Mangroves, reefs and coastal ecosystems are more than natural assets — they are frontline climate solutions. Across Pacific villages, including Naidiri on Fiji’s Coral Coast, these systems are helping reduce erosion, protect livelihoods and support long-term resilience. Credit: Ludovic Branlant/SPC

By Sera Sefeti
NAIDIRI, FIJI, Apr 17 2026 (IPS)

Climate change is no longer a distant threat. Across the Pacific, it is a daily reality reshaping coastlines, livelihoods, and the delicate balance between people and the environment. But in a region long defined by resilience, solutions are not being invented from scratch. They are being remembered, strengthened, and scaled. Nature-based solutions (NbS) approaches that use ecosystems to address climate, disaster, and development challenges have always existed in Pacific communities. For generations, villages have relied on mangroves, agroforestry, and customary practices to protect their land and sustain their people. But as climate impacts intensify, the scale and speed of change demand more.

Now, a new regional effort is working to bridge the gap between tradition and modern policy.

The Pacific Community’s Promoting Pacific Islands Nature-based Solutions (PPIN) project is designed to do exactly that: connect what communities already know with the systems that govern development and investment.

Dr Rakeshi Lata, Training and Capacity Building Officer for Nature-based Solutions at SPC, explains that the project is not about replacing traditional knowledge but elevating it.

“It functions as a bridge connecting community practices with national policies to secure resources and scale up proven local methods,” said Lata.

Naidiri village on Fiji’s Coral Coast shows how nature-based Solutions are put into practice, with communities restoring mangroves and reefs to protect their coastline and sustain livelihoods. Credit: Ludovic Branlant/SPC

At its core, PPIN challenges a long-standing imbalance in development thinking where engineered, “grey” infrastructure is prioritised, and nature is treated as secondary.

“More specifically, PPIN addresses the fact that Pacific countries are highly vulnerable to climate change, disasters, and ecosystem degradation, yet development decisions still prioritise grey, engineered solutions while nature is treated as secondary or only an environmental issue,” Lata said.

This disconnect is especially stark in the Pacific, where people’s lives, cultures, and economies are deeply intertwined with the natural environment. When ecosystems fail, communities feel it immediately through food insecurity, coastal erosion, and increased disaster risks.

Yet despite the proven value of nature-based solutions, their adoption has remained limited—often fragmented, underfunded, and confined to small pilot projects.

“There is limited policy integration, technical capacity, economic evidence, and financing to make NbS ‘business as usual’ across sectors such as infrastructure, finance, agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and tourism,” Lata said.

That gap between what works locally and what is scaled nationally is where PPIN steps in.

Importantly, the project rejects the idea that traditional knowledge and modern science are in competition.

“The core philosophy of PPIN is that traditional knowledge and modern policy are not opposing forces but complementary strengths, this project aims to formalise what communities have already been practising successfully for centuries,” she said.

“PPIN actively incorporates modern science to strengthen traditional approaches.”

Across Fiji, Vanuatu, and Tonga, this integration is already visible not in theory but in practice.

Mangrove restoration, for example, is being used to reduce coastal erosion and storm surges, offering a natural alternative to costly seawalls. During Cyclone Vaiana in Fiji, boats sought shelter within mangrove systems, shielded from powerful winds and waves,  an example of ecosystem protection delivering real-time resilience.

These same mangroves also trap sediment, protecting downstream communities and coral reefs without the need for concrete infrastructure.

In rural areas, traditional agroforestry systems are being strengthened, combining trees and crops to improve soil stability, enhance food security, and build drought resilience. These systems reduce the need for engineered irrigation and land stabilisation while maintaining ecological balance.

Despite these successes, scaling such solutions has historically been difficult. Fragmented governance, siloed implementation across ministries and NGOs, and limited technical capacity have slowed progress.

Coral restoration helps rebuild reef ecosystems that protect Pacific coastlines, support fisheries and sustain community livelihoods. Credit: Ludovic Branlant/SPC

PPIN is designed to dismantle these barriers.

“A central pillar of PPIN is targeted capacity-building, which includes training programmes and communities of practice by establishing peer-to-peer learning networks focusing on specific sectors to foster continued knowledge exchange and collaboration,” she said.

Beyond policy integration, the project is investing in people, particularly those closest to the land.

Training programmes, including Farmers’ Field Schools and coastal resilience initiatives, focus on practical, livelihood-based applications of NbS. Participants gain hands-on skills in climate-smart and organic farming, linking ecosystem health directly to food production and household wellbeing.

The response has been strong. Women make up more than half of participants over 80 out of 146 with youth and community practitioners also actively engaged.

As the project moves toward closure, its legacy is already taking shape not just in outcomes but also in systems that will endure.

“To ensure sustainability and long-term accessibility, materials from trainings, technical guidance, needs assessment findings and more are being consolidated and hosted within a regional NbS knowledge hub led by SPREP,” Lata said.

“This hub provides a single, trusted platform where governments, practitioners, communities, women and youth can access the PPIN resources.”

But perhaps its most lasting impact will be less tangible and more powerful.

“Beyond materials, PPIN leaves behind strengthened regional networks and communities of practice, which will continue to connect practitioners across countries and sectors.”

In a region on the frontline of climate change, the future may not lie in choosing between tradition and science but in weaving them together.

Because in the Pacific, resilience has never been built on one system alone. It is carried across generations, across knowledge systems, and now, increasingly, across policy and practice.

IPS UN Bureau Report

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

 
CIVICUS discusses the spread of AI-powered surveillance in Africa with Wairagala Wakabi, executive director of the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) and co-editor of Smart City Surveillance in Africa: Mapping Chinese AI Surveillance Across 11 Countries, the latest report by the African Digital Rights Network (ADRN) and the Institute of Development Studies (IDS).

Wairagala Wakabi

How widespread is AI-powered surveillance in Africa?

Under the guise of reducing crime and fighting terrorism, at least 11 governments have invested over US$2 billion in AI-powered ‘smart city’ surveillance infrastructure: Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Governments are installing thousands of CCTV cameras linked to central command centres, paired with tools such as automatic number-plate recognition, biometric ID systems and facial recognition to track people and vehicles. The largest known investments are in Nigeria (over US$470 million), Mauritius (US$456 million) and Kenya (US$219 million), though the real total is likely much higher, since surveillance spending is often secret and the report covers only 11 of Africa’s 55 countries.

Despite being presented as tools for crime prevention, counter-terrorism, modernisation and urban management, these are not targeted security measures. They represent a broader shift toward continuous, population-level monitoring of public spaces, rolled out over the past five to ten years almost always without clear legal limits or public debate.

Are these systems achieving their stated purpose?

No, there is no compelling evidence that they have in any of the countries studied. Instead, the data points to a pattern of use that raises serious human rights concerns.

In Uganda and Zimbabwe, AI-powered surveillance including facial recognition is being used to suppress dissent rather than ensure public safety. Activists, critics of the government, opposition leaders and protesters are identified and monitored through this system, even after protests have ended. In Mozambique, smart CCTV systems have reportedly been installed in areas of strong political opposition, suggesting targeted rather than neutral surveillance.

In Senegal and Zambia, countries with relatively low terrorism threats, governments have still invested heavily, which calls into question the stated security rationale.

Across the countries studied, the scale of surveillance far exceeds any actual or perceived security threat, and the infrastructure is consistently being used to monitor dissent and consolidate state control rather than address genuine public safety needs.

Who’s supplying this technology?

While firms from Israel, South Korea and the USA supply surveillance technologies, Chinese companies are the primary suppliers and financiers. They typically offer end-to-end ‘smart city’ packages that include cameras, software platforms, data analytics systems, training and ongoing technical support. Many projects are backed by loans from Chinese state-linked banks, which makes them financially accessible in the short term but creates long-term dependencies on external vendors for maintenance, system management and upgrades.

This model undermines transparency. Procurement processes are opaque and civil society, the public and oversight institutions including parliaments rarely have information about how these systems operate, how data is stored or who has access to it. That lack of accountability is what makes abuse not just possible, but hard to detect or challenge.

What impact is this having on civic space?

This large-scale surveillance of public spaces is not legal, necessary or proportionate to the legitimate aim of providing security. Recording, analysing and retaining facial images of people in public without their consent interferes with their right to privacy and, over time, their willingness to move, assemble and speak freely.

The most immediate consequence is a chilling effect, particularly where civic space is already restricted. Knowing they can be identified and tracked, activists and journalists are less willing to attend protests for fear of later arrest or reprisals, and end up self-censoring. Civil society organisations also report heightened anxiety about the risks for their members and partners.

What should governments and civil society do?

None of the 11 countries studied have a legal framework capable of balancing the state’s security needs with its commitments to protect fundamental human rights. That must change. Governments must adopt clear regulations on surveillance, including restrictions on facial recognition and other AI tools, require independent human rights impact assessments before introducing new systems, make procurement and deployment processes transparent and establish strong oversight mechanisms, including judicial and parliamentary scrutiny, to prevent abuse.

Civil society should continue documenting abuses, raising public awareness and advocating for accountability, while also supporting affected people and communities through digital security support and legal assistance.

Technology-exporting states and donors must enforce stricter controls and safeguards on the export and financing of these tools, support rights-based approaches to digital governance and help fund independent monitoring and advocacy across Africa.

Without urgent action, these systems will continue to expand, and the rights of people across Africa will continue to shrink.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

GET IN TOUCH
CIPESA/Website
CIPESA/Facebook
CIPESA/LinkedIn
CIPESA/Twitter
ADRN/Website
ADRN/Facebook
ADRN/Twitter
IDS/Website
IDS/BlueSky
IDS/Facebook
IDS/Instagram
IDS/LinkedIn

SEE ALSO
Technology: innovation without accountability CIVICUS | State of Civil Society Report 2026
AI governance: the struggle for human rights CIVICUS Lens 11.Sep.2025
Facial recognition: the latest weapon against civil society CIVICUS Lens 23.May.2025

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

The GEF actively supports climate resilience and sustainable livelihoods in Zanzibar, with a specific focus on the seaweed farming sector, which is crucial for over 20,000 farmers—mostly women—in the region. Here a woman identified as Jazaa is pictured working as a seaweed farmer. She carefully attaches little seaweed seedlings to the rope that she will harvest after two months. Credit: Natalija Gormalova/Climate Visuals Countdown

By Umar Manzoor Shah
SRINAGAR, India, Apr 16 2026 (IPS)

The Global Environment Facility, widely known as the GEF, plays a central role in financing environmental protection across the world. It supports developing countries in tackling climate change, biodiversity loss, land degradation, pollution, and threats to ecosystems.

Since its establishment in the early 1990s, the GEF has grown as a multilateral environmental fund, supporting projects in more than 170 countries.

Over time, the GEF has evolved into what it calls a “family of funds”, each targeting a specific global environmental challenge while operating under a shared strategic framework.

This explainer looks at how the GEF funding works, the origins of its financing model, and the role of six major funds that channel resources toward global environmental goals.

While the GEF predates the 1992 Rio ‘Earth’ Summit, its importance as a financial mechanism grew after the summit. Here UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali opens the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, which aimed to develop a global blueprint for balancing economic development with environmental protection. Credit: Michos Tzavaras/UN Photo

Origins of the GEF Funding Model

The GEF was created in 1991, before the Rio ‘Earth’ Summit in 1992, which aimed to develop a global blueprint for balancing economic development with environmental protection; however, its importance grew after the summit.

The Rio Summit produced three major environmental conventions. These were the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Convention on Biological Diversity, and, later in 1994, the Convention to Combat Desertification. The GEF became the financial mechanism for these agreements, meaning it mobilises and distributes funds to help countries implement them.

Over the past 35 years, the GEF has expanded its mandate. Today it supports multiple conventions and environmental initiatives through a structured set of trust funds. This architecture allows the facility to coordinate funding across different environmental priorities while maintaining specialised programs for each global commitment.

The Global Environment Facility (GEF) is now focusing on solving environmental problems together instead of separately. It looks at climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution as connected issues and works with governments, international groups, civil society, and businesses to address them.

The GEF Trust Fund was initially created to support multiple environmental agreements simultaneously. Over time, countries preferred more specific funding for their particular needs.

Because of these changes, the GEF now has different funds, each designed for different purposes and methods of giving money.

Some funds – like the Trust Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), and part of the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) – use a system that helps countries know in advance how much funding they can expect.

The GEF Trust Fund

The Global Environment Facility Trust Fund is the main source of funds for the GEF. It provides grants to support environmental projects in developing countries.

The Trust Fund finances activities across several environmental areas.

These include

• Biodiversity conservation,
• Climate change mitigation,
• Land degradation control,
• International waters management, and
• Chemicals and waste reduction.

Countries receive funding through a system known as the System for Transparent Allocation of Resources, or STAR, which distributes funds based on their environmental needs and eligibility.

Projects funded by the Trust Fund often focus on creating global environmental benefits. These may include:

• Protecting endangered species,
• Restoring ecosystems,
• Reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and
• Improving pollution management systems.

The Trust Fund operates through periodic “replenishment” cycles. Donor countries pledge new contributions every four years, which allows the GEF to finance programs during the next funding period. For example, the GEF-9 cycle will cover the period from July 2026 to June 2030 and focus on scaling up environmental investments while mobilising private capital and strengthening country ownership of environmental policies.

The Global Environment Facility (GEF) has created Integrated Programs. These are special programs designed to address multiple environmental goals at the same time in a more coordinated and efficient way.

For example, the Food Systems Integrated Program does not fund separate projects for climate change, biodiversity, and land degradation. Instead, it combines them into one unified project, which helps achieve stronger and longer-lasting results while making better use of funding.

The GEF helps fund biodiversity across the globe, helping to create conditions to prevent the further endangerment of species like the Sumatran Orangutan (Pongo abelii). Credit: Thomas Gabernig/Unsplash

Global Biodiversity Framework Fund

The Global Biodiversity Framework Fund is a relatively new component of the GEF family of funds. It was created to help countries implement the Kunming Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, which was adopted in 2022 under the Convention on Biological Diversity.

The biodiversity framework sets ambitious targets for protecting nature by 2030. Its most prominent targets include the “30 by 30” target, which calls for protecting at least 30 percent of the world’s land and ocean areas by the end of the decade.  The Framework also sets a 30 percent target for the restoration of ecosystems and a target of mobilising 30 billion dollars in international financial flows to developing countries for biodiversity action.

The Global Biodiversity Framework Fund supports actions that help countries meet these targets.

Actions that are supported include the following:

• Expanding protected areas,
• Restoring degraded ecosystems,
• Protecting endangered species, and
• Strengthening biodiversity monitoring.

Another important focus is the integration of biodiversity into economic planning. Many projects supported by this fund work with governments and businesses to match financial flows with biodiversity goals. This means reducing financial support for activities that damage the environment and encouraging more sustainable farming, forestry, and fishing practices.

By providing targeted financing for biodiversity commitments, the fund helps translate global agreements into practical actions at the national and local levels.

It is also important to highlight that the fund sets a target of providing at least 20% of its resources to support actions by Indigenous Peoples and local communities. This form of direct financing is unique for a multilateral environmental fund.  To date, this target has been exceeded and mechanisms such as the Green Climate Fund and the Tropical Forest Forever Facility are considering replicating this approach.

GEF-9 biodiversity investments will bring together four interconnected pathways:

• Scaling up financial flows to close the nature financing gap,
• Embedding environmental priorities in national development strategies,
• Mobilising private capital through blended finance, and
• Empowering Indigenous Peoples, local communities, and civil society as active conservation partners.

“A renewed emphasis on the Forest Biomes Integrated Program will continue directing investment into the landscapes most critical for achieving 30×30 – ensuring that GEF financing remains focused where the stakes are highest,” said Chizuru Aoki, the head of the GEF Conventions and Funds Division.

Medicinal and aromatic plant species, such as the baobab, are often exploited; however, the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing aims to ensure fair use of the planet’s genetic resources and secure benefits for Indigenous knowledge holders. Credit Noah Grossenbacher/Unsplash

Nagoya Protocol Implementation Fund

The Nagoya Protocol Implementation Fund supports countries in implementing the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing. This international agreement, part of the Convention on Biological Diversity, aims to make sure that the genetic resources of the planet are used fairly and equitably, with benefits shared with those who provide them.

Genetic resources include plants, animals, and microorganisms that are used in research and commercial products such as medicines, cosmetics, and agricultural technologies. Historically, many developing countries have expressed concerns that companies and researchers benefit from these resources without sharing profits or knowledge.

The Nagoya Protocol fixes these issues by requiring users to do the following:

• Get permission from the country providing the resources, and
• Agree on how benefits (like money or knowledge) will be shared.

The fund supports countries by helping them:

• Create laws and rules for using genetic resources,
• Improve monitoring systems, and
• Build skills among researchers and policymakers.

Projects funded also support Indigenous peoples and local communities, who often hold traditional knowledge associated with biological resources. Protecting this knowledge and ensuring fair compensation is a key objective of the Nagoya framework.

Least Developed Countries Fund

The Least Developed Countries Fund focuses on supporting climate adaptation in the world’s most vulnerable nations. These countries often face severe environmental risks but lack the finances and systems to respond efficiently.

The fund supports the preparation and implementation of National Adaptation Programs of Action and National Adaptation Plans. These are country-specific strategies that identify the most urgent climate risks facing each country and outline measures to reduce vulnerability.

Typical projects include the following:

• Strengthening climate-resilient agriculture,
• Improving water management systems,
• Protecting coastal zones, and
• Building early warning systems for extreme weather events.

Because many least developed countries face multiple environmental issues at once, the fund often supports integrated projects that address climate change alongside biodiversity conservation and land management.

This funding system makes sure that the poorest and most vulnerable countries get the help they need to deal with climate change, even though they did very little to cause it.

Villagers in Nyamisati, Rufiji District, wade through muddy tidal flats to plant mangrove seedlings—part of a grassroots effort to curb saline intrusion that has begun to poison nearby rice paddies as saltwater seeps underground. The initiative reflects growing local responses to environmental degradation driven by human activity along Tanzania’s coast. The GEF supports projects like these that help mitigate the impacts of climate change. Credit: Kizito Makoye/IPS

Special Climate Change Fund

The Special Climate Change Fund supports climate action in developing countries and works alongside the Least Developed Countries Fund.

While the Least Developed Countries Fund focuses on the poorest nations, this fund helps other developing countries that are also affected by climate change.

It supports projects that:

• Help countries prepare for climate impacts,
• Include climate planning in development and infrastructure,
• Improve water management and agriculture.
• Reduce disaster risks, and
• Promote environmentally friendly technologies.

The SCCF also, in some cases, supports mitigation efforts, particularly when they involve innovative technologies that reduce greenhouse gas emissions. By financing both adaptation and mitigation initiatives, the fund contributes to global efforts to stabilise the climate system.

Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency Trust Fund

The Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency Trust Fund supports countries in implementing transparency requirements under the Paris Agreement.

Under this agreement, countries must regularly report their greenhouse gas emissions and track their progress on climate goals. However, many developing countries do not have the tools or skills to do this properly.

This fund helps by supporting:

• Training for government officials,
• Creation of national emissions data systems, and
• Better monitoring and reporting methods.

Strong reporting systems are important because they:

• Help track climate progress,
• Build trust between countries, and
• Ensure countries meet their commitments.

The fund helps developing countries improve their climate reporting so they can fully take part in global climate efforts.

How the “family of funds” works together

One of the defining features of the GEF funding model is that each part speaks to the others.

Think of it like a team of funds working together, rather than separate, isolated programs.

These funds are coordinated so they can:

• Support the same project from different angles,
• Avoid duplication (no overlapping funding for the same purpose), and
• Align with global environmental agreements.

