ordered the postponement of all large conferences till the virus infections subside and the environment is safe again for large and small congregations of people drawn from all corners of the world?

And, why have not the diplomats accredited to the UN in New York, from States parties to the NPT, already decided to postpone the NPT review conference? What is it about COVID-19 that they do not understand and why are they delaying taking the common sense decision to postpone the event?

The UN Secretary-General’s “Message on COVID 19” is limited to bulleted points such as, “All of us face a common threat – the coronavirus – COVID 19. Today’s declaration of a pandemic is a call to action – for everyone, everywhere”, which is not reassuring!

UN General Assembly President Tijjani Muhammad-Bande, on the other hand, has stated that the coronavirus will only be tackled “through a multilateral response” in which the UN “must lead by example” and that the UN should take a “coordinated and coherent approach” regarding decisions on whether major meetings can go ahead.

He added that at the UN Secretariat “we have started the process looking at scaling down, postponing and/or cancelling meetings, as appropriate”. Well, it’s high time to do so – the sooner the better!

Options for the NPT Review Conference

Reportedly, “options” are being considered but no decision has been taken as yet. One option seemingly gathering support, and reportedly pushed by some States, is to convene the NPT Review Conference as scheduled on 27th April but then to immediately prorogue (or adjourn) it to August or later this year after possibly adopting a statement or declaration commemorating 50 years of the NPT.

The stated rationale being that the NPT conference is a scheduled quinquennial event according to the Treaty and therefore must be convened – if only for a day under present circumstances – going from the sublime to the ridiculous!

The logic of such a bizarre “option” can only emanate from New York and capitals, as oftentimes they tend to be oblivious to the calendars of events and meetings in other UN capitals that deal with nuclear matters, namely Vienna (Austria) and Geneva (Switzerland).

Not surprisingly, the reaction in Vienna and Geneva has tended to be one of shock and disbelief. What were these diplomats/officials thinking? Are they not aware that the third session of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva is scheduled for 3 August to 18 September?

And, do they not realize that in Western Europe the civilized practice of annual vacation in August is nearly sacrosanct! Just because in the United States the concept of taking an annual vacation is generally frowned upon is no reason to subject others to this stress of giving up their vacation time.

Postpone to 2021 and Convene in Vienna

As I have recommended earlier this month, there is only one sound course of action: that to postpone the NPT review conference to 2021 (possibly 26 April to 21 May) and to convene it from then on in Vienna. The following are the reasons for my recommendation, which is beginning to get some traction:

1. The year following an NPT review conference always is a gap year; hence there should not be any impediment to moving it to next year. No important decisions need to be taken this year and the 50th anniversary of the NPT can be marked by speeches and statements by ministers in capitals, New York, Geneva and Vienna.
2. At present, there are no prospects for any progress on nuclear disarmament – a key element of the NPT. Both the Russian Federation and the United States are engaged in modernization of their nuclear weapons; and the United States is pursuing a policy of steadily abandoning treaties, multilateralism and striking out in favour of unilateral nationalistic policies. Last year, the United States abandoned the 1987 Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty as well as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) limiting Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme; earlier in 2002 it pulled out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that formed the basis of strategic stability between Russia and the United States. In addition, thus far, the United States has not indicated any interest in extending the 2010 New START Treaty limiting strategic nuclear weapons that will expire in February 2021, and in preserving the Open Skies Treaty that permits confidence-building aerial overflights. In addition, some officials now are openly verbally attacking those in countries who promote fulfilling the nuclear disarmament obligations under the NPT. Thus, postponing the NPT conference to 2021 provides a respite of a year with the possibility of an improved climate in 2021?
3. The technical and policy expertise for nuclear verification, safety and security, and peaceful uses always has resided in Vienna (Austria) at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA provides secretariat support and expertise to the NPT review conference on two of the three pillars of the NPT – nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses.
4. The expertise and experience for negotiating multilateral nuclear arms control resides at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (Switzerland) – the third pillar of the NPT.
5. UN New York has no diplomatic or technical expertise related to the NPT; it is basically a political talk shop. Negotiations on resolutions on nuclear arms control matters in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, as well as in the UN Disarmament Commission, normally are conducted by diplomats coming over to New York from Geneva and from capitals.
6. Staff from the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA) in New York, together with IAEA staff form the “secretariat” for NPT review conferences and their preparatory committees. UN ODA New York staff travel to Vienna and Geneva, respectively, to service the preparatory committee sessions held there along with UN ODA staff based in these two European cities. Thus, UN ODA New York staff can easily support the review conference held in Vienna.
7. The claim that participation in NPT review conferences held in New York is higher as all Member States of the United Nations are represented there is not credible. Of the 191 States Parties to the NPT, generally not more than 150 attend review conferences and then too small delegations only make a showing on the first and last days in order to be listed in the official list of participants. It need not be a burden for small States to attend review conferences in Vienna.
8. Given concerns about the effect on the climate from air travel and current tendency to minimize long distance travel by air to reduce the carbon footprint; convening the review conference from 2021 onwards in Vienna also can have a positive impact in reducing the carbon burden of attendance. The geographic location of Vienna in Central Europe will greatly reduce distances to be travelled by delegates from Asia, Africa and Oceania, as well as of course by European countries – these regions put together comprise the largest number of countries in the world. Only the North and South American delegates will have increased travel distances, but these obviously are a minority compared to those from the regions noted above.
9. It is obvious that costs of hotel accommodation in New York are inordinately high with tax upon taxes, as are the high costs of food and meals. Hotel and food costs in Vienna are much cheaper than in New York or Geneva, as are hotel costs. Thus, significant savings can be incurred by foreign ministries in connection with participation in the review conference held in Vienna. Such savings would be even more beneficial for civil society representatives, who obviously cannot draw upon tax payer funding as can official delegates.
10. Finally, there is now no rationale to hold NPT review conferences at any location in any nuclear-weapon State (NWS), especially since 25 years after the indefinite extension of the NPT the deficit in nuclear disarmament remains significant, nuclear weapons are being modernized in some NWS, the threshold of possible use of nuclear weapons has been lowered, and existing treaties are under threat. Better to hold review conferences in a “neutral” country such as Austria that is a strong champion on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