For example:

• A biodiversity project might use:
  • The main GEF Trust Fund
  • Plus the Global Biodiversity Framework Fund
• A climate adaptation project could combine:
  • Least Developed Countries Fund
  • Special Climate Change Fund

This ‘family’ structure improves:

• Coordination, so different funds work in sync,
• Efficiency, so funds work with less waste and duplication, and
• Flexibility, so projects can tap into multiple funding sources.

Environmental problems are interconnected. A single project (like forest conservation) can:

• Reduce carbon emissions,
• Protect biodiversity,
• Improve water systems, and
• Avoid land degradation.

Because of the integrated funding system, the GEF can support all these goals at once, rather than funding them separately.

The “family of funds” is a coordinated funding system that allows the GEF to:

• Combine resources;
• Support complex, multi-sector projects; and
• Maximise environmental impact

The Future of GEF Financing

As global environmental crises grow, so does the demand for money and resources to meet climate and biodiversity needs. International assessments suggest that hundreds of billions of dollars are needed each year.

The GEF aims to play a “catalytic” role in closing this gap – in short, the GEF acts as a “catalyst” or tool for using limited public funds to unlock much larger investments.

Its funding model mobilises additional resources from

• Governments,
• Development banks, and
• Private investors.

“In practical terms, the mechanisms being supported in GEF-9 include debt-for-nature and debt-for-climate swaps, green bonds, pooled investment vehicles, and outcome-based financing structures. Each of these can serve a different purpose depending on the context – but the common thread is that they allow the GEF to use its resources strategically to unlock much larger pools of capital from the private sector, multiplying the environmental impact that public funding alone could achieve,” Aoki said.

Note: This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.

IPS UN Bureau Report

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

Credit: 279photo/iStock by Getty Images. Source: IMF

By Hippolyte Balima, Andresa Lagerborg and Evgenia Weaver
WASHINGTON DC, Apr 16 2026 (IPS)

War is again defining the global landscape. After decades of relative calm following the Cold War, the number of active conflicts has surged in recent years to levels not seen since the end of the Second World War.

Meanwhile, rising geopolitical tensions and heightened security concerns are prompting many governments to reassess their priorities and spend more on defense.

Beyond their devastating human toll, wars impose large and lasting economic costs, and pose difficult macroeconomic trade-offs, especially for those countries where the fighting is taking place.

Even without active conflicts, rising defense spending can raise economic vulnerabilities in the medium term. After the war, governments face the urgent post-conflict task of securing durable peace and sustaining recovery.

In an era of proliferating conflicts, our research in two analytical chapters of the latest World Economic Outlook highlights the deep and prolonged economic harm inflicted by war, which has particularly affected sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, and the Middle East.

We also show that rising defense spending—which can boost demand in the short term—imposes difficult budgetary trade offs that make good policy design and lasting peace more important than ever.

Economic losses

For countries where wars occur, economic activity drops sharply. On average, output in countries where fighting takes place falls by about 3 percent at the onset and continues falling for years, reaching cumulative losses of roughly 7 percent within five years.

Output losses from conflicts typically exceed those associated with financial crises or severe natural disasters. Economic scars also persist even a decade later.

Wars also tend to have significant spillover effects. Countries engaged in foreign conflicts may avoid large economic losses—partly because there is no physical destruction on their own soil.

Yet, neighboring economies or key trading partners with the country where the conflict is taking place will feel the shock. In the early years of a conflict, these countries often experience modest declines in output.

Major conflicts—those involving at least 1,000 battle-related deaths—force difficult trade-offs in economies where they occur. Government budgets deteriorate as spending shifts toward defense and debt increases, while output and tax collection collapse.

These countries may also face strains on their external balances. As imports contract sharply because of lower demand, exports decrease even more substantially, resulting in a temporary widening of the trade deficit.

Heightened uncertainty triggers capital outflows, with both foreign direct investment and portfolio flows declining. This forces wartime governments to rely more heavily on aid and, in some cases, remittances from citizens abroad to finance trade deficits.

Despite these measures, conflicts contribute to sustained exchange rate depreciation, reserve losses, and rising inflation, underscoring how widening external imbalances amplify macroeconomic stress during wartime. Prices tend to increase at a pace higher than most of central banks’ inflation targets, prompting monetary authorities to raise interest rates.

Taken together, our findings show that major conflicts impose substantial economic costs and difficult trade-offs on economies that experience conflicts within their borders, as well as hurting other countries. And these costs extend well beyond short-term disruption, with enduring consequences for both economic potential and human well-being.

Spending trade-offs

More frequent conflicts and rising geopolitical tensions have also prompted many countries to reassess their security priorities and increase defense spending. Others plan to do so. This situation presents policymakers with a crucial question about trade-offs involved with such a boost to spending.

Our analysis looks at episodes of large buildups in defense spending in 164 countries since the Second World War. We find that these booms typically last nearly three years and increase defense spending by 2.7 percentage points of gross domestic product.

That’s broadly similar to what is required by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members to reach the 5 percent of GDP defense spending target by 2035.

Ramping up defense spending primarily acts as a positive demand shock, boosting private consumption and investment, especially in defense-related sectors. This can raise both economic output and prices in the short term, requiring close coordination with monetary policy to temper inflationary pressures.

Overall, the aggregate effects on output of scaling up defense spending are likely modest. Increases in defense spending typically translate almost one for one into higher economic output, rather than having a bigger multiplier effect on activity.

That said, the multiplier or ripple effects of such spending vary widely depending on how outlays are sustained, financed and allocated, and how much equipment is imported.

For instance, output gains are smaller and external balances deteriorate when the stimulus is partly spent to import foreign goods, which is especially the case for arms importers. By contrast, a buildup of defense spending that prioritizes public investment in equipment and infrastructure, together with less fragmented procurement and more common standards, would expand market size, support economies of scale, strengthen industrial capacity, limit import leakages, and support long-term productivity growth.

The choice of how to finance defense spending entails critical trade-offs. Defense spending booms are mostly deficit-financed in the near-term, while higher revenues play a larger role in later years of defense spending booms and when the defense spending buildup is expected to be permanent.

The reliance on deficit financing can stimulate the economy in the short term, but strain fiscal sustainability over the medium term, particularly in countries with limited room in government budgets.

Deficits worsen by about 2.6 percentage points of GDP, and public debt increases by about 7 percentage points within three years of the start of a boom (14 percentage points in wartime). The resulting increase in public debt can crowd out private investment and offset the initial expansionary effect of defense spending.

The buildup of fiscal vulnerabilities can be mitigated by durable financing arrangements, especially when the increase in defense spending is permanent. However, raising revenues come at the cost of reducing consumption and dampening the demand boost, while re-ordering budget priorities tends to come at the expense of government spending on social protection, health, and education.

Policies for recovery

Our analysis also shows that economic recoveries from war are often slow and uneven, and crucially depend on the durability of peace. When peace is sustained, output rebounds but often remains modest relative to wartime losses. By contrast, in fragile economies where conflict flares up again, recoveries frequently stall.

These modest recoveries are driven primarily by labor, as workers are reallocated from military to civilian activities and refugees gradually return, while capital stock and productivity remain subdued.

Early macroeconomic stabilization, decisive debt restructuring, and international support—including aid and capacity development—play a central role in restoring confidence and promoting recovery. Recovery efforts are most effective when complemented by domestic reforms to rebuild institutions and state capacity, promote inclusion and security, and address the lasting human costs of conflict, including lost learning, poorer health, and diminished economic opportunities.

Importantly, effective post-war recovery requires comprehensive and well-coordinated policy packages. Such an approach is far more effective than piecemeal measures. Policies that simultaneously reduce uncertainty and rebuild the capital stock can reinforce expectations, encourage capital inflows, and facilitate the return of displaced people.

Ultimately, successful post-war recovery lays the foundation for stability, renewed hope and improved livelihoods for communities affected by conflict.

This IMF blog is based on Ch. 2 of the April 2026 World Economic Outlook, “Defense Spending: Macroeconomic Consequences and Trade-Offs,” and Ch. 3, “The Macroeconomics of Conflicts and Recovery.” For more on fragile and conflict-affected states: How Fragile States Can Gain by Strengthening Institutions and Core Capacities.

IPS UN Bureau

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

Protesters demonstrate outside the Columbia University campus in New York City. Credit: UN Photo/Evan Schneider
 
For decades, five powerful actors—the United States, the Arab states, the European Union, AIPAC, and Israel’s own opposition—have all claimed to seek Israeli-Palestinian peace while enabling permanent occupation, together burying the two-state solution.

By Alon Ben-Meir
NEW YORK, Apr 15 2026 (IPS)

Every powerful actor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict professes to seek peace. The US and EU repeat the two-state mantra, the Arab states invoke Palestinian rights, AIPAC proclaims its defense of Israel’s security, and Israeli opposition parties promise “responsible” leadership and stability.

Yet each, in its own way, has enabled and entrenched a destructive status quo—shielding Israel from accountability, normalizing permanent ruthless occupation, and rendering Palestinian statehood ever more illusory while fueling radicalization on both sides.

The US as the Prime Enabler

Successive US administrations have long recited support for a two-state solution, yet in practice, Washington has done more to bury that prospect than to realize it. For decades, the United States has shielded Israel from real international accountability while refusing to use its vast leverage to compel any meaningful movement toward Palestinian statehood.

By turning the “peace process” into an empty ritual, the US has provided cover for a status quo that is neither peaceful nor temporary.

At the same time, unconditional US military, financial, and diplomatic backing has enabled Israel’s relentless settlement expansion and creeping annexation of Palestinian land. American officials issue ritual complaints about settlements, but the financial and military aid kept flowing and the vetoes at the UN kept coming, signaling that no red line would ever be enforced.

This toxic mix of lofty rhetoric and impunity has locked both peoples into an ever more entrenched, zero-sum conflict and foreclosed the only viable formula—two states—for ending it.

The Gaza war has stripped away any remaining illusions. Even amid mass devastation and accusations of genocidal conduct, Washington has continued to arm and protect Israel diplomatically, becoming complicit in Israel’s war crimes. To be sure, in the name of protecting Israel, the United States has gravely imperiled Israel’s viability as a democratic state and its long-term security while setting the stage for the next violent conflagration, to Israel’s detriment.

The Arab States’ Shortcomings

The Arab states, though never tiring of affirming the justice of the Palestinian cause and the necessity of a two-state solution, have consistently fallen short of their words. Although they possess enormous strategic weight—withholding or granting diplomatic recognition, and opening markets, energy, airspace, and security cooperation—they have rarely used these tools to force Israel to choose between occupation and peace with the Palestinians.

This failure has signaled to Israel that it can normalize relations with some Arab states, à la the Abraham Accords, while maintaining its grip on Palestinian land without risking any backlash.

Even in the face of Israel’s genocidal war in Gaza, most Arab governments limited themselves to statements, summits, and carefully choreographed outrage that stopped well short of meaningful pressure.

The Arab states that normalized relations with Israel continued to protect key political and economic ties, while the front-line states—Egypt and Jordan—maintained security coordination that shielded Israel from real strategic isolation.

By doing so little when so much was at stake, Arab states have become, in effect, accomplices to the perpetuation of the conflict they denounce. Their inaction has left Palestinians without a credible Arab shield, allowed Israel to entrench settlement and annexation, and pushed the two-state solution—the only realistic path to a just peace and security for both Israel and the Palestinians—to the wayside.

The EU’s Shortsightedness

The European Union is Israel’s largest trading partner and a major source of investment, technology, and diplomatic legitimacy. Yet, it has systematically refused to wield this considerable leverage to force a choice between occupation and peace with the Palestinians.

Instead of linking market access, research cooperation, or association agreements to clear benchmarks on settlements and Palestinian rights, Brussels has largely confined itself to criticism and symbolic measures that Israel has comfortably ignored.

The EU’s posture has effectively insulated Israel from serious economic or diplomatic consequences for entrenching an apartheid one-state reality of perpetual domination.

At the same time, although individual EU states, including France, the United Kingdom, and Spain, have recognized the Palestinian state, they have done virtually nothing to turn that recognition into hard power; arms exports and trade preferences continue with Israel as usual. Recognition becomes a cheap, cost-free declaration rather than a meaningful constraint on Israeli policy.

Thus, EU passivity has helped normalize occupation and settlement expansion while leaving Palestinians without an effective European counterweight, making a genuine two-state solution ever more remote, to the detriment of both Israel and the Palestinians.

AIPAC’s Culpability

AIPAC presents itself as a friend of Israel. Still, by relentlessly reinforcing the country’s most hardline positions, it has turned “pro-Israel” into a rigid orthodoxy that equates any pressure on Israeli governments with betrayal, thereby narrowing the range of policies American lawmakers feel politically safe to support.

For decades, AIPAC has backed Israeli governments without qualification—endorsing military campaigns, providing political cover for settlement expansion, and supporting a maximalist posture toward the Palestinians.

It rallies Congress behind unconditional aid, arms transfers, and diplomatic protection. This has helped Israeli leaders believe they can permanently deepen occupation and de facto annexation while still counting on automatic American support.

AIPAC has refused to use its considerable leverage to press for peace-oriented concessions and territorial compromise. Instead, it has rendered the two state solution an empty slogan while supporting the Israeli policies that make it impossible. In doing so, AIPAC has directly contributed to the ever worsening conflict and put Israel’s security under constant threat.

Still, AIPAC has not awakened from its blind support that jeopardizes Israel’s very existence and, with that, scuttles any prospect for an Israeli-Palestinian peace.

Israeli Opposition Parties’ Dismal Failure

Israel’s opposition parties have failed to offer a credible, sustained alternative to the right’s permanent conflict paradigm, and in doing so have gravely weakened Israel’s chances for peace. Instead of forcefully championing a two-state solution, most opposition leaders tiptoe around the very words “Palestinian state,” intimidated by electoral backlash and the charge of being “soft” on security. Their political inaptitude has allowed the right to define what is “realistic,” narrowing the political options to endless occupation and recurrent war.

Thus, they have directly contributed to the current impasse, making the conflict ever more intractable. Without a major party willing to argue that Israel’s long-term security depends on a two-state solution, the public hears only variations of the same message: manage, contain, punish, but never resolve. This abdication cedes the strategic debate to the extremist Netanyahu and his messianic lunatics, who are creepingly implementing their scheme of greater Israel, which would bury any prospect for peace.

It is a dire reality for the country that the opposing parties failed to coalesce and present a united front to push for a two-state solution, even following the Gaza war, which has unequivocally demonstrated that after nearly 80 years of conflict, only peace would provide Israel with ultimate security.

Every leader from these parties feels they are the most qualified to be the prime minister, but has failed miserably to offer realistic plans to end the conflict.

By failing to unite, organize, educate, and mobilize Israelis around a clear two state vision, these parties are undermining Israel’s security, eroding its international standing, and endangering its very future as a Jewish, democratic state.

The record of these five enablers is devastating. They made a just peace ever more remote, pushing Israel precariously toward an apartheid one state reality it cannot sustain morally, demographically, or strategically, while abandoning the Palestinians to the cruelest, inhumane occupation.

They must change course now—or condemn Israelis and Palestinians to generations of bloodshed that will erase Israel’s reason for being and extinguish Palestinian nationhood.

Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a retired professor of international relations, most recently at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He taught courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies.

IPS UN Bureau

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

Credit: Kristian Tuxen Ladegaard Berg/NurPhoto via AFP

By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Apr 15 2026 (IPS)

When Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen addressed her supporters on election night on 24 March, she chose her words carefully. Losing four percentage points after almost seven years in power, she suggested, wasn’t so bad given there’s been a pandemic, a war in Europe and a confrontation with Donald Trump over Greenland. The reality was the Social Democrats had recorded their worst general election result since 1903. Meanwhile, the far-right Danish People’s Party (DPP) tripled its seat count, despite years of the Social Democrats leading a systematic crackdown on immigration to try to prevent it gaining support.

A historic result

While the Social Democrats came first on 21.9 per cent of the vote, they dropped from 50 to 38 seats. Their centre-right coalition partner, Venstre, had its worst result in its 150-year history. These are the two parties that have led every government since mainstream politics began copying far-right narratives on immigration. The bargain has benefitted neither.

Vote-switching data from exit polls told the story. The Social Democrats retained only around two thirds of their 2022 support. Their largest group of defectors — 13 per cent of their previous voters — switched to the Green Left, which now holds 20 seats as parliament’s second-largest party. Right-leaning voters switched to the DPP rather than rewarding the Social Democrats for delivering the immigration restrictions the DPP has long demanded. Time and again, evidence suggests that voters who are highly motivated about an issue tend to prefer parties that have always prioritised it over parties that have adopted it more recently out of electoral calculation.

The overall picture leaves neither bloc with a majority. The left-wing grouping holds 84 seats and the right holds 77, both short of the 90 needed to govern. Frederiksen has submitted her resignation as prime minister but, as leader of the largest party, has been charged with forming a new government. This is a task made harder by the conditions attached by Moderates leader Lars Løkke Rasmussen, who’s unwilling to join a government that does not include both left and right.

Twenty-five years of accommodation

The Social Democrats’ turn on immigration began in the aftermath of their 2001 election defeat. The party believed it was losing working-class voters to the far right over immigration and concluded it needed to compete on that ground. It framed anti-immigration policies as a defence of the welfare state, trying to emphasise solidarity rather than xenophobia, and over the next decade moved steadily rightward on this issue.

The nine seats the DPP got in 2001 became invaluable to centre-right Venstre leader Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who formed a minority government with its support. His government subsequently launched a wave of amendments to the Aliens Act, which was changed 93 times between 2002 and 2016 with the explicit goal of making Denmark less appealing to asylum seekers.

Throughout the 2000s and early 2010s, the DPP grew steadily, winning 20.6 per cent of votes in 2015 to become the biggest force on the right. Between 2015 and 2018, immigration law was amended over 70 times.

When Frederiksen became Social Democrat leader in 2015, she sought to outbid the DPP. By the 2019 election, the Social Democrats’ anti-immigration platform closely mirrored the DPP’s. And in the short term, it worked for them. They won the 2019 election while the DPP lost almost 12 percentage points. In losing, though, the DPP had won: its previously fringe positions on migration, belonging and identity had been absorbed into mainstream politics.

A rights-violating regime

On entering government in 2019, Frederiksen entrenched what the Social Democrats called a ‘paradigm shift’, moving from integration to deterrence, detention and return, with the stated goal of admitting ‘zero asylum seekers’. Denmark became the first European state to declare parts of Syria safe, enabling it to deport Syrian refugees to an active conflict zone. In 2021, parliament authorised the outsourcing of asylum processing to countries outside Europe. By 2024, Denmark was granting under 900 people asylum a year, the lowest figure in four decades, pandemic years excluded.

The human rights consequences have been documented by international civil society organisations and bodies such as the United Nations Committee Against Torture. Amnesty International has raised concerns about the forced return of asylum seekers to danger in violation of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The European Court of Human Rights ruled that Denmark’s three-year waiting period for family reunification for refugees with temporary protection status violates the right to family life. Policies targeting government-classified ‘ghetto’ areas — overwhelmingly low-income neighbourhoods with high concentrations of people from migrant backgrounds — have been challenged at the European Court of Justice on grounds of racial discrimination.

The harm has been intentional. A framework designed to make Denmark as unwelcoming as possible has placed tens of thousands of people in prolonged legal uncertainty, with documented effects on family stability and mental health. Under Denmark’s presidency of the Council of the European Union, Frederiksen pressed for similar policies across Europe and, alongside far-right Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, lobbied for a revised European Convention on Human Rights to enable easier deportation. Centre-left governments in Sweden and the UK have looked to Denmark as a model.

Normalisation, not neutralisation

The political calculation was that taking ownership of immigration would reduce its salience as an issue and deny the far right the fuel to grow. Instead, the move intensified demand, leaving opponents of migration taking ever more extreme positions while erasing the distinction between mainstream and far-right politics.

Denmark’s experience is a lesson other European centre-left parties appear determined not to learn. Twenty-five years of accommodation have produced a society in which far-right assumptions have become normalised, at enormous and ongoing cost to those whose rights are being stripped away. This is not a template; it is a warning.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

From the left, Rev. Tolbert Thomas Jallah Jn with Mariann Bassey Olsson during the launch of the campaign in Cartagena, Colombia. Credit: AFSA.

By Isaiah Esipisu
NAIROBI, Apr 14 2026 (IPS)

Over 800 households in Ikolomani Constituency in Kakamega County, Western Kenya, fear eviction to pave the way for a British firm, Shanta Gold Limited, to begin extracting gold valued at Sh683 billion ($5.29 billion) on an estimated 337 acres of residential and agricultural land.

Efforts by residents to protest against the looming displacement during an attempt for a public participation session on the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) by the government on 4 December 2025 were met with police brutality, leading to four deaths due to bullet wounds, arbitrary arrests and scores of injuries.

According to the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), the incident is part of a disturbing and escalating pattern in Kenya’s extractive sector, where communities seeking accountability are met with brutal force, political threats, and procedural manipulation.

“Mining zones are increasingly becoming death traps rather than engines of community development,” reads part of a statement issued by the commission following the incident.

This trend mirrors what is happening in many other countries across Africa, where communities living in mineral-rich areas face forceful displacements, abuse of basic human rights, and environmental degradation linked to industrial mineral extraction, often perpetrated by foreign firms with full support of the political class.

According to Appolinaire Zagabe, a Congolese human rights activist and the Director for the DRC Climate Change Network (Reseau Sur le Changement Climatique RDC) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), often, people he terms ‘greedy government officials’ sign contracts with extractive firms to legalise their activities, then use police machinery to forcefully and brutally evict communities without informed consent and proper compensation.

It is based on such injustices that civil society organisations, social movements, faith-based actors, Indigenous Peoples, pastoralist and peasant organisations from Africa under the umbrella of the Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa (AFSA) launched a campaign calling for land policies that protect African smallholder farmers and communities against punitive extractive practices and land grabbing, which are currently a threat to human rights, livelihoods and sustainable food systems.

“Land is more than a resource; it is our heritage, our identity, and our future,” said Rev. Tolbert Thomas Jallah Jr, the Executive Director at the Faith and Justice Network, during the launch of the campaign on the sidelines of the International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ICARRD+20) in Cartagena, Colombia.

“Across Africa, our soils feed our families, sustain our economies, and connect generations, yet today, land degradation, industrial extractive practices by foreign enterprises, climate change, and land grabbing threaten the very foundation of our food systems,” he added.

In a joint declaration at the conference, the organisations observed that rural communities across the world continue to face dispossession, land concentration, and ecological destruction.

“Despite global commitments to end hunger and poverty, land and food systems are increasingly controlled by corporate and financial interests, while communities that produce food remain marginalised and insecure,” reads part of the declaration statement.

It was further observed that carbon offset projects, extractive industries, agribusiness expansions, and speculative land markets are accelerating dispossession, soil degradation, and social inequality, often excluding communities from territories they have governed collectively for generations.

The campaign, dubbed “Protect Our Land, Restore Our Soil”, is now calling on governments to strengthen land rights and protect smallholder farmers; communities to embrace sustainable farming practices that rebuild soil fertility; and youthful farmers to view agriculture not as a last resort but as a powerful pathway to innovation and resilience.

“When soil is degraded, food becomes scarce, and when land is taken or misused, communities lose dignity and security,” said Rev. Tolbert, who is also the sitting Chairperson at the AFSA’s Board of Directors.

Just like the looming evictions of residents of Ikolomani in Kenya, Amnesty International has also observed that people of the DRC also pay a high price to supply the world with copper and cobalt: forced evictions, illegal destruction of their homes, and physical violence – sometimes leading to deaths.

The DRC supplies 70 to 74 percent of the copper and cobalt used in lithium-ion batteries. These batteries power our smartphones, laptops, electric cars, and bicycles, and they play a major role in the energy transition away from fossil fuels. This transition is urgent and necessary.

However, according to Amnesty International, mineral-rich regions of the DRC are sacrificed to mining development, leading to a shocking series of abuses in the region. Thousands of people have lost their homes, schools, hospitals, and communities due to the expansion of copper and cobalt mines in the country, especially in Kolwezi, which sits above rich copper and cobalt deposits.

The AFSA-led campaign calls on governments and corporate organisations to guarantee meaningful participation of affected communities and free prior and informed consent of Indigenous Peoples in land, agriculture and climate decision-making to avoid conflicts and abuse of basic human rights.

“The future lies not in further commodifying land and food systems, but in restoring community control over territories, securing pastoralist mobility and commons, and supporting agroecological transitions rooted in justice and ecological integrity,” observed Mariann Bassey Olsson, a Lawyer, and Director at Action (Friends of the Earth Nigeria).

IPS UN Bureau Report

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

The Rohingya did not choose dependency on aid. It was created by the restrictions surrounding them. Credit: UNHCR/Amanda Jufrian

By Mohammed Zonaid
COX’S BAZAR, Bangladesh, Apr 14 2026 (IPS)

While global attention right now is on escalating geopolitical tensions involving the United States, Israel, and Iran, another crisis continues quietly in Bangladesh.

Beginning April 1, 2026, the World Food Programme (WFP) introduced a revised Targeting and Prioritisation Exercise (TPE) for Rohingya refugees living in camps in Cox’s Bazar and Bhasan Char, according to a statement released by the United Nations in Bangladesh on April 2.

Under the new system, refugee households will receive food assistance of $12, $10, or $7 per person per month, depending on their assessed level of food insecurity. Previously, all refugees received $12 per person.

On paper, vulnerability-based targeting appears reasonable. In many humanitarian crises, such systems help ensure that limited resources reach those most in need. However, the Rohingya context is different.

Nearly nine years after fleeing genocide and persecution in Myanmar, more than one million Rohingya refugees remain confined to camps in Bangladesh, according to the latest data from UNHCR Bangladesh including 144,456 biometrically identified new arrivals and 1,040,408 Registered refugees 1990s & post-2017. 78% them are Women and children.

Unlike refugees in many other countries, Rohingya in Bangladesh have extremely limited freedom of movement and cannot legally work or run small businesses within the camps. Refugees are also not formally employed by humanitarian organizations—except as volunteers receiving small daily allowances. As a result, they remain almost entirely dependent on humanitarian assistance.

Within this context, reducing aid raises serious concerns. When refugees are not permitted to engage in meaningful economic activity, food insecurity becomes less a household condition and more a structural outcome.

Humanitarian agencies have provided life-saving support for years, and their efforts should not be overlooked. But survival is not the same as stability. Instead of creating pathways toward self-reliance for Rohingya and local communities in Cox’s Bazar who are affected due to refugee statements, the current system has largely institutionalized dependency.

Many programs labeled as “livelihood initiatives” have not produced meaningful outcomes. Skills training programs—such as electrical repair or other technical courses—often fail to translate into real opportunities because refugees do not own motorbikes, electricity access is limited in many camp areas, refugees cannot legally move beyond the camps to seek work, and humanitarian organizations don’t employ trained refugees within their own operational structures.

This raises difficult questions: Why invest donor resources in skills that cannot realistically be applied? And what long-term strategy do these initiatives serve?

The new targeting model categorizes refugees as extremely food insecure, highly food insecure, or food insecure. Some vulnerable households—such as those led by elderly individuals, persons with disabilities, or children—will continue receiving the highest level of assistance.

Yet the broader reality remains unchanged: the entire Rohingya population in Bangladesh faces severe restrictions on economic participation.

Recent protests in the camps are often described as reactions to ration reductions. In reality, they reflect deeper concerns about uncertainty and the absence of long-term planning. Refugees are asking a simple question: What happens if funding declines further in the future? Where will we go? Well Bangladesh alone will be left dealing with the Rohingya crisis?

They want to send a message to the world: dependency on aid was designed around the Rohingya. It is time to think beyond relief and give them the tools to stand on their own feet.

Long-term strategic thinking is urgently needed. This includes serious discussions about ensuring safe and dignified lives in the camps until the Rohingya are able to return to Myanmar, expanding economic participation for refugees, and creating policies that allow them to contribute economically while remaining under appropriate regulation.

At the same time, Bangladesh itself is going through a transitional period after the election, and the new government and said it will work closely to make Rohingya repatriation possible and shared data on 8.29 lakh Rohingyas with Myanmar.

But the Rohingya crisis cannot be a lesser priority, the new government also needs to recognize that prolonged displacement cannot be managed indefinitely through restriction and relief alone—the same approach that largely characterized the policies of the previous government.

Carefully regulated work opportunities—such as camp-based enterprises, pilot employment schemes, or limited work authorization programs—could help reduce humanitarian dependency while preserving government oversight.

If even one or two members of each refugee household were allowed to work legally under controlled frameworks, humanitarian costs could gradually decline, camp economies could stabilize, and youth frustration could decrease.

Most importantly, dignity could begin to return.

After nearly nine years, international agencies have managed one of the world’s largest refugee operations with remarkable logistical capacity. Yet the central question remains: what durable systems have been created to help refugees stand on their own feet?

As global funding pressures increase and donor fatigue grows, humanitarian assistance is being recalibrated downward. Without structural reforms, this risks managing dependency more efficiently rather than reducing it.

The Rohingya did not choose dependency on aid. It was created by the restrictions surrounding them. Food assistance remains essential. But the future of an entire population cannot be defined solely by ration cards and vulnerability categories.

The Rohingya crisis requires more than improved targeting of aid. It requires policies that combine protection with participation and living with safety.

The world has learned how to feed the Rohingya.

The real test is whether it will allow them to stand—until the day they can safely return home to Myanmar with rights, safety, and dignity.

Otherwise, families quietly reduce meals. Young people seek unsafe informal labor. The risks of child labor, early marriage, unsafe migration. and involvement in illicit activities increase. When opportunity disappears, desperation fills the gap.

Mohammed Zonaid is a Rohingya SOPA 2025 honoree, freelance journalist, award-winning photographer, and fixer. He works with international agencies and has contributed to Myanmar Now, The Arakan Express News, The Diplomat Magazine, Frontier Myanmar, Inter Press Service, and the Myanmar Pressphoto Agency.

IPS UN Bureau

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

 
CIVICUS discusses recent regressive changes to Argentina’s labour laws with Facundo Merlán Rey, an activist with the Coordination Against Police and Institutional Repression (CORREPI), an organisation that defends workers’ rights and resists state repression.

Facundo Merlán Rey

What does the new law change and why did the government decide to push it through?

Capitalising on its victory in last year’s legislative election, which gave it a majority in both parliamentary chambers, the government pushed through a labour law that introduced changes on several fronts simultaneously.

It increases the daily maximum of working hours from eight to 12, with a weekly cap of 48. Hours worked beyond this limit no longer need to be paid separately, but can be accumulated and exchanged for days off at a later date.

It also introduces the concept of ‘dynamic wage’, allowing part of an employee’s pay to be determined based on merit or individual productivity. The employer can decide this unilaterally with no need for a collective agreement. This would allow two people to be paid differently for doing the same work.

The law creates the Labour Assistance Fund, an account to which the employer contributes three per cent of a worker’s salary, of which between one and 2.5 percentage points come from the worker’s pay. If dismissed, the worker receives the amount accumulated in that fund. This is deeply humiliating. It makes the worker contribute to the financing of their dismissal. Given that these contributions previously went into the pension system, the effect will also be to weaken pensions.

The law restricts the right to strike by expanding the list of occupations deemed essential, which means they are required to maintain at least 75 per cent of their operations during a strike. Previously, this category included air traffic control, electricity, gas, healthcare and water. Now it also includes customs, education at all levels except university, immigration, ports and telecommunications. In practice, this means that in these fields a strike will have a much more limited impact.

Finally, the law repeals the special regimes that regulated working conditions in some trades and professions. Over the next six months, hairdressers, private drivers, radio and telegraph operators and travelling salespeople will lose these protections. The Journalists’ Statute will be abolished from 2027 onwards.

At CORREPI, we believe all these measures are unconstitutional, as they directly contravene article 14 of the constitution, which guarantees the right to work and the right to decent living conditions. The changes put employers in a position of almost absolute dominance in an employment relationship, leaving workers with no real scope to defend their rights.

How have trade unions and social organisations reacted?

The most militant groups highlighted the problems with the new law clearly, but the response from the organised labour movement has been insufficient.

Union leaders responded with a belated and low-profile campaign plan. They have long been criticised for preferring discreet agreements to open confrontation, and this time was no different. They negotiated behind the scenes and secured concessions to protect themselves. The law maintains employers’ contributions to trade union health schemes and the union dues paid by workers for two years. The rights of workers as a whole were sidelined.

What impact are the changes having?

Although the law is already in force, its full implementation faces obstacles, partly because it has internal consistency issues that hinder its practical application. When the government attempts to apply it in employment areas that still retain rights, it will likely face legal challenges, which will increase social unrest.

Even so, some of its effects are already being felt. Unemployment is rising slowly but steadily. Factory closures, driven by the opening up of imports and the greater ease of dismissal, are pushing more workers into informal employment and multiple jobs. The result is a fall in consumption and a level of strain with outcomes that are difficult to predict.

The consequences extend beyond the economic sphere. Increasingly demanding working conditions, combined with high inflation and rising household debt, are taking a toll on workers’ mental health. Regrettably, there is already a worrying rise in the suicide rate.

There’s also a consequence that is harder to measure: this reform erodes the collective identity of workers. When work is informal, individuals tend to solve their problems on their own, making it much harder to organise to demand better conditions. In working-class neighbourhoods, drug trafficking is becoming established as an alternative source of employment, generating situations of violence that largely go unnoticed. Unfortunately, everything points to an ever-deepening social breakdown.

What lessons does this experience hold for the rest of the region?

Regional experience shows it is very difficult to reverse this kind of change. In Brazil, President Lula da Silva came to power in 2022 promising to repeal the labour law passed in 2017 under Michel Temer’s government, similarly opposed by social organisations and trade unions. However, he failed to do so, and the framework Temer left remains in force. Once passed, these laws tend to remain in place regardless of who governs next.

That’s why what’s happening in Argentina should not be viewed as an isolated phenomenon. The reform appears to be part of a broader direction that regional politics is taking under the influence of the USA, one of the main drivers of these changes and a supporter of the governments implementing them.

The weakening of labour rights and collective organising is not a side effect; it is the objective being pursued. Dismantling workers’ ability to organise collectively facilitates the advance of extractive and financial interests and guarantees access to cheap labour. In that sense, Argentina offers a warning to the rest of the region.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

GET IN TOUCH
Website
Facebook
Instagram
Twitter
YouTube

SEE ALSO
‘Milei managed to capture social unrest and channel it through a disruptive political proposal’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Carlos Gervasoni 13.Dec.2025
‘Society must prepare to act collectively to defend rights and democracy’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Natalia Gherardi 27.Feb.2025
‘The state is abandoning its role as guarantor of access to rights’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Vanina Escales and Manuel Tufró 22.Jul.2024

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

The Global Environment Facility (GEF) announced that donor countries ​p​ledged an initial ​U​SD 3.9 billion to ​the facility for the ninth replenishment cycle​, indicating that nature remains a priority, as in this image, where a veterinary team applies a collar to a sedated elephant​ in KwaZulu-Natal​, South Africa, as part of an ambitious project aimed at conserving the animals. Credit: Dan Ingham/IPS

By Alison Kentish
SAINT LUCIA, Apr 9 2026 (IPS)

With just four years left to meet a series of global environmental targets, governments are committing to shore up one of the world’s main environmental funds, the Global Environment Facility (GEF), with a $3.9 billion pledge.

The funding will form the backbone of the GEF’s ninth replenishment cycle, known as GEF-9, a four-year financing round running from July 2026 to June 2030. Those years are widely seen as decisive for slowing biodiversity loss, tackling pollution and keeping climate goals within reach.

While the $3.9 billion pledge signals renewed momentum, it comes at a moment of deepening environmental strain. Ecosystems are continuing to decline, coral reefs are bleaching at scale and small island states are already grappling with the economic and social fallout of environmental change.

“This replenishment sends a clear message: the world is not giving up on nature,” said Claude Gascon, the GEF’s interim chief executive. He noted that donor countries had “risen to the challenge and made bold commitments towards a more positive future for the planet” despite competing global priorities.

“The coming four years of the GEF-9 cycle will reflect this high-ambition push to achieve the 2030 environmental goals,” he said.

The GEF, the world’s largest multilateral environmental fund, supports developing countries in meeting commitments under major global agreements on climate change, biodiversity, land degradation, chemicals, and ocean governance. Since its establishment, it has provided more than $27 billion in grants and mobilised a further $155 billion in co-financing.

GEF’s next funding round, its ninth replenishment cycle, aims to scale investment and mobilise private capital to close widening environmental financing gaps. Credit: Kea Mowat/Unsplash

Rewiring Economies Around Nature

At the centre of the new funding cycle is a push toward what the GEF calls “nature-positive development”. It is an effort to embed environmental value into economic decision-making rather than treating it as a secondary concern.

That includes reworking systems that drive environmental degradation, such as food production, energy, urban development and public health, so they operate within ecological limits.

The strategy also leans heavily on attracting private investment. Around 25% of GEF-9 resources are expected to be used to mobilise private capital, reflecting a growing recognition that public funding alone cannot close the global environmental financing gap.

Focus on the Most Vulnerable

The allocation of funds carries a clear political signal.

At least 35 percent of resources are expected to go to Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), countries that contribute least to environmental degradation but face some of its most severe impacts. A further 20% is earmarked for Indigenous Peoples and local communities.

For Caribbean nations, where coastal erosion, stronger storms and coral reef loss are already reshaping economies, the funding could prove significant if it translates quickly into action on the ground.

“We need multilateral cooperation more than ever to protect our planet for future generations,” said Niels Annen, describing the replenishment as a “joint effort” between countries in the Global North and South. “Environmental action and sustainable development have to go hand in hand. In GEF-9, we see Germany’s priorities very well reflected: innovative finance for nature and people, better cooperation with the private sector and stable resources for the most vulnerable countries.”

Support for the funding round has also come from Spain and Mexico, with Inés Carpio San Román emphasising the importance of “effective multilateralism” and Mexico backing “country-driven solutions” to global environmental challenges.

Calls to Deliver Results

Civil society groups have welcomed the increased emphasis on inclusion, particularly the allocation for Indigenous Peoples and local communities.

“This will strengthen a whole-of-society approach,” said Faizal Parish, Chair of the GEF’s Civil Society Organization Network, while Aliou Mustafa, of the GEF’s Indigenous Peoples Advisory Group, said the shift reflects efforts to place Indigenous groups “at the centre of decision-making.”

Still, expectations are high and time is short.

“The environmental crises we face are accelerating,” said Richard Bontjer. He described the  replenishment as “a vote of confidence” while stressing that “every dollar must count.”

“This replenishment will sharpen the GEF’s focus on impact, drive greater efficiency and mobilize private finance alongside public investment. It will also strengthen support to SIDS and LDCs and give recognition to the importance of supporting Indigenous Peoples and local communities.”

With the 2030 deadline fast approaching, the success of this funding round will ultimately be judged not by the size of the pledges but by how quickly they translate into measurable gains—restored ecosystems, protected coastlines and more resilient economies.

For countries on the frontlines, including those in the Caribbean, the $3.9 billion is not just another funding cycle.

It is a narrowing window of opportunity.

Additional pledges are expected before the end-of-May GEF Council meeting, when countries will lock in the final size and ambition of the four-year funding round.