Decide Now

The longer this decision is delayed to move the NPT review conference to 2021 in Vienna, the higher the costs incurred this year in cancelling New York flights and hotel rooms. While government delegates may well be able to afford such penalties as tax dollars pay for their expenses, for civil society participants cancellation costs would be onerous and unaffordable as they either self-finance or rely on charitable donations.

Thus, as I have described in some detail above, there are no compelling reasons at all to convene the presently scheduled NPT review conference in New York this year. It makes eminent common and fiscal sense to convene it next year in April-May and to hold it in Vienna – the historic capital location of important conferences for more than two centuries and imbued with the intangible “spirit of Vienna” that encourages harmony and compromise.

* Tariq Rauf has attended all nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) meetings since 1987 as a delegate, including as senior adviser to the chair of Main Committee I (nuclear disarmament) in 2015 and to the chair of the 2014 preparatory committee; as alternate head of the International Atomic Energy Agency delegation to the NPT; and as a non-proliferation expert with the Canadian delegation from 1987. Personal views are expressed here.

Credit: United Nations

By Tariq Rauf
VIENNA, Nov 20 2019 (IPS)

A historic conference on the Middle East opened at the United Nations in New York on 18th November and will continue until 22nd November. The Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction is presided over by Ambassador Sima Bahous of Jordan.

This matter has been before the international community since 1974 and remains controversial and unresolved to this day. On the one side, the Arab States of the region of the Middle East and Iran have called for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the dismantlement of Israel’s clandestine nuclear weapon programme.

On the other side, Israel supported by the EU member States, Canada and the US, maintain that regional peace and security is a pre-condition for any negotiations on such a zone and that concerns about nuclear programmes in certain Arab States also need to be resolved first.

Thus, this matter has simmered for decades, plagued the proceedings and outcomes of the review conferences of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the annual General Conferences of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as the First Committee and the United Nations General Assembly.

Now finally, pursuant to a decision by the General Assembly in December 2018, this conference is going ahead albeit without the participation of Israel and the United States.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

The original concept of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) was conceived with a view to preventing the emergence of new nuclear-weapon possessor States.

Efforts to ensure the absence of nuclear weapons in other populated parts of the world have led to five regional denuclearization agreements—the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco covering Latin America, the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga covering the South Pacific, the 1995 Treaty of Bangkok covering Southeast Asia, the 1996 Pelindaba Treaty covering Africa, and the 2006 Central Asian NWFZ treaty, all are in force—thus the entire southern hemisphere below the Equator is covered by NWFZ treaties.

In addition, in 1992 Mongolia declared itself to be a nuclear-weapon-free space that was approved by the Great Hural in 2000 and endorsed by UNGA in 2002.

Also, certain uninhabited areas of the globe have been formally denuclearized. They include Antarctica under the 1959 Antarctic Treaty; outer space, the moon, and other celestial bodies under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the 1979 Moon Agreement; and the seabed, the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof under the 1971 Seabed Treaty.