The 71st GEF Council meeting will be held in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, from May 31 to June 3, 2026. The meeting will take place in advance of the Eighth GEF Assembly, when individual country pledges will be publicly announced.

Note: This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.

IPS UN Bureau Report

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

Excerpt:

Shaun Hughes (left), WFP Country Director for Palestine, walks amid massive destruction in Gaza. Credit: WFP/Maxime Le Lijour
 
Excerpts from a statement by Tom Fletcher, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, to the Security Council, pursuant to resolution 2730 (2024) on the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and the protection of United Nations and associated personnel.

By Tom Fletcher
UNITED NATIONS, Apr 9 2026 (IPS)

In 2025, at least 326 humanitarians were recorded as killed across 21 countries, bringing the total number of humanitarians killed in three years to over 1,010. We recognise, grieve and honour each of our 326 colleagues, and commit the work ahead to their memory.

Of those over 1,000 deaths, more than 560 were in Gaza and the West Bank, 130 in Sudan, 60 in South Sudan, 25 in Ukraine and 25 in [the Democratic Republic of the Congo].

That number – over 1,000 – compares to 377 recorded as killed globally over the previous three years – so that’s almost tripling the death count. This is not an accidental escalation – it is the collapse of protection.

These humanitarians were killed while distributing food, water, medicine, shelter. They died in clearly marked convoys and on missions coordinated directly with authorities. And, too often, they were killed by Member States of the United Nations.

Credit: WFP/Sayed Asif Mahmud / Source: UN News

Humanitarians know we face risks. It is the nature of our work, the places in which we operate.
These deaths are not because we are reckless with our lives. They are because parties to the conflict are reckless with our lives.

So, on behalf of over a thousand dead humanitarians and their families, we ask: why?

Is it because the world no longer believes in Security Council resolution 2730, in which you spoke with such moral urgency about ending violence against humanitarians?

Is it because international humanitarian law, forged by a generation of wiser political leaders for just such a time as this, is no longer convenient?

Is it because it is more important to protect those designing, selling, supplying and firing lethal weapons – including drones, cyber tools, artificial intelligence – than protecting us?

Is it because those killing us feel no cost for their actions? How many were prosecuted? How many of their leaders resigned? On how many investigations did the UN Security Council insist? Were you ever selective in your outrage?

Or is it because Member States see these numbers as collateral damage, part of the fog of war? Or worse, are we now seen as legitimate targets?

And perhaps the most chilling question: if these deaths were ‘preventable,’ why then were they not prevented?

Over 110 Member States have chosen to act together through the political declaration on the protection of humanitarians. Yet across multiple crises, humanitarians are not just being killed.

Our action is being restricted, penalized, delegitimized. We are told where not to go, whom not to help. We are harassed or arrested for doing our job. And we are lied about – and those lies have these consequences.

And, of course, when humanitarians are harmed, aid often stops. Clinics close, food doesn’t arrive. In Yemen, 73 UN and dozens of NGO personnel remain arbitrarily detained by the Houthis. In Afghanistan and Yemen, women humanitarians are prevented from doing their jobs.

In Gaza, Israel restricts UN agencies and international NGOs. In Myanmar, insecurity and access constraints cut off aid to over 100,000 people in a single month.

And in Ukraine, drone attacks have forced aid groups to pull back from frontline communities.

In all these cases, the results of the deaths of humanitarians are too often the death of hope for millions who rely on them. These trends, alongside the collapse in funding for our lifesaving work, are a symptom of a lawless, bellicose, selfish and violent world. Killing humanitarians is part of the broader attack on the UN Charter and on international humanitarian law.

International humanitarian law was never, and is not now, an academic exercise. In honour of our colleagues killed, and in solidarity with those now risking their lives, we ask you to act with much greater conviction, consistency and courage.

I normally conclude with three asks of this Council. But it seems insulting to over one thousand colleagues killed to echo back to you the commitments of SCR 2730: protection, integrity, accountability.

We come here not to remind you of these commitments, but to challenge you to uphold them.
Because if we cast aside these hard-won principles, then the integrity of this Council, and the laws we are here to protect, die with our colleagues.

IPS UN Bureau

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

An artisan puts final touches to the monument of Magawa, a Tanzanian-born bomb-sniffing rat. Credit: APOPO

By Kizito Makoye
MOROGORO, Tanzania , Apr 7 2026 (IPS)

At Mazimbu village, not far from Tanzania’s Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA), Stephano Jaka still remembers the night he trapped and killed a rat that had been feasting on his maize cobs – stored in a meticulously woven basket designed to protect grains from rodents.
“I felt a big sense of relief when I finally killed it. It had been causing huge losses to my family,” he tells IPS.

Thousands of kilometres away in Siem Reap, Cambodia, farmers were among the dignitaries invited on Saturday to honour a Tanzanian-born rat for detecting hundreds of landmines, helping to clear swathes of land for farming.

Where farmers in Tanzania’s Morogoro region still perceive rats as destructive creatures threatening their livelihoods, communities in Cambodia embrace one of the species as a life-saving hero – underscoring how a despised animal has come to embody entirely different meanings across continents.

Cambodia remains one of the world’s most landmine-infested countries, with millions of explosives still buried underground, making large areas unsafe for farming, settlement and development.

On the eve of the International Day for Mine Awareness, a 2.2-metre statue – the world’s first public monument dedicated to a life-saving rat – was unveiled. The monument honours Magawa, whose bomb-sniffing career began after a yearlong stint at Sokoine University. He was hailed not as a crop-raiding pest but as an unlikely hero whose extraordinary sense of smell helped uncover hidden dangers.

For years, Magawa worked across some of Cambodia’s most dangerous terrain, detecting more than 100 landmines and helping to make large areas safe before his death in 2022. He remains the only rat ever awarded the PDSA Gold Medal for bravery.

Carved from local stone by Cambodian artisans, the statue shows Magawa wearing his medal and operational harness. Its base incorporates fragments of decommissioned explosives, symbolising the threat he helped eliminate. Erected in central Siem Reap, the monument also directs visitors to APOPO’s centre, where they can learn about the rats’ work and the ongoing impact of landmines.

“Magawa became a global symbol of hope for Cambodia’s mine-affected communities. This statue honours his extraordinary service and the work of all APOPO HeroRATs who continue to save lives in Cambodia and around the world — step by step, life by life,” said Christophe Cox, founder of APOPO.

The tribute also serves as a reminder that millions of landmines remain buried, and efforts to clear them continue despite limited resources.

Magawa was trained by APOPO, a non-governmental organisation that deploys African giant pouched rats to detect explosives. Because they are too light to trigger landmines, the animals can safely search contaminated areas far more quickly than conventional methods.

Born at Sokoine University of Agriculture in Morogoro, Magawa showed early promise before being deployed to Cambodia in 2016, where he became one of the most successful detection animals in the programme.

In heavily affected regions such as Battambang, land once considered too dangerous has been cleared and returned to productive use, allowing communities to rebuild livelihoods and restore a sense of normalcy.

Magawa’s work also highlights a broader story of African innovation contributing to global solutions, with a programme developed in Tanzania now supporting mine clearance efforts in several countries.

Although Magawa died in 2022, other trained rats continue the work, helping to reduce the threat posed by unexploded landmines.

Residents of Morogoro spoke with a mix of pride, curiosity and quiet awe when reflecting on the global recognition of Magawa, the giant African pouched rat whose work in Cambodia has saved countless lives.

“Who would have thought a rat from our region could become a global hero?” said Jaka. “Here, rats are something we chase away. But Magawa has changed that story completely. He has shown us that even the smallest creatures can carry the biggest responsibilities.”

At the Morogoro main market, trader Rehema Msuya said Magawa’s story had sparked new conversations among residents about science and innovation.

“People now talk about rats differently,” she said. “We used to see them only as destructive. But this one saved lives and detected danger where machines sometimes fail. It makes you proud, knowing such intelligence can come from a rat.”

For some, Magawa’s legacy goes beyond admiration, emphasising the possibilities often overlooked.

“Magawa represents Africa in a very powerful way,” said Dar es Salaam-based secondary school teacher Godfrey Lwambano. “We often underestimate what we have – our environment, our knowledge, even our animals. Yet here is a creature trained with patience and care, going on to clear deadly landmines and protect communities far away.”

Young people in Morogoro, too, say the story touched them.

“When I first heard about him, I thought it was a joke,” said 22-year-old university student Neema Kibwana. “But when I learnt he worked for years detecting mines and even received awards, I was inspired. It shows that impact doesn’t depend on size or status.”

As the story of Magawa circulates in Tanzania and beyond, it continues to challenge long-held perceptions – transforming an animal once seen only as a pest into a symbol of ingenuity, resilience and hope.

IPS UN Bureau Report

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

Credit: US Department of Defense / Wiki Commons

By Herbert Wulf
Apr 6 2026 (IPS)

 
Donald Trump ran on a platform of ending wars. After his success in Venezuela, he is intoxicated by his military achievements and is banking on regime change in several countries.

In a swift and decisive move, US forces abducted Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and his wife to the United States. The current government in Caracas has little choice but to largely submit to Washington’s dictates. Trump’s motives for the war against Iran remain unclear, partly because the US president has cited various reasons: to finally destroy the Iranian nuclear program, to end the Iranian threat to the Middle East, to support the Iranian people, and to overthrow the terrible regime in Tehran. He remains vague about his reasoning and seems to make off the cuff suggestions for regime change. Trump had a lofty idea at how he envisions the end of this war. He has suggested “unconditional surrender,” followed by his personal involvement in the selection of a successor: I must be involved in picking Iran’s next leader.

The swift victory against Iran failed to materialize, an end to the war is not in sight, and a new leader has been chosen without Trump’s involvement. The structures of the mullah regime appear so entrenched that the anticipated regime change following the rapid decapitation of the leadership did not occur. Yet Donald Trump had proclaimed: “What we did in Venezuela is, in my opinion, the perfect, the perfect scenario.” The Atlantic calls this attitude a “hostile corporate takeover of an entire country”. Now the US government expects Cuba to surrender. “I think I could do anything I want” with Cuba, Trump declared, now that the island is virtually cut off from energy supplies and its economy is in ruins. He is demanding the removal of Cuban President Diaz-Canel.

In the business world hostile corporate takeovers sometimes work, sometimes they fail. Similarly with Trump’s idea of swift government surrenders. In the case of Iran, he was misguided by the Wall Street playbook. Irresponsibly, he called on Iranians to overthrow the government before the bombing campaign started. Regime change in Iran has now been forgotten and Trump is agnostic about democracy. He is interested to get the oil price down and the stock market up.

Lessons from the past

The concept of regime change—replacing the top of the government to install one more agreeable to the US—is not new to US foreign policy. Proponents of regime change usually point to Japan and Germany as positive examples of successful democratization. Often, however, the goal is not, or at least not primarily, democratization, but rather the installation of a government that is ideologically close to the US or amenable to them. But the “Trump Corollary”, as explicitly stated in the National Security Strategy to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, is not new either. In reality, it was already the Kennedy, Nixon, Reagan, and Bush doctrine.

Both Trump’s idea of regime change and his rigorously pursued territorial ambitions (Canada, Greenland, the Panama Canal) are reminiscent of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, particularly the version of this doctrine expanded by President Roosevelt in 1904. This doctrine legitimized American interventions in Latin America. At the beginning of the 20th century, the US intervened in numerous Latin American countries in ‘its backyard’, using military and intelligence means: in Colombia, to support Panamanian separatists in controlling the Panama Canal; repeatedly in the Dominican Republic; they occupied Cuba from 1906 to 1909 and intervened there repeatedly afterward; in Nicaragua during the so-called ‘Banana War’, to protect the interests of the US company United Fruit; in Mexico, as well as in Haiti and Honduras.

The New York Times recently suggested that Trump’s current enthusiasm for regime change is most comparable to that of Dwight D. Eisenhower. During his two terms in office from 1953 to 1961, the once coldly calculating general allowed himself to be seduced into a downward spiral from one coup to the next. In 1953, the US succeeded in overthrowing the elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh with Operation Ajax. Mossadegh wanted to nationalize the British-owned oil industry. The coup succeeded with CIA support. The US installed the Shah as its puppet. He ruled with absolute power until the so-called Iranian Revolution and the dictatorship of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. After the successful overthrow of the government in Iran, Eisenhower decided to intervene in Guatemala. The elected president, Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán, who initiated far-reaching land reform laws, was overthrown in a coup d’état in 1954 and replaced by the pro-American colonel, Castillo Armas.

During this period, the US government also formulated the so-called domino theory, which aimed to prevent governments, particularly in Asia, from aligning themselves with the Soviet Union. The assumption was that if one domino fell, others would follow. It was during this time that the costly war in Korea ended in an armistice. Therefore, countries like Vietnam, Laos, Burma, Indonesia, and others were on Eisenhower’s domino list. However, the destabilization campaigns carried out by the CIA sometimes had the opposite effect. Governments in Indonesia and Syria emerged strengthened from the interventions. Eisenhower left Kennedy with the loss of American influence in Cuba. The failed Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, intended to overthrow Fidel Castro, was the starting point for the decades-long blockade of Cuba, which Trump is determined to end now through regime change.

The most dramatic example of failed regime change in recent history is undoubtedly the Iraq War, which began in 2003 under President George W. Bush. The stated goal was to remove Saddam Hussein from power and destroy his weapons of mass destruction. The war led to the overthrow of the regime. The United Nations and US teams found no weapons of mass destruction despite intensive on-site investigations. Attempts to establish an orderly state in Iraq failed. These experiences, and especially the disastrous outcome of two decades of military intervention in Afghanistan, discredited the concept of regime change.

What are the implications?

The most important lesson taught by efforts to affect externally forced regime change is that interventions often lead to crises that were ostensibly meant to be prevented or solved. The temptation was too great for Trump to miss the opportunity to depose the despised Maduro government.

Scholarly studies of the numerous attempted regime changes and democratization efforts reveal three key findings. First, simply removing the government from power (whether through assassination, as in the case of Saddam Hussein in Iraq or now in Iran, or through kidnapping as in Venezuela) is insufficient, as such actions often lead to chaos, state collapse, or even civil war. Thus, it will be interesting to watch further developments in Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran.

A second lesson from empirical studies of regime change is that democratization is more likely to succeed if democratic experience already existed in the country. However, this is often not the case.

Finally, if the real goal is democratization (and not just to secure spheres of influence or oil supplies etc.), it is far more promising not only to hold elections (as in Afghanistan, for example), but to renounce violence and initiate a long-term program with development aid and support for civil society.

Whether the US government will be impressed by these findings, or even acknowledge them, is doubtful. Currently, the American president is euphoric, despite the strong reaction from the Iranian government which he, surprisingly, did not expect. His promises to end the senseless wars and not start any new ones, however, seem to have been forgotten.

Related articles:
The US: Good at Starting but Bad at Ending Wars
Failure of US–Iran Talks Was All Too Predictable — But Turning to Military Strikes Creates Dangerous Unknowns
The ‘Donroe Doctrine’
The Return of the Ugly American

Herbert Wulf is a Professor of International Relations and former Director of the Bonn International Center for Conflict Studies (BICC). He is presently a Senior Fellow at BICC, an Adjunct Senior Researcher at the Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg/Essen, Germany, and a Research Affiliate at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, New Zealand. He serves on the Scientific Council of SIPRI.

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.

IPS UN Bureau

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

Credit: Mamunur Rashid/NurPhoto via AFP

By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Apr 6 2026 (IPS)

Bangladesh’s first credible election in nearly two decades delivered a landslide win for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and its leader Tarique Rahman, son of a former prime minister, just back from 17 years of self-imposed exile.

The election was made possible by a Generation Z-led uprising that security forces sought to repress by killing at least 1,400 people. The protest that began when young people rose up against a job quota system that functioned as a tool of patronage grew into a movement that brought down a government. Many protesters wanted something beyond the ousting of an authoritarian government, calling for old politics to be swept aside and young people to have a genuine say in government. What’s resulted falls short of that, and Bangladesh’s new government should be aware that unless it delivers genuine change, protests could rise again.

The uprising

The 2024 protests that toppled Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina began when Bangladesh’s High Court reinstated a 30 per cent quota for descendants of 1971 independence war veterans, leaving less than half of public sector jobs open to recruitment based on merit. In a country with acute youth unemployment, frustrated young people rejected this system as a vehicle for Awami League patronage. Coordinated by the Students Against Discrimination network, the movement spread nationwide through road and railway blockades.

The government’s response turned a policy dispute into a political crisis. Members of the Awami League’s student wing attacked protesters. Authorities imposed a nationwide curfew with a shoot-on-sight order, shut down the internet and directed security forces to fire lethal weapons into crowds. But the repression backfired. People used their phones to document every incident, and footage circulated widely after internet access was partly restored, directly undermining the government’s narrative that cast protesters as violent agitators. The killing of student coordinator Abu Sayed, filmed as he stood unarmed with arms outstretched before police opened fire, became the uprising’s defining image.

On 5 August 2024, facing a mass march on her residence, Hasina fled to India on an army helicopter. As CIVICUS’s 2026 State of Civil Society Report sets out, Bangladesh’s Gen Z-led uprising went on to inspire subsequent protests in Indonesia, Nepal and beyond.

Reforms in the balance

Three days after Hasina fled, Nobel Peace Prize-winning economist Muhammad Yunus was sworn in as Chief Adviser of an interim government. This was a victory for the student movement, which had made clear it would not accept a military-backed administration. His government established reform commissions covering the constitution, corruption, judiciary, police and public administration, and negotiated the July National Charter with political parties: 84 proposals designed to reduce the concentration of power in the prime minister’s office and make it structurally harder for any future government to capture the state the way Hasina had. Most parties signed it in October 2025.

But the path to the election was neither clean nor consensual. The International Crimes Tribunal, a domestic judicial body reinstated by the interim government, convicted Hasina in absentia for crimes against humanity and sentenced her to death. In May 2025, the interim government banned the Awami League under anti-terrorism legislation. International observers warned that excluding the country’s largest party risked disenfranchising millions and undermining the election’s democratic credibility.

The election timing was also bitterly contested: the BNP, eager to capitalise on its frontrunner status, pushed for an early date, while the newly formed National Citizen Party (NCP), founded by Gen Z protesters, wanted more time to organise and for institutional reforms to be locked in first. The BNP prevailed.

A dynasty returns

The BNP and its allies won 209 of 299 contested seats, securing a decisive two-thirds parliamentary majority. The right-wing Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami — whose 2013 ban the interim government lifted — emerged as the main opposition with close to 80 seats, its best-ever result. The NCP won just six of the 30 seats it contested.

The NCP’s poor showing had partly structural causes — formed in February 2025, it had barely a year to build an organisation with limited funds and no networks beyond urban centres — and was partly self-inflicted. A decision to ally with Jamaat-e-Islami as part of an 11-party coalition alienated many young voters who had hoped for genuinely new politics. Prominent NCP figures resigned in protest and stood as independents. NCP leader Nahid Islam, just 27 years old, did win a seat, and the party has pledged to rebuild in opposition.

The election itself was a genuine improvement on Bangladesh’s recent history. Turnout reached 60 per cent, up from 42 per cent in the fraud-ridden 2024 poll. Over 60 per cent of voters endorsed the July Charter in a referendum that was held alongside the election, giving the reform agenda a democratic mandate the new government will find difficult to ignore. Yet the vote would have been more legitimate had all parties been permitted to compete freely, and the campaign was not fully free of violence either: rights groups documented that at least 16 political activists were killed in the run-up to polling day.

Now the BNP inherits a state apparatus politicised over decades of one-party dominance and holds a two-thirds parliamentary majority with no meaningful check on its authority. Whether it will govern differently from those it replaced, or simply settle into the same logic of power, remains to be seen. The young people whose uprising made this election possible are watching. They have already brought down one government. The new one would do well to remember this.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

Smoke rises in downtown Dhaka, the capital of Capital, during the July-August 2024 youth-led anti-government protests. Credit: UN Bangladesh/Mithu

By The Institute of Development Studies
BRIGHTON, UK, Apr 6 2026 (IPS)

Urgent steps need to be taken to rebuild the relationship between citizens and state to stem the decline of democracy globally. Experts point to inequality and political exclusion as two of the biggest drivers for democratic backsliding, with the exclusion of citizens from a role in policy and decision-making spaces leading to ‘hollow citizenship’.

A report, published by the Institute of Development Studies, comes as Europe, Africa, Latin America, Asia and the US, have seen a rise in support for populist leaders on the left and right stoking division and weakening democratic safeguards, such as free and fair elections and free media.

This has led to key aspects of democracy declining during the last decade and now 74% of the
world’s population (6 billion) live in autocracies.

In response, the report authors call for an urgent rethink of democracy – which evidence shows delivers better social and economic outcomes than other regimes – to focus on people, power and inequality and less on institutions.

The experts say that past efforts to strengthen democracy globally focused too much on strengthening institutions, like legislature, judicial systems and electoral commissions and neglected the needs of people.

To sustain and strengthen democracies for the future, the reports call for urgent action to ensure people are included and engaged in democracy at local and national levels.

Shandana Khan Mohmand, Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies, said: “After decades of unsuccessful efforts, and millions of dollars spent by Western powers to try and strengthen democracy globally, we need to learn the lessons about what does and doesn’t work.

“While supporting democratic institutions like electoral commissions, judicial systems and independent media are all critically important, evidence shows that the missing ingredient is people – and the extent that they can engage in democracy in meaningful ways. Whether in local council decisions about community parks or on a nation’s policy on green energy, or going to war, citizens need to be included and feel that they are heard in decision making.”

While there was optimism that digital technology, and particularly social media, would act as a force for democratisation and improving transparency and accountability, the research finds that has only led to limited gains.

Instead, the evidence shows that digital technology has been harnessed by regimes to support a descent into authoritarianism, using tactics like mass surveillance and internet shutdowns to suppress dissent and human rights.

The report also finds that the notable youth-led uprisings, such as in Bangladesh, Nepal and Madagascar attracted the headlines but that it is the more everyday acts of young people demonstrating inclusion and collective decision-making, rather than the mass protests, that are more significant for strengthening democracy and peace.

Marjoke Oosterom, Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies, said: “The scale of democratic backsliding globally serves as a warning to leaders of high, middle and low-income democracies alike. They ignore inequality and political exclusion at their peril as both are being exploited by anti-democratic politicians to stoke division, and lead people to question whether democracy works for them.

“The evidence shows that democracy is still the best model for an inclusive and fair society and urgent action is needed to halt the current democratic decline we are seeing in continents around the world.”

Despite the budget cuts by governments across Europe and the USA which significantly reduced initiatives designed to strengthen democracy globally, the report includes several recommendations for ways that states, policymakers and philanthropist funders can help strengthen democracy.

Those include fixing the relationship between states and citizens via greater inclusion of people in governance and politics, making space for diverse opinions and ideological positions, and public policy to address the needs of marginalised groups and reduce inequality, which in turn builds trust in democracy.

IPS UN Bureau

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

Public Domain. Smoke rises above Tehran, Iran. Source: UN News

By Daniel D. Bradlow
JOHANNESBURG, South Africa, Apr 3 2026 (IPS)

By Easter 2026 it was still not clear when – or how – the war initiated by Israel and the US against Iran would end. But what was already clear was that it would harm Africa in a number of ways.

Firstly, it would adversely affect the global supply and prices of oil and gas, fertilisers and food. Secondly, local currencies would be affected. More than a month after the war had started a number of African currencies had begun to lose value against the US dollar.

Thirdly, interest rates stopped falling and further rate increases were highly likely. Fourth, there will be a decline in access to affordable foreign financing.

How should Africa respond?

African countries cannot avoid being harmed by the current Gulf war. Nevertheless, based on my work in international economic law and global economic governance, I think there are two lessons that, if followed, can help the continent emerge from the crisis in a better place.

First, governments and societies need to be pragmatic. Their first priority must be to do whatever they can to mitigate the impact of the war, particularly on their most vulnerable citizens. This will require governments to make trade-offs.

Our mission is to share knowledge and inform decisions.

About us

They will have to reallocate budgets to at least maintain the level of imports necessary to meet the society’s basic needs. They will need to convince their creditors to help finance their necessary imports. They will also need to persuade them to be flexible enough that they leave governments with at least some policy space.

Second, states and societies need to identify opportunities within the crisis for actions that over the medium term can help them meet their financing, economic, environmental and social challenges. This requires collaboration between the state and its non-state stakeholders. Business, labour, religious groups, civil society organisations and international organisations all have something to contribute.

Oil price surge is hurting African economies: scholars in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa take stock

Action in the short run

The focus of Africa’s efforts in the short term must be on minimising the negative effects of the war and on managing the state’s external debts in the most sustainable and effective way.

This is easy to state, but hard to implement. This is particularly the case in the current international environment, in which it is not realistic to expect donor countries and other international sources of finance to be particularly generous.

African countries will need to convince their creditors to acknowledge that this crisis is beyond Africa’s control and that they should not compound the pain that’s being experienced. This will require, at a minimum, that the creditors agree to suspend debt payments for the next year.

Creditors have already accepted the principle that debt payments can be suspended when debt challenges arise from sources beyond the debtor’s control. Many of them have accepted clauses requiring such action under specific conditions in their most recent debt contracts. They also did this during COVID.

Second, African countries, which are already heavily indebted, should challenge their multilateral creditors to accept the consequences of being among the biggest creditors for the continent. This includes the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the African Development Bank. By custom these institutions are treated as preferred creditors.

This means that they get paid before all other creditors. Instead of participating in any debt restructurings, they also make new loans to the debtor in crisis. This shifts the debt restructuring burden onto the debtor’s other creditors. It also increases the total amount owed to the multilaterals.

This cannot continue. These institutions need to be more creative in providing Africa to financing. This should include:

• Using their financial resources to guarantee the financial transactions of African countries so that they can reduce their borrowing costs and attract new equity investments.
• More generously supporting innovative debt for development swaps. These involve creditors agreeing with African sovereign debtors to convert a portion of the existing debts into financing for specific local projects, for example in health or education.
• Helping African governments convert their foreign exchange denominated debts into local currency debts at affordable interest rates.

Third, governments should work with the Alliance of African Multilateral Financial Institutions to use these institutions more effectively to finance African development. For example:

• They should require the institutions to only undertake transactions that are consistent with their development mandates. This means no more opaque transactions like the recent one that the African Finance Corporation concluded with Senegal.
• African governments should take the necessary action to activate the African Financial Stability Mechanism that they agreed to establish last year. This would create a useful financial safety net for the continent.

Fourth, African governments must build on the efforts they began last year to become a more effective advocate for African development financing interests at the international level. Among these efforts was the initiative by African ministers of finance to develop common African positions on sovereign debt restructurings. Another was South Africa’s launch of the African Expert Panel that proposed a number of initiatives on African debt and development financing.

In the medium term

African countries should advocate for the IMF to review its governance arrangements so that it becomes more accountable and responsive to developing countries, including African states and societies.

They should also advocate for the IMF to more use its existing resources, including its gold reserves, more creatively to support Africa.

Second, Africa should call for a debate on the preferred creditor status of multilateral financial institutions. This has become particularly relevant because the members of the Alliance of African Multilateral Financial Institutions are claiming that, like all other multilateral financial institutions, they are entitled to this status.

It is not clear that there are good arguments for excluding these institutions from preferred creditor status while protecting the position of the legacy institutions. This suggests that there is a need for some general principles that help determine which institutions should be treated as preferred creditors. These should be acceptable to all multilateral financial institutions and other market participants.

Third, African societies must make every effort to demonstrate that they are taking control of their own development. They should demand that their governments and all other actors in African development finance behave responsibly in regard to the financial, economic, environmental and social aspects of these transactions.

Another medium-term objective should be to limit the illicit financial flows that are so often associated with international trade and investment. This goal would be advanced by the successful conclusion of the current efforts to agree on a UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation.

Prof Daniel D. Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship at the University of Pretoria, was Senior Non-Resident Fellow, Global Development Policy Center, Boston University and Professor Emeritus, American University Washington College of Law

Source: Conversation Africa

IPS UN Bureau

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

 
CIVICUS discusses Italy’s restrictive immigration policies with Eleonora Celoria, a researcher at FIERI (Forum Internazionale ed Europeo di Ricerche sull’Immigrazione), a research centre on migration, and a member of the Association for Legal Studies on Immigration (ASGI), an Italian legal organisation that defends migrants’ and asylum seekers’ rights through advocacy, public awareness and strategic litigation.

Eleonora Celoria

What are the main objectives of the new migration bill?

The bill introduces a 30-day naval blockade mechanism, extendable to six months, for ships deemed to pose a ‘serious threat to public order or national security’, including on the grounds of ‘exceptional migratory pressure’. It goes beyond European Union (EU) frameworks and is designed to restrict civil society organisations conducting search and rescue operations.

The blockade is really a prohibition on entering Italian waters, and ships that violate it would face fines of up to €50,000 (approx. US$ 57,000), with repeat offenders facing confiscation. Since civil society rescue vessels are the only ships making multiple trips in and out of Italian waters, they are the primary target. This is not simply a border management tool; it’s a deliberate escalation of state control over maritime arrivals.

More significantly, the bill would make the Italy-Albania protocol permanent: migrants intercepted at sea would be transported directly to Italian-run processing centres in Albania, bypassing Italian mainland ports entirely. Their asylum claims would be determined outside Italy’s jurisdiction. Because they never reach Italian soil, they wouldn’t access Italian legal protections or independent judicial review. The government is determined to use this mechanism. Albanian facilities held only 10 to 15 people due to adverse court rulings, but the government has recently ramped up transfers to take the number to around 80.

How does the bill change asylum and border management practices?

The bill focuses on criminalisation, deportations and removals rather than asylum procedures. It introduces stricter rules for immigration detention centres (Centri di Permanenza per i Rimpatri, CPRs), expands expulsion grounds to include minor criminal convictions and ramps up criminal penalties for people facing expulsion. This effectively criminalises irregular status itself.

Critically, the bill eliminates special protection, a form of national protection that Italian courts have frequently recognised for people who don’t meet narrow refugee criteria but face serious risks if they are returned. This has been one of the few remaining meaningful pathways to legal status. Stricter eligibility criteria would reduce judicial discretion, trapping more people in legal irregularity.

Finally, the bill implements the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, a package of EU laws overhauling asylum and border procedures across the bloc, which member states must transpose by 12 June. It does so through legislative delegation, giving the government wide discretion to enact implementing measures by decree. Italy’s approach is the most restrictive possible. The Albania externalisation model is the primary mechanism, prioritising rapid removal over thorough examination. Changes to asylum procedures will be determined through executive action, with limited parliamentary scrutiny.

What is remigration, and why does it concern civil society?

Remigration is a white supremacist concept that calls for the forced removal of immigrants, refugees and their descendants, including legal residents and naturalised citizens, on grounds of ethnicity, race or perceived failure to ‘assimilate’. It targets people for who they are, not what they have done, violating the non-discrimination principle that underpins human rights law and the rule of law.

What makes this dangerous is that remigration has moved from marginal to mainstream political discourse. A far-right petition on remigration has recently gathered enough signatures to force a parliamentary debate. When such concepts gain mainstream legitimacy, they push other parties towards increasingly restrictive policies. Italy’s current bills move precisely in that direction.

From a legal perspective, remigration violates international human rights conventions and Italy’s constitution, which guarantees non-discrimination and solidarity. A policy based on ethnic or racial identity would also be incompatible with Italy’s international obligations.

Where do these measures conflict with international law?

The measures create serious tensions with several binding legal instruments: the 1951 Geneva Convention, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and EU primary law including the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Expanded administrative detention in Italy and Albania risks being arbitrary where the legal basis is insufficiently precise or subject to inadequate judicial review. Documented conditions in Italian CPRs and foreseeable conditions in Albanian centres expose people to inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR. The externalisation model creates a direct risk of violating the non-refoulement principle, the absolute prohibition on returning people to places where they face persecution.

The government will argue these measures align with the EU Pact. But alignment with the pact does not guarantee compatibility with the ECHR or the Geneva Convention. ASGI will respond with litigation, through individual cases and strategic cases targeting CPR detention and the Italy-Albania deal, and documentation of the human costs of these policies.

What risks do these policies pose for migrants’ and asylum seekers’ rights?

Under the proposed legislation, Italy would intercept boats and transfer rescued migrants to extraterritorial centres without assessing their health status, protection needs or vulnerabilities. Victims of persecution, torture and trafficking may never get to present their claims or be identified as needing protection.

The bill criminalises irregular migrants by allowing both administrative detention in CPRs and criminal imprisonment in prisons, a dual-track approach that multiplies the risk of fundamental rights violations and exposure to degrading conditions. Detention in existing CPRs is already documented as dangerous. Conditions in the Albanian centres, with minimal oversight and no independent monitoring, would predictably be worse.

The result is a system designed to process people quickly rather than accurately. Trafficking victims, torture survivors and people with severe mental health conditions — people who most need careful assessment and legal support — are unlikely to be identified and protected. Compressed timelines and limited access to lawyers amount to a serious restriction on the right to effective judicial protection.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

GET IN TOUCH
Website
Facebook
Instagram
LinkedIn
YouTube

SEE ALSO
Migration: Cruelty as policy CIVICUS | 2026 State of Civil Society Report
Greece: ‘New migration and asylum policies challenge the basic principles of refugee protection and the European legal order’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Minos Mouzourakis 26.Sep.2025
Italy: ‘No migration policy should be based on fear and punishment’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Valeria Carlini 17.Nov.2024

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

Credit: World Trade Organization (WTO)

By Kinda Mohamadieh
YAOUNDE, Cameroon, Apr 2 2026 (IPS)

The WTO’s 14th Ministerial Conference (MC14), which took place from 26 to 30 March 2026 in Cameroon, was reported as a collapse resulting from the stand-off between Brazil and the United States on the extension of the e-commerce moratorium. This is one screen shot of a bigger unfolding story where the US is attempting to enforce its will on the organization, while some are resisting.

The Trump administration did not pull the US out of the WTO so that it can complete a project of remaking the organization into one that fits the US’s vision of a new international order serving its ‘national security interests’. Since the Trump administration came into office, they made clear that their approach to foreign relations will be based on brutal power and politics of coercion. The WTO 14th ministerial conference is one international forum where these politics manifested.

The US vision for remaking the organization, as reflected in its submissions under the ‘WTO reform’ negotiations, along with the statement of US Trade Representative in Yaoundé, embody an attack on the raison d’etre of the organization, which is multilateralism.

Multiple US administrations had maintained a fairly consistent approach to the WTO, undermining some of its key functions, such as through paralyzing the dispute settlement function, and pushing for a self-judging non-reviewable national security exception.

The latter could effectively become an opt-out mechanism for the US from its obligations under the WTO rules including the most-favoured-nation (MFN) principle, and secure an immunity from questioning for any US unilateral trade measures packaged as a security issue.

The Trump administration’s talk at the WTO did not hide behind diplomatic or legal jargon. The US submissions made it clear that they are out to dismantle the fundamental pillar that holds the multilateral trading system together – that of non-discrimination and the MFN principle.

They want to strip away the system from an effective ‘special and differential treatment’, a core part of the original bargain that made the WTO establishment possible and that reflected in trade law an acknowledgment that one-size-fits-all rules do not work given the varying levels of development among Members.

The US vision is to turn the WTO from a multilateral organization where each Member, big or small, have an equal voice, to a platform of deals among the big players where it can effectively control the setting of the agenda and focus the organization on US corporate interests.

This is effectively what the US attempted at MC14, where they focused attention on their proposal for a permanent moratorium on customs duties on electronic commerce transmissions.

In Yaoundé, the US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer suggested there “would be consequences,” if the US did not get this delivered. This was the US administration carrying forward the agenda of its tech corporate giants. Since 1998, the US had secured this moratorium against the growing concerns of developing countries that this practice costs them billions of dollars in forgone tariff revenue that is key for their development, industrialization and building of digital capacities.

Ironically, the Trump administration brought the multilateral trading system to its knees by its aggressive unjustified tariff policies and illegal bilateral tariff deals over the past year. In Yaoundé, the same administration denied the developing countries the legitimate use of tariff policy to advance developmental objectives and preserve digital sovereignty and policy space essential for developing their digital economy.

It is clear that the US’s fight at the WTO is not only against China. It seeks to erase any trajectory towards industrialization and competitive edge that any other developing country could potentially build under multilateralism.

With no decision on this issue nor on WTO reform, the LDC package, and the Moratorium on TRIPS non-violation complaints achieved in Yaoundé, the work will be brought back to Geneva. A question often posed in Geneva is how to keep the US engaged in the negotiations, which will become more prominent in light of what unfolded in Yaoundé.

When negotiations are overwhelmed by this question, the attention moves away from efforts to make the organization relevant for all its members, and a forum where negotiations could potentially lead to compromises and outcomes for members at different levels of development. Even decision makers in the WTO administrative body get geared towards ensuring the US stays on board. This adds to the distortions.

In this context, developing countries face the larger threats of fragmentation and distraction from their key concerns and interests. Yet, the costs of such fragmentation cannot be higher in the face of the unfolding project to remake the WTO.

Multiple US administrations showed WTO members how they can keep key negotiation agendas, like the dispute settlement reform, in limbo and block the functioning of the WTO appellate body against the will of the rest of the membership.

In this case, the US’s blocking is void of any justified principled position, but rather a brutal imposition of their will and narrow interests on the rest of the WTO membership.

In the face of the remake project of the WTO advanced by the US, and largely supported by the European Union, what Jane Kelsey calls “a coup underway at the WTO”, developing countries need to stand together despite the differences they might have on some negotiation portfolios where their national interests might dictate disparities in the negotiation positions.

In such an era, managing differences while leveraging the power of dialogue, cooperation and coalition building is crucial to maintain a voice and role in determining how the WTO will be functioning in the future.

A WTO focused on plurilaterals as a norm rather than exception will be a place where the voice of developing countries is eroded. Trade wars will potentially be imported into the WTO through simultaneous plurilateral counterinitiatives leading to further fragmentation of this trading regime. This will be a world where MFN is discarded, consensus decision-making undermined, and leverage points to advance issues of development and special and differential treatment eroded.

Developing countries should collectively assess the cost such a future hold for them and the WTO, its survival as a multilateral organization and its potential to deliver for Members at different levels of development.

IPS UN Bureau

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

 
CIVICUS discusses the presidential election in the Republic of the Congo with Ivan Kibangou Ngoy, executive director of Global Participe, a civil society action-research organisation focused on democratic governance based in Pointe-Noire.

Ivan Kibangou Ngoy

How can the 94.8 per cent result be explained?

The outcome of this election was predictable from the outset, and for one fundamental reason: the legal framework gives free rein to electoral fraud. The electoral law lacks the necessary safeguards to prevent manipulation. The ruling party has systematically rigged the electoral process, excluding its opponents and independent civil society from any meaningful participation.

Accreditation for observers was refused to independent civil society organisations (CSOs), evidence of a total lack of transparency. Without independent observers, there’s no external oversight of the conduct of the vote or the counting of votes.

The result was not the outcome of electoral competition; it was the logical result of a system designed to guarantee precisely this outcome. When the legal framework allows for fraud, the opposition cannot campaign, observers are excluded and the government controls all administrative mechanisms, including the electoral administration, the result becomes inevitable. This is not an anomaly but the product of a system designed to produce it and to give it the appearance of democratic legitimacy. So the result was already decided even before polling stations opened.