General Assembly resolution 3472 B (1975) defines a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone as

• any zone recognized as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which any group of States, in the free exercises of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or convention whereby:
a) The statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject, including the procedure for the delimitation of the zone, is defined;
b) An international system of verification and control is established to guarantee compliance with the obligations deriving from that statute.

NWFZs ban the production, testing and stationing of nuclear weapons, permit peaceful uses, include verification provisions and in some cases an institutional set up; and require security assurances from nuclear-weapon States.

Article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) affirmed the right of States to establish NWFZs in their respective territories and the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) expressed the conviction that regional denuclearization measures enhance global and regional peace and security.

The NPTREC adopted a Resolution on establishing a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction as well as delivery systems in the region of the Middle East. The 2000 NPTRevConf reiterated the importance of the 1995 Resolution, and the 2010 RevConf mandated that a conference be held on such a zone by 2012; and the 2015 RevConf came to an inglorious end over disagreements on the Middle East zone.

Earlier in 2000, the IAEA General Conference adopted a Resolution for the IAEA Director General to convene a Forum on Experience of NWFZs Relevant for the Middle East. On joining the IAEA in 2002, the Director General assigned me the task to make the arrangements for holding this Forum – during the course of the summers of 2002-2004, I was able to get agreement on the Agenda but the Forum itself was convened only in November 2011.

Representatives from all five zones and Mongolia attended and made presentations at the IAEA Forum; however, under the-then Director General the Agency acceded to pressure from certain sources to ensure that the Forum was a one-off event and that there would not be any follow-up activities.

In terms of new NWFZs, the Middle East remains an old unfulfilled aspiration. First jointly proposed by Egypt and Iran in 1974 through a General Assembly resolution, the concept was broadened in 1990 through the Mubarak Initiative to cover all weapons of mass destruction.

There is as yet no general agreement on the contours and details of a WMD-free zone (WMDFZ), however keeping to basics it is possible to identify practical measures and elements – as is endeavoured in the draft treaty text prepared by The METO Project.

Middle East

Traditionally, Egypt has taken the lead in promoting efforts for the implementation of the 1995 NPTREC Resolution on the Middle East in the NPT review process, as well as at the IAEA General Conference and at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on the establishment of a NWFZ in the region of the Middle East.

Last year, UNGA First Committee adopted by voting (103 yes :3 no : 71 abstentions) decision (A/C.1/73/L.22/Rev.1) co-sponsored by Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt,* Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen and State of Palestine on Convening a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

The UNGA decision A/73/546, adopted on 22 December 2018 by a vote of 88 to 4 with 75 abstentions, called on the UN Secretary General to:

• convene a conference for the duration of one week to be held no later than 2019 dealing with the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction;
• the conference shall take as its terms of reference the 1995 NPTREC resolution;
• all decisions emanating from the conference shall be taken by consensus by the States of the region;
• all States of the Middle East, the three co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, the other two nuclear-weapon States and the relevant international organisations (IAEA, OPCW, BTWC ISU) to participate;
• the Secretary-General to convene annual sessions of the conference for a duration of one week at United Nations Headquarters until the conference concludes the elaboration a legally binding treaty establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region ; .

Accordingly, Under-Secretary General and High Representative for Disarmament Izumi Nakamitsu and the Department for Disarmament Affairs made the preparations to hold the conference on 18-22 November 2019.

The main areas of contention between the Arab States and Israel can be summarized as follows: that there still continues to be a long-standing and fundamental difference of views between Israel, on the one hand, and other States of the Middle East region, on the other hand, with regard to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in the region of the Middle East (MENWFZ/WMDFZ).

Israel takes the view that MENWFZ/WMDFZ and related regional security issues, cannot be addressed in isolation from the regional peace process and that these issues should be addressed in the framework of a regional security and arms control dialogue that could be resumed in the context of a multilateral peace process.

These should help reduce tensions, and lead to security and stability in the Middle East, through development of mutual recognition, peaceful and good neighbourly relations and abandonment of threats and use of force by states as well as non-State actors as means to settlement of disputes.

Following the establishment of full and lasting peaceful relations and reconciliation among all nations of the region, such a process could lead to the adoption of confidence-building measures, discussion of arms control issues, and eventually pave the way to regional negotiations of a mutually and effectively verifiable regime that will establish the Middle East as a zone free of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons as well as ballistic missiles.

Israel also holds the position that any modalities, obligations or provisions should be solely addressed by the states concerned through direct negotiation.

The other States of the region maintain that there is no automatic sequence which links the establishment of the zone, the application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East, to the prior conclusion of a peace settlement, and that the former would contribute to the latter.

The Arab States maintain that all of them have acceded to the NPT, while Israel continues to defy the international community by refusing to become a party to the Treaty or to place its installations under the Agency’s comprehensive safeguards system, thus exposing the region to nuclear risks and threatening peace.

Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons is likely to lead to a destructive nuclear arms race in the region; especially if Israel’s nuclear installations remain outside any international control.

Most Arab States of the region of the Middle East consider that:

• the 2018 UNGA decision A/73/546 on convening a conference on the zone was a breakthrough;
• the new initiative through the UNGA is directed at all States of the region of the Middle East, the three co-sponsors of the1995 NPTREC Resolution are invited and no States of the region shall be excluded;
• while the UNGA route was not ideal, it was resorted to as there was no realistic alternative due to the prevailing situation regionally and globally; and
• the initiative shall be fully inclusive, involve direct dialogue, be based on arrangements freely arrived at, there will be no singling out of any State of the region; however, if any State of the region does not attend, this cannot prevent other States of the region to attend the conference slated for November this year.

Regarding the question of how to deal with the Middle East issue at the 2020 review conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the following points are relevant:

(a) the NPT review process remains the primary focus and the UNGA initiative is not an alternative to the NPT process but should be regarded as parallel and complementary;
(b) it can alleviate pressure on the 2020 review conference;
(c) there is no intention to hold the review conference hostage to the Middle East issue and the NPT States of the region want the review conference to be successful;
(d) the UNGA conference shall be open to all States and now it is important to start engagement and preparations on the modalities and procedural aspects;
(e) the assertion is incorrect that Israel was not consulted in advance on the 2018 resolution at UNGA, in fact it was consulted in advance of the decision;
(f) the decision garnered more than 100 affirmative votes at UNGA, which was a clear majority;
(g) the 2019 NPT PrepCom should take factual note of the UNGA decision to convene the conference in November;
(h) the Middle East zone issue remains within the NPT process and the 2020 review conference would have to reaffirm and recognize this;
(i) the November conference provides an opportunity to all States to meet and discuss zone matters, express views, all decisions shall be by consensus, it is an opportunity for direct consultations among the States of the region of the Middle East, and it is up to the States of the region to decide whether to sign/ratify a future MEWMDFZ treaty;
(j) the Middle East zone now can be considered as the fourth pillar of the NPT;
(k) it is regrettable that some States (Israel and the United States) had urged the IAEA (and other relevant international organizations) not to attend the November conference;
(l) the NPT States of the region believe in collective not selective security and this calls for the universalization of the NPT and the cessation of granting privileges to States not party to the Treaty (Israel);
(m) regarding the three co-sponsors (Russia, UK, USA) of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference Resolution calling for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction: the UK has voiced support for the vision of a MEWMDFZ and is attending the November conference; the Russian Federation endorsed the convening of the conference also is attending the November conference which it regards as easing pressure at the 2020 review conference; while the US has indicated support for the goal of a Middle East free of WMD based on direct dialogue and consensus but has condemned the General Assembly decision of 2018 to convene the November conference as “illegitimate” and is boycotting the conference; and
(n) Israel too has decided not to attend the November conference.

The METO Project

The Middle East Treaty Organization (METO) Project for a zone free of WMD in the Middle East represents a civil society initiative on “Achieving the Possible” was launched and sustained by Sharon Dolev of the Israeli Disarmament Movement and has attracted support from experts from States of the region of the Middle East as well as from other countries. The METO project has developed the elements of a text of a MEWMDFZ treaty that has been shared with the States of the Middle East region and is designed to serve as a catalyst for them to jump start discussions on such a treaty.

Ii is hoped that the States attending the current conference can draw motivation, ideas and elements from the draft treaty text prepared by the METO Project as they discuss the possible elements and provisions of a future treaty that can garner the support of the States of the region.

Some may find shortcomings or omissions in the draft text but States of the region and other concerned parties are invited to further develop, enhance and enrich the elements presented in the draft text.

This effort needs to be joined not by sceptics nor naysayers but by optimists and those who are serious about promoting the cause of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction and of its transformation into a region of peace, justice and security.

Conclusion

The Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction now underway at the United Nations in New York provides a belated but important opportunity to address regional security, non-proliferation and disarmament matters in the region of the Middle East.

It sets into place an annual process focusing on discussing matters pertaining to eliminating the threats, dangers and risks of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in the region; achieving universal adherence in the region to the NPT through the verified elimination of Israel’s nuclear weapon programme, and also securing universal adherence in the region to and compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention that prohibit biological and chemical weapons, and signature and/or ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) that prohibits all types of nuclear explosive tests.

Bringing peace and security to the region of the Middle East should be accorded the highest priority by the States of the region as well as by all other States.

The views expressed are the writer’s personal observations.

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