How was competition restricted?

Opposition parties and independent CSOs were not allowed to organise public meetings or campaign openly among voters. They were denied access to public media, preventing them communicating with people.

The country still operates under a prior authorisation regime: the government must approve all public political activity. This system creates a fundamental imbalance: the ruling party can organise its rallies freely, while the opposition is blocked at every turn. There is an urgent need to move to a simple notification system, in which CSOs and parties would inform the authorities of their activities without needing their consent. Without this change, the opposition has no legal mechanism to participate fairly in an election.

The imprisonment and exile of major opposition figures send a clear message: challenging Sassou Nguesso’s regime is criminalised. Two of the country’s best-known opposition figures have been in prison for nearly a decade. When opponents cannot stand for election, campaign or move about freely, the result is predetermined both by fraud and the physical elimination of alternatives. The election is merely an administrative charade designed to legitimise the retention of power. It’s not a genuine choice but a demonstration of state power over a population reduced to silence.

Why is the internet cut off during elections?

Since the advent of social media, every election has been accompanied by an internet blackout, a deliberate measure the authorities take to control the information circulating during the vote. Internet shutdowns directly reinforce the system of electoral fraud by preventing the spread of information on fraud, irregularities or violations of voters’ rights. Without the internet, people cannot share photos or videos from polling stations, observers cannot report anomalies in real time and citizen movements cannot coordinate monitoring efforts.

The internet blackout effectively transforms the country into an information-controlled zone where only government messages can circulate. This reveals that the regime understands the power of social media as a tool for accountability and mobilisation. It’s an implicit acknowledgement that, without control over information, the regime could not maintain its official narrative. This systematic practice ultimately reveals the fragility of the regime’s legitimacy.

How has civil society mobilised despite restrictions?

Despite systematic restrictions, civil society organised itself by holding press conferences and workshops in private spaces, where the authorities could not intervene directly. These meetings enabled civil society to coordinate strategies and strengthen cohesion between organisations, even with a limited number of participants. Press conferences enabled direct engagement with the media despite restrictions on access to public media. Civil society also used social media to document rights violations, mobilise people and maintain a public conversation on electoral issues.

However, these strategies reveal the limits of resistance in a heavily controlled environment. Meetings in private spaces reach only a limited audience and social media can be shut down at any moment, as happened on election day. We must continue mapping independent CSOs to identify and connect all those working outside the regime’s control. We must also train CSO leaders in techniques for raising awareness and mobilising people.

People must understand the nature of the regime governing Congo-Brazzaville. The current regime is embodied by the Congolese Labour Party, a former Soviet-style party-state ousted from power at the ballot box in 1992, in the only truly free and transparent election the country has ever held. The party returned to power by force of arms after overthrowing the democratically elected government. Understanding this history is crucial: it proves that democratic change is possible. When people understand the mechanisms of power seizure and refuse to accept them, the regime loses its legitimacy even if it retains formal control of the state.

What’s the future for democracy in Congo after 42 years of rule?

Four decades under the same regime amount to the systematic denial of democratic change, of citizens’ fundamental right to choose a different government through the ballot box. Sassou Nguesso’s fifth term consolidates an institutional framework designed to ensure no one else ever comes to power through democratic means.

This framework operates through the systematic contradiction between constitutional promises and practice. The constitution proclaims a multi-party system, but a law recognises only those parties that pledge allegiance to the ruling power. The constitution creates the post of leader of the opposition, but this leader is the head of a party affiliated with the ruling power. The constitution establishes an advisory council of associations, but this institution is attached to the office of the head of state to muzzle civil society. The country is run like a barracks.

We must expose and discredit this regime internationally, by publicly denouncing its supporters, notably the French government and oil multinationals. Independent civil society must step up awareness-raising campaigns, both in person and online. The international community must exert sustained pressure, including diplomatic pressure, sanctions and support for organisations in exile. Without this combination of internal action and international pressure, democratic change will remain impossible. But it is possible. It happened in 1992, and it can happen again.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

GET IN TOUCH
Facebook

SEE ALSO
Democracy: an enduring aspiration CIVICUS | 2026 State of Civil Society Report
‘Gabon remains at a crossroads between democratic change and authoritarian continuity’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Sentiment Ondo 21.Nov.2025
‘Media and social networks are battlegrounds where rumours and disinformation circulate widely’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Kaberu Tairu 11.Oct.2025

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

Credit: UN Photo/Pasqual Gorri

By UN Development Programme
AMMAN / NEW YORK , Apr 1 2026 (IPS)

New estimates by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) suggest the military escalation in the Middle East, now into its fifth week, may cost economies in the region from 3.7 to 6.0 percent of their collective Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

This represents a staggering loss of US$120-194 billion and exceeds the cumulative regional GDP growth achieved in 2025. Coupled with an estimated rise in unemployment of up to 4 percentage points or 3.6 million jobs lost—more than the total jobs created in the region in 2025, these reversals will push up to 4 million people into poverty.

The assessment — “Military Escalation in the Middle East: Economic and Social Implications for the Arab States region” — exposes the concerning reality of structural vulnerabilities characteristic to the region, which enable a short lived military escalation to generate profound and widespread socio economic impacts that may persist over a long-term.

“This crisis rings alarm bells for countries of the region to fundamentally reevaluate their strategic choices of fiscal, sectoral, and social policies, representing an important turning point in the development trajectory of the region,” said Abdallah AlDardari, UN Assistant Secretary General and Director of the Regional Bureau for Arab State in UNDP.

“Our findings underline the pressing need to strengthen regional collaboration to diversify economies—beyond reliance on growth driven by hydrocarbons, and to expand production bases, secure trade and logistics systems, and broaden economic partnerships, to reduce exposure to shocks and conflicts.”

The assessment employs Computable General Equilibrium modelling to capture the magnitude of disruptions caused by a four-week conflict, and models its effects through key transmission channels, including increased trade costs, temporary productivity losses, and localized capital destruction.

It conducted five simulation scenarios, representing escalating levels of conflict scenarios, ranging from a “moderate disruption,” where trade costs increase by tenfold, to an “extreme disruption and energy shock,” where trade costs increase a hundred-fold, intensified by a stop of hydrocarbon production.

The findings highlight that impacts are not uniform, varying significantly across the region due to structural characteristics of its main subregions. Estimates suggest that the largest macroeconomic losses are concentrated in Gulf Cooperation Council and the Levant subregions, where strong exposure to trade disruptions and energy market volatility drives significant declines in output, investment, and trade.

Both subregions stand to lose 5.2-8.5 percent and 5.2-8.7 percent of their GDP, respectively. Increases in poverty rates are concentrated in the Levant and Least Developed Arab Countries, where baseline vulnerability is highest and shocks translate more strongly into welfare losses. In North Africa, impacts remain moderate but still significant in absolute terms.

In the Levant, the crisis is expected to increase poverty by 5 percent, pushing an additional 2.85-3.30 million people into poverty—accounting for over 75 percent of the rise in poverty across the region. Across the region, human development as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI) is expected to decline by approximately 0.2 to 0.4 percent, corresponding to a setback of roughly half a year to nearly one year of human development progress.

Footnote

• The Assessment will be available online—through the following link.
• This Assessment if part is part of a series of rapid assessments that UNDP is producing on the impacts of the Middle East military escalation on Iran, the Arab States in the region, Africa, the Asia Pacific region and on the global development outlook.
• Results presented in this brief should be interpreted as illustrative estimates of potential outcomes under different shock intensities, rather than realized impacts.
• Impact estimates are presented for four Arab States subregional groupings, including:
• Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates
• The Levant, including Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, the State of Palestine and Syria
• North Africa, including Algeria, Egypt, Libya Morocco and Tunisia
• Least Developed Arab countries (LDCs), including Sudan and Yemen—insufficient data did not allow for simulating impacts on Djibouti and Somalia.

IPS UN Bureau

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, carrying around a quarter of global seaborne oil trade and significant volumes of liquefied natural gas and fertilizers.

By Alon Ben-Meir
NEW YORK, Mar 31 2026 (IPS)

Trump’s Iran war has left the Gulf shattered: US bases turned into targets, economies battered, and the “oasis” myth destroyed. Gulf rulers now confront a harsh reckoning over their reliance on Washington and the uncertain search for a new, fragile security order.

As Trump assembled major US naval and air assets in the eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and others quietly urged Washington to avoid a full-scale assault on Iran, fearing a direct blowback on their territory and energy infrastructure.

Nevertheless, the US–Israeli air campaign began on February 28, 2026, without a clearly defined and publicly articulated political endgame beyond “crippling” Iran’s capabilities. This disconnect between military escalation and strategic purpose now lies at the core of Gulf leaders’ anger and sense of betrayal toward Washington.

Trump’s Strategic Miscalculation

Trump’s decision to launch joint US–Israeli strikes on Iran has produced far higher strategic costs than his administration appears to have anticipated, from energy shock and disrupted shipping to heightened regional fragmentation and anti-American sentiment.

Even if Iranian capabilities are significantly degraded, the war has exposed vulnerabilities in US power projection, unsettled allies, and invited greater Russian and Chinese diplomatic activism in the Gulf. The long-term “price” for Washington will be measured less in battlefield metrics than in diminished trust and leverage among its traditional Arab partners.

US Bases Turned to Liabilities

From a Gulf perspective, US bases in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE were meant to deter Iran and guarantee regime security; instead, they became priority targets once the war began. Iran explicitly framed its strikes on these facilities as retaliation against Washington, but their location in densely populated and economically vital areas meant that nearby civilian infrastructure also suffered severe damage.

This experience is reinforcing a view in Gulf capitals that foreign basing arrangements draw fire without delivering the reliable protection they assumed for decades.

A Nightmare Realized

Gulf leaders long warned that a war with Iran would shatter their security and economies, a nightmare that has now materialized as Iranian missiles and drones hit oil facilities, ports, power plants, and cities across the region. They blame Washington for launching the campaign and Israel for pressing to “neutralize” Iran regardless of collateral damage in neighboring Arab states.

The sense in Gulf capitals is that their caution was dismissed, while they have paid a disproportionate price in physical destruction, economic setback, disrupted exports, and heightened domestic anxiety.

Shattered Oasis Narrative

The image of Gulf hubs like Dubai, Doha, and Riyadh as insulated “oases” open to business, tourism, and investment has been badly damaged by missile alerts, strikes on ports and airports, and the closure of key sea lanes.

Restoring confidence will require visible reconstruction, enhanced civil defense, improved air and missile defenses, and credible diplomacy that lowers the perceived risk of another sudden war. Investors and tourists will demand proof that the region can manage Iran-related tensions, not just high-end events and mega-projects.

Trump’s Misreading of Iranian Escalation

Trump publicly argued that overwhelming force would quickly coerce Iran and usher in regime change while keeping fighting “over there,” yet he appears not to have anticipated the breadth of Iranian retaliation against neighboring Gulf states or a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

The IRGC’s effective shutdown of the strait, including attacks and threats against commercial shipping, has produced global energy shocks and exposed the fragility of US planning assumptions. For Gulf leaders, this underscores how inadequate Washington’s war planning was in accounting for second- and third-order consequences.

Calculated Decision Not to Retaliate

Despite heavy damage, Gulf rulers have so far avoided direct retaliation against Iran, calculating that further escalation would expose their cities and infrastructure to even more punishing strikes. Publicly, they stress restraint and international law, but privately, officials acknowledge their enduring geographic reality: they must coexist with a powerful and proximate Iran long after this US-led campaign ends.

By holding their fire, they hope to preserve space for postwar de-escalation and avoid being locked into a permanent state of open conflict.

Recasting Security Arrangements with Washington

Given their limited strategic alternatives, Gulf monarchies are unlikely to sever ties with Washington but will seek more conditional, transactional security arrangements. They are pressing for clearer US commitments on defense of their territory, better integration of regional missile defenses, and greater say over decisions that could trigger Iranian retaliation.

At the same time, they will hedge by deepening ties with China, Russia, Europe, and Asian energy importers, thereby reducing exclusive reliance on the US while keeping the American security umbrella in place.

Gulf Options to Prevent Future Conflagration

To prevent a repeat, Gulf states are also exploring limited de-escalation channels with Tehran, tighter regional crisis hotlines, and revived maritime security arrangements that include non-Western actors such as China and India. They may push for new rules of engagement around energy infrastructure and shipping lanes, seeking informal understandings that keep these off-limits even in crises.

Internally, they are reassessing missile defense, hardening critical facilities, and considering more diversified export routes that reduce dependence on Hormuz. None of these options are fully reassuring, but together they offer partial risk reduction.

Prospects for Normalization with Iran

Speculation about full normalization, including a non-belligerency pact between Iran and Gulf states, builds on prewar trends of cautious dialogue and economic engagement. Whether this is truly “in the cards” depends on war outcomes, Iran’s internal politics, and Gulf threat perceptions: if Tehran’s regime survives but remains hostile, Gulf states will likely revert to hedging—combining deterrence, limited engagement, and outreach to outside powers.

A more pragmatic Iranian leadership could make structured security arrangements and phased confidence-building measures more plausible over time.

No Return to Status Quo Ante

The Gulf States will not return to the prewar status quo; instead, they are likely to pursue a more diversified security architecture, combining a thinner US shield with expanded ties to China, Russia, and Asian importers. This shift will gradually dilute Washington’s centrality in Gulf security, complicating US force posture and Israel’s assumption of automatic Arab backing against Iran.

For Israel, a more cautious, risk-averse Gulf may limit overt strategic alignment, while for the US, enduring mistrust will make coalition-building for future crises far more difficult.

Trump’s Iran adventure is not an isolated blunder but the latest, and perhaps most explosive, expression of his assault on an already fragile global order. By discarding restraint, sidelining allies, and weaponizing American power for short-term political gain, he has accelerated the erosion of US credibility, fractured Western alliances, and opened new strategic space for Russia and China. The Gulf States are simply the newest casualties of this disorder: their cities struck, economies shaken, and security assumptions shattered.

Whatever emerges from this war, it will not be a restored status quo, but a more fragmented, volatile Middle East in which Israel and the United States confront a diminished margin for error and a far narrower circle of willing, trusting partners.

Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a retired professor of international relations, most recently at the Center for Global Affairs at New York University (NYU). He taught courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies.

alon@alonben-meir.com

IPS UN Bureau

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

The United Nations was not founded to be comfortable; it was founded to be necessary. Created in the aftermath of catastrophe, its purpose was clear: to maintain international peace and security, to uphold international law, to defend human rights and to promote human dignity and development.

Dag Hammarskjöld, who understood that the Secretary-General was not merely a secretary to governments, but a servant of the Charter and, ultimately, of the peoples of the world.

As member states consider the appointment of the next Secretary-General, they face a decision that will shape not only the future of the United Nations, but also its credibility. The world today does not suffer from a surplus of institutions; it suffers from a shortage of trust in them.

The next Secretary-General must therefore be more than a careful manager of bureaucracy. The world needs a leader with vision, independence and integrity — a leader willing to uphold the Charter even when doing so is inconvenient to powerful member states.

Too often, the selection process produces a candidate who is acceptable to everyone precisely because they are unlikely to seriously challenge anyone. This may be politically expedient, but it is strategically short-sighted. An overly cautious Secretary-General may preserve short-term diplomatic comfort while presiding over long-term institutional decline.

The United Nations does not need a figure who simply reflects the balance of power within the Security Council; it needs a figure who reflects the principles of the Charter.

The next Secretary-General must be bold enough to articulate a clear vision for what the United Nations is for in the twenty-first century. That vision must be rooted in the organization’s founding objectives: preventing conflict, strengthening respect for international law, protecting human rights and promoting conditions under which peace is possible. These goals require not only administrative competence, but political courage and moral clarity.

Equally important, the next Secretary-General must be strong enough to maintain independence from the influence of any single member state or group of states. The United Nations does not exist to legitimize the actions of the powerful; it exists to ensure that power operates within rules.

The Secretary-General cannot fulfill this role if the office is perceived as operating at the beck and call of a few influential capitals. Independence is not a luxury in this role; it is the source of its authority.

With independence must come integrity. The United Nations possesses little in the way of traditional power: it does not command armies, it does not control vast financial resources and it cannot compel states to act. Its greatest asset is legitimacy — the belief that it stands for something larger than the interests of individual nations.

That legitimacy depends heavily on the personal credibility of the Secretary-General. Ethical leadership, transparency, accountability and consistency must once again become the defining characteristics of the office.

In this regard, the world would do well to remember Dag Hammarskjöld, who understood that the Secretary-General was not merely a secretary to governments, but a servant of the Charter and, ultimately, of the peoples of the world. He demonstrated that quiet diplomacy and moral courage are not opposites; they are partners.

He showed that the authority of the Secretary-General does not come from military or economic power, but from independence, integrity and a willingness to act when action is required.

Much attention is often given to the identity of the next Secretary-General — nationality, region, and increasingly gender. These questions are politically understandable, but they are not the most important questions. The defining question is not where the Secretary-General comes from, but what the Secretary-General stands for.

The United Nations is often described as an organization of states. But states exist to serve people, not the other way around. If that principle is true at the national level, it must also be true at the international level. The United Nations, therefore, does not ultimately belong to governments. It belongs to the peoples in whose name its Charter was written. Member states do not own the United Nations; they are trustees of it. And trustees are not meant to serve themselves, but those on whose behalf they hold responsibility.

This understanding should guide the selection of the next Secretary-General. The position requires someone who understands that the office is not merely administrative, but custodial — custodial of the Charter, of international law and of the trust that the world’s peoples place, however imperfectly, in the United Nations.

The selection process itself, however, raises a final and somewhat uncomfortable question. The Secretary-General is often described as the world’s top diplomat, and yet the world’s people have no direct voice in choosing this person.

The decision rests, as everyone knows, with a small number of states possessing veto power. This may be politically realistic, but it is increasingly difficult to explain to a global public that is more educated, more connected and more aware than at any time in history.

Perhaps, then, one day the world might experiment with something new — global consultations, or even worldwide elections — allowing the peoples of the world to express their preference for who should occupy this uniquely global office.

It is a slightly amusing idea, perhaps even an unrealistic one for now, but it contains a serious point: if the United Nations truly begins with “We the Peoples,” then their voice should be heard more clearly in choosing its leader.

Until that day comes, the responsibility rests with member states. They must choose not the safest candidate, not the most convenient candidate and not the candidate least likely to upset powerful governments. They must choose the candidate most likely to uphold the Charter, speak with independence, act with courage and restore integrity to the office.

The world does not need a careful manager.
The world needs a courageous Secretary-General.

Naïma Abdellaoui, UNOG – UNison Staff Representative, International Civil Servant since 2004.

IPS UN Bureau

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

Credit: Ryan Brown/UN Women

By Inés M. Pousadela and Samuel King
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay / BRUSSELS, Belgium, Mar 30 2026 (IPS)

On 19 March, the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) did something unprecedented in its eight-decade history: it held a vote. The Trump administration, having spent two weeks attempting to defer, amend and ultimately block the session’s main outcome document, known as the agreed conclusions, cast the only vote against its adoption. That dissenting vote said a lot, as it came from the world’s most powerful government, backed by financial leverage, bilateral reach and a network of anti-rights states and organisations that are making inroads at many levels.

Established in 1946, the CSW brings together 45 states each year to negotiate commitments that, while not legally binding, shape domestic legislation, set international norms and signal the direction of political will. Civil society plays an important role in it: the NGO Committee on the Status of Women coordinates thousands of organisations, from large international bodies to grassroots groups, with the aim of ensuring those most affected by policy have a seat at the table. For several decades, this has been the closest thing the world has to a dedicated annual intergovernmental negotiation on women’s rights.

The assault on gender equality

The Trump administration arrived at CSW70 having withdrawn from UN Women in January and from its Executive Board in February, citing opposition to what it calls ‘gender ideology’. It submitted eight amendments targeting language on reproductive health. When these didn’t succeed, it attempted to defer or withdraw the conclusions entirely. When that too failed, it voted against adoption and tabled a separate resolution seeking to impose a restrictive definition of gender, effectively attempting to rewrite 30 years of carefully negotiated commitments. Its resolution was blocked.

At the Munich Security Conference in February, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio defined western civilisation as bound together by Christian faith, shared ancestry and cultural heritage, an ideological approach that treats women’s equality, reproductive rights and LGBTQI+ rights not as human rights but ideological impositions to be rejected. The Trump administration’s financial muscle is now the delivery mechanism for this worldview.

Defunding as a weapon

The immediate material crisis at CSW70 was the collapse of funding. The elimination of 90 per cent of USAID contracts wiped out US$60 billion in foreign aid. The USA is instead negotiating bilateral deals with 71 countries under its ‘America First’ global health strategy, extending its global gag rule not just to civil society organisations but to recipient governments. This means any institution that receives US health funding must certify that neither it nor any organisation it works with promotes or provides abortion.

Funding will now flow through faith-based groups, with ultra-conservative Christian organisations such as the Alliance Defending Freedom and Family Watch International set to benefit, having spent years building networks across Africa, Asia and Latin America. They use the language of family values, parental rights and national sovereignty to consolidate conservative influence over laws affecting women, LGBTQI+ people and young people. In many countries, they already have direct access to governments while progressive organisations are routinely excluded.

With threats intensifying, the UN is signalling retreat. A proposal under the UN80 cost-cutting initiative to merge UN Women with the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) has alarmed civil society worldwide. The stated rationale is efficiency, but there’s little overlap between the two agencies and their combined budgets make up a small part of the UN’s overall spending, suggesting savings would be modest. It’s hard to escape the conclusion that the targeting of these organisations reflects the increasing contestation of their rights-based mandates rather than any logic of organisational efficiency.

Over 500 civil society organisations signed an open letter to UN Secretary-General António Guterres warning that, when sexual and reproductive health rights are absorbed into broader mandates, they risk ‘being deprioritised, underfunded, or rendered politically invisible’. Some states have urged caution but so far none has committed to blocking the merger.

Civil society holds the line

In difficult times, over 4,600 civil society delegates attended CSW70 and made their presence count. They took the floor to name structural barriers and demand accountability: youth representatives challenged the normalisation of online violence, Pacific Island delegates described how geography compounds the denial of justice for survivors, and activists from Haiti documented the labour exploitation of migrant domestic workers. They all emphasised that when women’s rights organisations are restricted or defunded, survivors lose their primary pathway to justice.

The NGO CSW Forum hosted over 750 events alongside the official session. But not everyone could participate. US visa restrictions meant several women’s rights activists, particularly from the global south, couldn’t enter the country. This is a worsening problem that limits civil society’s ability to engage.

CIVICUS’s newly released 2026 State of Civil Society Report documents exactly what civil society has been up against: institutions built to protect women’s rights under sustained, coordinated attack, their funding cut, their mandates targeted and the human rights values they are built on reopened for revision. CSW70’s agreed conclusions offer hope, committing states to action on AI governance, discriminatory laws, digital justice, labour rights, legal aid and the formal recognition of care workers. But as the contest over them made plain, political will is running low and the anti-rights community is emboldened. Civil society left CSW70 without losing ground – and this seems to be the measure of success in the regressive times we live in.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

Vivian van de Perre, Deputy Special Representative for Protection and Operations in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and Interim Head of MONUSCO, addresses the Security Council meeting on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Credit: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Mar 27 2026 (IPS)

In the month following the reopening of the Burundi-Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) border, the humanitarian crisis in the DRC has deteriorated considerably, recently marked by an influx of Congolese refugees returning home, where they face overcrowded conditions and a severe shortage of essential services. This comes in the midst of escalating clashes between rebel groups AFC and M23, and forces affiliated with the Kinshasa government, with drone strikes causing widespread destruction and pushing violence closer to Burundi’s borders, where conditions are most dire.

Vivian van de Perre, Deputy Special Representative for Protection and Operations with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), described the current humanitarian situation as “extremely volatile”. During a press stakeout on March 26, she highlighted that the rapid spread of the conflict from North and South Kivu into Tshopo Province and toward Burundi’s borders is a major concern, warning that it increases the risk of a broader “regional conflagration.”

Van de Perre also warned that armed militants have been increasingly relying on the use of heavy weapons and drone strikes in densely populated urban areas, which have caused great damage to civilian infrastructure as well as serious risks to civilian safety, underscoring recent violent incidents at the Kisagani Bangoka International Airport and in Goma, the largest city in North Kivu. Additionally, she warned of M23’s growing presence in Goma, where the coalition has managed to gain influence, undermine state authority, and disrupt humanitarian aid deliveries.

Furthermore, the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office in the DRC (UNJHRO) has uncovered a considerable rise in human rights violations committed by armed groups. Since December 2025, approximately 173 cases of conflict-related sexual violence have been documented, affecting at least 111 victims, the majority of whom were women and girls.

Van de Perre described these findings as “only the tip of the iceberg,” and highlighted growing rates of exploitation, particularly along artisanal mining sites, where child labour is especially pronounced. Armed groups have also been alleged to hamper monitoring, investigation, and justice mechanisms, and subject human rights defenders, journalists, and civil society actors to intimidation and arbitrary detention.

This follows a sharp escalation of hostilities between the armed groups in December 2025, which forced hundreds of thousands of Congolese to flee to Burundi, most coming from Uvira in South Kivu Province and the surrounding areas. Figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) show that after M23’s withdrawal from Uvira in January and a relative return of stability, more than 33,000 refugees began returning home since the border’s reopening on February 23, with most crossing through the Kavimira border point. Many of these returnees already received little humanitarian assistance in Burundi due to chronic underfunding.

“Conditions in many areas of return in the DRC remain fragile, with acute humanitarian needs,” said Ali Mahamat, UNHCR Head of Sub-Office in Goma, DRC, on March 24 at a press briefing at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. “Initial UNHCR assessments in Uvira and Fizi show families arriving with few belongings, in urgent need of shelter, basic household items, health care, and access to water and sanitation. Many returned to find their homes destroyed and belongings looted, leaving them in deep despair and unable to resume normal life without substantial support.”

According to the latest updates from the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), roughly 60 percent of returnees are living in damaged shelters and over 30 percent face challenges accessing their land. Returnees face heightened risks of gender-based violence, forced recruitment into armed groups, extortion, and exploitation, with female-headed households disproportionately affected due to limited livelihood opportunities for women, which leave these communities entrenched in poverty and especially vulnerable.

Figures from UNHCR show that approximately 30 percent of returnees had been taking refuge in Burundi’s Busama displacement camp, where they faced significant levels of overcrowding and limited access to clean water, sanitation services, healthcare, and shelter. Currently, roughly 4,500 Congolese refugees remain stuck at transit points as they await being relocated to Busama. Additionally, Burundi continues to host over 109,000 Congolese refugees, with 67,000 of them in Busuma alone.

Additionally, internal displacement remains widespread in the DRC, with more than 6.4 million people currently displaced. IFRC estimates that over 5.2 million internally displaced Congolese are concentrated in North and South Kivu, as well as Ituri, 96 percent as a result of ongoing armed violence. According to van de Perre, over 26.6 million people, roughly a quarter of DRC’s population, are projected to face food insecurity this year.

Currently, UNHCR’s response plan to assist returnees, refugees, and displaced Congolese civilians is only 34 percent funded, seeking a total of USD 145 million. MONUSCO is currently on the frontlines providing protection services for nearly 3,000 civilians in Djaiba village. Through the mission, the UN has been able to support over 18,000 farmers in harvesting and transporting crops and has conducted 204 patrols. Van de Perre stressed that stronger governance and security enforcement are crucial in protecting vulnerable civilians, and disarmament and repatriation efforts must be conducted to resolve broader regional tensions.

IPS UN Bureau Report

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

 
CIVICUS discusses Portugal’s presidential runoff election and the rise of the far-right Chega (Enough) party with Jonni Lopes, Executive Director of Academia Cidadã (Citizen Academy) and a Steering Committee member of the European Civic Forum, an organisation working on civic engagement, democratic participation and the protection of civic space at national, regional and international levels.

Jonni Lopes

Why did centre-right voters back a Socialist candidate?

Despite not agreeing with his politics, centre-right voters backed a Socialist candidate to build a firewall around the presidency, recognising that the office demands deliberation, predictability and respect for democratic rules, none of which Chega represents. Seguro’s campaign made this possible. He distanced himself from party politics, avoided turning the race into a debate about the Socialist Party and positioned himself as a stable figure capable of providing institutional continuity during a political crisis.

This was practical risk management, not ideology. The centre-right Social Democratic Party is pushing labour law changes that triggered a joint general strike in December, with over three million workers participating. With Chega already holding significant parliamentary power, voters feared that a far-right president would go further still, using veto powers not to check the government’s agenda, but to entrench it and block any legislation protecting workers’ rights.

This coalition shows that a clear boundary against the far right still exists, at least when it comes to leading the state. It’s a defensive pact: democrats can disagree on policy, but there’s a line when it comes to handing power to a reactionary force that threatens democratic institutions.

What does the result mean for Portugal and Europe?

For Portugal, this result is a temporary reprieve for democracy. Seguro won two-thirds of the second-round vote and over 3.5 million votes, the most ever cast for a presidential candidate in Portugal, despite storms that disrupted voting. This shows that, faced with a genuine far-right threat, Portuguese democracy can still mobilise broadly to defend itself.

But this wasn’t a clear victory against the far right. Ventura won one-third of the vote, strengthened his base and positioned himself as a serious contender for right-wing leadership. In just a few years, Chega has gone from a fringe party to parliament’s second largest.

This sends a mixed message to Europe: broad democratic coalitions can still prevent far-right candidates reaching the top office, but the far right is now mainstream, shapes political agendas and forces other parties to constantly define themselves in relation to it. This is the new normal. This matters particularly for the European Commission, as far-right movements are structural threats and the only response is to strengthen the rule of law and democratic institutions.

Where does Chega go from here?

Ventura lost the presidential election, but Chega has emerged stronger. Winning a third of the vote against a candidate backed by the entire democratic spectrum cements its position. Ventura can now claim to speak for a significant portion of the right, and his loss only strengthens that claim, as he can frame the firewall as evidence that the political system is rigged against him, feeding narratives of elite persecution. He will also use his parliamentary strength to extract concessions by supporting or blocking the government’s budget and pushing on immigration and security, winning enough policy gains to show he delivers for his voters.

Ventura has already said that support for stability ‘has limits’. If the government hits serious problems, such as a budget crisis or a political deadlock, Chega will position itself as the only force willing to break the impasse and ‘fix things’. He’s not treating the presidential loss as the end of his political project but as a stepping stone to bigger gains in future elections. His calculation is that electoral legitimacy can eventually become governmental power.

What does this mean for civic space and civil society?

Portugal’s civic space is shrinking. Hate speech is becoming normalised, immigration rules are tightening, government administration is becoming more exclusionary, protest organisers face police intimidation and civil society organisations are struggling financially. These create real barriers to people exercising their rights. Chega’s rise and its racist and xenophobic rhetoric now heard in parliament raise the risk that discrimination and violence against migrants will become politically acceptable.

A president committed to rights protection can set limits: vetoing discriminatory laws, refusing to suppress information the public needs and protecting communities and organisations under attack. The presidency alone cannot reverse the shrinking of civic space, but it can prevent the government from fully institutionalising a far-right agenda.

Human rights organisations, labour movements and migrant groups see this moment as an opportunity to strengthen protections, not a final victory. Turnout held strong despite devastating storms and emergency conditions, evidence that people were genuinely mobilised by the threat, particularly urban voters connected to civil society, including unions, who had already fought the government over labour rights. The organisations that coordinated the strike now expect the president to use his powers to defend rights.

How should Seguro use his presidential powers?

Seguro has been clear he won’t be the reason parliament is dissolved, and has committed to working with the government while demanding ‘solutions and results’. This means dissolution of parliament will be a last resort in a genuine crisis, not a tactical move to tackle normal political disagreements. He will use his veto power to block laws he thinks violate the constitution and rights and mediate between the government and opposition to push them towards compromise.

The challenge will be to keep the democratic parties, both government and opposition, at the centre while Chega tries to dictate the agenda. If Seguro dissolves parliament too quickly or without a strong reason, he’ll just fuel Chega’s narrative that the system is broken. If he’s too passive and doesn’t use his veto when rights are threatened, he’ll look complicit in democratic erosion. Both scenarios would help Chega: either the system looks incapable of functioning, or it looks unwilling to defend people’s rights.

Seguro will have to walk a very fine line between doing too much and doing too little, while a far-right opposition waits to exploit whatever mistakes he makes. If he gets it wrong, his historic electoral victory will give way to deeper crisis rather than democratic renewal.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

GET IN TOUCH
Website
Facebook
Instagram
LinkedIn
YouTube

SEE ALSO
Portugal’s far-right surge CIVICUS Lens 30.May.2025
‘Civil society must engage to prevent discussions devolving into demagoguery’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Jorge Máximo 28.May.2025
‘The rise of the populist right only further weakens trust in the political system’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Ana Carmo 19.Feb.2024

Credit: Sanjit Pariyar/NurPhoto via AFP

By Andrew Firmin
LONDON, Mar 25 2026 (IPS)

Less than six months after Nepal’s Generation Z rose up in protest, the country has a new prime minister. A 35-year-old former rapper who soundtracked the protests swept to power in a landslide in the 5 March election.

Balendra Shah defeated former prime minister KP Sharma Oli, whose third stint as prime minister was cut short by the protests, beating him in his own turf. After years of fragile coalition governments, in which Sharma Oli and two other men of advancing age repeatedly swapped the role of prime minister, Nepal has chosen to change direction.

Gen Z-led protests

The September 2025 protests were triggered by the government’s banning of 26 social media platforms in an evident response to the ‘nepokids’ trend, in which people used social media to satirise the ostentatiously wealthy lifestyles of politicians’ family members, while most young people experienced daily economic struggles amid high inflation and youth unemployment. In a country where the median age is just 25, the ban was the final straw, activating long-simmering anger about corruption, poor public services and a political system that refused to listen to young people.

When young people took to the streets, the state unleashed violence. The deadliest day was 8 September, when some protesters broke into the parliamentary complex and police fired live military-grade ammunition, shooting many victims in the head. Nineteen people died that day, and overall at least 76 people died in the protests.

Rather than silence the protests, the state’s lethal crackdown swelled them, making clear this was about more than the social media ban; it was a struggle for Nepal’s future. Even more people took to the streets. On 9 September, Sharma Oli resigned. Some protesters turned to violence, while the army took over security and imposed a nationwide curfew. But events soon took a decisive turn. Chief Justice Sushila Karki was sworn in as interim prime minister on 12 September, kickstarting a process that led to the election. The interim government agreed to establish a Gen Z Council, a formal body designed to bridge the gap between the government and young people and enable them to hold it accountable and monitor implementation of reforms.

As the latest State of Civil Society Report sets out, Nepal’s movement inspired many of the year’s other Gen Z-led mobilisations. Nepali activists used the gaming platform Discord, including for a radical exercise in democracy that saw 10,000 people take part in online discussions that put forward Karki as interim prime minister. Morocco’s protesters also used Discord to coordinate their actions, while the Gen Z movement in Madagascar, where the army ultimately forced the government to quit, connected with Nepal’s Discord communities to learn from their organising. Movements in several countries adopted Nepal’s protest symbol, the skull-and-straw-hat flag from the One Piece manga, identifying themselves as part of the same global movement.

Around the world, Gen Z-led protests have commonly faced violent state repression but have forced real concessions: Bulgaria’s government quit, while politicians dropped unpopular policies in Indonesia and Timor-Leste. In Bangladesh, where a Gen Z-led protest movement ousted an authoritarian government in 2024, the country recently held its first credible election in almost two decades.

Time for change

The new energy unleashed by Nepal’s Gen Z-led protests was reflected in the registration of over 800,000 new voters, more parties standing than ever before, a profusion of younger candidates and an election campaign focused on corruption and good governance.

The result was a shock. Coalition governments are the norm in Nepal, but the centrist Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) won an outright majority, taking 182 of 275 House of Representatives seats after a campaign that made intensive use of social media. The three established parties all sustained heavy losses.

Shah used his music to attack corruption and inequality, resonating with the Gen Z movement during the protests, when one of his songs was viewed over 10 million times on YouTube. But he isn’t a completely new political figure, having become mayor of the capital, Kathmandu, in a surprise result when he ran as an independent in 2022. His track record there suggests grounds for concern. He’s rarely made himself available for media questioning, preferring to communicate directly via social media, where he’s known for making controversial outbursts. He also received criticism for deploying police against street vendors and launching ‘demolition drives’ to clear illegally built structures with minimal notice, leading to clashes between police and locals.

Shah now has a mandate to deliver change, and expectations are high. But he faces the challenge of reforming a typically resistant bureaucracy while delivering on his economic promises amid difficult global conditions worsened by the Israeli-US war on Iran, which threatens the remittances sent by the many Nepali workers based in Gulf countries, which constitute one quarter of the country’s GDP. He’ll need to navigate the difficult foreign policy balance between Nepal’s two powerful and often antagonistic neighbours, China and India. The new government must also ensure accountability for human rights violations during the 2025 protests, starting with releasing the report of a commission set up to investigate protest deaths, which hasn’t yet been made public.

The obvious danger, given these challenges and an outsized mandate, is that the government will adopt a heavy-handed approach, pushing through change while failing to listen. This is precisely when civil society is needed, to step in to hold the new government to account and ensure it respects human rights, including the right to keep expressing dissent.

Nepal’s Gen Z movement must guard against co-option by the new administration. The new government must acknowledge the vital role of Nepal’s outspoken young generation by moving quickly to form and resource the Gen Z Council and fully respecting its autonomy. The movement that helped bring Shah to power must stay engaged.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

Kaveh Madani, Director of the UN University’s Institute for Water, Environment and Health and lead author of the report entitled “Global Water Bankruptcy: Living Beyond Our Hydrological Means in the Post-Crisis Era” briefs reporters at UN Headquarters. Credit: UN Photo/Evan Schneider

By Umar Manzoor Shah
UNITED NATIONS, Mar 25 2026 (IPS)

Professor Kaveh Madani of Iran has been named the 2026 Stockholm Water Prize laureate. The award will be formally presented by King Carl XVI Gustaf of Sweden in August during World Water Week in Stockholm.

The Stockholm Water Prize is widely regarded as the highest global honour in water science and policy. Often called the Nobel Prize for water, it recognises individuals and institutions for exceptional contributions to the sustainable use and protection of water resources. This year’s selection stands out for both scientific impact and the extraordinary personal journey of the laureate.

At 44, Madani is the first Muslim and the youngest recipient in the prize’s 35 year history. He is also the first United Nations official and the first former politician to receive the award.

Madani currently serves as Director of the United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health. Once a senior official in Iran’s government, he later faced arrest, interrogation, and a sustained smear campaign that forced him to leave his country.

Born in Tehran in 1981, Madani grew up in a family deeply connected to Iran’s water sector. His early exposure to the country’s mounting water challenges shaped his academic direction. He studied civil engineering at the University of Tabriz before moving to Sweden to pursue a master’s degree in water resources at Lund University. He later earned a PhD from the University of California, Davis, followed by postdoctoral research at the University of California, Riverside.

By his early 30s, Madani had established himself as a leading systems analyst. He joined Imperial College, London, where his work focused on the mathematical modelling of complex human water systems. His research combined hydrology, economics, and decision sciences to improve policymaking in water management.

In 2017, he made a decisive move. Leaving a prestigious academic career in London, he returned to Iran to serve as Deputy Vice President and Deputy Head of the Department of Environment. Many viewed his appointment as a signal of reform and a bridge between Iran and its scientific diaspora.

During his tenure, Madani pushed for transparency and structural reforms in water governance. He used innovative public campaigns to raise awareness about environmental degradation. However, his efforts challenged entrenched interests.

State-aligned media accused him of espionage and labelled him a “water terrorist” and “bioterrorist”. Conspiracy theories circulated, linking him to foreign intelligence agencies and even to alleged weather manipulation schemes. His advocacy for international environmental agreements further intensified opposition.

In early 2018, a broader crackdown on environmental experts began. Madani was detained and interrogated multiple times. Several of his colleagues were arrested. One of them, Kavous Seyed Emami, died in custody under contested circumstances.

Facing mounting pressure, Madani left Iran and entered a period of exile. He joined Yale University, where he continued his research and advocacy. He began to focus more on bridging science and policy at the global level.

Madani’s academic contributions have been widely recognised. He is known for integrating game theory into water resource management. His work challenged traditional models that assumed cooperation among stakeholders. He demonstrated that individual incentives often lead to uncooperative behaviour, which makes many engineering solutions ineffective in practice.

This approach provided new tools to understand conflicts over shared water resources. It has been applied to transboundary water disputes and to policy design in regions with limited trust among stakeholders.

One of his most influential contributions is “water bankruptcy.” He introduced the term to describe a condition where water systems can no longer recover to their historical levels. Unlike a crisis, which implies a temporary disruption, water bankruptcy signals a long-term structural failure.

In a recent United Nations report, Madani argued that the world entered an era of global water bankruptcy in January 2026. The report highlighted that many river basins and aquifers have lost their capacity to regenerate. This framing has sparked debate among policymakers and researchers.

Madani uses simple financial language to explain complex ecological realities. He argues that humanity is no longer living off renewable water flows but is depleting long-term reserves. This framing has made the concept widely accessible and influential.

Beyond academia, Madani has built a strong public presence. With a large following on social media, he has used digital platforms to communicate scientific findings in accessible ways. His work includes documentaries and public campaigns aimed at increasing awareness and accountability.

He has also played key roles in international diplomacy. As Iran’s lead environmental diplomat, he participated in global negotiations and served as Vice President of the UN Environment Assembly Bureau in 2017. At the COP23 climate conference in Bonn, he called for greater attention to water in global climate agreements.

Today, as head of the United Nations water think tank, he continues to advocate for integrating water into climate and development policies. He has particularly focused on the Global South, where water stress closely links with food insecurity, migration, and conflict.

The Stockholm Water Prize Committee cited his “unique combination of groundbreaking research, policy engagement, diplomacy, and global outreach, often under personal risk” in awarding him the 2026 prize.

In an exclusive interview with Inter Press Service, Madani recalled the intense pressure and fear that defined his final days in Iran. He described repeated interrogations, surveillance, and a growing sense that his work had placed him in direct confrontation with powerful institutions.

Here are edited excerpts from the interview: 

IPS: You introduced the idea of “water bankruptcy.” How does this change how governments must act today?

Madani: Water bankruptcy is defined as a post-crisis state of failure in which the system is suffering from insolvency, meaning that water use has been more than the available water for an extended period, and also irreversibility, meaning that there are some damages to the ecosystem and the machinery of water production that are irreversible and cannot be fixed.

What that means is that some of the things that used to be just anomalies and abnormal conditions are now the new normal, and we’re no longer experiencing only a temporary deviation from what we are used to, but we have a situation that we have to get used to. Crisis management is about mitigation.

Bankruptcy management is about mitigating what can still be mitigated and adapting to new realities with more restrictions. Bankruptcy management calls for an honest confession, the admission of a confession that a mistake has been made, and the current business model is not working, so it calls for honestly admitting to the mistakes made and transforming the business model, that calls for a fresh new start and a change of course.

It is bitter. Bankruptcy is not a pleasant condition but admitting to it helps us prevent further irreversible damages and enables a future that is less catastrophic.

IPS: You faced arrest, exile, and serious accusations in Iran. What kept you going during that period?

Professor Madani: Hope. Hope is what kept me going because I had gone back there to help and at least at the start, I was trying to take what was happening to me as part of the job and as part of the adventure because I was there to make a positive impact, and if I had given up too quickly, then that would not have matched my essential motivation to help.

I knew that it would not be a very smooth path, but it turned out to be much more bumpy than what I had anticipated, and I think many also, you know, those who made that situation bumpy for me, also regret that today, but by the time they realised mistakes were made, it was too late to do anything about it.

Can you recall your arrest and interrogation? What do you remember most from that experience, and how did it affect you personally?

I think arrests and interrogations are very frustrating, especially when you haven’t done anything wrong.

What kills you is constantly worrying about what others think of you and coming up with different scenarios and conspiracy theories. Dealing with conspiracy theories and proving them wrong is not easy. Those were very hard times for me, but as you know, my background is in behaviour analysis. I was trying to put myself in the shoes of those who were suspicious of me, understand their concerns, and address them so I could help my homeland.

IPS: Many countries still treat water stress as a temporary crisis. What are the biggest policy mistakes they continue to make?

Madani: Yes, crisis management is all about mitigation. Those who deny the crisis and enter the bankruptcy state continue to borrow more from nature, build more infrastructure, dig deeper wells, add additional reservoirs and storage capacity, implement more water transfer projects and build more, and construct more desalination plants. Continuing to add to their supply, on the other hand, they think things would be temporary, and through some sort of rationing, things would be solved, but the continuation of that behaviour and the denial of that reality makes the problem worse.

They get drained into a deepening problem, and again, like the financial world, if your business model is not working and you’re in denial, you continue taking more loans and your expenses and your debt become higher and higher. By the time that people realise that there is no way out of that chaos and that failure, the cost is much, much higher. Remaining in denial would result in major significant irreversible damages that generations would have to pay for.

IPS: You combined science with diplomacy and public outreach. Which of these has had the most real impact on decision-making?

Professor Madani: It’s very hard to really say which one has the most impact, because they’re very complementary. The science is very good, but it’s not enough for decision-making. You still have to understand what the real world looks like and how incentives shape behaviour and actions and how interests promote conflicts and cooperation to be able to act.

Science, of course, opens doors and puts more solutions on the table, but still, without understanding the politics or navigating through politics, it would not work. Diplomacy is another one when it comes to the international scale; even when it comes to negotiating with stakeholders, that’s a skill that would be extremely helpful. So, in a way, these are the things that you need.

And on top of these, public outreach educates you about perceptions, how people and societies understand problems, how they judge different situations, and how their emotions and their perceptions shape their beliefs, and that tells you what you need to do when it comes to communicating your science better, changing their opinion, impacting their opinion, and even negotiating with them or convincing them that things might be different or a different pathway is required. I think they all help you create a recipe for something that might work.

IPS: Your work focuses on human behaviour in water management. Why do technical solutions alone often fail?

Madani: A lot of times, technical solutions developed by our computer models or in our labs don’t take into account the full elements of reality. When humans are involved, we deal with different motives, incentives, emotions, and psychologies, and that makes – that creates – some essentially unexpected realities that might tweak things. Simply put, a lot of times when it comes to developing a solution for a water problem or an environmental solution or a sustainability solution, we think that everyone agrees to making short-term sacrifices for the sake of long-term resilience, but that is not the case in reality because different stakeholders, different groups, farmers, urban users, and industrial users also have short-term goals.

They maximise profit, make sure that the quality of life is not impacted, and so on, which makes them non-cooperative to an extent. And if you miss this reality, then you think that the solution, the optimal solution, is very practical and everyone would cooperate, but then you get very disappointed.

Yet, you can take that into account to the extent possible, try to understand the behavioural element and incorporate those into your assessment and projections to be able to align those incentives and motives with the long-term interest to offer a solution that is more attractive and win-win.

IPS: You now advise governments globally. What is the one urgent action every water-stressed country must take in the next five years?

Madani: I think that by now, countries must understand the importance of water as an essential resource for establishing peace, national security, justice, prosperity, and development. I mean, it supports human development, health, and long-term resilience in society. So, countries must not take it for granted and understand that technological solutions would not be sufficient to address shortages.

They must revisit their practices. They must do a proper accounting to understand what, what’s, and how water is currently being spent and if it’s strategic – strategically speaking, that is the right way of doing things when it comes to matters of national security and long-term resilience. Bankruptcy management starts with accounting and transparency.

That’s something that is missing in many water-stressed and non-water-stressed countries, and I think that’s something that we can focus on, put the lens of science on, and not be afraid of accounting and measuring and monitoring what is happening in the system because that knowledge is required if you want to make improvements.

IPS: Thank you very much for taking the time and speaking to IPS  and congratulations again for the well-deserved award.

IPS UN Bureau Report

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

Excerpt:

 
CIVICUS discusses Nepal’s upcoming election with youth activist Anusha Khanal of the Gen Z Movement Alliance, a youth-led civil society coalition mobilising for democratic accountability and governance reform in Nepal.

Anusha Khanal

What triggered the Gen Z protests, and how did the state respond?

The immediate trigger was the government revealing its authoritarian tendencies by banning 26 popular social media platforms. This happened during the ‘nepokids’ trend, in which people exposed the wealth of politicians’ families, contrasting with widespread economic desperation. Inflation was high and unemployment among young people stood at around 23 per cent, and there were no pathways for change within existing political structures. But this wasn’t just about jobs. Young people demanded accountability for decades of corruption, poor governance, service delivery failures and a political system completely disconnected from our realities. The leaders of three parties had rotated in power for years without delivering anything meaningful. We mobilised because we had nothing to lose.

The response was brutal. On the first day of protests, police killed several young people. The government refused to show any responsibility, instead seeking to frame the movement as violent and deny it any legitimacy. It criminalised youth anger instead of listening to it. The choice to emphasise property damage over deaths when some buildings were burned and vandalised told us everything about where their priorities lay. The government showed it did not care about young people.

But repression didn’t stop the movement; it accelerated it. Thousands more young people mobilised, and eventually the pressure became impossible to ignore. Oli’s resignation was a forced concession. But it exposed something important: the political system only moves when threatened directly. That’s a lesson we’re carrying into these elections.

How did civil society organisations engage with the movement?

Young people created the movement, not civil society organisations. Once it started, we received a lot of support from wider civil society. It became a people’s movement, with people of all ages taking part, in person and in spirit. Many civil society groups made a conscious choice to support it, document what was happening, share knowledge, help shape narratives, amplify demands and help exert pressure to translate grassroots anger into political demands. We pushed for accountability, investigations into the killings, protection for protesters and systemic reforms around corruption and governance. We insisted that any negotiation include young people at the table, as stakeholders in decision-making.

A major win was a 10-point agreement with the interim government that included commitments to address corruption, improve governance, ensure youth participation in decision-making and move towards more inclusive democracy. We also pushed for the establishment of the Gen Z Council, a body designed to hold government accountable, monitor implementation of reforms and bridge the gap between the state and young people.

But we’ve been realistic about what civil society can and cannot do. We can organise, advocate, document and monitor. We cannot force a government to implement reforms if the bureaucracy resists or political will collapses after elections. That’s why we’re now focused on maintaining pressure and building systems that make it harder for future governments to ignore youth demands.

How have election candidates addressed the movement’s demands?

Anti-corruption and good governance have become dominant themes across party manifestos. All parties are talking about digital governance, e-governance, going cashless and paperless. Some are promising to establish commissions to investigate past corruption or audit public officials’ assets going back decades. Others focus on timecard systems for service delivery, budget transparency and digitisation of transactions. It’s just that corruption is so visible that ignoring it would be political suicide.

The problem is that most parties are vague on implementation. They describe the what but not the how. There are also ideological differences, but most parties are talking about systemic reform and public-private partnerships.

Across the board, parties are responding to the movement’s anti-corruption demand because they have to. The question is whether these commitments are genuine or just campaign rhetoric.

Why are women and excluded groups still so underrepresented among candidates?

Campaign financing is a massive problem. The government sets spending limits, but everyone knows that’s not what happens on the ground. To run a serious campaign with widespread reach, you need sponsorship from wealthy backers or business interests. If you’re a woman earning a minimum wage, you simply cannot compete against candidates funded by millionaires. There is no public financing system, no state support for candidates from marginalised backgrounds. The economic system excludes most women and poor people before we even get to party selection processes.

Safety is another critical issue that doesn’t get enough attention. Digital violence against women running for office is rampant. Women and queer candidates face abuse, harassment and threats online and offline. When we encourage female and queer colleagues to run, the response is often hesitancy, due to the lack of support and because we haven’t created safe enough spaces for them to participate in politics. Although the constitution guarantees women 33 per cent representation, the reality on the ground is completely different.

Then there’s the distribution of candidacy slots within parties, which is opaque and controlled by party leaders. Even after public pressure, many parties failed to meet the female quota in direct candidacies. Some did better in proportional representation slots, but even there, they selected women who are mostly well-connected and wealthy. The movement emphasised inclusion, but we’ve regressed when it comes to candidate selection.

What obstacles stand in the way of reform?

The first challenge is that we’re almost certainly heading towards a coalition government, which means compromise on every issue. When multiple parties have to negotiate and share power, reform agendas get watered down. Parties will prioritise holding their coalition together over pushing through the anti-corruption and governance reforms they promised. We’ve seen this pattern before. What isn’t clear yet is what kind of coalition will result and what compromises will be made.

The second challenge is the bureaucracy. Nepal’s bureaucracy can be notoriously resistant to change, transparency and accountability. A reform can pass parliament and still die in implementation because mid-level bureaucrats refuse to change how they work. Even though the law to establish the Gen Z Council has been passed, it hasn’t been formed yet. We can identify problems, document failures and advocate loudly, but we cannot force a government to act. If the bureaucracy decides to drag its feet, we have limited leverage. Structural incentives favour the status quo, and that’s before we even consider whether individual politicians will prioritise reforms over personal interests or patronage networks.

But we’re not giving up. Civil society’s role now is to maintain constant pressure, document what does and doesn’t get implemented and call attention when governments fail to keep their promises. The Gen Z Council gives us a formal mechanism to do this, and we can also raise our voices independently of it. We need to build broader coalitions, keep the movement’s demands visible in public discourse and make clear that if a government fails to deliver, there will be consequences. Real change is slow and difficult — but it’s possible if civil society stays organised and vigilant and doesn’t compromise on core demands.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

GET IN TOUCH
Instagram
Anusha Khanal/LinkedIn

SEE ALSO
Nepal’s Gen Z uprising: time for youth-led change CIVICUS Lens 10.Oct.2025
‘The government was corrupt and willing to kill its own people to stay in power’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Dikpal Khatri Chhetri 02.Oct.2025
‘The Social Network Bill is part of a broader strategy to tighten control over digital communication’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Dikshya Khadgi 28.Feb.2025

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
  

Credit: Michaela Stache/AFP

By Samuel King
BRUSSELS, Belgium, Mar 20 2026 (IPS)

When German Chancellor Friedrich Merz opened the 62nd Munich Security Conference by declaring that the post-war rules-based order ‘no longer exists’, there was plenty of evidence to back his claim. Israel is committing genocide in Gaza in defiance of international law, Russia is four years into its illegal invasion of Ukraine, the last nuclear arms control treaty between Russia and the USA has just expired and the USA has withdrawn from 66 international bodies and commitments. Since the conference, Israel and the USA have launched another war on Iran, threatening to spark a broader regional conflict. Meanwhile the UN is undergoing a funding crisis, cutting staff and programmes, and civil society organisations that relied on US Agency for International Development funding are facing closure.

Inaugurated in 1963 as a transatlantic defence meeting, the Munich Security Conference has grown into the most significant annual global security meeting, with heads of state, foreign ministers, civil society, think tanks and the media taking part. The 2026 edition focused on the theme ‘Under Destruction’ and convened over 1,000 participants from more than 115 countries, including over 60 national leaders, alongside China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the directors of multiple UN agencies.

The conference’s Munich Security Report 2026 provided the analytical backdrop. It argued that the world has entered a period of ‘wrecking-ball politics’, with the post-1945 order being demolished by political forces that prefer disruption to reform. The report’s Munich Security Index showed the scale of the crisis. In France, Germany and the UK, absolute majorities of respondents said their government’s policies would leave future generations worse off. Across most BRICS and G7 countries, the USA is now rated as a growing risk.

In the build-up the conference, the world had been bracing for Rubio’s keynote address. Last year, US Vice President JD Vance’s aggressive speech accused European governments of suppressing free speech and aligning with political extremism, with no apparent acknowledgement of irony. Rubio took a more conciliatory tone, calling Europe America’s ‘cherished allies and oldest friends’. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said she was ‘very much reassured’. Half the hall rose to applaud.

The substance of the speech, however, followed every position Vance advanced the year before. Rubio defined the transatlantic relationship not around shared democratic institutions or international law, but around ‘Christian faith, culture, heritage, language, and ancestry’. This framing drew anger from global south delegates, who understood its explicit claim of global north cultural and racial superiority, excluding the majority of humanity.

The Trump administration was making a strategic calculation, having evidently concluded that Vance’s confrontational tone had backfired, bringing Europe closer to China and making it more reluctant to endorse US-led initiatives. So it switched to a softer messenger without changing the message.

Rubio’s post-conference itinerary made the USA’s current priorities clear. He flew directly from Munich to Budapest and Bratislava to meet two nationalist leaders, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico. Both are pro-Trump and friendly towards Vladimir Putin. These are the European politicians the Trump administration considers its true allies. Now the USA is planning to fund right-wing think tanks and charities across Europe in a blatant attempt to influence the continent’s politics.

Friedrich Merz’s diagnosis led to a historic and disturbing move: he and French President Emmanuel Macron announced they’d begun talks on extending France’s nuclear umbrella to cover other European countries. This is a development it would have been hard to imagine just a year ago. For decades European countries have based their security policies on NATO and its article 5, the collective defence commitment. But the Trump administration has threatened not to respect article 5, driving European states to embark on the long and expensive process of detaching themselves from relying on NATO. Now this evidently includes the exploration of nuclear alternatives.

Von der Leyen described the move as a ‘European awakening’ and called for a ‘mutual defence clause’ to be brought to life. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer called for ‘hard power’ and readiness to fight if necessary. Poland’s nationalist President Karol Nawrocki said his country should get nuclear weapons. By responding in this way to the unravelling of the multilateral order, European states are further weakening the norms of non-proliferation and arms control that the post-war order sought to sustain. Responding to crisis with a second nuclear arms race could bring still further instability. Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez was the only European leader at the conference to warn against this.

The conference’s conclusion was that those who care about the international order must build new institutions, coalitions and frameworks that are fit for purpose and accountable to the people they are supposed to serve. This reasonable framing sidesteps crucial questions: whose interests institutions will serve, and who’s excluded as the blueprints are drawn.

Instead of a new nuclear arms race, European states’ reaction to the fraying of their old alliances with the USA must be anchored in human rights, genuine multilateralism and a commitment to international law. This will only happen if civil society is present as a partner at the table.

It’s clear the old order is broken, and those committed to human rights and opposed to militarisation and naked power politics can’t afford to be bystanders. Their responses need to be more assertive and inclusive. A new international architecture that continues to exclude civil society and sideline the global south will simply reproduce the structures that have failed to address today’s crises.

Samuel King is a researcher with the Horizon Europe-funded research project ENSURED: Shaping Cooperation for a World in Transition at CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau